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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CHANGING ALLIANCE AND COOPERATION DYNAMICS:  
GLOBALIZATION, NATION-STATE AND THE THREAT 
 
Çağlar, Barış 
Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assis. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
March 2010 
 
This dissertation is a study about the form and dynamics of inter-state cooperation 
and alignment against transnational terrorism epitomized by Al-Qaeda. Since 
international security is traditionally regarded as the parcel of nation-states, 
transnational terrorism is a conceptual new-comer to the playground of politics. Its 
scale of operations occurs in a security environment structurally different from that 
of the Cold War. The recurrent reason given for debating the role and relevance of 
alliances in regard to counterterrorism is discussed in the literature to be a systemic 
change in world affairs marked by the end of the Cold War and globalization. The 
latter must be disaggregated to determine the essential elements and features of the 
systemic differences and related threats. Does contemporary inter-state cooperation 
and alignment against transnational terrorism correspond to the previous alignment 
behaviors of states that were conducted against other states? Analyzing the 
evolving forms of cooperation in general and the form of cooperation in alliances is 
the aim of the study. Through a three-pronged analytical discussion based on the 
factors of globalization, unit-level preferences and the features of the threat itself, 
the study concludes that cooperation form in general and in alliances in particular -
including the form of cooperation in NATO- is experiencing a shift from a 
‘defensive nature’ to a ‘security nature’. Coalitions of the Willing type of 
cooperation appears to be the re-emergent form of inter-state security cooperation, 
especially against ambiguous threats such as transnational terrorism that erodes the 
distinction between internal and external threats. 
 
Key Words: cooperation, alliance, alignment, globalization, the new threat, NATO, 
security culture, transnational terrorism 
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ÖZET 
 
 
DEĞİŞEN İTTİFAK VE İŞBİRLİĞİ DİNAMİKLERİ: 
KÜRESELLEŞME, ULUS-DEVLET VE TEHDİT 
 
 
Çağlar, Barış 
 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
Mart 2010 
 
Bu doktora tezi, devletlerin ulus-ötesi terörizme karşı gösterdikleri işbirliği ve 
gruplaşma biçimleri ve dinamikleri hakkındadir. Uluslararası güvenlik çalışmaları 
geleneksel olarak devletlerin ilişkilerini incelediğinden, ulus-ötesi terörizm bu 
alanda görece yeni bir kavramsallaştırmadır ve faaliyetleri Soğuk Savaş ortamından 
farklı bir güvenlik ortamında gerçekleşmektedir. Literatürde ittifakların rollerinin 
ve  terörle mücadeleyle ilintilerinin tartışılmasının başlıca nedeni, Soğuk Savaşın 
bitmesi ve küreselleşmeyle gelen sistemik değişiklikler olarak gösterilmektedir. 
Son dönem müttefiklik ve işbirliği dinamiklerinin anlaşılabilmesi için sistemik 
değişimlerin ve beraberinde getirdiği tehditlerin çözümlenmesi gerekmektedir. 
Devletlerin ulus-ötesi terörizme karşı günümüzde gösterdikleri işbirliği ve 
gruplaşma davranışları daha önce kendi aralarında diğer devletlere karşı 
gösterdikleri işbirliği davranışlarıyla örtüşmekte midir? Tezin amacı ittifak içinde 
ve dışında gelişmekte olan işbirliği biçimlerinin getirdikleri yeni boyutlarıyla 
beraber çözümlenmesidir. Küreselleşme, devletlerin tercihleri ve tehdidin farklı 
boyutları saçayağında yürütülen inceleme, gerek genelde gerekse ittifaklar içindeki 
işbirliği yapısının -NATO içindeki işbirliği biçimi dahil- ‘savunma ağırlıklı’ 
olmaktan ‘güvenlik ağırlıklı’ olmaya doğru evrildiği sonucuna ulaşmıştır. 
Kurumsal olmayan koalisyonlar çerçevesindeki işbirliği, devletlerarası güvenlik 
işbirliğinin başat biçimi olarak tekrar kendini göstermektedir. Bu işbirliği türü, iç 
ve dış tehditler arasında yapılagelen ayrımı zorlaştıran ulus-ötesi terörizm benzeri 
muğlak tehditlere karşı özellikle kullanılacak işbirliği biçimi olarak gözükmektedir.    
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: işbirliği, ittifak, küreselleşme, yeni tehdit, NATO, güvenlik 
kültürü, ulusötesi terörizm 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
-“We ‘ad hoc’ our way through coalitions of the willing. That’s the future.”1 
 
-“There are new forces at work: Information technology has politicized world’s 
people. People and societies are involved. Almost everybody has a TV set. They are 
informed instantaneously. We cannot do with traditional tools of power/economic or 
military. The way power is exercised is changing because national borders are 
eroding, because of the growth of non-state actors. It's a different kind of a world. 
We are tied down by a tiny little country -- Iraq. It's amazing, given the disparity in 
military economic strength. It's a -- it's a world where most of the big problems spill 
over national boundaries, and there are new kinds of actors and we're feeling our 
way as to how to deal with them. I think it is less policy oriented than Zbigniew 
indicated. I think it's more systemic.”2 
  
-“Current relations among the Europeans, the US, Russia and China are not strategic 
or confrontational.”3  
 
-“Charlie Rose: Let me turn to China. You have said in conversations with me 
before, China is the most important foreign policy challenge for America, the 
peaceful rise of China. 
 
Henry Kissinger: Right. For this reason: Historically when there is a rising power 
like China, it has usually led to confrontations between the rising power and the 
existing dominant powers. And when you have a shift of the center of gravity of 
world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific, then you have an additional element. 
 
                     
1Dinmore, Guy. 2006. “U.S. Sees Coalitions of the Willing as Best Ally” Financial Times, January 4. 
2Scowcroft, Brent. 2007. “Interview with Kissinger, Brzezinski and Scowcroft” Charlie Rose, July 
12, http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8551 
3Kissinger, Henry and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2007. “Interview with Kissinger, Brzezinski and 
Scowcroft” Charlie Rose, July 12, http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8551 
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On the other hand, that was in a period when national states were still the dominant 
feature. Now we have a whole series of problems -- energy, environment, 
proliferation ... 
 
Charlie Rose: Right. 
  
Henry Kissinger: ... which go beyond the nation. And we also know that a conflict 
between major powers would be a catastrophe for which there is no compensation in 
anything you can gain. So the challenge is whether China as a rising country, the 
United States as the superpower, can develop a cooperative relationship in this 
period before nationalism becomes so dominant in China as a substitute for 
communism, and a kind of self-righteous isolationism in this country that substitutes 
China for the Soviet Union… The most important thing for all governments, in the 
face of today’s threats, such as energy, environment, proliferation and terrorism, 
threats that go beyond nation-states, is strategic dialogue. Establishing common 
understanding and cooperative relations among governments transcends even the 
crises in the Middle East.” 4 
 
-“We know that we cannot swim as others sink.”5 
 
 
-“…The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is 
turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several 
states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of 
power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past. The twentieth century started 
out distinctly multipolar. But after almost 50 years, two world wars, and many 
smaller conflicts, a bipolar system emerged. Then, with the end of the Cold War and 
the demise of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity -- an international 
system dominated by one power, in this case the United States. But today power is 
diffuse… even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended: Three 
explanations for its demise stand out.  
 
The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing 
together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity 
and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of 
these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors 
able to exert influence regionally or globally.  
 
Secondly, US policy. US oil policy during 1970s, the Vietnam War, the 2003 Iraqi 
intervention and the way it deals with Iran engulfed power from influence.  
 
(Thirdly,)… today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states 
and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable 
consequence of globalization.  
 
Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border 
flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured 
goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and 
weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many 
cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their 
knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers.  
 
Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such as 
energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to 
                     
4Kissinger, Henry. 2007. “Interview with Kissinger, Brzezinski and Scowcroft” Charlie Rose, July 
12, http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8551 
5Benjamin, Daniel. 2008. “Strategic Counterterrorism”, Brookings Policy Paper, No. 7, October.  
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transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the 
international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system to 
move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 
500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments).  
 
It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a 
near monopoly on power. It is easier than ever before for individuals and groups to 
accumulate and project substantial power… In addition to the six major world 
powers (China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States), 
there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; 
Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; 
Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. A good many 
organizations would be on the list of power centers including those that are global 
(the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that 
are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the 
International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the 
World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nation-states, such as 
California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and 
Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate 
the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion 
would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, 
Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and 
movements, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, drug cartels, and NGOs of a 
more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without 
Borders, Greenpeace). Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than 
concentrated, power.”6 
 
This dissertation is a study about the form and dynamics of inter-state 
cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism best exemplified by Al-
Qaeda. Since international security is traditionally regarded as the parcel of nation-
states, transnational terrorism is a conceptual new-comer to the playground of 
politics. Its scale of operations occurs in a security environment structurally 
different from that of the Cold War. The security landscape has changed as pointed 
out by the quotations above.  
Within such an environment, does contemporary inter-state cooperation and 
alignment against transnational terrorism correspond to the previous alignment 
behaviors of states that were conducted against other states? Analyzing the role, 
relevance and evolving form of cooperation and alliances regarding the 
                     
6Haass, Richard. 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance” Foreign Affairs 
May/June, highlights added. 
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transnational terrorist threat is the aim of the study. 
Cooperation has been traditionally categorized as taking place either in 
high-politics of defensive-military issues or in low-politics of non-military issues. 
Importantly, alliances have constituted the height of military cooperation among 
nation-states especially during the twentieth century. Around the turn of the 
century, the role and relevance of alliances in regard to terrorism have become a 
matter of controversy and debate. However, the debate is not pervasive or 
comprehensive, nor does it bear analytical clarification. Most of the discussions 
appear to be fractional without presenting the big picture. As the recent literature 
itself indicates, the embryonic debate on alliances and terrorism seems to be just 
browsing over the dynamics without a sense of analytical direction.7 The vagueness 
or lack of analytical direction of such studies is explained by the uncertainties and 
conceptual difficulties of a transformational era, or by the understudied dynamics 
of the international structure under globalization. Nevertheless, the recurrent reason 
given for debating the role and relevance of alliances in regard to terrorism is 
discussed in the literature to be a systemic change in world affairs marked by the 
                     
7Byman, Daniel. 2006. “Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies Vol. 29, No. 5, 767 – 811, October; Report of the Secretary-General. 2005. “Strengthening 
international cooperation and technical assistance in preventing and combating terrorism”, General 
Assembly-Sixtieth Session, Items 107 and 109 of the provisional agenda-Crime prevention and 
criminal justice Measures to eliminate international terrorism 25 July; de Nevers, Renée. 2007. 
“NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4, 
pp. 34–66; Kreps, Sarah. 2008. “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of 
Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan” Security Studies, 17: 3, 531-567; Popescu, 
Ionut C. 2009. “Strategic Theory and Practice: A Critical Analysis of the Planning Process for the 
Long War on Terror”, Contemporary Security Policy 30:1,100-124; Allin, Dana H., Andréani, 
Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. “Chapter One: Beyond the War on Terror” Adelphi 
Papers 47:389, 17-34; Davies, Philip H.J. 2004. “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in 
Britain and the United States” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No 3, 495 520; 
Byman, Daniel. 2007. “US Counter-terrorism Options: A Taxonomy', Survival, 49:3, 121-150; 
Jackson, Richard. 2007.”An analysis of EU counterterrorism discourse post-September 
11”Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20:2,233-247; Noetzel, Timo and Schreer, Benjamin. 
2009. “NATO's Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance”, Contemporary 
Security Policy, 30: 3, 529-547; Douglas M. Gibler, Jamil A. Sewell. 2006. “External Threat and 
Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, no. 4, 2006, 413-
431. 
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end of the Cold War and globalization. This claim of the emerging literature must 
be disaggregated in detail to determine the essential elements and features of the 
systemic differences and related threats. Accordingly, this study attempts to explore 
the compatibility of the established alliance literature with non-state violence. It is 
specifically about the form of inter-state cooperation and alignment against 
transnational terrorism.  
 
1.1. The Organization of the Dissertation 
The contents of the study add up to nine chapters. After the present 
introductory chapter, next chapter -Chapter 2- presents an extended summary or 
synopsis of the entire dissertation. Chapter 2 summarizes the independent variables 
that affect inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. It also discusses 
the reasons for why these variables are selected among others. It explains the 
cause-and-effect relationships alongside the examination of differences between 
‘alignment’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘alliance’.  
A quick list of items that Chapter 2 elaborates is: the research question, the 
argument, the methodology, the relation of terrorism with International Relations 
discipline, why cooperation and alliance are studied, working definitions of key 
concepts, the significance and goals of the study, why and how specific 
independent variables are selected and developed, and their relations/causalities. 
The reasons for singling out the threat variable, as the most explanatory 
independent variable, are also discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, the methodology 
is further elaborated in the second chapter.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literatures on cooperation hypotheses, alliance 
theories and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. It also extends on the 
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distinctions between ‘alliance’, ‘alignment’ and ‘cooperation’, which are also 
briefly explained in the second chapter. 
Chapters from 4 to 7 examine the independent variables conditioning inter-
state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. Two chapters are 
invested to examine which structural variable fits the research question at hand: 
While Chapter 4 examines and elaborates the structural independent variable of 
globalization; Chapter 5 discusses the argument of polarity and whether it is 
tenable under the research question. 
Chapter 6 defines contending national counterterrorism cultures. While 
counterterrorism culture explains security culture-induced state preferences 
underwritten by security understandings or security culture of a state. The way the 
preferences are implemented is manifested in alignment policies such as 
penetration or balking, which are explained in Chapter 3. Alignment strategies as 
policy-choices after September 11, 2001 are reviewed as they are elaborated in the 
literature and their relevance is further substantiated in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 6 also outlines the contemporary concerns of the intelligence 
institutions alongside a brief review of American and European responses to 
terrorism. The latter is again further detailed in the empirical Chapter 8. Suffice it 
to note here that alignment strategies as response policies are the policy 
manifestations of different national preferences over how to deal with the threat 
vis-à-vis the security concerns of other nation-states: while national perceptions 
and preferences (or the ways the threat is defined and responses are devised 
respectively) are explained by the national counterterrorism culture, the application 
of these preferences into policy in relation to other states gives the alignment 
strategy. While counterterrorism culture explains a nation’s perception and 
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preferences (definition of the threat and its method of countering it), alignment 
strategy describes how it tries to activate its preferences amidst other states’ policy 
implementation.  
Chapter 7 details ‘the distinctive features of the threat’, as a variable 
conditioning inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. 
It starts off by dissecting the distinct features of the threat without involving any 
debate on its newness or novelty. It just concentrates on the different dimensions or 
manifestation of the transnational terrorism threat. Although the working definition 
of the transnational terrorism threat is explained in Chapter 2, it is worth 
mentioning here succinctly: The dissertation is not involved in the debate whether 
the new dimensions or form of terrorism amounts to a ‘new terrorism’. Rather, the 
study focuses on the new features or manifestation of the transnational terrorism 
threat without tackling the debate on implications of these new manifestations for 
the nature or essence of terrorism. Transnational terrorism may be assessed by 
different scholarly and governmental circles as constituting a new terrorism entirely 
different from the ones previously experienced. It may alternatively be regarded as 
constituting just a new version of the age-old terrorism as usual. Although 
assessments differ, manifestation of a threat is distinguishable from nature of threat 
itself. Again, although ‘form’ and ‘essence’ are correlated, different forms are not 
necessarily equivalent to different essences. The relationship between the 
manifestation and the nature of terrorism is a separate research subject that might 
be studied elsewhere.  
Distinctive features of the terrorist threat and the nature of the threat are two 
separate subject-matters; and thus, distinctive features of the terrorist threat are 
separable from the discussions over whether these features also give way to a 
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distinct threat in essence or ontology. This is especially possible due to the way 
research question is framed. ‘The new terrorism debate’ is not central to the 
research question that the study answers. It is thereby outside the main scope of the 
study, which is interested in nation-state reactions and counter-policies in the way 
they define the situation. The focal point of the study is neither the evolution of 
terrorism nor its types. The focal point is on the form of inter-state cooperation: the 
form of nation-states’ cooperative responses against what they regard as a national 
security threat.  
The dissertation is limited to the impact of globalization and impact of 
transnational terrorism threat upon international security and alliance politics. As 
such, this is an international security study rather than being a study on terrorism 
per se. This is the definitional framework for what is studied under the 
transnational terrorist threat, against which inter-state efforts are carried out. 
The clarification of the threat factor is important for it is gauged as the most 
explanatory contributing-cause that conditions inter-state cooperation and 
alignment against transnational terrorist groups. Within the above-mentioned 
framework, ‘transnational terrorist threat’ implied in the research question refers 
to the distinctive dimensions or manifestations of the transnational terrorism threat 
against many nation-states around the world. This is the working definition of the 
transnational threat, which is short-handed as the new threat. ‘The new threat’ is 
used throughout the dissertation to denote ‘the distinctive dimensions or 
manifestation of the threat of transnational terrorism’. Yet again, it is vital to 
reiterate that the label ‘the new threat’ is not meant to argue that transnational 
terrorism is a new kind of terrorism. It is not referring to essence of terrorism 
either. The word ‘new’, in the phrase “the new threat”, just refers to terrorism’s 
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novel manifestations short of its implications for the evolution of terrorism. The 
dissertation does not focus on the new terrorism debate, which is process-traced 
only to the extent that demonstrates the transatlantic rift on contemporary terrorism. 
Thus, Chapter 7 presents the ambiguity of the threat and its implications for 
cooperation among states within the contemporary conflict environment. To that 
end, the topics covered in the Chapter 7 are: The Distinct Features of the Threat; 
Ambiguity of the Threat and Its Implications; Terrorism and the State-System 
during and after the Cold War; Deterritorialized Economy of the Threat; Old 
Threat, New Threat? Different State Policies and Non-Cooperation; 
Transnationality, Al Qaeda and the PKK: A Discussion on the Scales of Threats; 
and Cooperation Setback: The Nature of the Threat Debate and Different Threat 
Assessments.  
Chapter 8 is the empirical chapter about the NATO transformation and the 
convergences-divergences of the Atlantic Allies regarding transnational terrorism. 
The empirical chapter tries to enliven the analytic explanations through the method 
of process-tracing. What is more, the empirical research is enhanced by numerous 
interviews that were conducted face-to-face with NATO authorities within the 
timeline of 1999-2009. And, finally, Chapter 9 sums up the findings and prospects 
for further research. 
In order to correspond to the international counterterrorism effort, the study 
works through two levels: theoretical and empirical. The systemic changes along 
with the distinct features of the contemporary form of terrorist threat are examined 
in the middle chapters. Next, contending counterterrorism cultures of European 
countries and that of the US are explained before the developments on the ground 
are presented in the last chapter with an eye on the regulatory and legal 
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undertakings such as legal initiatives, new agencies and intelligence difficulties 
within and among states.  
 
1.2. The Research Question 
To what extent nation-states, which involve in alliances or align to one 
another rather easily in the face of threats emanating from other nation-states, can 
show these alignment behaviors against transnational terrorist groups? 
 
1.3. Departure Point of the Study: The Argument 
The argument that led to the making of the research question above is that 
nation-states do not show their ‘previous alignment and cooperative behaviours’ 
against transnational terrorism. The argument is not that there is no cooperation 
against transnational terrorism. The research question does not seek to find out 
whether there is cooperation or not either; rather, the argument and the related 
research question is about the form of inter-state cooperation against transnational 
terrorism. Before the research is fully conducted, the starting point was based on a 
claim: A claim based on an initial unsystematic empirical observation was made 
such that previously demonstrated Cold War alignment and cooperation pattern 
among nation-states is not existent this time against transnational terrorism as of 
the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is the argumentational departure 
point for the research question and the study at large.   
Since this is an observational claim to be tested, the dissertation presents 
both an empirical and analytical test to see whether this is the current situation. 
Defense and military oriented alignments and cooperation among states were the 
order of the Cold War days. Does this kind of cooperation among states continue or 
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not? Equally, the research question is: to what extent nation-states (which involve 
in alliances or align to one another rather easily in the face of threats emanating 
from other nation-states) can show these alignment behaviors against transnational 
terrorist groups?  
 
1.4. Methodology  
1.4.1. Theory-oriented Case Study Method  
The dissertation is conducted by means of theory-oriented case study 
method. The case study approach is the detailed examination of an aspect of a 
historical episode to develop historical explanations that might be generalizable to 
other events.8 Before detailing what kind of a case study research is conducted, it is 
essential to clarify why the case study approach is chosen as the method. Why not 
the statistical approach, formal modeling or another theory or method is not used is 
worth mentioning. 
Researchers should use a method for a research task for which it is best 
suited.9 For instance, statistical methods have been widely used in recent decades to 
develop logically consistent models. Statistical method tries to take observable 
implications from the model that is abstracted, and it instructs to test these 
implications against empirical observations. In turn, it uses these tests to decide 
how best to modify the deductive theory.  
However, neither statistical method nor formal modeling is used in this 
dissertation. This is simply because they do not fit the present research question 
and task at hand. The answer to the research question is best answered via ‘process-
                     
8 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 5. 
9 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 6. 
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tracing’. The latter method is used in case study approach to academic research 
where no extant research program or theory exists for the research task.  
There is not any established theory to be used for studying the research 
question. Neither a theory with regard to the impact of private entities upon nation-
states, nor a consensual research program for the study of inter-state cooperation 
against terrorism exists. That is why the research program and the analytical 
framework of contributing-causes and causalities are worked out by the candidate 
from the scratch: the research is at the intersection of the accumulation of the 
prevailing alliance literature and the relatively embryonic literature on cooperation 
and globalization that forays into answering contemporary developments that go 
beyond national borders. The subject-matter of this dissertation is a new one that 
has been hardly studied in the literature as of 2010. 
Under such circumstances of uncharted analytic waters, process-tracing is 
of help. The method of process-tracing helps to trace the links between possible 
causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines 
histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, personal interviews, official 
documents and declarations to see whether the causal process a study implies in a 
case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the contributing-causes or 
factors in that case.10  
Process-tracing is used for theory formation where the research task does 
not correspond or lend itself to any prevailing theory. It can perform a heuristic 
function, generating new variables or hypothesis on the basis of sequences of 
events observed inductively in case studies.11Process-tracing is used either to 
                     
10 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 7 
11 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 7. 
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uncover evidence of causal mechanisms at work or to explain outcomes. The causal 
mechanism behind inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism can thus 
be studied via process-tracing, which is especially useful in case studies. Since it 
allows incorporating both material and ideational variables, process-tracing is ideal 
for establishing the possibility of a causal chain linking independent and dependent 
variables or contributing-causes of an observed outcome.  
 
1.4.2. What is a ‘Case’? What is a Case Study? 
‘A case’ is defined, via Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, as an 
instance of a class of events:  
The term ‘class of events’ refers here to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as 
revolutions, types of governments, kinds of economic systems, or personality types 
that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or generic 
knowledge) regarding the causes of similarities and differences among instances 
(cases) of that class of events. A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a 
historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical 
event itself. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, is a historical instance of many 
different classes of events: deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management, and 
so on. A researcher’s decision about which class of events to study and which 
theories to use determines what data from the Cuban Missile Crisis are relevant to 
her or his case study of it.12 
 
    
 As Alexander George indicates, there is potential confusion among the terms 
‘comparative methods’, ‘case study methods’, and ‘qualitative methods’. In one 
view, the comparative method (the use of comparisons among a small number of 
cases) is distinct from the case study method, which in this view involves the 
internal examination of single cases. However, this dissertation follows George’s 
definition of case study method: to include both within-case analysis of single case 
studies and comparisons of a small number of cases. This is because there is a 
growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case 
                     
12 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 18. 
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studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparisons within a single study or research program. Yet again, he maintains 
that single-case studies can also play a role in theory formation or development.13 
 Theory formation or development requires exploring casual mechanisms, 
which operate only under certain conditions. Case studies examine the operation of 
causal mechanisms in single cases in detail. Within single cases, one can look at a 
large number of intervening variables and inductively help identify what conditions 
present in a case activate the causal mechanism. Contrastingly, statistical studies 
omit all contextual factors except those inherent in the variables selected for 
measurement and leave out many contextual and intervening variables. 
 Case study researchers are more interested in finding the conditions under 
which specified outcomes occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which 
those conditions and their outcomes arise. Correspondingly, the present dissertation 
tries to find the dynamics and conditions under which inter-state cooperation 
against transnational terrorism occurs. It is concluded that the causal mechanisms 
that are dissected into parts in other chapters are evident in the sequence of relevant 
events and processes that are traced in chapter eight.  
Process-tracing is a research method; rational choice models or formal 
modeling are theories. Thus, process-tracing is fit to studying an understudied 
subject-matter that cannot be explained by any extant theory of the literature. 
Process-tracing can also be used by statistical research programs, by rational choice 
models or game theory to test their insights derived from the latter theories’ 
deductive frameworks. 
 
                     
13 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 18. 
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As for using process-tracing method in case studies, it is maintained that it 
helps build the explanation of causal mechanisms of outcomes. Tracing the 
processes that may have led to an outcome helps narrow the list of potential causes. 
Therefore, process-tracing is an invaluable tool for the first stages of theory 
formation on a new question. Alexander George underlines two reasons for how it 
helps theory-building: first, tracing processes generates many observations within a 
case, and secondly, it helps to link these observations to one another to form an 
explanation. 
There are four kinds of process-tracing: a- detailed narrative, b- use of 
hypothesis and generalizations, c- analytic explanation, and d- general explanation. 
The kind of process-tracing that is used in this dissertation is a conflation of type-b 
and type-d. That is, both generalizations specific to the case and general 
explanations of form of inter-state cooperation are made.  
In general explanation kind of process-tracing, the researcher constructs a 
general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process. The 
researcher may do this either because the data or theory necessary for explanation 
is lacking, or because an explanation is intended at a higher level of generality or 
abstraction due to the research objective. This is also true for the present 
dissertation; that is, not the data but a theory to be benefited from is lacking. 
Secondly, since this study attempts to explain violent non-state entities’ impact 
upon inter-state relations, it tries to climb the ladder of abstraction in order to 
define the place of non-state entities in world politics and thereby answer the 
research question. Thus, the kind of process-tracing used in this study is suitable for 
abstraction and general explanation. Yet again, it is also analytic to the extent parts 
of the narrative are accompanied with explicit causal factors or variables highly 
16 
 
specific to the case. Yet, no testing of a hypothesis occurs: this study neither 
employs theoretical variables of any theory, nor does it assert any generalization of 
its explanation into a generalization. Therefore, the study, via process-tracing, 
heads for analytical general explanation of the specific subject. 
 
1.5. The Place of the Study 
As for the place of the study in the literature, the main interest is to see 
whether inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism follows the 
previously established inter-state form of cooperation and alignment against other 
nation-states. If not, why? Is there a new form of cooperation among states against 
transnational terrorism? What is it and why does it come to surface? By discussing 
the differences between past and present cooperation patterns, the research question 
links itself to the alliance literature that seldom queried the impact of non-state 
entities upon inter-state cooperation in general and alliances in particular. The need 
to establish such a linkage arose because cooperation and alliance literature largely 
ignores the new security landscape that is evolving, and it seems to underestimate 
the impact of networked/transnational threats upon nation-state alignments.   
The alliance literature still overwhelmingly focuses on state-centric threats 
in the face of the bourgeoning studies that assert the unlikelihood of large-scale 
invasion or of major inter-state war.14The lack of hard-balancing and its 
                     
14Miller, Steven E. “International Security at Twenty-Five: From One World to Another” 
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 Summer 2001, pp. 5–39; Jervis, Robert. “Theories of War in 
an Era of Leading-Power Peace” Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 
2001 American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 1 March 2002; SIPRI Yearbook. 2009. 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute; Brawley, Mark R. “The Rise of the Trading State Revisited” in Aydinli and Rosenau eds. 
Globalization, Security and the Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition Albany: State University of 
New York Press, pp.67-81; Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce 
and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: Basic Books; Rosecrance, Richard. 1999. The Rise 
of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century. New York: Basic Books; Kaysen, 
Carl. 1990, “Is War Obsolete? - A Review Essay” International Security 14:42–64; Mueller, John. 
17 
 
implications for alliances,15 lack of poles16, the questioning of the proper 
applicability of balance of power theory and the need for initiating new concepts 
such as soft-balancing17 or under-balancing18 mainly originate from the waning of 
major war or the low anticipation of force-on-force confrontation of armies on the 
                                                                
1989. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books; Mueller, 
John. 1995. Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics. New 
York: Harper Collins; Mueller, John. 2004. The Remnants of War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 
Van Creveld, Martin. 1991. The Transformation of War, New York: Free Press, P.3; Ray, James 
Lee. 1989. “The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War” International Organization 
43:405–439; Rosenau, James. 1990 Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and 
Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Van Evera, Stephen. 1990/1991 “Primed For 
Peace: Europe after The Cold War” International Security 15:7–57; Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. 
“Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War” International Security 22:5–43; Mandelbaum, Michael. 
“1998/1999 Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival 40:20–38; Mandelbaum, Michael. (2002) The Ideas 
That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, And Free Markets In The Twenty-First Century. 
New York: Public Affairs. 
15 Michael Don Ward, “Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics,” Monograph Series in World Affairs 
19 1982; Stephen M. Walt, “Multilateral Collective Security Arrangements,” in Richard Shultz, Roy 
Godson, and Ted Greenwood, eds., Security Studies for the 1990s Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 
1993; Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39 Spring 1997; William C. 
Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24 Summer 1999; Stephen 
M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World”, World Politics 61, no. 1 January 2009, 86–120; John 
Ikenberry, ed., American Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, 2001; Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics: Realism 
and State Strategies after the Cold War New York: Columbia University Press, 1999; David Malone 
and Yuen Foong Khong, eds., Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives 
Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003; and T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, 
Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2004.  
16 Smith, Steve. 2002. “The End of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World 
Order” International Relations Vol. 16-2: 171–183 and Calleo, David P. 2009. Follies of Power-
America’s Unipolar Fantasy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; as for the state-agency 
papers and reports, 2007. Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for 
the United States, National Intelligence Council Report DR-2007-16D- 23 August; 2004. “Mapping 
the Global Future” Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project Based on 
consultations with nongovernmental experts around the world December, http:\\bookstore.gpo.gov; 
as for the think-thank sources, Sunstein, Cass R. 2006. On the Divergent American Reactions to 
Terrorism and Climate Change AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 
06-13 May downloadable, www.aei-brookings.org or from the Social Science Research Network at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 901217J O I N T C E N T E R; Institutes,  Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld, Paul Huth. 2008. Peace and Conflict. The Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management (CIDCM) University of Maryland, www.cidcm.umd.edu; as for a viewpoint 
from a practitioner and theorist, Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What 
Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, Foreign Affairs. 
17Pape, Robert. 2005. A. “Soft Balancing against the United States” International Security, Summer 
2005, Vol. 30, No. 1 Summer, pp7-45; Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power - Global 
Response to US Primacy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 126-132; Brooks, Stephen G., 
and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. "Hard Times for Soft Balancing" International Security 30, no. 1 
Summer: 72-108; Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wolforth. 2002. "From Old Thinking to New 
Thinking in Qualitative Research" International Security 26, no. 4 Spring, 93-111. 
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Last Twenty Years,” in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds., Critical Reflections on Security and 
Change London: Frank Cass; Schweller, Randall L. 2004. “Unanswered Threats: a Neoclassical 
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battlefield. When the conventional military threat assessments are low, alliance 
literature experiences difficulties in using the conventional concepts such as 
counter-balancing, power, polarity and balance of power theory for the main 
underlying rationale of all these concepts focuses on external military threats 
anticipated from nation-states.  
The unlikelihood of major war is acknowledged by most nations and the 
NATO authorities.19However, current world-wide academic debate on the 
conceptualization and usage of the above-mentioned terms is multifaceted and 
bereft of consensus.20That is fundamentally because the alliance literature does not 
work on entities other than nation-states yet. As a corollary, examination of the rise 
of non-state entities and the threats they pose is the first step to resolve the hardship 
of alliance literature in answering non-state threats. Facing the reluctance in the 
alliance literature, the dissertation attempts to address the gap between the 
established conceptual lenses and the contemporary developments on the ground. 
Duly, next page presents the figure that depicts the causal mechanism that is 
developed to answer the research question. 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
19All NATO strategic concepts adopted since 1999 underlines the point - especially the Riga 
Summit Declaration, www.nato.int; Interview with William R. Puttmann, NATO WMD Center-
NATO Maritime Security Seminar, Crete-Greece, September 20, 2009.  
20Byman, Daniel. 2006. “Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 29:5, 767 – 811; Tertrais, Bruno. 2004. “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances” The 
Washington Quarterly 27:2, 135-150; Thies, Wallace J. “Was the US Invasion of Iraq NATO's 
Worst Crisis Ever? How Would We Know? Why Should We Care?” European Security, 16:1, 29-
50. 
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The answer to the research question is given via three independent variables 
that condition inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. Variable is 
used in the sense of contributing-causes or factors that play into the outcome. They 
are not tested in any statistical sense for the study follows only process-tracing 
method in case studies, which leaves out statistical approach.  
The independent variables are: first, the structural variable of globalization; 
secondly, the unit-level variable of nation-state behaviours drived from their 
counterterrorism cultures, that is convergent or divergent security cultures that help 
answer to what extent contemporary transnational terrorism is defined in similar 
terms and to what extent methods to deal with terrorism is similar; and thirdly, the 
new threat variable or ‘the threat of transnational terrorism itself with its distinctive 
features’. 
These independent variables condition the dependent variable of inter-state 
cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. The study incorporates 
discussions that bring forth a ranking of independent variables, and it concludes 
that the new threat variable or ‘the distinctive dimensions or manifestation of the 
threat of transnational terrorism’ have the highest explanatory power. 
One of the obstacles for inter-state cooperation and alignment against 
transnational terrorism is lack of corresponding bureaucratic and legal procedures 
among states. The bureaucratic rearrangements undertaken in the US and Europe 
are different from each other due to their different political cultures and 
bureaucratic organization. European states are attached to supranational institutions 
to which they intentionally and partially compromise their sovereignty. Europe 
argues to be primed for being a ‘power for peace’ through methods avoiding use of 
force. The EU as an institution is leveraged by the European states to answer the 
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threat in ‘a European way’, which is different from that of the US.  
However, neither European nor American counterterrorism efforts are 
consolidated in the face of a threat that excels in adaptation to state-responses. 
States still try to manage their response in its conceptual, regulatory and operational 
phases. Significantly, European and American counterterrorism cooperation is 
limited mostly to bilateral undertakings devoid of comprehensive institutional 
collaboration. The European states, despite their differences among each other, still 
remain mostly introvert or turned into European-self: They try to manage a unified 
foreign policy within the EU.  While Europe tries to form a unified policy with a 
common Europe-wide strategy, the US acts along its peculiar understanding of the 
threat. 
Markedly different from most European approaches, the US perceives 
transnational terrorism as a totally unprecedented new threat. This crucial 
difference of the American outlook paves the way for bureaucratic and regulatory 
measures that are much more sharp-pointed: Terrorism has been regarded as a 
minor criminal issue in the US until September 11, 2001. Prior terrorist attacks to 
American interests around the world did not stimulate a change in American 
perceptions of terrorism. This is no longer the case in the American eyes. 
Yet, not all states see transnational terrorism as a new threat. Thus, 
contending counterterrorism cultures on the two sides of the Atlantic is a factor that 
exacerbates reaching a common ground for a unified allied policy in curtailing 
transnational terrorism. European ‘anti-terrorism measures’ (which are measures 
short of use of force and focused more on legal regulatory action, law enforcement, 
diplomacy, preventive-intelligence, economic aid, reconstruction and nation-
building) are not in harmony with ‘counterterrorism measures’ of the US such as 
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use of force, use of specific interrogation and rendition methods and counter-
intelligence that focuses more on punishment than prosecution. 
Still another factor limiting inter-state cooperation and realignment against 
transnational terrorism is the opportunities presented by globalization. Information 
technology and advances in transportation, communication and banking systems 
strengthen terrorist and criminal hands. While globalization presents an opportune 
environment for criminals and terrorists, it hardens the counter-operational terrain 
for nation-states.  
Although globalization presents opportunities or permissive causes for 
private violence, it is mostly an indirect cause. Rather, the transnational terrorist 
threat (which is posed by non-state terrorist groups that takes advantage of the 
opportunities presented by globalization) is the heart of the answer to the research 
question: the form of threat determines the form of cooperative responses of states; 
the form of inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism is different from 
the previous forms of inter-state cooperation. The threat of transnational terrorism 
shapes inter-state cooperation with its distinctive features. Moreover, the threat 
itself is a limit against cooperation and alignment among states. Therefore, the 
threat itself is argued to be the most explanatory variable in explaining the form 
and shortfalls of inter-state cooperation. The features and impact of the threat on 
cooperation and alignment is elaborated and discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.   
As depicted in the figure on page thirteen, globalization not only conditions 
the formation of the threat, but it affects the working conditions of states as well. 
Globalization’s chief effect is interconnectedness of social processes. Its due 
impact for policy-making and implementation is conflation or combination of 
previously different job-definitions both at the decision-making level and 
23 
 
operational/bureaucratic level. Overlapping fields of policy-making increases trade-
offs, which makes it difficult to prioritize one national security policy over another. 
The way nations pursue their different national security interests has become ever 
interconnected as a result of the structural role of globalization in binding counter-
strategies with internal and international law.  
Owing to globalization, strategy is no longer restrained to conventional 
defense affairs of national armies, but it is now connected to or conflates with 
domestic and international law regarding the contemporary politics of violence that 
does not include major wars between Western states. The fight against 
transnational terrorism or against unconventional form of warfare requires a 
marriage between law and strategy. Equally and problematically, it requires the 
marriage of internal and external affairs of a nation-state. The ongoing difficulty of 
differentiating between the internal and external realms of the nation-state policies 
is the fundamental imposition and characteristic of the threat of transnational 
terrorism. 
The contemporary form of political violence testifies to the eroding 
conceptual borders between ‘the internal’ and ‘the external’: Various terrorist 
attacks around the world during late 1990s and the first decade of the new century 
are the primary examples to the ambiguity of the threat. Apart from those, 
unconventional forms of warfare such as civil war in Balkans during the 1990s, 
warlordism and conflict over diamonds in Africa, global trade of cocaine and 
heroin among all continents, the problem of child soldiers and small arms, the 2001 
Afghanistan and 2003 Iraqi intervention and the unconventional protracted conflict 
(insurgency) in their aftermath, the illegal migration of people, illicit trafficking of 
nuclear materials through land and sea borders (via NATO jargon, border security 
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and maritime security) and separatist movements in Asia also demonstrate the 
transnationality of security concerns. In particular, terrorism in its contemporary 
manifestation or dimensions demonstrates the change in the way power is 
exercised.  
The study concludes that states try to implement a new form of cooperation 
against transnational terrorism. This is a mode of cooperation that is different from 
their previously demonstrated alignment and cooperative behaviours, which were 
restricted to almost pure military defense contingencies. ‘Coalition of the Willing-
type inter-state cooperation’ has emerged as the form of inter-state cooperation 
applied against the transnational terrorist threat. Coalition of the willing type inter-
state cooperation is an un-institutionalized and short-term cooperation among 
several states whose formation is based on the goals of particular missions. It is 
mostly conducted by national groupings or alignments as witnessed not only in 
2001 and 2003 interventions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in bilateral law 
enforcement and intelligence cooperation. 
Utmost importantly, the formation process and undertakings of the coalition 
of the willing-type cooperation are mostly outside the institutional frameworks of 
the NATO and the UN. These latter intergovernmental institutions are not at the 
forefront in inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. 
They are given a back-filling or supporting role. The acme of alliances, the NATO, 
is going under a transformation from a ‘defensive nature’ to ‘a security nature’ with 
its new missions and command structure. Yet, its role in the fight against terrorism 
does not seem to be central as discussed in the following chapters. Coalitions of the 
Willing appear to be the emerging form of cooperation among states, especially 
against ambiguous threats such as transnational terrorism for it overrules the 
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distinction between internal and external threats.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
THE METHODOLOGY AND THE SYNOPSIS 
 
 
This chapter presents a synopsis of the dissertation for ease of reading the 
entire dissertation. It outlines the flow of the study by explaining the following: the 
research question, the argument, the methodology, the relation of terrorism with 
International Relations discipline, why cooperation and alliance are studied, 
working definitions of key concepts, the significance and goals of the study, why 
and how specific independent variables are selected and developed, and their 
relations/causalities. The reasons for singling out the threat variable, as the most 
explanatory independent variable, are also discussed. Figure 1, on page 43, 
summarily demonstrates the framework of analysis conducted. The content of the 
chapters are also given during the explanation of the above-mentioned elements of 
the dissertation.  
 
2.1. The Research Question 
This study focuses on the form of inter-state cooperation and alignment 
behavior against transnational terrorism. Corresponding to the original argument of 
the dissertation, the research question that is to be answered is:  
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To what extent nation-states, which involve in alliances or align to one 
another rather easily in the face of threats emanating from other nation-states, can 
show these alignment behaviors against transnational terrorist groups? 
 
2.2. Departure Point of the Study: the Argument 
The argument that led to the making of the research question above is that 
nation-states do not show their ‘previous alignment and cooperative behaviors’ 
against transnational terrorism. The argument is not that there is no cooperation 
against transnational terrorism. The research question does not seek to find out 
whether there is cooperation or not either; rather, the argument and the related 
research question is about the form of inter-state cooperation against transnational 
terrorism. Before the research is fully conducted, the starting point was based on a 
claim: A claim based on an initial unsystematic empirical observation was made 
such that previously demonstrated Cold War alignment and cooperation pattern 
among nation-states is not existent this time against transnational terrorism as of 
the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is the argumentational departure 
point for the research question and the study at large.  
Since this is an observational claim to be tested, the dissertation presents 
both an empirical and analytical test to see whether this is the current situation. 
Defense and military oriented alignments and cooperation among states were the 
order of the Cold War days. Does this kind of cooperation among states continue or 
not? Equally, the research question is: to what extent nation-states (which involve 
in alliances or align to one another rather easily in the face of threats emanating 
from other nation-states) can show these alignment behaviors against transnational 
terrorist groups?  
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  2.3. What’s in the Research Question? The Backgrounder 
This dissertation is specifically about inter-state cooperation and alignment 
against transnational terrorism. As such, it is part of two literatures that overlap 
with one another: it is both a part of the broader cooperation literature that involves 
several different actors and issue-areas, and also a part of the alliances and 
alignment literature that concentrates mostly on relations among nation-states over 
fields of ‘high-politics’. On the one hand, cooperation literature is involved in this 
dissertation due to inter-agency cooperation over non-military fields related to 
counterterrorism. On the other hand, there is alignment and alliance politics. 
Alignment behaviors (or grouping of states that converge on a military-political 
cause) have been traditionally studied in the alliance literature rather than in the 
generic cooperation literature. That is, ‘alignment’ has been traditionally 
understood as military-centric and state-centric cooperation. ‘Alignment’ is the 
customary term that is equivalent to ‘inter-state cooperation in high politics’. There 
are other types of cooperation among nation-states such as those over economy and 
environment. The latter issues are not military-centric, and they are examples to 
non-military issue-areas that constitute the shift from ‘defense’ to ‘security’.  
As for terrorism, it can be noted that it is a contested policy-issue among 
nation-states without a clear consensus whether it is mainly a defensive or security 
issue. States differ on whether it is an issue that must be struggled with criminal 
and domestic means or with military tools. As such, it is an in-between subject that 
has interfaces with both realms of military-oriented ‘defense’ and non-military 
aspects of ‘security’. Therefore, the reason for why states differ regarding the fight 
against terrorism, as the chapters elaborate, is that it is a gray threat with distinct 
characteristics that is at the intersection of both high politics and low politics. The 
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features of the threat conditions nation-state policy responses. 
Since alliance literature focuses on nation-state as unit of analysis and since 
it mainly concentrates on high politics of external military threats and arms build-
up, the literature does not study all areas of cooperation that are involved in the 
fight against terrorism. Law enforcement, reconstruction, prosecution and 
jurisprudence, border security and illicit trafficking, financial tracking, surveillance 
of individuals, intelligence gathering, democracy and rule of law are the areas that 
may be qualified as the gray zone at the intersection of low politics and high 
politics. It is those areas where counterterrorism cooperation is conducted alongside 
counter-insurgency and special military operations of national armed forces. 
Besides, the alliance literature via realist theory is traditionally reluctant to study 
international organizations for the literature’s order of priority is on nation-states 
and much less on international organizations or on intra-state agencies. Thus, the 
alliance literature does not analyze national institutions or agencies within a nation-
state. However, inter-agency cooperation among departments of different nation-
states lies at the heart of inter-state counterterrorism cooperation.  
Within that framework of analysis, alliance literature can be seen as a sub-
category of the broader cooperation literature in that the wide-scope literature about 
cooperation includes, inter alia, the study of alliances. The study of alliances is a 
specified field of cooperation studies that focuses on ‘international security’. Its 
issue-area is traditionally narrowed down to military and defense affairs with 
nation-states as the sole actors.  
However, this customary trajectory of alliance politics is under change: 
Alliances of collective defense nature are increasingly giving way to security 
alliances that approximate collective security institutions. This change or attempted 
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transformation from a defensive nature to a security nature of alliances is one of the 
findings of the dissertation at hand. This change is not only limited to NATO’s 
transformation, but it also applies to other alliances such as Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). Correspondingly, the study aims to understand: to 
what degree previous inter-state alignment and cooperative behaviors against 
nation-state-rivals remain or disappear when the threat against which they 
cooperate changes from being state-centric to non-state-centric/transnational 
terrorism? The research question does not aim to understand whether nation-states 
cooperate against transnational terrorism or not, fundamentally because it 
inherently presumes that there is some cooperation on the ground. The study 
concentrates on the form of inter-state cooperation and alignment behavior that 
seems to be under change. The main empirical onus or burden of proof is on 
NATO’s recent transformational trajectory. 
Previous cooperative behaviors seen in alliances, especially during the Cold 
War, were driven by preparation for and anticipation of war among nation-states. 
They were chiefly against large-scale military aggression emanating from other 
states. Defense departments, military establishments and intelligence agencies of 
nation-states were at the forefront of defensive cooperation conducted within the 
framework of alliances, and the confrontational relationship between the US and 
the USSR was the driving motor of Cold War alliance system. Since the argument 
that gives birth to the research question is that nation-states do not demonstrate 
much of these previous defensive cooperative behaviors against terrorist groups, 
the dissertation examines the similarities and differences in cooperation patterns 
among states during and after the Cold War. The reason for the selection of the 
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Cold War as a period of comparison is its recent past, which has accustomed 
mental repercussions for nation-state policies and international security culture at 
large.  
In due course, the study seeks to figure out the differences between the Cold 
War pattern of cooperation among nation-states against other states and the present 
cooperation against transnational terrorism mainly exemplified by Al Qaeda. 
Therefore, to what extent states confronted by transnational terrorism demonstrate 
alignment and cooperative behaviors in the way they previously demonstrated them 
against other states is the determining yardstick of the research question.  
Since it is necessary to explain why the research question is worth studying, 
a brief elaboration is what follows: By researching to see whether established 
alignment behaviors are still applied this time against transnational terrorism, the 
dissertation tries to fill in the vacuum of the alliance literature about states’ 
exposure to terrorism and their form of cooperative response. Thereby, the 
dissertation is an attempt to figure out and situate non-states’ impact on alliance 
literature. Despite the accumulation of the literatures on alliance and cooperation, 
the question of the impact of non-state groups upon nation-states remains mostly 
unexplored. Previously, nation-states were aligning among themselves against 
other nation-states. As a feature of the new conflict environment, transnational 
terrorism is defined by states as a new national security threat. The latter is a 
novelty to be studied where the dissertation attempts to make a modest contribution 
to alliance literature by answering the research question.  
By asking the research question again, several dynamics are studied such as 
what makes states urge inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism? The 
answer is that the scale and distinct features of the threat drive inter-state 
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cooperation. However, one of the research findings is that the threat itself is also 
the strongest limitation against inter-state cooperation.  
Previously, no single terrorist threat caused a collective-response effort as 
international as the contemporary effort against Al Qaeda. Different from the latter, 
separatist terrorist groups and the threats they have posed have primarily 
concentrated on a particular country: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or Kurdistan Workers' Party-Parti Karkerani 
Kurdistan best known as PKK (which is also called KADEK, Kongra-Gel, and 
KGK) mostly hit a particular country. However, Al Qaeda and its offshoots or 
groups affiliated with Al Qaeda hit many states, not just a particular state. The 
global scale and transnationality of Al Qaeda threat motivate states to align with 
each other and urge them to give a collective response. Nevertheless, there are still 
limits to inter-state cooperation as summarized in the following pages and detailed 
in the chapters. 
The literature on alliances includes a vast amount of work about the 
alignments and alliances of states against other states. However, the novel issue to 
be explored is the alignments of states against non-state violence, that is to say, 
states facing terrorist groups. Thus, the research question required finding answers 
to such questions as: Is the prevailing literature on cooperation and alliance well 
enough in guiding us to understand this understudied dimension of alignment 
dynamics against non-state entities? If there is a need to improve the prevailing 
literature, in what ways can it be done? What are the problems and analytical 
pitfalls? What may be the modest analytical steps to undertake in explaining this 
understudied dimension?  
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Throughout history, nation-states or political formations other than nation-
states such as city-states and empires enter into treaty-based alliances or showed 
cooperative behaviors. The modern literature on alliances includes considerable 
amount of work about the alignments and alliances of nation-states against other 
nation-states.21 It goes without saying that there were two adversarial alliance 
systems during the Cold War: first, the NATO-based Western bloc that comprised 
the peripheral states revolving around the US as a superpower; secondly, the 
Eastern bloc that comprised the former Soviet superpower and the countries that 
aligned with it mostly under the Warsaw Pact. The NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
were two formal alliances in that they were treaty-based. Utmost importantly, 
threats were emanating from other states, not from non-state formations. This was 
the situation until after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the end of the 
USSR sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.  
The demise of the USSR quickly followed, which ended the Cold War era 
that can be seen as rivaling alliance systems. A decade later, September 11, 2001 
attacks against the United States of America took place in the absence of any polar 
structure. September 11 attacks and the subsequent terrorist attacks that took place 
around the world seemed to replace state-centric threats due to lessening threat of 
large-scale invasion of nation-states by other states. Although state-to-state rivalry 
continues, non-state entities rose to prominence in addition to classical power 
politics. Thus, the series of terrorist attacks at the start of the twenty-first century 
underscored the rise of non-state influence in international affairs. They motivated 
nation-states to fight transnational terrorism. In accordance, there are two different 
pictures of alignment and cooperation dynamics that can be compared and 
                     
21 Chapter 3 provides a detailed literature review of the alignment and alliance literature. 
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contrasted: the dynamics of Cold War alignments and cooperation and those of the 
post-Cold War era. Can states show previously demonstrated alignment and 
cooperation behaviors against transnational terrorist groups? This is the research 
question that is under-studied in the alliance literature. 
 
2.4. The Differences between Cooperation and Alliance 
2.4.1. Alliance 
Nation-states traditionally have used alliances to extend power beyond their 
borders and to prevent or prepare for military conflict. “An alliance (or alignment) 
is a formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or more 
states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and/or influence. 
Although the precise arrangements embodied in different alliances vary 
enormously, the essential element in a meaningful alliance is a commitment for 
mutual support against some external actor(s).”22 
Although informal commitments are included in Walt’s above definition of 
alliances, formal commitments (not informal ones) are the clearest manifestation of 
an alliance because they are coded in international treaties. Alliances (as treaty-
based alignments) become part of international law with clear rights and 
obligations of state members. As such, alliances enhance the credibility of 
commitments made under the terms of the alliance agreement. Thus, the addition of 
informal commitments (which are not attached to treaties) into the definition of 
alliances causes ambiguities in the alliance literature. Put differently, whether 
informal commitments and relations among nation-states constitute an alliance is 
contested in the alliance literature. ‘Cordial relations’ or ‘partnerships’ are the 
                     
22 Walt, Stephen M. 2009. “Alliances in a Unipolar World” World Politics 61, No. 1, January, 86-
120. 
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terms that are used to refer informal commitments without any treaty. 
In alliance literature, alliances are commonly understood to be treaty-based 
military cooperation among states against ‘external’ threats. Thus, alliances most of 
the time refer to treaty-based or institutionalized military cooperation among states. 
Moreover, the terms ‘alignment’ and ‘alliance’ mostly denote military security 
cooperation, rather than cooperation on non-military issues. ‘Alignment’ and 
‘alliance’ have been used as the equivalent of cooperation in the military-security 
field or defence realm. That is basically why armies and military officers are 
closely involved in alliances throughout history.  
 
2.4.2. Cooperation 
‘Cooperation’ is a broader term, which refers also to non-military issue-
areas alongside military and defensive cooperation fields. Cooperation is a generic 
term that refers to both military and non-military issue-areas over which either 
nation-states or non-governmental organizations, or both nations and non-state 
entities collaborate among each other. Thus, when compared to ‘cooperation’, 
alliance is a specific form of cooperation. Alliance is the institutional name for 
defence cooperation or military cooperation among nation-states excluding non-
state entities. Accordingly, ‘alignment’ is the behaviour of nation-states through 
which they group together or draw closer on a specific issue-area related to military 
security. ‘Alignment’ is traditionally understood as military security cooperation 
among nation-states, whereas ‘cooperation’ is not restricted either to military field 
or to nation-states. 
Cooperation is a broader term that includes, among other forms of 
cooperation, alignments among states. Other than military-centric cooperation such 
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as alliances and alignments, ‘cooperation’ also includes collaboration or joint work 
such as those associated with the anti-personnel landmines campaign and the 
initiative on the International Criminal Court in the mid to late 1990s. 
‘Cooperation’ can be distinguished as the upper-most general term for 
collaboration among both nation-states and non-state entities. However, it is 
traditionally regarded as being more appropriate to talk about alliances when 
cooperation is carried out only by nation-states on defence and military affairs or 
on war preparation and war contingencies. This is the traditional usage and 
meaning of the concept of alliance. 
‘Cooperation’, as a general term, includes other examples such as the 
campaign against the use of child soldiers and small arms, and the formation of the 
Kimberley process on conflict over diamonds. This latter form of ‘cooperation’ 
operated as fluid networks without a clear leadership of the cooperation process, 
and they did not include nation-states alone. They were voluntary, group-
interaction-based cooperation samples with mixed actors that included 
nongovernmental entities.23  
 
2.5. Terrorism and International Relations 
The sequence of terrorist attacks around the world in the timeline of 2000-
2010 demonstrated the increasing global impact of terrorism on nation-states. That 
is why international relations scholars around the world rushed to study 
contemporary terrorism to an unprecedented extent. Otherwise, the subject would 
continue to reside mainly in the realm of terrorism experts. When the number of 
states hit increased, the threat resonated globally, becoming an inter-state security 
                     
23Cooper, Andrew F. 2005. Stretching the Model of “Coalitions of the Willing” The Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI) Working Paper No.1 October, pp. 1-3.  
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problem. The fact that terrorism has truly become an international security threat 
against many states is new; 24and this is basically why terrorism has been included 
in the parcel of International Relations and Security Studies more than ever before.  
Previously, terrorism was mostly a sideline issue. It was occasionally 
factored in mainstream research questions of International Relations because it was 
not a national security concern. That is basically why International Relations did 
not examine terrorism or due state-responses in-depth. Terrorism was a subject 
mostly left to the terrorism experts and political scientists that deal with its history 
and relation to domestic problems respectively. It was not regarded as a proper 
‘national security threat’ to be studied within the domain of International Relations. 
However in the last decade, most nation-states have regarded terrorism as a threat 
to national security; and the academia followed suit. Both for practitioners and 
scholars, terrorism has become a high-politics issue. For these reasons, 
transnational terrorism is one of the subject-matters against which inter-state 
cooperation and alignment is studied.  
 
2.6. Why Study Forms of Cooperation and Alliance? 
Alliances, alignment and cooperation lie at the heart of international 
relations. However, there seems to be ongoing challenges to the above-mentioned 
traditional conceptual distinction between ‘alliance’ and ‘cooperation’. The 
challenge mainly originates from the novel dimensions of the transnational threat, 
which imposes overlaps between the activities that ‘alliance’ and ‘cooperation’ 
refer. The challenge is about rearranging conceptual tools and working-
                     
24Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2006, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups”, 
International Security 31-1 Summer pp. 7-48; Zimmerman, Doron. 2003. The Transformation of 
Terrorism, Zurich: Andreas Wenger; Burnett, Jonny and Dave Whyte. 2005. “Embedded Expertise 
and the New Terrorism” Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media 1-4, 1-18. 
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mechanisms of alliances to adapt to the post-Cold War strategic environment. The 
existence of such a challenge is the reason why alliances and cooperation forms are 
chosen as the subject matter to be revisited.  
The challenge is visible in the most resilient alliance of our time, namely 
NATO. The challenge that NATO faces is the changing form of cooperation within 
or the challenge of a shift from ‘defense’ to ‘security’.25 The main reason for such a 
shift is the change from state-centric threats to non-state, transnational, ambiguous 
threats in the sense that it combines or conflates internal threats and external 
threats. This is extensively detailed in Chapter Six where the features of the 
transnational terrorism threat and their implications for cooperation and alignment 
are elaborated. The consequence of the transnational threat exposure can be 
succinctly summarized: that ‘cooperative military relations in an alliance’ 
traditionally refer to relations centred on defense, whereas ‘cooperation on different 
realms alongside military collaboration’ is used in the emerging relevant literature 
as corresponding to security rather than to defense. That is, NATO is at pains to 
shift from a ‘defensive alliance’ that focuses on military affairs to a ‘security 
alliance’ that also includes non-military security issues such as transnational 
terrorism and illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction materials and 
devices, border security and maritime security in  high seas. That is the heart of the 
NATO transformation process.26 
NATO is not a single-headed body. Since NATO has an intergovernmental 
organization depending upon the sovereign decisions of its member-states, the 
modifications in the national threat assessments are determining the way the 
Alliance transformation is carried out in the post-Cold War strategic environment. 
                     
25 “Security Cooperation”, NATO Issue Brief, March, 2008. 
26Chivvis, Christopher S. 2009. Recasting NATO’s Strategic Concept Possible Directions for the 
United States Occasional Paper, RAND. 
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Clearly identified territorial threats within the bipolar world -which served as the 
guidelines of defence planning- have been mostly replaced by ambiguous or hybrid 
threats posed by transnational groups. Importantly, NATO’s transformation is a 
result of the contemporary transnational threat that confronts states. Irrespective of 
the ambiguity of the threat, it has been the most influential factor that channels the 
course of NATO transformation.27 The threat, due its distinct features, is not clearly 
identified and assessed in a standard fashion in that nation-states, as Rickli 
maintains, give more importance to perceived future consequences.28 Accordingly, 
as Rasmussen argues, ‘it is not present actions that are to produce future results, but 
perceived future results that produce present actions’.29The latter indicates that ‘if 
states know that they might be able to prevent an unwanted occurrence from 
happening, this gives them the duty to protect the future from the present. It 
therefore leads to pre-emptive and preventive national strategies.’30However, this 
does not prove valid for all the member-states at all times. All members are 
sovereign and retain the right to disagree. Nevertheless, some states prefer pre-
emptive and preventive strategies as elaborated in the empirical Chapter 8. Utmost 
importantly, the reason for such a preference mainly originates in the threat itself. 
The distinct features of the transnational terrorism threat shapes threat assessments 
of states in a way different from the previous national threat assessments made 
against state-centric threats.31  
                     
27NATO military-concept-developers of the Allied Transformation Command-ACT underlined the 
point repetitively in the Crete-Greece meeting of NATO-MIO seminar in October 19-24, 2009. 
28Rickli, Jean-Marc. 2007. “The Impact of Globalization on the Changing Nature of War”, February 
7, GCSP Policy Brief No 24, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva. 
29The point also explains the logic of ‘the mission determines the coalition’ statement, which is 
much discussed in the run-up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2001 and 2003 respectively. 
Ramussen, Mikkel Vedby. 2001. “Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society”, 
Millenium-Journal of International Studies, 30: 285-309. 
30 Ramussen, Mikkel Vedby. 2001. “Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society”, 
Millenium-Journal of International Studies, 30: 285-309. 
31The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
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In turn, the transnational threat not only shapes a single state’s response, but 
it affects the collective response or the cooperative responses of states because 
international policies are determined and conducted in relation to one another.32It 
causes the contemporary form of inter-state cooperation against transnational 
terrorism to be different from the previous nation-state alignment and cooperative 
behaviors. This point is elaborated throughout the dissertation, especially in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 8. 
Consequently, the above-mentioned points give the summary-answer to the 
research question: States do not show their previously demonstrated cooperative 
and alignment behaviours against transnational terrorism as the main argument of 
the study has it. There is inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism, but 
its form is different from states’ previously demonstrated cooperative and 
alignment behaviours.  
That has both practical implications and academic implications. Practical 
implications for alliances are seen in the case of NATO. Its strategy, purpose, tasks 
and mode of cooperation are in a continuous process of modification: The alliance 
is under an ongoing transformation which is leaning towards a security-oriented 
form of cooperation. An evolving shift from ‘defense’ to ‘security’ is underway in 
NATO. The details of why and how this is the case is analytically studied from 
along chapter two to chapter seven, and it is empirically studied in chapter eight.  
                                                                
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-
Greece, 22 October 2009. 
32States can imitate other states’ behaviours for gaining influence over its neighbours, penetrating 
into its alignment partner’s decision making process, externalizing its domestic problems or sharing 
gains at the end of a campaign. These alignment policies have been implemented especially in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. They are detailed in Chapter 3 as documented in the 
literature. Importantly, preference of a state (whose formation is explained in the dissertation by the 
counterterrorism culture of a state) is different from the way that preference is implemented. The 
way a preference is implemented equals to the alignment policy of a state. Thus, while 
counterterrorism culture explains state preferences, the way the preferences are activated is 
manifested in (alignment) policies such as penetration or balking. 
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The implication for academia is worth noting: contemporary national threat 
assessments, national security strategies and due bureaucratic overhauling and 
rearrangements testify that the significance of transnational threats, globalization, 
and non-state entities’ increasing political clout should not be underestimated. 
Nation-states are not the only entities that pose national security threats, especially 
where NATO as an organization and nation-states as its state-members do not 
regard conventional large-scale military invasion as likely. 
As a corollary of the decreasing expectation of major war, late twentieth 
century was a period during which international security came to be understood to 
include non-military security issues. In accordance, the dissertation tries to 
understand the struggle against transnational terrorism with an emphasis on the 
form of cooperation among states. Previously, the form of cooperation in alliances 
was military and defense oriented. Threats such as illicit trafficking of weapons of 
mass destruction and transnational terrorism were regarded as the additional or 
supplementary items of the main agenda, not the heart of intra-Alliance cooperation 
schedule. However, they are regarded by most nation-states today as national 
security threats or as part of ‘high politics.’ Within the present transformational era 
where definitions are overhauled due to globalization and threats such as 
transnational terrorism, the dissertation attempts to explain the changing parameters 
of alliance and cooperation.  
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2.7. The Methodology  
2.7.1. Theory-oriented Case Study Method  
The dissertation is conducted by means of theory-oriented case study 
method. The case study approach is the detailed examination of an aspect of a 
historical episode to develop historical explanations that might be generalizable to 
other events.33 Before detailing what kind of a case study research is conducted, it 
is essential to clarify why the case study approach is chosen as the method. Why 
not the statistical approach, formal modeling or another theory or method is not 
used is worth mentioning. 
Researchers should use a method for a research task for which it is best 
suited.34 For instance, statistical methods have been widely used in recent decades 
to develop logically consistent models. Statistical method tries to take observable 
implications from the model that is abstracted, and it instructs to test these 
implications against empirical observations. In turn, it uses these tests to decide 
how best to modify the deductive theory.  
However, neither statistical method nor formal modeling is used in this 
dissertation. This is simply because they do not fit the present research question 
and task at hand. The answer to the research question is best answered via ‘process-
tracing’. The latter method is used in case study approach to academic research 
where no extant research program or theory exists for the research task.  
There is not any established theory to be used for studying the research 
question at hand. Neither a theory with regard to the impact of private entities upon 
nation-states, nor a consensual research program for the study of inter-state 
                     
33 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 5. 
34 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 6. 
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cooperation against terrorism exists. That is why the research program and the 
analytical framework of contributing-causes and causalities are worked out by the 
candidate from the scratch: the research is at the intersection of the accumulation of 
the prevailing alliance literature and the relatively embryonic literature on 
cooperation and globalization that forays into answering contemporary 
developments that go beyond national borders. The subject-matter of this 
dissertation is a new one that has been hardly studied in the literature as of 2010. 
Under such circumstances of uncharted analytic waters, process-tracing is 
of help. The method of process-tracing helps to trace the links between possible 
causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines 
histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, personal interviews, official 
documents and declarations to see whether the causal process a study implies in a 
case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the contributing-causes or 
factors in that case.35  
Process-tracing is used for theory formation where the research task does 
not correspond or lend itself to any prevailing theory. It can perform a heuristic 
function, generating new variables or hypothesis on the basis of sequences of 
events observed inductively in case studies.36Process-tracing is used either to 
uncover evidence of causal mechanisms at work or to explain outcomes. The causal 
mechanism behind inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism can thus 
be studied via process-tracing, which is especially useful in case studies. Since it 
allows incorporating both material and ideational variables, process-tracing is ideal 
for establishing the possibility of a causal chain linking independent and dependent 
                     
35 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 7. 
36 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 7. 
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variables or contributing-causes of an observed outcome.  
 
2. 7. 2. What is a ‘Case’? What is a Case Study? 
‘A case’ is defined, via Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, as an 
instance of a class of events:  
The term ‘class of events’ refers here to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as 
revolutions, types of governments, kinds of economic systems, or personality types 
that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or generic 
knowledge) regarding the causes of similarities and differences among instances 
(cases) of that class of events. A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical 
episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, is a historical instance of many different 
classes of events: deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management, and so on. A 
researcher’s decision about which class of events to study and which theories to use 
determines what data from the Cuban Missile Crisis are relevant to her or his case 
study of it.37 
 
    
 As Alexander George indicates, there is potential confusion among the terms 
‘comparative methods’, ‘case study methods’, and ‘qualitative methods’. In one 
view, the comparative method (the use of comparisons among a small number of 
cases) is distinct from the case study method, which in this view involves the 
internal examination of single cases. However, this dissertation follows George’s 
definition of case study method: to include both within-case analysis of single case 
studies and comparisons of a small number of cases. This is because there is a 
growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case 
studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparisons within a single study or research program. Yet again, he maintains 
that single-case studies can also play a role in theory formation or development.38 
  
                     
37 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 18. 
38 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 18. 
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Theory formation or development requires exploring casual mechanisms, 
which operate only under certain conditions. Case studies examine the operation of 
causal mechanisms in single cases in detail. Within single cases, one can look at a 
large number of intervening variables and inductively help identify what conditions 
present in a case activate the causal mechanism. Contrastingly, statistical studies 
omit all contextual factors except those inherent in the variables selected for 
measurement and leave out many contextual and intervening variables. 
 Case study researchers are more interested in finding the conditions under 
which specified outcomes occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which 
those conditions and their outcomes arise. Correspondingly, the present dissertation 
tries to find the dynamics and conditions under which inter-state cooperation 
against transnational terrorism occurs. It is concluded that the causal mechanisms 
that are dissected into parts in other chapters are evident in the sequence of relevant 
events and processes that are traced in chapter eight.  
Process-tracing is a research method; rational choice models or formal 
modeling are theories. Thus, process-tracing is fit to studying an understudied 
subject-matter that cannot be explained by any extant theory of the literature. 
Process-tracing can also be used by statistical research programs, by rational choice 
models or game theory to test their insights derived from the latter theories’ 
deductive frameworks. 
As for using process-tracing method in case studies, it is maintained that it 
helps build the explanation of causal mechanisms of outcomes. Tracing the 
processes that may have led to an outcome helps narrow the list of potential causes. 
Therefore, process-tracing is an invaluable tool for the first stages of theory 
formation on a new question. Alexander George underlines two reasons for how it 
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helps theory-building: first, tracing processes generates many observations within a 
case, and secondly, it helps to link these observations to one another to form an 
explanation. 
There are four kinds of process-tracing: a- detailed narrative, b- use of 
hypothesis and generalizations, c- analytic explanation, and d- general explanation. 
The kind of process-tracing that is used in this dissertation is a conflation of type-b 
and type-d. That is, both generalizations specific to the case and general 
explanations of form of inter-state cooperation are made.  
In general explanation kind of process-tracing, the researcher constructs a 
general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process. The 
researcher may do this either because the data or theory necessary for explanation 
is lacking, or because an explanation is intended at a higher level of generality or 
abstraction due to the research objective. This is also true for the present 
dissertation; that is, not the data but a theory to be benefited from is lacking. 
Secondly, since this study attempts to explain violent non-state entities’ impact 
upon inter-state relations, it tries to climb the ladder of abstraction in order to 
define the place of non-state entities in world politics and thereby answer the 
research question. Thus, the kind of process-tracing used in this study is suitable for 
abstraction and general explanation. Yet again, it is also analytic to the extent parts 
of the narrative are accompanied with explicit causal factors or variables highly 
specific to the case. Yet, no testing of a hypothesis occurs: this study neither 
employs theoretical variables of any theory, nor does it assert any generalization of 
its explanation into a generalization. Therefore, the study, via process-tracing, 
heads for analytical general explanation of the specific subject. 
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An analytical disaggregation of the relevant variables is sought after: The 
chapters that examine the independent variables (of globalization, counterterrorism 
cultures, and the new threat) explain why and how analytical constructs or security 
concepts are changing as a response to developments on the ground: A separate 
chapter is invested for each contributing-cause or independent variable. These 
chapters theoretically examine the independent variables. They are not historical 
briefs, but rather analytical discussions about how variables help answer the 
research question. The sum of all three independent variables might also be seen to 
present a picture about the changing parameters of international security. These 
analytical discussions about variables are married to an empirical chapter reserved 
for the examination of the research question via process-tracing method. 
Analytical inquiries attempt to figure out the reasons why and how current 
developments regarding inter-state cooperation and alignment evolve. This is done 
not only by mere descriptive narrative, but through a systematic framework of 
analysis that includes causalities: Three independent variables (of globalization, 
counterterrorism culture of a nation-state, the new threat) and the dependent 
variable of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism are 
put to an empirical examination.  
The approach is qualitative and largely positivist, though the independent 
variable or the contributing-cause of ‘counterterrorism culture of a nation-state’ 
borrows from the constructivist and neoclassical realism literatures in a way that 
complements the use of traditional approaches in theorizing about the inter-state 
cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. That is, analytical and 
theoretical inquiries are part of the methodology followed. Qualitative and coherent 
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discussions of theorizing constitute part of the method itself.39  
The answer to the research question is given via the above-mentioned three 
independent variables that condition inter-state cooperation against transnational 
terrorism. To repeat, the independent variables are: first, the structural variable of 
globalization; secondly, the unit-level variable of nation-state behaviors drived 
from their counterterrorism cultures, that is convergent or divergent security 
cultures that help answer to what extent contemporary transnational terrorism is 
defined in similar terms and to what extent methods to deal with terrorism is 
similar; and thirdly, the new threat variable or ‘the threat of transnational terrorism 
itself with its distinctive features’. These independent variables condition the 
dependent variable of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational 
terrorism. The study incorporates discussions that bring forth a ranking of 
independent variables, and it concludes that the new threat variable or ‘the 
distinctive dimensions or manifestation of the threat of transnational terrorism’ 
have the highest explanatory power. 
There is not any established theory to apply for the research question. 
Neither a theory with regard to the impact of private entities (non-state entities in 
general or transnational terrorism in particular) upon nation-states, nor a consensual 
research scheme for the study of inter-state cooperation against terrorism exists. 
That is why the research program and the analytical framework of causalities are 
worked out by the candidate from the scratch: the research is at the intersection of 
the accumulation of the prevailing literature of alliance and the relatively 
                     
39Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. "Hard Times for Soft Balancing" 
International Security 30, no. 1 Summer: 72-108; Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 
2002. "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research" International Security 26, no. 
4 Spring, 93-111; Smith, Steve. 200. “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: 
Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years,” in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds., Critical 
Reflections on Security and Change London: Frank Cass; Schweller, Randall L. 2004. “Unanswered 
Threats: a Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing” International Security 29-2, 159-201. 
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embryonic literature on cooperation and globalization that forays into answering 
contemporary developments that go beyond national borders.  
In accordance, the main research question leads to two interrelated follow-
up questions: The questions of where non-state entities in general and terrorist 
entities in particular may academically be placed in the field of International 
Security and where nation-states place them in their security conceptions and 
policies.40 As for their place in academic and policy quarters, it can be noted that 
they are gradually acquiring a semi-actor or pseudo-actor status owing to their 
capacity to cause counter-policies from nation-states. Non-state entities are taken 
seriously when they pose significant threats; and although they are not regarded as 
proper actors in the customary sense, their autonomy or freedom of action defies 
traditional conceptions. These latter points are reached by conducting a theoretical 
inquiry checked by empiricist verification. Thereby, the research attempts to situate 
transnationally-active violent non-state entities within the context of overall world 
politics. That is, the study concentrates both on explanation of causalities and 
empirical reality-check at separate chapters. The theoretical explanation is taken 
down to earth by explaining the variables themselves and the relation among 
variables. Causalities are shown mainly through the case study on NATO 
transformation. A second case study is also conducted regarding the contending 
national counterterrorism cultures of Europe and the US and regarding the 
difficulties of the threat. These case studies are completed by means of process-
tracing, which builds upon official declarations, recorded interviews and 
conversations with diplomats, law enforcement authorities, military officers, and 
                     
40Non-states entities might be seen as of three kinds: market, illicit and moral. Transnational 
corporations (market authority), transnational criminal and terrorist organizations (illicit authority) 
and various types of non-governmental organizations (moral authority). The issue is elaborated in 
Chapter 4. 
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above all, scholars both in Turkey and abroad to substantiate the argument. It goes 
without saying that pondering over the written material of the literature fed the 
qualitative approach pursued. Academic articles and books, numerous conferences 
attended especially in Bilkent, TOBB, Koc and Ankara Universities as well as 
governments’ reports on the issue were invaluable. National security strategy 
documents, special commission reports, press meetings, media news services such 
as UNWire, IPRIS, UN News Center, UN Foundation, UN Dispatch, local and 
foreign newspapers articles, international organizations’ news briefs, policy briefs, 
monographs, working-papers of think-tanks and research institutes proved 
valuable. Sources on the Cold War era such as the ‘Parallel History Project’ were 
also invaluable. 
Personal contacts helped conduct the qualitative approach toward the 
subject-matter: Interviews and conversations were conducted with diplomats, civil 
and military officials of the NATO Headquarters, Belgium in 1999 and 2005, and 
in Greece in 2009. Contacts with NATO officials in person in 1999, 2005 and 2009 
created the opportunity to make a comparison between the NATO’s standing with 
regard to its mode of operation, transformation within, and the strategy and clarity 
of purpose of the Alliance. Personal conversations with Turkish military and police 
authorities also help shape the dissertation. Military and police authorities are 
consulted mainly through a number of opportunities created by the Centre of 
Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), which also provided the 
chance to consult Georgian, Polish, Turkish, American and French military 
authorities. Political advisers of different NATO member countries were 
interviewed in the United States in 2005, in the workshop of February-March 2007 
in Georgia and NATO seminar in Crete, Greece in 2009.  Presentations and 
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seminar participations made in Georgia, Belgium, Greece and the Yale and Harvard 
Universities in the US provided ample opportunity to discuss the research question 
with both academics and practitioners. 
As for more on methodology and the place of the study in the literature, the 
main interest is to see whether inter-state cooperation against transnational 
terrorism follows the previously established inter-state form of cooperation and 
alignment against other nation-states. If not, why? Is there a new form of 
cooperation among states against transnational terrorism? What is it and why does 
it come to surface? 
By discussing the differences between past and present cooperation 
patterns, the research question links itself to the alliance literature that seldom 
queried the impact of non-state entities upon inter-state cooperation in general and 
alliances in particular. The need to establish such a linkage arose because 
cooperation and alliance literature largely ignores the new security landscape that is 
evolving, and it seems to underestimate the impact of networked/transnational 
threats upon nation-state alignments. The alliance literature still overwhelmingly 
focuses on state-centric threats in the face of the bourgeoning studies that assert the 
unlikelihood of large-scale invasion or of major inter-state war.41The lack of hard-
                     
41Miller, Steven E. “International Security at Twenty-Five: From One World to Another” 
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 Summer 2001, pp. 5–39; Jervis, Robert. “Theories of War in 
an Era of Leading-Power Peace” Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 
2001 American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 1 March 2002; SIPRI Yearbook. 2009. 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute; Brawley, Mark R. “The Rise of the Trading State Revisited” in Aydinli and Rosenau eds. 
Globalization, Security and the Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition Albany: State University of 
New York Press, pp.67-81; Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce 
and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: Basic Books; Rosecrance, Richard. 1999. The Rise 
of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century. New York: Basic Books; Kaysen, 
Carl. 1990, “Is War Obsolete? - A Review Essay” International Security 14:42–64; Mueller, John. 
1989. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books; Mueller, 
John. 1995. Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics. New 
York: Harper Collins; Mueller, John. 2004. The Remnants of War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 
Van Creveld, Martin. 1991. The Transformation of War, New York: Free Press, P.3; Ray, James 
Lee. 1989. “The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War” International Organization 
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balancing and its implications for alliances,42 lack of poles43, the questioning of the 
proper applicability of balance of power theory and the need for initiating new 
concepts such as soft-balancing44 or under-balancing45 mainly originates from the 
waning of major war or the low anticipation of force-on-force confrontation of 
armies on the battlefield. When the conventional military threat assessments are 
low, alliance literature experiences difficulties in using the conventional concepts 
                                                                
43:405–439; Rosenau, James. 1990 Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and 
Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Van Evera, Stephen. 1990/1991 “Primed For 
Peace: Europe after The Cold War” International Security 15:7–57; Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. 
“Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War” International Security 22:5–43; Mandelbaum, Michael. 
“1998/1999 Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival 40:20–38; Mandelbaum, Michael. (2002) The Ideas 
That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, And Free Markets In The Twenty-First Century. 
New York: Public Affairs. 
42 Michael Don Ward, “Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics,” Monograph Series in World Affairs 
19 1982; Stephen M. Walt, “Multilateral Collective Security Arrangements,” in Richard Shultz, Roy 
Godson, and Ted Greenwood, eds., Security Studies for the 1990s Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 
1993; Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39 Spring 1997; William C. 
Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24 Summer 1999; Stephen 
M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World”, World Politics 61, no. 1 January 2009, 86–120; John 
Ikenberry, ed., American Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, 2001; Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics: Realism 
and State Strategies after the Cold War New York: Columbia University Press, 1999; David Malone 
and Yuen Foong Khong, eds., Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives 
Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003; and T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, 
Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2004.  
43 Smith, Steve. 2002. “The End of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World 
Order” International Relations Vol. 16-2: 171–183 and Calleo, David P. 2009. Follies of Power-
America’s Unipolar Fantasy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; as for the state-agency 
papers and reports, 2007. Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for 
the United States, National Intelligence Council Report DR-2007-16D- 23 August; 2004. “Mapping 
the Global Future” Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project Based on 
consultations with nongovernmental experts around the world December, http:\\bookstore.gpo.gov; 
as for the think-thank sources, Sunstein, Cass R. 2006. On the Divergent American Reactions to 
Terrorism and Climate Change AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 
06-13 May downloadable, www.aei-brookings.org or from the Social Science Research Network at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 901217J O I N T C E N T E R; Institutes,  Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld, Paul Huth. 2008. Peace and Conflict. The Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management (CIDCM) University of Maryland, www.cidcm.umd.edu; as for a viewpoint 
from a practitioner and theorist, Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What 
Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, Foreign Affairs. 
44 Pape, Robert. 2005. A. “Soft Balancing against the United States” International Security, Summer 
2005, Vol. 30, No. 1 Summer, pp7-45; Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power - Global 
Response to US Primacy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 126-132; Brooks, Stephen G., 
and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. "Hard Times for Soft Balancing" International Security 30, no. 1 
Summer: 72-108; Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wolforth. 2002. "From Old Thinking to New 
Thinking in Qualitative Research" International Security 26, no. 4 Spring, 93-111. 
45 Smith, Steve. 200. “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the 
Last Twenty Years,” in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds., Critical Reflections on Security and 
Change London: Frank Cass; Schweller, Randall L. 2004. “Unanswered Threats: a Neoclassical 
Realist Theory of Underbalancing” International Security 29-2, 159-201. 
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such as counter-balancing, power, polarity and balance of power theory for the 
main underlying rationale of all these concepts focuses on external military threats 
anticipated from nation-states.  
The unlikelihood of major war is acknowledged by most nations and the 
NATO authorities.46Given that, current world-wide academic debate on the 
conceptualization and usage of the above-mentioned terms is multifaceted and 
bereft of consensus.47That is fundamentally because the alliance literature does not 
work on entities other than nation-states yet. As a corollary, examination of the rise 
of non-state entities and the threats they pose is the first step to resolve the hardship 
of alliance literature in answering non-state threats. Facing the reluctance in the 
alliance literature to address the gap between the established conceptual lenses and 
the contemporary developments on the ground, the dissertation attempts to address 
this gap.  
Such an attempt seems timely when non-state networks such as Al Qaeda 
with its distinctive features of transnational threat confront nation-states. Such an 
attempt is to try to take an initial modest step in explaining the new security 
landscape from the alliances/cooperation point of view, without which the 
dissertation cannot compare between the past and present forms of nation-state 
cooperation and alignment. Alongside other variables, the examination of and 
discussion about the contemporary structural circumstances are needed for a 
systematic research because structural analysis is needed to disaggregate evolving 
systemic factors that condition state behaviours. The following section summarizes 
                     
46 The candidate’s interviews with civil and military NATO authorities during the Seminar on 
Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 19-24 October 2009. 
47 Byman, Daniel. 2006. “Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 29:5, 767 – 811; Tertrais, Bruno. 2004. “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances” The 
Washington Quarterly 27:2, 135-150; Thies, Wallace J. “Was the US Invasion of Iraq NATO's 
Worst Crisis Ever? How Would We Know? Why Should We Care?” European Security, 16:1, 29-
50. 
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how the study goes about the structural or systemic factors. 
 
2.8. The Independent Variable of Globalization  
Structural variables, by definition, condition other variables that are 
nevertheless separate from the structural variable. Structure, whether it is selected 
as globalization or international system, presents permissive or restraining causes 
for the entities involved in politics. As such, it conditions actors and the relations 
among them. By presenting opportunities or worsening the play-ground 
circumstances, the structural variable is indirectly involved in any process. Through 
such an analytical role of structural variables in understanding causalities or cause-
and-effect relationships, structure is traditionally seen as the international system 
that shapes and shoves nation-state behaviours via neo-realism.  
However, contemporary security landscape demonstrates features that 
cannot be fully explained from the level of international system. The internal and 
external, domestic and foreign distinctions are challenged by formations other than 
states. The way they force observers to devise new conceptual tools are presented 
in detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Thus, which structural variable answers the 
research question of this study is an important point to ponder over. To this end, the 
thesis discusses both polarity and globalization in order to dissect the differences 
between the previous and present structural environment and how the present one 
conditions the contemporary state behaviours in question. After a discussion of 
polarity, the study opts for ‘hegemony qualified by globalization or the non-
polarity argument’ which claims that ‘polarity’ as an analytical-construct does not 
correspond to the research question well enough. This point is elaborated in chapter 
five.  
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The present security environment goes back to mid-twentieth century 
technological and economic advancements, the nuclear age and transnational illicit 
markets which defy state-centric conceptualizations such as polarity. Besides, the 
source of transnational terrorism is not a nation-state. Thus, polarity as an 
analytical-construct or concept is not seen as an independent variable that 
corresponds to inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. However, 
polarity as a concept can still be used in other studies analyzing state-centric threats 
and state-to-state relations. All in all, the most salient structural independent 
variable for this study is demonstrated in the following chapters to be 
‘globalization’.  
The structural discussions in the study involve both ‘arguments of 
globalization’ that can be studied at a meta-theoretical level with a macro-
approach, and ‘arguments of polarity’ that are discussed at the neo-realist structural 
level. Polarity debate is conducted at a relatively traditional theoretical framework, 
whereas the realm of globalization and its impact on security are interdisciplinary 
with respect to both issue-areas and theoretical orientation.  
The working-definition of globalization used in the dissertation is the flow 
of inanimate and animate objects inside and across borders with tremendous 
velocity and in tremendous volume. These objects can be tangible or intangible: 
ideas, information, people, capital, labor, drugs, conventional arms, tanks, artillery, 
small arms, AK47s, fissile material, know-how, greenhouse gases or endemic 
diseases flow in and across the borders. Keywords for globalization are ‘mobility’ 
and ‘interconnectedness’. As for the course of the theoretical discussion and 
standing-point of the study about globalization’s effect on nation-states, the study is 
one of the transformationalist views that are congruent to a mid-way or via media 
56 
 
between the approach of hyper-globalism and that of globalization-scepticism.48 
In the light of above-mentioned specifications, globalization as an 
independent variable conditions two other independent variables. The question of 
how an independent variable conditions other independent variables is worth 
explaining succinctly: Whatever conception of structure is used (whether it is the 
traditional trilogy of system, state and individual levels of analysis, or micro-macro 
level of analysis in globalization studies), the levels are analytical constructs which 
are nested into each other in real-world practicality; yet, they are separated for 
analytical purposes. Therefore, globalization as a structural variable conditions 
other variables, namely counterterrorism culture of a nation-state and the new 
threat. 
The figure on the next page demonstrates how globalization affects other 
variables. Globalization, depicted as the circular platform, affects nation-states and 
the formation process of the threat of transnational terrorism. However, since other 
variables include agency or political groups that take action by their own choice, 
they are still separate variables with independent effect on the dependent variable.  
Globalization creates suitable environment for the conduct of non-state 
violence. This becomes possible by the technology-driven time-space compression. 
That is, geographical distance becomes a lesser obstacle in the conduct of violence. 
Action-reaction time-period is shortened. This is roughly called deterritorialization 
whose implication for strategy is elaborated in Chapter 4. Interconnectedness 
increased for both private and public (or state and non-state) entities and 
transactions of any kind changed with respect to form and speed. Societal and 
logistical dimensions of the new threat come into life due to these features of the 
                     
48 Bell, Duncan S. A. 2003. “History and Globalization: Reflections on Temporality” International 
Affairs, 79, 4, pp. 801-814; Hopkins, A. G. 2002. ed. Globalization in World History London: 
Pimlico. 
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independent variable of globalization.  
Yet, globalization is not a direct cause for the creation of the new threat; 
rather, it presents window of opportunities that are exploited by violent extremism. 
Thus, apart from its civil uses, globalization leaves open a dark side of it to be 
advantaged by violent groups. While globalization gives permissive causes for the 
formation of private violence, it simultaneously hardens the difficulties that nation-
states face by presenting problems of categorization, prioritization/strategizing and 
coordination within and among bureaucracies.  
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2.9. How Does Globalization Condition ‘The New Threat’? 
What is structurally distinct about the contemporary security environment is 
that there is an ongoing diffusion of power owing to globalization. What is meant 
by ‘diffusion of power’? Power resources such as economy, weapons, knowledge, 
technology, skill and mobility of citizens increased both in depth and breadth or 
qualitatively and quantitatively. They became available not only for nation-
states/public entities, but for private/non-sovereign entities as well. Resources of 
power (which are used both by nation-states to counter threats and by non-state 
entities to challenge the status quo) expanded world over. Such power-diffusion is a 
distinct feature of the present era, and it is chiefly a structural feature related to 
globalization.  
Power is more diffused and took different forms. Conventional lenses give 
contradictory accounts about the repercussions of power diffusion on new polar 
configuration or lack of polarity itself. Yet, what is more fundamental than the 
debate on polarity or politics of power-balancing is the phenomenon entitled as 
‘globalization and terrorism’. The relation between globalization and terrorism 
displays how power is scattered. Illicitly funded asymmetrical warfare is one of the 
manifestations of power diffusion. It is also the chief example to the changing way 
power is used. Transnational terrorism is an asymmetrical form of power that has 
global operational reach hand in hand with ideological propaganda. Globalization 
enhances terrorists’ operational reach or their unconventional power-projection 
ability. Weapons acquisition and financing of violence is facilitated through 
interconnectedness of goods and services. Furthermore, terrorist attacks instantly 
affect international public opinion thanks to real-time news of information and 
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communication technologies. This is how facilitating availabilities of the 
globalization process set the stage for non-state violence.  
Utmost importantly, globalization causes mobility both within and across 
nation-states. In other words, alongside the mobility across borders, the mobility is 
also within nation-states. This becomes possible by the technological leverage that 
globalization process provides for private entities. Thereby, states’ monopoly on 
the use of force is challenged by terrorist groups and nation-states’ capacity to 
control violence and manipulate information is relatively reduced. It is a relative 
reduction assessed in parallel to the rise of the autonomy of terrorist groups in 
financing and committing violence.  
States cannot control economic, financial flows as effectively as done 
before, and they do not have direction and control over transnational terrorist 
groups. Transnational terrorism, flourishing in the circumstances of globalization, 
is not a state-proxy. That allows its mobility across borders alongside the mobility 
within nation-states. Therefore, globalization paves the way for the formation of 
internal threats, too. Thus, globalization merges the internal and external realm of 
nation-states through interconnectedness that cannot be effectively controlled by 
states. This is the permissive structural circumstance that is open to be exploited by 
transnational terrorists. The structural circumstances or the independent variable of 
globalization is inherent to or embedded in the distinct dimensions of the 
transnational terrorism threat that is animated and put into effect by terrorist 
groups. 
 The ‘flow’ or ‘mobility’ of objects is the main feature of globalization that 
interconnects the world, though not necessarily interconnecting the minds of 
people. That is, different ideologies contend with each other. However, ideologues’ 
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recruiting tools are enhanced by advanced technology. Innovations especially in 
communication and transportation are the tools that terrorists take advantage in 
attracting new followers, acquiring weapons and communicating with each other. 
Globalization-induced availability of those means and instruments is at the 
service of terrorist groups: Globalization, by presenting a permissive cause, plays 
into the formation of the threat. Yet, globalization is not the direct cause of non-
state violence since it is, by definition, a structural variable. The conscious use of 
these power-resources is realized by transnational terrorist groups.  
Transnational terrorists act as if they were agents or actors. Suicide-
bombing, truck-bombs, kalashnikov, laptop, global positioning device, illicit 
trafficking of nuclear materials and devices, unregulated economic and financial 
transactions, and use of the Internet for mobilizing the masses are some of the 
catch-phrases telling of the way how globalization plays into the formation of the 
threat. 
Globalization diffuses power resources. In so doing, it affects the way 
power is used. Asymmetrical warfare is the non-state use of violence different from 
the way nation-states previously used it in the form of army battalions. 
Asymmetrical or unconventional warfare is not war in the proper sense, but 
certainly a form of it. Non-state use of power is the result of power diffusion 
around the world, which is a feature of globalization. This is how globalization-
caused power diffusion conditions the formation of the transnational terrorism 
threat. 
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2.10. How Does Globalization Condition Cooperation Problems Within 
and Among Nation-States?-The Circumstances within which States 
Behave 
Alongside terrorism as asymmetrical form of warfare, diffusion of power 
resources can be noticed even in social sciences. Power diffusion is an overarching 
development that has implications for most branches of social sciences, whose 
research programs and analyses reflect the way power spreads around the world: In 
addition to international relations and security, other branches such as international 
and domestic law, sociology, history, economy, political philosophy, and political 
science are also affected. The effect demonstrates itself as increasing overlaps and 
interdisciplinarity. The hardship is that there is now ever increasing overlaps 
among these branches. That is telling of the consequences of power-diffusion under 
globalization: interconnectedness and ever overlapping processes of any kind that 
requires academia to follow suit. 
Increasing interdisciplinarity and departmental overlaps is also valid for 
national bureaucracies. There are overlaps among bureaucratic categorizations and 
job-definitions. Moreover, the overlapping processes take place both within and 
among nation-states. The main point that explains how globalization affects states 
is that there is an increasing overlap among different job definitions of nation-state 
agencies. Globalization presents uneasy working conditions for states by giving 
way to problems of categorization, prioritization and coordination in national 
bureaucracies. That is basically how globalization affects nation-states’ working 
mechanisms and in turn conditions their behaviors. 
Globalization’s impact on nation-state strategizing and policy-making is 
remarkable. For one thing, criminality and warfare conflates into one another as 
does internal and external security threats. Police-work and military work exchange 
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roles.49Multinational troops that are deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq pursue tasks 
within cities, not on the battlefield. They try to neutralize insurgencies by 
cooperating with the tribal leaders. They try to bolster corruption-ridden 
governments. Nations sent police trainers and military trainers for the Afghan and 
Iraqi authorities. They provide money for civilian projects such as reconstruction, 
infrastructure and health facilities. Furthermore, coordination in the military side of 
the cooperation against transnational terrorism is not without problems. New 
NATO members are not fully qualified to work with older members. Intra-alliance 
training of new NATO members’ troops to be deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq 
continues. However, the training given cannot be categorized as pure military 
because it involves civil tasks as well as counter-insurgency tasks. 
Yet, counter-insurgency operations of 2000-2010 in Afghanistan and Iraq 
represent part of the responses to the transnational terrorism threat. 
Counterinsurgency is not the heart of counterterrorism cooperation. Since 
transnational terrorism is more about attacks against civilians in different countries 
around the world, most counterterrorism effort is carried out at the inter-agency 
level among different states. Coordination of different, and yet overlapping, tasks 
are assigned to police, judiciary, internal and external intelligence agencies and the 
media of each nation that are in cooperation with those of another nation. However, 
categorizations and thereby prioritization/strategizing become harder for nation-
states owing to interconnectedness of national security issue-areas: Diffusion of 
power resources under globalization gives way to overlapping categories and to 
interconnectedness of previously separate fields of work. Besides, as it is 
                     
49Bensahel, Nora. “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism”, Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism 29/1 January–February 2006, 35-49; Bensahel, Nora. 2003. The 
Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND; and Fair, C. Christine. 2004. “The Counterterror Coalition: Cooperation with 
India and Pakistan” Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
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elaborated in the following chapters, national decision-makers’ challenge of 
prioritization and balancing different national security interests with one another 
became severe due to hard policy trade-offs because implementation of different 
policies depend upon each other more than ever. Those are the ways how 
globalization structurally limits and exacerbates inter-state counterterrorism 
cooperation.  
Issue-areas of security and thereby threats to national security increased in 
kind and number. Moreover, they became multi-faceted and ever overlapping. 
Different, and yet, overlapping threats such as migration, environmental problems, 
pandemics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit trafficking (of 
money, nuclear materials, small weapons, narcotics, precious stones, human 
beings), poverty, criminal organizations’ activities such as money laundering, and 
terrorism depend upon one another to continue to exist. They manifested 
themselves as being ‘transnational’ threats. Transnational threats are both an 
external and internal threat at the same time. Transnational threats challenge states’ 
indigenous capability of detecting, arresting or crashing illicit activities. 
Importantly, the challenge takes place both inside and outside of national 
jurisprudence.  
The overlapping nature of these transnational threats rose to prominence 
due to globalization: the best example for the scope of this study is again the 
conflation of criminality and terrorism.50Corresponding to the overlapping features 
                     
50 Bjornehed, Emma. “Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror” 
Global Crime Vol. 6, No. 3&4, August–November 2004, pp. 305-324; Levitt, Matthew. 
“Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover Between 
Terrorist Groups” SAIS Review Vol. 24, No. 1 Winter-Spring; Thachuk, Kimberley. “Countering 
Terrorist Support Structures” Defense Against Terrorism Review Vol. 1 No.1 Spring 2008, pp.13-
28; Croissant, Aurel. 2007. “Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing and Government 
Responses in Southeast Asia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30:131-156; Levitt, Matthew A. 
2002. “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” Middle East Review of International 
Affairs, 6, 4: 49-65; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2007. Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking 
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of the threat, counter-terrorism fields overlap with each other: Financial tracking, 
surveillance of communication routes, law-enforcement, intelligence gathering, 
coordination, assessment and sharing, military operations, black market 
surveillance and investigation, border security, critical infrastructure protection, 
civil responders and the media have all become interrelated and overlapping. Law-
enforcement and military are affected the most because they exchanged their 
missions to certain extent. Police-work comprises activities related to national 
security, and the military is assigned seek-and-destroy missions against semi-
criminal entities.51Hence, bureaucratic job-definitions are blurred.  
Although nation-states’ problem of strategizing in the face of several 
overlapping fields or issue-areas is not new, the conflation and ambiguity among 
job-definitions of state agencies seem to be higher than the previous eras. Different 
national security interests regarding energy, demography, economy and military 
strategy have been interrelated for a long time now. However, not only 
counterterrorism is included in these national security issue-areas, but also 
counterterrorism undercuts or impedes the work that is required for other issue-
areas. Furthermore, the work specifically undertaken for counterterrorism alone is 
such that military tasks of counterterrorism cancels anti-terrorist intelligence 
gathering. In other cases, police-work duplicates military work. This is how the 
                                                                
in Arms, Drugs and Human Life Westport, Conn: Praeger; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2002. 
“Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: Can It Be Severed?” Strategic Forum, Institute for the National 
Strategic Studies Defense University, Washington DC. 191-May; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2005. 
“Corruption: The International Security Dimension,” SAIS Review 25, 1: 143-152; Porter, Richard 
D. and Ruth Judson. 1996. The Location of US Currency: How Much Is Abroad? Federal Reserve of 
St. Louis; Baker, Raymond. 1999. “Money Laundering and Flight Capital: The Impact on Private 
Banking”, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
10 November; Pearl, Daniel and Steve Stecklow. 2002. “Taliban Banned TV but Collected Profits 
on Smuggled Sonys,” Wall Street Journal, 9 January; Napoleoni, Loretta. 2005. “Money and 
Terrorism” Friede, http://www.fride.org/publicacion/93/dinero-y-terrorism; Napoleoni, Loretta. 
2003. Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks. London: Pluto Press; 
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operational environment of states is shaped by globalization. 
 
2.11. The Unit-Level Independent Variable: Contending Counter-
Terrorism Cultures of Nation-States 
Inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism has confronted the 
above-mentioned operational environment induced by globalization. The 
circumstances within which states carry out their policies have worsened. The 
work-load tremendously increased and became complicating for authorities 
because counterterrorism issue-areas proliferated with remarkable overlaps. 
Combating such threats entailed a network-like steady coordination among state 
departments that have different competences and mandates. As indicated in the 
above section on how globalization shapes the contemporary environment, the 
internal security authorities and external security forces conflated into each other. 
Police, intelligence agencies and military partly exchanged their roles. Indeed, they 
became dependent on each other to remedy the threat. This is the globalization-
caused operational environment in which states find themselves.  
Apart from this environment within which states act, nation-state decisions 
depend on their counterterrorism cultures.  While globalization conditions the 
context for state actions, it does not fully determine states’ immediate decisions and 
actions. The working conditions of cooperative state bureaucracies worsened due to 
globalization, yet that is a structural determinant of nation-state policies. The latter 
is different from national decision-making, which is also largely affected by the 
counterterrorism culture of a state.  
Counterterrorism culture of a nation-state is about how states perceive and 
assess threats and devise response-policies. Since states are sovereign in that they 
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retain the right to craft their own policies, they may differ on the strategy to be 
followed. Each may decide on a particular method or strategy to face the 
transnational terrorism threat. Counterterrorism culture, as sub-category of a 
nation’s strategic culture, is marked by the history of a state’s experience with 
terrorism. The concept of ‘strategic culture’, and ‘counterterrorism culture’ as an 
extension of it, are based on the understanding that nation-states are inclined or 
predisposed by their historical experiences, political systems and cultures to 
respond threats. It tends to accept that states may drive lessons from their historical 
experiences. Sustaining economic performance and military capabilities of a state 
may influence strategic choices, yet the concept of strategic culture presumes that 
state preferences will be mostly determined by its past.  
The study focuses on the decisions of the EU as a supranational institution, 
the behaviours of the EU states and the behaviours of the US, especially before and 
after they are victimized by terrorist attacks. It is important to explain the reasons 
for such a selection. The reasons for studying the words and deeds of European 
states and those of the US are four-fold: 
First, these countries are directly targeted by transnational terrorist groups, 
whose pronouncements directly confront Europe and the US. The values of the 
West such as democracy, rule of law and individual liberties are addressed by 
transnational terrorists groups as targets to be demolished. Transnational 
terrorism’s challenge against the dominant Western economic and political order of 
international relations is anti-hegemonic and it concerns the West most.  
Secondly, these states are commonly regarded in the world-wide academic 
literature as the most powerful ones in the system. As such, they are also 
commonly referred to as ‘major powers’. They rank highest regarding most criteria 
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that are used to measure national power. Accordingly, European states and 
especially the US have been setting the world agenda more than other states. Their 
political, diplomatic, economic and military clout is higher than the rest of the 
states. This is reflected in the power to obstruct or pressure for the adoption of most 
decisions and resolutions of international organizations such as the UN, Concert of 
Europe, International Monetary Fund and the NATO. Indeed, most international 
organizations that are of international significance were established by these states 
in the very first place. 
Thirdly, those states are the ones that experience the highest turbulence in 
relations with their citizenry due to the ideological propaganda of transnational 
terrorist groups that shuns the values of the West. These countries are so much at 
the target of transnational terrorism that a country that establishes cooperative 
relations with them takes a risk in its association with them. The content analysis of 
Al Qaeda declarations and the examination of their attacks indicate that the new 
threat is particularly against the strong or major states above all. That is why 
transnational terrorism has a strategic dimension and acquired a national security 
threat status for Europe and the US. Even before the terrorist attacks in Europe took 
place, European states were quick to support the US in the immediate aftermath of 
the September 11 attacks. That is because they assessed the new threat to be 
directed at them, too. That proved right and several terrorist attacks in Europe 
followed September 11. Although it is not much publicized in foreign daily 
newspapers so as not to cause societal unrest and panic, transnational terrorism 
continues to pose a dire threat to Europe and the US. There have been a dozen 
foiled attacks in Europe, and twenty-nine foiled attacks in the US since September 
11. Thus, the burden of defense against transnational terrorism is mostly on the 
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shoulders of European and American governments. 
Fourth reason is that these nations have the most advanced capabilities to 
wage conventional and unconventional warfare when compared to those of most 
other nations. They still train other nations’ anti-terrorism and intelligence 
personnel, give technological and economic support and mostly channel the course 
and agenda of the struggle against transnational terrorism. For all of these reasons, 
European states’ policies and the US policy on counterterrorism are examined in 
this study. The contending counterterrorism cultures of the transatlantic partners 
accounts for their different responses to terrorist attacks, which are detailed in 
chapter six and chapter eight.   
 
2.12. The Working Definition of ‘Transnational Terrorism Threat’ 
It is important to specify what is meant by the threat of transnational 
terrorism or ‘transnational terrorist threat’ that is posed by transnational terrorist 
groups. To that end, it goes without saying that terrorism is not a new phenomenon. 
It has been a problem for centuries. Although the contemporary manifestation of 
terrorism has been internationally debated for a decade now as to whether it 
constitutes a new kind of terrorism or not, this study is not involved in this debate 
per se. Whether transnationality of terrorism constitutes a new kind of terrorism is 
outside of the main scope of the study, which is not after figuring out whether 
terrorism is transformed.  
The dissertation is not involved in the debate whether the new dimensions 
or form of terrorism amounts to a ‘new terrorism’. Rather, the study focuses on the 
new features or manifestation of the transnational terrorism threat without tackling 
the debate on implications of these new manifestations for the nature or essence of 
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terrorism. Transnational terrorism may be assessed by different scholarly and 
governmental circles as constituting a new terrorism entirely different from the 
ones previously experienced. It may alternatively be regarded as constituting just a 
new version of the age-old terrorism as usual. Although assessments differ, 
manifestation of a threat is distinguishable from nature of threat itself. Although 
form and essence are correlated, different forms are not necessarily equivalent to 
different essences. The relationship between the manifestation and the nature of 
terrorism is a separate research subject that might be studied elsewhere. Therefore, 
distinctive features of the terrorist threat and the nature of the threat are two 
separate subject-matters. Distinctive features of the terrorist threat are separable 
from the discussions over whether these features also give way to a distinct threat 
in essence or ontology.  
This dissertation is not studying the linkage between manifestations of 
terrorism and essence of terrorism. It is just concentrating on the distinctive 
manifestation of the transnational terrorist threat alone: Novel characteristics are 
brought forth without seeking whether these novel features mean transformation of 
terrorism. This is possible because whatever categorization is applied to 
transnational terrorism, it has distinct characteristics as demonstrated in Chapter 7. 
However, whether these distinctive characteristics add up to transformation of 
terrorism requires a separate research to be conducted elsewhere.  
One of the independent variables explained in the dissertation is based upon 
‘the distinctiveness of the transnational terrorism threat itself’. It is argued that it 
has the highest explanatory power in explaining inter-state cooperation against 
transnational terrorism. Yet, this variable is studied in a way irrespective of 
whatever rubric, label or category the contemporary manifestation of terrorism is 
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placed under. This is simply because ‘the new terrorism debate’ is not central to the 
research question at hand. It is thereby outside the main scope of the study, which 
is interested in nation-state reactions and counter-policies in the way they define 
the situation. The focal point of the study is neither the evolution of terrorism nor 
its types. The focal point is on the form of inter-state cooperation: the form of 
nation-states’ cooperative responses against what they regard as a national security 
threat. In doing so, NATO is specified as the main exemplary institutional 
framework to test whether form of cooperation in alliances change or not. The 
dissertation is limited to the impact of globalization and transnational terrorism 
threat upon international security and alliance politics. As such, this is an 
international security study rather than being a study on terrorism per se. 
Furthermore, leaving ‘the new terrorism debate’ out is an analytical and 
methodological requirement so as not to be biased or entrapped by analytical 
conceptions of other research programs on different topics. Consequently, 
‘transnational terrorist threat’ implied in the research question refers to the 
distinctive dimensions or manifestations of the transnational terrorism threat against 
many nation-states around the world. This is the working definition of the 
transnational threat. It is the definitional framework for what is studied under ‘the 
transnational terrorist threat’ against which inter-state efforts are carried out.  
Hereafter, ‘the new threat’ is used throughout the dissertation to denote ‘the 
distinctive dimensions or manifestation of the threat of transnational terrorism’. Yet 
again, it is important to reiterate that the label ‘the new threat’ is not meant to argue 
that transnational terrorism is a new kind of terrorism. It is not referring to essence 
of terrorism either. The word ‘new’, in the phrase “the new threat”, just refers to 
terrorism’s novel manifestation short of its implications for the evolution of 
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terrorism.  
 
2.13. Why Is ‘The New Threat’ Itself an Independent Variable? : 
‘Transnationality’ 
The scale of extremist attacks and the governmental responses are taken as 
a guide for the working definition of ‘transnationality’ and for what is meant by 
transnational terrorism and due groups: While terrorism has not emerged in the 
twenty-first century, its scale of operations and political weight has increased in the 
late 20th century. States have seldom seen it as a national security threat in the 
previous eras; rather, they mostly treated it as a criminal issue, which was privately 
countered by their domestic law-enforcement means.52 
Contrastingly, the start of the twenty-first century records the initiation of a 
collective effort by states that started to see terrorism as an international security 
threat to be countered internationally and by all means deemed necessary - not just 
by criminal prosecution. In that sense, the study’s selection (of ‘terrorism with a 
global reach’ as the target that is countered by states in cooperation) is a technical 
choice. Previously known terrorist groups did not stimulate a wide-ranging 
international effort by many states, and they remained relatively local when 
compared to the manifestation of terrorism in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. That is due to scale of contemporary terrorist attacks. Former groups hit 
mostly a single country, while contemporary terrorism hits many countries. 
September 11, 2001 New York City, Virginia and Pennsylvania; 12 October, 2002 
Bali; November 15, 2003 and November 20, 2003 Istanbul; May 16, 2003 
                     
52About previous state-responses in the 20th century, Evans, Graham. 1990. The Dictionary of World 
Politics. NY: Simon & Schuster, p. 388; Rapoport, David. 1992. “Terrorism,” in Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics M. Hawkesworth and M. Kogan, eds. London: 
Routledge. 
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Casablanca; 11 March, 2004 Spain; September 1, 2004 Beslan; 7 July, 2005 
London; 26-29 November, 2008 Mumbai are some of the examples to the 
overarching geographical extension of the new threat. So far, transnational 
terrorism threat seems to be identical with the threat of international terrorism.  
However, it is also crucially important to define what it is not: 
Transnational terrorism is not international terrorism. Transnational terrorist 
threats are more than attacks in many states. In other words, transnational threats 
are not equal to international threats. “Transnationality” is the distinct feature of 
contemporary terrorism around the world: 
-  A massive and dispersed body of followers all around the world whose 
whereabouts are unclear 
- No nation-state-control, manipulation or sponsorship over transnational 
terrorist groups (Thus, no internationality is included. They are active in the 
societal dimension, which might be also called ‘the uncivil society’ 
dimension). 
- Merger with organized crime and unregulated financing that is supported by 
black markets and corrupt officials53(Previously, almost a clear distinction 
between criminality and terrorism was possible. Such a distinction does not 
apply to transnational terrorism. 
- Lack of a territory (base, headquarters or address) to be retaliated at, which 
cancels deterrence. 
- Incorrigibility; closed to bargaining, negotiation or compromise 
                     
53Thachuk, Kimberley. 2008. Countering Terrorist Support Structures. Defense Against Terrorism 
Review DATR Vol.1 No.1, p.13-29. 
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- Open endorsement of indiscriminate killing as determined choice; pursuing 
any means that give catastrophic effect such as exploding jets into 
buildings, suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or seeking WMD 
- Possessing suicide-bombers as the smartest weapon54 
- Effective combination of the pre-modern and modern skills and technology in 
carrying out attacks (the use of hawala, hundis, banking system, explosives, 
airliners, GPS and the Internet) 
- A learning curve higher than other terrorist groups, which enables them to be 
ever adaptive to state-responses. 
 
These distinct features of the contemporary manifestation of terrorism limit 
inter-state cooperation against it. Put differently, due to these above-mentioned 
features, the threat itself is a limit against inter-state cooperation. Its ambiguous 
features animate both internal and external threats. Above-mentioned features play 
into the disagreements among states as to what methods and strategies to be 
followed in the fight against it. That is why the new threat is a separate variable on 
its own. As explained in the next section, the new threat variable is more 
determining than both the variable of contending national counterterrorism cultures 
and that of globalization. 
The ambiguity of the threat reduces the cohesion among cooperation 
partners: Its distinct features are immune to traditional and established war-fighting 
schemes and bureaucratic organization of nation-states. Its ambiguity and societal 
dimension means the erosion of the distinction between internal and external 
threats. It also imposes upon nation-states to work in ways that compromise their 
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75 
 
sovereignty through new national, international and supra-national legislature 
needed for the collective anti-terrorist cause. Not only strategy, but both domestic 
and international law have become included in the fight against the new threat; a 
feature totally different from the previous cooperative struggles against state-
centric threats. Thus, the new threat is itself a limit against inter-state cooperation 
forcing states to re-design bureaucratic working-mechanisms alongside forcing 
nation-states to overhaul their foreign relations with other states. Above-enlisted 
features of the new threat point to the non-state and transnational characteristics of 
the new threat. Utmost importantly, these characteristics are different from threats 
coming from other nation-states with regard to organization, scale, ideology, 
political autonomy, and economic and weapons capacity. Thus, inter-state 
cooperation against the new threat is shaped by the distinct characteristics of the 
threat itself.  
The exercise of power by non-state entities became much more de-
centralized and autonomous in organization. Besides, they are operationally active 
both within and beyond borders of many nations, not within a single nation. Thus, 
setting them apart from previous terrorist groups, contemporary terrorists obtained 
global reach that is underwritten by the increase in their autonomy from nation-
states and by the increase in their scale of operations.  
 ‘Transnational security threat’ is an oxymoron itself. As every oxymoron 
underlines an ironic point, transnational threat underlines a point, too: its own 
distinctive features. Viewed from the international security perspective, it is both an 
internal and external threat simultaneously. It can hit countries both from inside and 
outside. Therefore, the features of the threat force itself upon state authorities by 
challenging the established conceptual lenses with which threats are previously 
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understood and assessed. This has complicating ramifications for counterterrorism 
coordination both within and among nations.55The issue becomes more 
complicating for states when transnational terrorism is entangled with criminality 
and funded by a global black market.56 
One of the different features or dimensions of the transnational threat is 
worth reiterating: different from the earlier forms of terrorism, the late 20th and 
early 21st century terrorism got out of nation-state control and manipulation - they 
are less of a proxy status.57They do not belong to the inter-national template: It 
goes without saying that the states-system is composed of nation-states separated 
by sovereign borders, which are political lines that divide the external and internal 
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‘relations among nation-states’. These two separate realms of the internal and the 
external correspond to internal sovereignty of states, and to its corollary, namely 
external sovereignty or international anarchy. That is the root political template 
within which the threat assessments are made by nation-states. This analytical 
scheme has not foreseen non-state formations acting as if they are independent 
agents of political consequence that hardly see halt at national border security. Any 
regular person without arrest warrant or criminal record is hardly a suspect and can 
travel without interruption if there is no prior intelligence about him/her. Besides, 
illegal or unregulated access to national territories is not rare.58Besides, insider or 
sleeper cells reside within the countries that are attacked and these attacks may be 
carried out by the resident citizen of the attacked country. Therefore, transnational 
threats operate mostly beyond the intellectual and practical templates of the nation-
states system and national bureaucratic organization.59 
Outstandingly, unlike the previous manifestations of terrorism, transnational 
terrorist groups are not trying to correct alleged wrongdoings while still approving 
the system and working within it. They are challenging and trying to transform the 
system itself through destruction, however far-fetched their objective is:60 They do 
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not fall squarely into the category of state-proxies as it was mostly the case during 
the Cold War. They break free to evolve into self-subsistent networked structure. 
It is not that nation-states do not play partial roles in the formation of the 
networked structure of terrorism by turning a blind eye in order not to invite threats 
or due to lack of capacity to oversee them as in the case of failing-states. However, 
that is not a central role in their subsistence. Investigations reportedly indicate that 
most terrorist attacks of the twenty-first century are devoid of both passive and 
active government support. Some terrorist groups approximate autarchic entities 
due to illicit black markets of finance and weapons. This is terrorism under ever 
complicated and complicating licit and illicit global economy and finance. Yet, 
globalization permits or conditions the agents of political violence; it does not 
cause terrorism directly. The non-state entity is a purposeful unit that gives life to 
destruction. That is why globalization as a structural variable is separate from the 
new threat variable. 
Under these circumstances, there is no geographically clear threat. Hot-
spots are everywhere and may arise even without short-notice. Transnational 
threats have no addresses and they spread like the nodes of the Internet. Bearing in 
mind the complications of the thorny analogy, the threat works as if there seems to 
be an approximate analogy to the forward-defence doctrine: Interests are 
everywhere and thus borders are everywhere; power-projection has key 
importance. With partially corresponding logic, hotspots of terrorism are 
everywhere. Transnational terrorism is arguably akin to something nebulous as 
‘unconventional forward defence’. Yet, the units and their means are different from 
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those of nations-states, and the geographical location is largely out of the equation. 
The point is that transnational terrorism is similar to asymmetrical power-
projection of private entities against nation-states.  
Due to these distinctive features of transnational terrorism, no 
counterterrorism effort focusing on a single field of cooperation matches the threat. 
International cooperation requires coordination of intergovernmental and 
interagency responses. Cooperation among several agencies of different nations has 
to focus on the interfaces among police, military, financial, intelligence and 
judiciary activities, not to mention the dissuasion and persuasion aspect of the 
problem through public diplomacy and counter-propaganda or what is commonly 
referred to as winning hearts and minds of people. Yet, ‘best-practices’ (to use the 
international organizations jargon) seem to be slow-developing. 
 
2.14. Why Does ‘The New Threat’ Have the Most Explanatory Power 
When Compared to Other Independent Variables? 
In order to answer the research question, it became essential to clarify more 
than the structural features of the contemporary security landscape. Instead of 
ignoring non-state formations, almost all causalities that are involved in the 
contemporary security environment are determined. Figure 1 is intended to help 
clarify both the argument itself and the study methodologically. Yet, so as not to be 
superfluous, the casual center of gravity is put on ‘the new threat variable’.  
Why does the new threat have the most explanatory power? It is so because 
transnationality of the threat, which gives its distinctiveness, does not correspond to 
working mechanism of state bureaucracies. It is alien to the entire political template 
of the Westphalian states-system. Thus, it affects cooperation much more than 
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other variables such as national counterterrorism cultures, which can be seen more 
of an insider variable to the state-system.  
 Transnational threats are the most limiting factor regarding inter-state 
cooperation because its features create bureaucratic and analytical conundrums: 
The feature of ‘transnationality’ obstructs application of established concepts to 
transnational terrorism. This hardship of applying former concepts to the new threat 
creates half-responses because most concepts related to law enforcement, domestic 
law or military strategy fall short of addressing it.  
Since states are organized along these established concepts, doctrines, 
definitions and working-mechanisms, state responses are hard to design let alone 
implementing them. The hardship for nation-states starts with identifying the threat 
and then it goes on as to how states work out a strategy. The new threat defies the 
Clausewitzan trilogy of strategy, and as such military strategy doctrines are just 
offering recommendations which actually apply to state-centric warfare. By 
crossing established boundaries, the new threat is the biggest factor that hinders 
inter-state cooperation among states because transnational terrorism blurs the 
boundaries between external security and internal security. 
Moreover, state responses are likely to be mixed, ranging from the use of 
force to increasing internal security measures such as law enforcement and judicial 
action. Creating a common cooperative ground is not easy even when all states in 
cooperation managed to minimize their divergences on how to fight it. Even if 
contending counterterrorism cultures are absent and all cooperative states pursue a 
common counterterrorism strategy, the above-mentioned features of the new threat 
continue to present problems of cooperation both within and among national 
bureaucracies and institutions. Since transnational threats are not international 
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threats, it conflates almost all analytical schemes and categorization in the body-
politic of nation-states. If it was an international or state-centric threat, it would be 
more likely to effectively benefit from previous national and international 
organizational schemes and institutions without the need for re-arrangements owing 
to the fact that there are already established means and protocols to respond 
accustomed threats, which are threats coming from other nation-states.  
As such, the new threat carries potential and likelihood to cause change in 
the states’ working-mechanisms. New national institutions and intra-state tasks 
have already been initiated. Thereby, the new threat is likely to cause modifications 
in the counterterrorism cultures of states in the future. That is, the new threat also 
affects the counterterrorism cultures of states. As of 2010, Obama administration’s 
counterterrorism policy demonstrates a shift from those of two G. W. Bush 
administrations.61 
Another example is the way the new threat channels the EU policies in 
addition to its effect on individual policies of European states. The integration of 
the first pillar and third pillar of the EU is underway, fundamentally as a response 
to transnational terrorism. The EU aims to conduct a distinctive foreign and 
security policy that sees it starting point as the peculiar response it gives to 
transnational terrorism. To sum up, transnational features of the threat stimulates a 
remarkable overhauling or rearrangement process in states.  
This is so much so that it modifies not only strategy, but it also modifies 
domestic law. An eminent academic Philip Bobbitt, in his book Terror and 
Consent, persuasively argues that transnational terrorism slowly changes the 
Western constitutional order. Thus, transnational terrorism does not stop at killing 
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people. It gradually leads to institutional and constitutional change inside the states 
that are hit. Although the point is elaborated in the following chapters, it might 
suffice it here to underline that he argues that transnational terrorism imposes new 
strategies that include domestic and international legislative rearrangements. 
Strategy concerns the role of the State in defending itself from violence from other 
states, while law has to do with the role of the State in monopolizing legitimate 
violence within its own borders. In the twentieth century, it made sense to separate 
law and strategy… democratic nations in the past successfully protected themselves 
from aggression and largely avoided domestic repression. Nevertheless, this 
particular habit of insulating law from strategy (and vice versa) can contribute to our 
defeat in the century we have entered because the threats posed by the twenty-first 
century terrorists do not arise from the politics of a hostile nation state - such threats 
were the domain of strategy, not law – nor do they arise from causes within a nation 
state.62  
 
As such, the new threat itself affects nation-states in not only how they 
cooperate among each other, but also in how they organize themselves internally. 
The empirical chapter details such national institutional overhauling. In order to 
cooperate, states must have corresponding institutions that can communicate with 
each other based on the rule of law. Thus, labeling the new threat as ‘international’, 
rather than defining it as ‘transnational’, runs the risk of an illusion such that the 
threat concerned was just one of the state-centric threats that can be responded with 
classical international security measures of defense and military. Military defensive 
measures are just one of the aspects of the counterterrorism effort by states. The 
previous cooperation dynamics demonstrated by states in the past seem to fall short 
as examined in chapter eight. 
The new threat does not come directly from a nation-state. It is not 
sponsored indirectly by any nation-state either. In cases where it takes refuge in 
some of the states such as Afghanistan, it is not the state that controls transnational 
terrorist groups: More often than not, it is the transnational groups that control or 
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manipulate the governments.63Terrorists’ use of failed states as safe-havens does 
not give terrorism an international dimension. Indeed, the reverse is valid. Since the 
state providing safe-havens is a failed one, it cannot get rid of the terrorist elements 
let alone control them. That gives the new threat a transnational dimension that 
defies states from both inside and outside of their borders. The defiant or challenger 
is transnational terrorism threat that operates at the societal and non-state 
dimension. 
As Stephen M. Walt maintains, transnational terrorism is not a Realist 
phenomenon: “It seems to me, a Realist would have to concede that the 
phenomenon of al Qaeda is not really a Realist phenomenon. It's not a state. You 
could invent ways of squeezing it [into the theory] in different ways.”64To perceive 
terrorist groups through the state within which they reside for a certain period of 
time is an analytical squeezing that categorically equates terrorists with nation-
states. That might have unintended consequences simply because such analytical 
squeezing does not address the threat directly. In order to address it directly, 
strategists seem to be forced to combine strategy with law: 
We tend to associate terrorism with institutions that command power within, but 
not among states, that is, in the domain of law, not strategy. Yet, twenty-first 
century terrorism is unlike that of the preceding century in that it possesses a 
significant strategic dimension. To combat twenty-first century terrorism, we shall 
have to think in terms of strategies that reinforce the legal institutions that 
command power among states as well as anticipatory legal institutions that operate 
strategically within our borders – that is we have to think in terms of the 
confluence of strategy and law.65  
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The terms ‘transnational’ and ‘international’ are not synonyms. They denote 
different conceptions. The distinct feature of the new threat, namely 
transnationality does not refer to state-centric processes. It refers to private or non-
state processes in economy, finance, logistics, ideology and conduct of illicit 
violence that break the state monopoly on the use of force. The threat has trans-
national features, not inter-national features.  
Transnationality, on its own, is an important determinant for inter-state 
cooperative response. The way the cooperative response is crafted by states 
depends on transnational features of the new threat more than on other independent 
variables. Why is the new threat more determining than other variables? Because, 
on one hand, the new manifestation or dimensions of the transnational terrorist 
threat is the activation or animation of the circumstances that globalization leaves 
open to be exploited. In so doing, it enlivens or puts life into the structural variable 
of globalization. It is, thereby, one step beyond globalization. Without non-state 
groups’ actions, the available circumstances presented by globalization would not 
lead to violence. Globalization, as a structural variable, is an indirect independent 
variable that conditions or contextualizes inter-state cooperation. Yet, the threat 
variable also reflects agency, the conscious decision and implementation of terrorist 
attacks. Without transnational terrorist groups, there would be nothing to fight 
against. Globalization would continue to present windows of opportunities for 
violence without the occurrence of private violence. 
On the other hand, the new threat determines the dependent variable more 
than the counterterrorism cultures of states do. National differences about counter-
strategies have frequently accompanied international relations. If the contemporary 
threat was posed by a state, national differences would exist again. However, 
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diverging from the disagreements over how to respond a nation-state threat such as 
threat of use of force, invasion, sporadic military raids, attrition or blitzkrieg, the 
disagreements among governments over how to respond non-state threats are 
heavier in that the qualities of the new threat worsens the ever present hardships of 
reaching a common strategy. Devising common strategies and roadmaps were very 
hard even during the Cold War where the threat was relatively much clearer. 
Nevertheless, Europe and the US still diverged on the methods to respond the 
Soviet threat. Therefore, contending national counterterrorism cultures exist long 
before the new threat exposure. The ways states perceive threats and the ways they 
assess the strategies to counter threats have almost always diverged from each 
other.  
Underlining the higher weight of the new threat variable, this age-old 
obstacle of contending counterterrorism cultures and assessments are aggravated by 
the distinct dimensions of the new threat, which would impede inter-state 
cooperation even in the absence of contending counterterrorism cultures. Even if 
states converged on all points of a common counterterrorist strategy, the new threat 
would continue to present dire difficulties such as categorization, prioritization and 
coordination among states. The new threat itself exacerbated the implementation of 
cooperative inter-state responses to an unprecedented extent. That is fundamentally 
because the new threat cancels the established bureaucratic working routine of state 
institutions and the ways they interact. Thus, the threat is the most significant 
variable in explaining cooperative problems. Yet, that does not annul other 
variables. The variable of the new threat is just the higher determining variable 
affecting inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism.  
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Another reason for singling out the variable of threat originates from the 
accumulation of alliances and cooperation literature: The literature focuses on 
threats. The threat that is countered by states is the main determinant of the form of 
cooperation among them. Whether it is conducted in an institutionalized form such 
as NATO, or on an ad hoc basis such as ‘the coalition of the willing’, cooperation 
is almost always against a perceived threat, only secondly for something else. 
Threats channel the way cooperation and alliance is conducted. In other words, 
security cooperation among states usually aims at protection from threats – that are 
destructive factors and agents. The literature on cooperation and alliance does not 
address the need to make peace; rather it addresses the ways to protect nation-states 
from threats. Building up or sharing peace-dividends is a lesser priority due to the 
security dilemma and international anarchy.66Thus, the literature on inter-state 
security cooperation has been revolving around a threat in a specific context. Thus, 
it is appropriate via the alliance and cooperation literature to single out ‘the new 
threat variable’. The examination of nation-states’ words and deeds, or the 
discursive examination of nation-state declarations and their actual actions carried 
out on the ground might be traced throughout the study to reach conclusions about 
the main causality between the threat factor and inter-state cooperation and 
alignment against terrorism. 
An emphasis is put on ‘the new threat’ as a separate variable from both the 
structural variable of globalization and unit-level variable of states’ 
counterterrorism culture. Since ‘the new threat’ (or the distinctive features and 
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manifestation of transnational terrorism) is discussed to be the most determining 
independent variable, it is specifically studied in the chapters ahead. The variable 
of threat is argued to be the one with the higher explanatory power regarding 
whether past cooperative practices are still applied in the way they were applied 
during the Cold War. In understanding the past and present cooperation forms, a 
good guideline is claimed to be the new features or distinctiveness of the 
transnational threat. It appears to help understand the differences between the Cold 
War cooperation pattern and the cooperation pattern of the post-Cold War world.  
It is important to elucidate the different manifestation of the threat itself to 
explain why the threat is the most important variable that limits inter-state 
counterterrorist cooperation:  If a group of lines or connections are cut, there are 
other routes for terrorists that work as backdoors to hit states, similar to the nodal 
system of the Internet. Internet, by way of analogy, is akin to globalization and the 
transnational threat is akin to particular groups of computers, nodes or servers at 
the disposal of terrorists.  
Backdoors exist because nodes or terrorist groups are splintered cells that 
operate independently from one another at the societal level and in a fashion freed 
from state-control. They are also freed from any terrorist headquarters, too. They 
are, thus, autonomous in two senses: Small terrorist cells, which may also consist 
of just one individual at times, are autonomous from one another. That is, so-called 
foot-soldiers are independent from one another. Secondly, they are not hierarchical 
or not ruled under one single higher-command or master-mind.67They have 
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operational independence to large extent. Thus, they operationally grew more 
individualistic and atomistic; there is diffusion in the form and direction of attacks. 
Operational distinctiveness of the threat itself is a limit against international 
cooperation on the ground, leaving aside the political divergences of governments 
and contending counterterrorism cultures on how to fight it. 
Diffusion of command-and-control of the non-hierarchical structure of 
terrorism approximates globalization of terrorism. There is no centrality or 
concentration of any kind typical of the previous forms of terrorism. Information 
revolution has paved the way for networked/nodal character of terrorism unlike the 
centralized terrorist groups mostly striking a particular territory with other nation-
states’ support at their disposal.68Halvard Buhaugb (while criticizing the traditional 
military-strategy accounts of contemporary threats and form of warfare) explains 
the determinant role of the new threat:  
...Moreover, many readers will find the discussion (Londsdale’s work in 2004) 
anachronistic and largely irrelevant, as it relies on the implicit assumption that future 
wars echo past ones in that they involve clearly identifiable state actors and the 
ultimate strategic goal is surrender of the opponent. There is no discussion of how the 
information age is affecting the nature of today’s predominant forms of organized 
violence – civil war and terrorism – despite occasional references to the 9/11 events. 
Because of this, The Nature of War in the Information Age is not likely to attract much 
interest outside the small community of military strategy scholars.69 
 
Thus, the new threat embodies the characteristics of the contemporary 
strategic environment and it performs as the political violence that states are not 
institutionally prepared to respond. In due course, this dissertation attempts to fill in 
the above-mentioned vacuum both in the international relations theory and alliance 
literature by studying the impact of globalization upon security concerns of states, 
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the manifestation of the new threat and forms of inter-state cooperation. Without 
the pillars of the new strategic environment marked by globalization, it is hard to 
go down to the specifications of cooperative problems and the features of the new 
threat that is animated by terrorists. The new pillars are about differentiating the 
factors related to the research question and analyzing them. Accordingly, the 
structural variable of globalization, and variables of the new threat and contending 
counterterrorism cultures of states are analyzed.  
The dissertation is not typical because it attempts to study the new factors of 
international security. That is why theoretical examinations, that compose most of 
the chapters, are somewhat different from the accustomed literature in that it aims 
at filling in analytical blanks to the extent possible.  
The previous security environment of the Cold War period was different. 
The power politics among nation-states focused on the bipolar structure composed 
of huge power concentrations of the US and the former USSR, each forming a pole 
that balanced the other. The power differentials set these state-poles separate from 
the rest of the states. This is judged by the distribution of capabilities among states.  
Utmost importantly, the threat assessments of intelligence agencies were 
then only state-centric, and the threats were clear and present: that is, ‘the who’s 
and ‘the where’s of the perpetrators were known to intelligence agents, analysts and 
in turn to decision-makers. There was a geographical delimitation of the political 
and military rivalry, with the main theatre of the Cold War confrontation being the 
continental Europe. The belligerents knew who was in charge of the threat, and 
where it originated from. Threats had geographical confines and coordinates. The 
intelligence work had always dealt with unknowns by definition, but it was 
relatively easier before to capture enemies. 
90 
 
Now, there is no definitional clarity of the threat on the side of the states: 
fugitives, criminals, soldiers of other nations, insurgents and terrorists resist clear 
identification and differentiation from one another. Uncertainty of the identities and 
whereabouts of the perpetrators caused the contemporary intelligence ever harder. 
National or indigenous agencies were more or less doing a good job of at least 
saving the day when previous threats were emanating from a particular state. 
Most importantly, the ever more complex nature of the strategic 
environment and the diversity of contemporary security arrangements have tested 
the very notion of “alliance”.70The official NATO declarations emphasized that 
NATO have acquired a new dimension and become a political organization as well 
as a military one.  NATO authorities have repetitively declared that NATO is under 
an ongoing shift from ‘defence’ to ‘security’ in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century.  
The chapters that follow examine the independent variables that are already 
summarized. A separate chapter is invested for each variable, to be followed by an 
empirical chapter that tries to take them down to earth through the case of NATO 
transformation. It is concluded that previously demonstrated inter-state alignment 
and cooperation behaviours are rarely demonstrated against transnational terrorism 
threat. Rather, coalition of the willing type of cooperation is likely to be states’ first 
choice of response.  
 
                     
70Byman, Daniel. 2006. “Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 29:5, 767 – 811; Tertrais, Bruno. 2004. “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances” The 
Washington Quarterly 27:2, 135-150; Thies, Wallace J. “Was the US Invasion of Iraq NATO'S 
Worst Crisis Ever? How Would We Know? Why Should We Care?” European Security, 16:1, 29-
50; Kay, Sean. 2005. “What Went Wrong with NATO?” Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, 18:1; Schori, Pierre. 2005. “Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union, 
and Global Governance” Global Governance 11, 273-280; Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, 
Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. “Chapter One: Beyond the War on Terror” Adelphi Papers, 
47:389, 17-34. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON COOPERATION HYPOTHESES, 
ALLIANCE THEORIES AND THEIR STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES 
 
 
 ‘Alliance’ and ‘cooperation’ are interrelated terms that have concept kinship. 
Both of them refer to cooperation or joint work of states, yet they are also 
separable. In accordance, the terms represent two separate literatures, namely 
alliance politics literature and cooperation literature. It is, first, essential to note at 
the outset that the correlation between these literatures lies in one commonality, 
which is the states’ adjustment of their policies to one another in order to reduce the 
negative consequences for the partner state. Suitably, ‘cooperation’ and ‘alliance’ 
are mostly described with comparisons and contrasts with one another due to their 
interlocking features. Despite the separate sub-headings throughout this chapter, it 
is important to underscore that the two literatures overlap.  
Secondly, the theoretical literatures review herein tries to describe the recent 
conceptual developments in a way that correspond to traditional concepts and 
theories. In such a way, why new concepts are initiated in the way they did is as 
easy to see as to show the connection between cooperation and alliance, and the 
past and present of the literatures. 
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3.1. The Study of Cooperation - The Prevailing Literature 
 
The study of cooperation (whether in the form of alliances or not) has a 
jargon that includes terms such as alignment, commitment, goals and preferences. 
It is appropriate to clarify the jargon concisely.  
Any rational action presumes a goal to achieve and each nation-state is 
assumed to have some policy goal/s. Yet, ‘commonality of goal/s’ among states is 
another factor altogether that determines the effectiveness of any alignment among 
nation-states towards a certain line of political standing or understanding.  
Alignment does not refer to effective cooperation directly, nor does it refer to 
magnitude of commitment. Briefly, ‘alignment’ is a particular grouping of states 
and it is an ‘attempt’ at the relative lessening of distance between state preferences 
through coordination. When this attempt succeeds, cooperation occurs. Alignment 
is indicated by the will and due declaration of states to try to approximate a 
congenial viewpoint that presents advantages to aligned states. The condition of 
alignment, however, does not necessarily bring about immediate effective 
cooperation on its own, the will and declaration notwithstanding. The realization of 
practical payoffs for cooperating states requires burden-sharing, too. That is the 
degree of commitments undertaken and compliance with the alignment agreement. 
Even when states are aligned to one another, commitment of states might be 
perceived as low by participating nation-states and burden-sharing might be seen 
unbalanced or the degree of coordination might be perceived as insufficient to help 
achieve congruent results regarding the specified terms of alignment. As a 
consequence of such instances, free-riding71 usually occurs. More often than not, 
                     
71International burden-sharing is the question of how costs of common initiatives or the provision of 
public or collective goods should be shared between states. Free-riding is lack of burden-sharing: 
obtaining something with no or very less effort or cost; it is benefiting without contribution by taking 
advantage of the efforts of the rest. In other words, it is taking a share from the final-product with low 
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the allegations of free-riding hamper the cooperation, and it in turn causes erosion 
of cooperation or failure of it.  
Reliability and ensuing trust are key building blocks of cooperation. Free-
riding is detrimental to effective cooperation basically because it diminishes the 
reliability of free-riding partner due to its perceived or actual lack of commitment 
to the collective effort or cooperation. Few states prefer to work with states that are 
eager to take without giving. Then, seeking mutual benefits through adjustment of 
policies (coordination) entails trust and reciprocity. 
Reputation is another term that is used in conjunction with reliability. 
Reputation is the image or perception of a state created in the long term regarding 
its reliability during joint-work or co-operation of states. However, if it is asked to 
give one keyword or leitmotif for successful cooperation, it is reciprocity for it 
paves the way for the formation of adjustment of policies via coordination, 
reliability and reputation.  
Coordinated actions that emerge by means of adjustment of policies generally 
make cooperation easier to realize because this reduces the potential harm to states 
with different preferences. Contrastingly, different preferences erase the meaning 
of alignment if coordination is absent. In other words, ‘co-ordination’ is a key 
condition to ‘co-operation’. Adjustment of policies and the coordination created 
thereby aim to lessen the clash of policies that serve different preferences. 
                                                                
or no participation in its production - taking without giving. If all attempt to free-ride or freeload, 
however, there is no accomplishment of the task and no ‘ride’ at all- the job is not done producing no 
benefits for anybody. Free-riding is a common problem of collective action whose logic is that of the n-
prisoner's dilemma, which is essentially a game-theoric model of exchange. As a problem that inhibits 
collective action, free-riding concerns a group that includes more than two members, that is when n>2. 
With only two parties in exchange, there can be no free-riding unless one is altruistic. Hardin, Russell. 
1971, ‘Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma’ Behavioral Science, 16 September: 
472-481; Hardin, Russell. 1982. Collective Action Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press; 
Hardin, Russell. 1982. ‘Exchange Theory on Strategic Bases', Social Science Information 21-2: 251-
272; Hardin, Russell. 1997. ‘Economic Theories of the State’, Dennis C. Mueller ed. Perspectives on 
Public Choice: A Handbook New York: Cambridge University Press: 21-34. 
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Therefore, even states which have different preferences can cooperate with each 
other by trying to do their best in not inhibiting others’ policies. Then, adjustment 
and coordination serve to ‘minimize’ the damage to cooperative partner state’s 
preferences and interests. 
In cooperation literature, a common single goal among states is not 
necessarily sought to speak of cooperation whereas alliance literature presupposes a 
common security goal in its conceptualization of alliance-induced cooperation. 
Distinguishingly, cooperation literature is not restricted to the realm of high-politics 
security; it involves adjustment of policies on other fields such as environment and 
economy.  
In comparison to alliance literature, cooperation is a holistic term whose 
study includes game theory models, rational design models and coalition models. 
Alliance, on the other hand, is mostly defined as being more formal. Formality 
refers to ‘structured security cooperation’ in the sense that they are mostly 
established on an international treaty-basis with more distinguishable 
characteristics to notice, and they are chiefly examined under the theoretical 
auspices of realism. Although realist premises are used both in cooperation and 
alliance literatures, realism dominates the study of alliance politics and theory more 
than it does cooperation theory. Alliance politics are under the guidance of theories 
such as balance of power, balance of threat, hegemonic stability theory72 and the 
theory of underbalancing. Recently, there is a promising yet unconsolidated 
literature that tries to merge the study of cooperation and alliances under the 
                     
72As it is discussed in section 1.3.3, Hegemonic Stability Theory is controversial in that it is argued not 
to be a theory, but more a research program that cannot be tested or refuted. Sheetz, Mark S. and 
Michael Mastanduno. 1997/98. “Correspondence-Debating the Unipolar Moment” International 
Security Vol.22 No.3 168-174. Distinguishingly, hegemonic stability theory is akin to political 
economy and structural cycler theory, which is also associated to systems-theory. 
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concepts of ‘stretched cooperation’ and ‘transnational advocacy networks’.73 
Milner underlines that cooperation literature has started to emerge from 
1970s onwards; however, as she maintains, cooperation has been elusive both to 
notice and analyze.74 Nevertheless, the literature has made two general 
contributions. First, a rough definition has emerged in the cooperation literature 
that can help distinguish what behavior counts as cooperation. Knowing what is 
meant by cooperation is an important point. Second contribution is the 
development of propositions about the conditions under which cooperation is likely 
to emerge. These propositions are developed by using game theoretical models. 
The definition of cooperation and the conditions under which cooperation works 
are what follows.  
3.1.1. The Definition of ‘Cooperation’ 
Following Robert Keohane, many scholars defined cooperation as occurring 
‘when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, 
through a process of coordination’.75 A process of policy coordination implies that 
                     
73Asal, Victor, Nussbaum, Brian and Harrington, D. William. 2007. “Terrorism as Transnational 
Advocacy: An Organizational and Tactical Examination” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30:1, 15-39; 
Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. “Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation and Networks of 
Violence” Cambridge Review of International Affairs Volume 18 Number 1, April; Bank, André and 
Van Heur, Bas. 2007. “Transnational conflicts and the politics of scalar networks: evidence from 
Northern Africa” Third World Quarterly 28:3, 593-612. 
74Milner, Helen. 1992. “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and 
Weaknesses” World Politics Vol. 44 No. 3 April, pp. 466-468. 
75Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Krasner, Stephen. ed. 1983. International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press; Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation New York: Basic 
Books; Putnam, Robert & Nicholas Bayne. 1987. Hanging Together Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press; Feldstein, Martin.1988. International Economic Cooperation Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; Lipson, Charles.1984. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs” World 
Politics 37-October; Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” World Politics 
30-January; Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “Cooperation versus Prisoner’s Dilemma” American Political 
Science Review 79-December; Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory” 
International Organization 39-4; Mosher, James S. 2003. “Relative Gains Concerns when the number 
of States in the International System” Increases Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.4 7 No. 5, 642-668; 
Farer, Tom. 2004. “Toward an Effective International Legal Order- from Coexistence to Concert?” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs Volume 17, Number 2, July; Jervis, Robert. 1985. “From 
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policies of each state have been adjusted in order to reduce the negative 
consequences for the other participant states. This conceptualization of cooperation 
involves two elements. First, it assumes that each actor’s behavior is directed 
towards some goal(s). It need not be the same goal for all involved actors for 
cooperation to occur. However, it does assume rational behavior of nation-states. 
Secondly, the definition assumes that cooperation provides nation-states with gains 
                                                                
Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation” World Politics Vol. 38, No. 1, 
October, pp. 58-79; Barrett, Scott. 1999. “A Theory of Full International Cooperation” Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 11-519; Carbone, Maurizio. 2007. “Supporting or Resisting Global Public Goods? 
The Policy Dimension of a Contested Concept” Global Governance 13 179–198; Leeds, Brett Ashley. 
1999. “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation” 
American Journal of Political Science Vol. 43 No. 4 October, pp. 979-1002; Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. 
“Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” 
International Organization Vol. 42 No. 3 summer pp. 485-507; Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, 
Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. “Conclusion: Ambitions and Limits of a Transatlantic 
Partnership” Adelphi Papers 47:389, pp. 87-92; Forman, Shepard & Derk Segaar. 2006. “New 
Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism” Global Governance 12, 
205–225; Schori, Pierre. 2005. “Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union, and 
Global Governance” Global Governance 11, 273-280; Dyson, Tom. 2008. “Convergence and 
Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French, and German Military Reforms: Between International 
Structure and Executive Autonomy” Security Studies 17:4,725-774; Atsushi, Tago. 2009. “When Are 
Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the ‘Coalition of the 
Willing’ ” Journal of Peace Research 46 219; Adler, Emanuel. 1992. “The emergence of cooperation: 
national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control” 
International Organization 46, 1, winter; Goldstein, Joshua S., Jon C. Pevehouse, Deborah J. Gerner, 
Shibley Telhami. 2001. “Reciprocity, Triangularity, and Cooperation in the Middle East, 1979-97” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 5, October pp. 594-620; Weaver, Michael E. 2008. 
“International Cooperation and Bureaucratic In-fighting: American and British Economic Intelligence 
Sharing and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1939-41” Intelligence and National Security, 23:2, 
153-175; Srinivasan, Krishnan. 2009. “International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century” 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 98:400, 37-47; Svolik, Milan. 2006. “Lies, Defection, 
and the Pattern of International Cooperation” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 50 No. 4 
October, pp. 909-925; Davies, Graeme A. M. 2008. “Strategic Cooperation, the Invasion of Iraq and the 
Behaviour of the ‘Axis of Evil’, 1990–2004” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 3 pp. 385–399; 
Young, Joseph K. 2006. “Simulating Two-Level Negotiations” International Studies Perspectives 7, 
77–82; Kreps, Sarah. 2008. “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of 
Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan” Security Studies 17:3, 531-567; Wang, Lake. 
2007. “The Good Neighbor- Why China Cooperates” Harvard International Review, Fall; Kydd, 
Andrew. 2005-2006. “US Hegemony and Global Cooperation: In America We (Used to) Trust” 
Political Science Quarterly Volume 120 Number 4; Lander, Stephen. 2004. “International Intelligence 
Cooperation: An Inside Perspective” Cambridge Review of International Affairs Volume 17, Number 3, 
October; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. “Is Anybody Still A Realist?” International 
Security Vol. 24-Fall 2, pp. 5-55; Schweller, Randall and David Priess. May 1997. “A Tale of Two 
Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, 
pp. 1-32; Choucri, Nazli. 2000. “Introduction: Cyber Politics in International Relations,” International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 243-264; Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio. 1996. “Origins and 
Evolutions of War and Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, pp. 1-22; Krasner, Stephen 
D. Spring 1994. “International Political Economy: Abiding Discord” Review of International Political 
Economy, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 13-19; Strange, Susan. 1994. “Wake up, Krasner! The World has Changed” 
Review of International Political Economy Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 209-219; Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. 
“Sharing Sovereignty” International Security Vol. 29, No. 2 Fall, pp. 85–120. 
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or rewards. The gains need not be same in magnitude and kind for each state, but 
they are mutual. Each actor helps the other to realize its goals by the anticipation of 
its own reward. Each state is not out there to help the other; it is the anticipation of 
bettering its own situation that leads to adjustment in one’s policies. To sum up, 
once mutual policy coordination to realize joint gains occurs, and then it is 
cooperation that follows. 
 
3.1.2. What Cooperation Is Not? 
To clarify the concept further, it is helpful to define what cooperation is not. 
“Cooperation” is often contrasted with ‘conflict’ or ‘competition’. Conflict or 
competition are situations created by nation-state behaviors, which try to reduce the 
gains of others or impede their want-satisfaction as opposed to cooperative 
behavior that intends to reduce the negative impact of one’s policy on other 
states.76  
In contrast to common-sensical assumption, it is important to underline that 
cooperation is not the behavioral situation where actors directly help each other to 
achieve their goals; since international relations, via realism, consist of self-help 
state behaviors, states that cooperate among each other just try to limit detrimental 
effects of their policies upon the other.  
 
3.1.3. Overshadowed Premises: Realism and Cooperation 
 
Viewed from the realist lenses, cooperation among nation-states produces 
indirect help for one another at best. Since ‘helping another entity’ is not 
conceptualized as an existential attribute of state-behavior in anarchy, cooperation 
                     
76Milner, Helen. 1992. “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and 
Weaknesses” Review Article World Politics Vol. 44 No. 3 April, pp. 468-470.  
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is not assumed to be easily forth-coming. Yet, that does not translate to a non-
nuanced assumption such that realism sees cooperation as impossible or 
undesirable. Indeed, realists assert that states cooperate with each other more than it 
is appreciated.77 
The presumption that realists have arguably concentrated more on conflictual 
nation-state behaviors does not refer to any realist opposition against cooperation, 
nor is that it is inconsistent with realism. As a defensive realist by his own self-
definition, Jervis implies that offensive realists are ostensibly given more voice by 
policy-makers that led to the presumption as if realism invalidates and isolates 
cooperation as a non-practical and idealist naiveté.  
Underlining the realist literature on cooperation in contrast with that 
presumption, Jervis stresses that cooperation is possible among states, and that it is 
not outside of the parameters of realism.78 Especially, classical realist, defensive 
realist and neo-classical realist accounts of cooperation are vigorous,79different 
from the neo-realist research agenda that does not deal with state behaviors on 
purpose so as to keep systemic, non-reductionist and parsimonious. Neo-realism 
does not aim to be a foreign policy theory, nor is it interested in states other than 
major ones.80 
 
 
                     
77Most of the classical and neo-classical accounts of realism substantiate the point. Also, most of the 
articles and books cited in footnote 5 follow this premise to a large extent.  
78Jervis, Robert. 1999. “Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation-Understanding the Debate” 
International Security Vol. 24, No. 1 Summer, pp. 42-63; Jervis, Robert. 1985. “From Balance to 
Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation” World Politics Vol. 38 No. 1 October, pp. 58-
79. 
79Neo-classical realism can be associated with Schweller et al; defensive realism with Jervis et al and 
classical realism is associated with seminal writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, 
Niebuhr, Morgenthau, Carr, Hertz, Oppenheimer and Gray. 
80Kenneth Waltz’s exchange with Colin Elman in Security Studies, Autumn 1996, pp.7-61; Waltz, 
Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
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3.1.4. What Makes Cooperation Work?  
Once mutual policy coordination to realize joint gains starts to occur, and 
then it is cooperation that follows. That is seen as a good enough definition of 
cooperation within its own literature. A more specific definition presumes 
cooperation as occurring when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others, through a process of coordination. 
But how and when does cooperation emerge and work? What are the 
conditions under which it emerges? The definition of cooperation does not tell 
anything about how the mutual gains from cooperation will be distributed. 
However, the conditions under which cooperation occurs can possibly do so. These 
conditions define the circumstances in which cooperation emerges. The conditions 
may also give clues about the working-mechanism of cooperation as well. In other 
words, attempts to explain what causes cooperation may help understand what 
makes cooperation work. As yet, there is no theory of cooperation clearly 
delineating these points; only hypotheses exist. Milner portrays the status of the 
cooperation literature in the following vein: 
One function of a definition is to enable us to classify different acts as being an 
instance of the concept at hand. Having a widely accepted definition of international 
cooperation should make it easier to agree on which acts count as cooperation and 
which do not. Keohane, Kenneth Oye’s Cooperation under Anarchy volume, Joseph 
Grieco, and Peter Hass all employ the same definition. They should therefore be able 
to agree on what is cooperative behavior and what is not. Indeed, this seems to be 
the case. Their disagreements are not about what constitutes cooperation; they are 
about what causes it. This, however, may be fortuitous since the empirical 
classification of events as cooperative can be very difficult. Establishing the 
counterfactual may pose serious questions: without some process of policy 
coordination, would the states have behaved differently? The strategic 
misrepresentation of preferences may add to this problem. Determining the 
beginning and end of an attempt at cooperation can also be problematic. Finally, it 
may not be easy to demonstrate that each side adjusted its policies in the expectation 
of gains.81  
 
  
                     
81Milner, Helen. 1992. “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and 
Weaknesses” World Politics Vol. 44 No. 3 April, p.468. 
100 
 
The problems mentioned in the above quotation do not amount to an 
analytical deadlock though; cooperation has been studied by numerous scholars: 
Cooperation can be noticed by contrasting a state’s declarations and its actions on 
the ground in relation to those of others. This is a parsimonious method that helps 
to understand whether the behavior is cooperative or uncooperative. Furthermore, 
in the present informational age where state authorities make regular and 
sometimes blunt declarations and statements, the job does not appear to be 
insurmountable. As Jervis points out, information sharing and disclosing policies is 
a very political issue that is gauged relatively in secrecy.82This exacerbates the 
analysis; yet, the leakages to the press that are not denied or refuted by the 
authorities together with the on-the-ground actions taken by nation-states help 
studying the secretive nature of bargaining and entanglements among nations. At 
least, this is how cooperation is studied within world academic community. 
In our times of information-technology where even intelligence authorities 
find open sources as informative as the secretive nation-state sources, noticing 
cooperation presumably might not be harder than it was the case in the past. One 
advantage that is created on purpose by the study herein is that it examines the 
recent past. Although the events pertaining international efforts to curb terrorism at 
large and the war on terrorism in particular are still ‘hot’ in comparison to ‘cold-
cases’ that are based on much former developments, numerous developments and 
events have already taken place to constitute the empirical side of a study. 
Within this framework, hypotheses as to how cooperation emerges and works 
are important for the present study. The above-mentioned definition of cooperation 
allowed several hypotheses to be developed in the cooperation literature. This is the 
                     
82Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” World Politics Vol. 30, No. 2 
January, pp. 167-214. 
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second contribution of the literature in addition to the provision of the definition. 
The hypotheses, which try to describe the circumstances under which cooperation 
emerges, are six-fold:         1- Absolute gains, Relative gains and Reciprocity 
Hypothesis, 2- Number of Actors Hypothesis, 3- Iteration Hypothesis, 4- 
International Regimes Hypothesis, 5- Epistemic Community Hypothesis, and 6- 
Power Asymmetries Hypothesis. For scope and space limitations, these theories are 
not examined in detail while some are explained in the following sections.  
 
3.1.4.1. Decision Makers’ Concerns that Hinder Cooperation  
    and Alignment among States  
Decision-makers’ concerns that hamper cooperation originates in the security 
dilemma, issues of reciprocity, relative gains/cost-benefit assessment, subjective 
security demands, and the unquantifiable problems associated with perceptions. 
The primary problem these hypotheses try to answer is the anarchy-induced 
security dilemma. International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (that is 
policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it 
difficult for states to realize their common interests. Against this problem, first, the 
model of the Prisoner's Dilemma has been used to demonstrate that cooperation is 
more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are 
low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual 
noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. 
Secondly, the security dilemma is argued to be reduced when the defense has the 
advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. 
Moreover, these two variables that form four possible security worlds or contexts 
are shown by the literature to be influenced by geography and technology.  
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Yet, the framework or the context within which actors are assumed to be 
acting is not examined enough according some scholars such as Robert Jervis. 
Jervis calls attention to the relation between ‘choice’ and ‘context’; the relation 
between the strategic decisions and actions carried out by nation-states (choice) and 
the structural environment or the current state of international relations that is 
inherent in the situation and not manipulable by nation-states (context): 
Perhaps the most important limitation of the works on anarchy is that it looks at 
individual actors, their preferences, and their choices, and thus blinds us to the broader 
setting in which behavior occurs. Problems arise in a context and out of history, and not 
all patterns are the product of careful and conscious choice.83  
 
In light of the above-mentioned problems, cooperation - via Oran Young - 
can be achieved in three ways: first tacitly, second through negotiation, and third, 
by imposed agreement or bargaining processes among nation-states.84 
Cooperation may be tacit without communication or explicit agreement. The 
metaphor of repeated prisoner’s dilemma captures this situation as best explained 
by Robert Axelrod in the Evolution of Cooperation.85Without the explicit 
agreement between governments, cooperation may occur as the expectations of 
actors converge.  
Cooperation may emerge through negotiation, too. It can be negotiated in an 
explicit bargaining process. As the most common and often studied type of 
cooperation emergence, negotiated cooperation is explained primarily by 
Keohane’s After Hegemony, Kenneth Oye’s Cooperation under Anarchy and 
Grieco’s Cooperation among Nations. They either examine the codes and issue-
areas of bargaining or the ideas and learning processes during the negotiations 
undertaken by nation-states. Since there is a cooperation agreement to focus on, 
                     
83 Jervis, Robert.1988. “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation” World Politics Vol. 40, No. 3 April 
p.320. 
84 Young, Oran. 1989. International Cooperation. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
85 Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation NY: Basic Books. 
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negotiated cooperation is easier to notice and analyze when compared to the tacit 
cooperation that is spontaneous and self-reinforcing. 
Finally, cooperation can be imposed. This approach, that aims to explain how 
cooperation emerges, is akin to the benign version of the hegemonic stability theory 
in that a stronger party enforces others to adjust their policies meanwhile it adjusts 
its own policies to those of the enforced states to achieve mutual gains. During the 
Cold War, the US maintained such a position in the Western bloc regarding 
economic, financial and military policies of the allied nation-states especially 
within the framework of the NATO. Gowa remains unsurpassed in this kind of 
explanation of cooperation. Gowa maintained that a hegemon can serve, to certain 
degree, as the functional equivalent of a common international authority to 
establish and sustain cooperation.86 
Independent from the fact that whether it is tacit, negotiated or imposed 
cooperation that is at issue, first hypothesis that attempts to explain cooperation 
focuses on relative or absolute gains debate and reciprocity. The heart of the 
hypothesis is that states cooperate in order to realize absolute gains. Following 
economic reasoning, states rationally seek to maximize their net benefits from 
interactions. This is often explained by the minute-details of the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Due to cheating and inability to sanction it, the best way for cooperation 
introduced by Axelrod is ‘the TIT for TAT strategy’ that gives the basis of 
reciprocity.87This is also supported by Keohane and other authors in Cooperation 
under Anarchy: cooperation is more likely when states pursue a strategy of 
reciprocity.  
 
                     
86Gowa, Joanne. 1986. “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and 
International Relations” International Organization 40, Winter.  
87Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation NY: Basic Books, pp. 3-24. 
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Grieco objected to the assumption that states cooperate to achieve absolute 
gains because relative gains matter more than absolute gains especially when 
uncertainty is prevalent due to the security dilemma. It is asserted that ‘security 
cooperation’ is delicate and harder to realize in comparison to cooperation on other 
fields of foreign policy. Even for Grieco though, cooperation is not impossible. He 
identifies one condition that leads to cooperation: ‘a balanced distribution of gains’ 
among cooperative participants.88 
Cooperation under the security dilemma is especially well studied by Jervis 
who clarified the conditions that make security cooperation likely despite the 
relative gains concerns.89 Some are relevant to this study as summarized in the 
following pages. 
 
3.1.4.2. Low Costs of Being Exploited  
The cost of being exploited by the process of cooperation is the cost of 
getting no reciprocal cooperative action in return for a state’s realized cooperative 
commitment. When one side contributes to its share of tacit or negotiated terms of 
cooperation whereas the other defects, there emerges a cost for the contributing 
state. If this cost is low, cooperation is still more likely to emerge.  
When the cost is tolerable, the arms-procurement level is likely to decrease 
and a less aggressive and patient foreign policy is apt to emerge. That decreases the 
security dilemma, and in turn, it plays into the hands of states that tend to cooperate 
with one another. 
  
 
                     
88Grieco, Joseph. 1990. Cooperation among Nations. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press; Haas, 
Peter.1990. Saving the Mediterranean. New York: Columbia University Press. 
89Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” World Politics Vol. 30, No. 2 
January, pp. 167-214. 
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3.1.4.3. Subjective Security Demands 
 There are two dimensions that determine decision-makers’ assessments of 
threats and due policy responses.  
One dimension is about the question of how much security the state seeks and 
the price the state is willing to pay for increments of security. Even if decision-
makers of different nations agree on the objective situation, they may differ on the 
price that they will pay for increasing their security. To be sure, the price is not 
only economic but it is life-comprehensive of a nation’s total resources both 
tangible and intangible.  
Second dimension is the predisposition that shapes the way threats are 
perceived. When a state is predisposed to regard other states in general as a threat, 
it will react more quickly and strongly to developments than a state that views 
others and the environment as generally benign. The predisposition to perceive 
threats is argued, by Jervis, to be related to the state’s view of how many enemies it 
must be prepared to fight.  
 
3.1.4.4. When Gains Overrun the Costs 
When gains from cooperation and costs of a breakdown of cooperation are 
perceived high, cooperation is likely. The main cost of a policy of reacting quickly 
and severely to increases in the other’s arms is not the price of arms-procurement. 
The cost is sacrifice of potential gains from cooperation and the increase in the 
dangers of needless arms races and wars. This is the classical argument of the 
security dilemma-induced analysis of cooperation whose dynamics are to be born 
in mind even if nation-states do not prepare for conventional or regular war against 
one another. It is also argued that regimes can be seen as a useful instrument 
facilitating the realization of the above-mentioned factors that make cooperation 
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likely. Regimes are defined as sets of norms, principles or decision-making 
procedures around which actors expectations converge. They mitigate the effects of 
international anarchy by aiding in the enforcement of international agreements. 
Regimes do so by easing the problem of defection from cooperation. Regimes are 
seen improving participant states’ information on the behavior of others. It provides 
information for states on the likelihood of cheating and likelihood of compliance. 
Regimes are also thought to be changing the patterns of transactions costs, which 
are namely any direct and indirect costs of working jointly and implementing 
policy. Regimes arguably do so by reducing the incentives of violating regime 
principles. Thereby, regimes reduce the uncertainty about other state’s behavior 
and it reduces the fear about other states’ defection from cooperation. That reduces 
the defection challenge or the fear of being exploited when cooperation is not 
reciprocated. 
 
3.1.4.5. Transaction-Costs Approach and  
Different Threat Assessments 
Non-polar environment presents an environment of competition. Competition 
of the nonpolar environment is unchecked and unregulated by the interworking of 
international organizations. In the absence of ineffective working of a set of 
international economic and political organizations unlike that of the 1945-1991 
post-World World II institutional order, nation-states are left to act more 
autonomously despite they are bound by the circumstances and threats to 
cooperate. 
 In other words, although states are hard pressed to cooperate with other 
states in the face of threats that they cannot individually confront, they nevertheless 
tend to act unilaterally absent the institutionally binding security arrangements. 
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Threats may force states to cooperate and work jointly, but the lack of institutional 
wherewithal to realize such cooperation constitutes one of the limits of cooperation 
according to this approach. The question is, then, how and why international 
security cooperation cannot be institutionalized. 
To that end, in addition to organizational transaction costs, the nature of 
threats to national security, fears of defection from cooperation, cheating and 
concerns of relative gains are studied in the alliance literature to explain the 
hardship to establish and sustain formal alignments. Military alliances are shown to 
be especially hard to establish if an external threat is not clearly perceived by all 
potential cooperative participants.  
Yet, the threat may come not only as an external one, but the literature 
demonstrated that it may come in another form, namely as internal threats. Alliance 
and cooperative problems becomes complicated when the form of threat turns from 
external to internal and from external to transnational. Transnational threats by 
definition manifest themselves as being both internal and external at times, leaving 
the dichotomous separation between the internal and the external relatively unclear 
as an instructive conception.  
That is why threat perceptions and assessments of nation-states evolve to 
become different from one another over time. Reaching consensus on the position 
of states as to where they stand in relation to transnational threats becomes a thorny 
issue. In sum, states differ in their perceptions of the threat even when they agree 
that they are all exposed and vulnerable to a common threat. 
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3.2. Alliance as ‘Institutionalized-Cooperation’ 
Definition and types of alliances, though controversial after the Cold 
War,90are best given by the collective security approach that is gauged hand in 
hand with traditional realist theories. Collective security approach can be seen as an 
approach that merges the principles of realism and public/collective goods 
perspectives. When alliances are concerned, it is more often possible to talk about 
collective security or collective defense organizations whereas cooperation may 
occur on a bilateral or multilateral basis without any organizational and institutional 
framework. Thus, ‘organization’ is more associated with alliances than 
cooperation. In parallel, alliances refer to structured international security 
cooperation. Their structure is established by and enshrined in treaty-based 
organizations, which give them an institutionalized hard-law form. In other words, 
institutionalized security cooperation comes with a treaty-based international 
organization, which can then be called an alliance. Alliance, thereby, denotes 
institutionalized cooperation.  
  
3.2.1. The Definition of ‘Alliance’ 
A clear definition of alliance can read as follows: alliance is an international, 
institutionalized, treaty-based security cooperation organization among nation-
states. Its legal status under international law is underlined by a treaty-ratification 
process by member-states, which gives alliances an organization-status and an 
institutionalized formal structure. The latter feature distinguishes ‘alliances’ from 
‘cooperation’. 
 
                     
90For a study about the conceptional and due definitional confusion on alliances after the Cold War, 
Salmon, Trevor. 2006. “The European Union: Just an Alliance or a Military Alliance?” The Journal of 
Strategic Studies Vol. 29 No. 5, 813-842 October. 
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Alliances usually take one of two forms: “security” alliances or “defensive” 
alliances. Both are organization-based; thus, alliances can also be respectively 
named as a collective security organization or a defensive security organization. 
Still other labels are “collective security alliances” and “collective defense 
alliances”. As a short-hand, they are heretofore referred to simply as “security” 
alliances or “defensive” alliances.  
On the one hand, defensive alliances require a clearly defined threat to fight 
and defend against because defensive organizations or alliances are almost always 
‘against’ a common foe. Alliances are different from other alignments and 
cooperation types because they have an actual or anticipated enemy. In Liska’s 
terms, “alliances are against, only derivately for, someone or something”.91On the 
other hand, security alliance is established to secure the member-states from one 
another. It is not against a common foe. The former aims to manage the security 
dilemma originating from outside the alliance whereas the latter tackles with the 
security dilemma within the alliance. 
The elements of an alliance are clearer in a ‘defensive alliance’ in comparison 
to both ‘security alliance’ and ‘mere cooperation’ because defensive alliance is 
institutionalized security cooperation, which have a structure provided by an 
international treaty. Although security alliances also have a structure, they are less 
specified and binding as is the case for mere cooperation. ‘Mere cooperation or 
cooperation at large’ refers to relatively less structured cooperative behaviors of 
states without international treaty guidelines at the background of the cooperative 
framework. ‘Mere cooperation’ has an underspecified or loose structure at best. It 
may be bilaterally or multilaterally conducted on not only about security, but on 
                     
91Liska, George. 1962. Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, p.12. 
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other issue-areas such as economy and environment as well.  
Importantly, ‘cooperation’ does not necessitate a consensual common goal 
among states. Each state may have different goals and agendas of their own. Thus, 
neither security alliances nor cooperation in general have the clear structural 
elements of a defensive alliance. That is mainly because, via the literature, 
defensive alliances are against a common clear enemy and accordingly a clear 
threat.92They are established for the pursuit of a specific common goal that paves 
the way for a more binding and preordained specific modus operandi than those of 
other types of cooperation among nation-states. 
The structural elements of a defensive alliance are:  
a-clear common state-centric-threat, b-predetermined common goal c-
predetermined common grand strategy d-international treaty-based organizational 
structure with modalities such as headquarters, secretariat, departments, protocols 
and procedures, e- executive and operational planning (also called ‘tactical level or 
minor strategies’) f- permanent personnel, and g- predetermined aggregation and 
arrangement of material capabilities to fulfill anticipated military tasks.  
First three and the very last elements (a, b, c and g) particularly distinguish 
defensive alliances from the rest of cooperative relations that take the forms of, 
first, coalitions; secondly, security alliances, and finally, bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation at large.93 To expand, cooperative relations other than defensive 
alliances manifest themselves, first, as coalitions;94 secondly, as bilateral or 
                     
92Booth, Ken and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2008. The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in 
World Politics New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Friedman, Julian, Christopher Bladen 
and Steven Rosen. eds. 1970. Alliance in International Politics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
93The categorization does not presume rigid exclusiveness among the types: There is intrinsic 
overlapping between ‘coalitions’ and ‘cooperation conducted bilaterally and multilaterally at large’. 
The types and their differences are further clarified in the following sections, first on alliances and then 
on coalitions. 
94Coalitions are cooperative endeavors short of alliance, and they come in two forms. ‘Coalition of the 
willing’ is one of the two coalition types. Coalition of the willing is an ad hoc joint-work-group of 
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multilateral cooperation on any issue-area such as trade talks, pollution-control, 
clearing landmines, climate change, poverty, terrorism or arms control95; thirdly, as 
the inward-looking collective security organizations such as the United Nations 
(UN) or Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).96 
Distinctive features of defensive alliances are clear and common state-
centric-threat, common goal and preordained common grand strategy and relevant 
material capabilities stationed in anticipation of attack. These defensive features are 
hardly existent in ‘coalitions’, ‘bilateral/multilateral cooperation at large’ and 
‘security alliances’. Where they partially exist in the former types, their modalities 
and institutional form are mostly different. Besides, any form of international 
regime97 (under which states cooperate short of predetermined specific target-
state/s, and predetermined possible and specific nation-state-oriented threat, and a 
pre-arranged institutional protocol and means to punish violators militarily if 
necessary) is not an alliance.98 
                                                                
states based on the mission, rather than based on a common threat perception. The example is the 
coalition formed by the alignment of states with the US following the onset of the 2003 Iraqi 
intervention. The types are discussed in the last chapter with examples. 
95Arms control is a kind of cooperative relationship among states. It is different from disarmament, 
which aims at elimination of weapons. Arms control is a control mechanism among states that 
cooperate among each other to ‘control’ weapons so as to lessen the security dilemma among the 
participants. It may lead to international treaties or agreements that limit or increase the number of 
weapons and weapon-systems. However, it is mainly about bilateral cooperation short of a security 
alliance structure or a defensive alliance structure. As such, arms control is akin or similar to 
nonproliferation regime in the sense that it creates international agreements, commitments and 
expectations so as to respond to the preferences of participating states. Yet, regimes are not formal in 
that they are devoid of institutionalized international treaty organizations established for either 
protection from the in-group member-states as in the case of security alliances or from out-group 
nation-states as in the case of defensive alliances. Their target is, first and foremost, issue-area based 
rather than being state-centric. 
96The reasons why Shanghai Security Organization is not a defensive alliance (but mainly an inward-
looking collective security organization/alliance that does not balance against out-group states such as 
the US and the EU member-states) are explained in sections below. 
97‘Regime’ is defined in the literature as ‘the principles, norms, rules, and procedures’ that are seen as 
governing state behavior in specific issue-areas of international politics. It is a rule-based cooperation in 
the international system. Further information is given above in section 4.1.4. 
98 From a collective security perspective, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) is a regime-
establishing treaty around which nuclear states (‘nuclear-haves’ or nuclear weapon states -NWS-) try to 
protect themselves from nonnuclear states (nuclear have-nots or non-nuclear weapon states -NNWS-) 
by avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons horizontally and vertically. In return, nonnuclear states 
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These remarks are made so as to clarify the terms (cooperation, regime and 
alliance) as much as possible because they are interrelated: When pictured as 
concentric circles or fields, alliances are at the very center while the regimes 
approximate the middle layer that also comprises alliances. Cooperation is at the 
most outer layer comprising all of them. When moved from the outer layer of 
concentric fields towards the center (that is from cooperation to regime and then to 
alliances), ‘institutionalization’, ‘specificity’ and ‘binding force of cooperation and 
reliability of commitments’ are likely to increase. The relationship is depicted just 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
expect security provision through articles IV and VI. Although a common goal (nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons) and a common threat (vertical and horizontal proliferation) can be said to exist, it 
fails in four elements to be named as a defensive alliance: a common strategy to enforce compliance, a 
collectively institutionalized headquarters of a defensive nature with operational military capabilities 
specific for the task, and lack of a target out-group state/s to defend against. Fourthly, it does not view 
states as direct referents of threats, but only indirectly so. The threat is not state-centric; it is subject-
centric; proliferation without attaching to a state is a derivative threat which is not clear and susceptible 
for strategizing. Within such a framework, the NPT is the linchpin of the nonproliferation regime 
alongside other relevant international agreements on biological, chemical weapons and ballistic 
missiles. Although it is functionally similar to a collective security organization in that it serves 
member-states to protect themselves from one another, it is not identical to an alliance for the above-
mentioned reasons, let alone a defensive one. Thus, not all regimes and regime-establishing treaties are 
of alliances. However, regimes may lead to alliance formation in time or vice versa. Alliances may also 
benefit from regime norms and decisions; nevertheless, regimes are not institutionalized enough to take 
punitive actions originating from hard-law, that is an international treaty. Regimes are weak at 
institutionalizing preordained strategy, goals and material capabilities that are operationalized in 
advance of a conflict among nations. Therefore, regimes are mainly of cooperation at large more than of 
alliances. 
Cooperation
 
Regimes 
 
Alliances 
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3.2.2. How Do Alliances Decrease the Uncertainty mainly caused by the 
Anarchic International System? 
Alliances are instruments to manage the security dilemma. Alliances increase 
‘the perceived likelihood of expected behavior to come true’. Thereby, they help to 
decrease the uncertainty among states. Alliances enhance perceptions positively in 
the sense that it reduces the uncertainty as to what other state will do. Uncertainty, 
alternatively labeled as shadow of the future, is an age-old factor that causes the 
security dilemma. Similar to ‘fog of war’, uncertainty about burden-sharing and 
reliability of partners (fog of alignments) causes impasse and reluctance to commit 
resources. Formal alliances, such as the NATO, are aimed at addressing this 
uncertainty. Alliances decrease the likelihood of defection from cooperation by 
their treaty-based road-map. Road-map includes guidelines or modalities serving 
materialization of reciprocal benefits and assessment of state commitments to 
common cause. These factors clear away ‘the fog of alignments’ and alliances to 
certain extent.  
The benefits provided by an alliance road-map and strategy are relatively 
higher in comparison to coalitions. Coalitions are ‘coalition of the willing’ kind of 
grouping of states. Coalitions are unstructured cooperation attempts. As structured 
cooperation, alliances are more predictable, binding and enforceable than rest of the 
cooperative relations. This is so due to alliances’ formal status and pre-arranged 
modalities. Thus, reliability of alliance member-states in their commitment and 
burden-sharing is perceived to be increasing because there are binding clauses of a 
treaty when compared to other types of cooperation.99The institutional procedures, 
                     
99As to how international law is directly relevant to international politics in general, and how it came to 
be binding and enforceable, please see:  Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 2000. “Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance” International Organization Vol. 54, No. 3 Legalization and World 
Politics-Summer pp. 421-456. 
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formal communication between governments, concerns of prestige and reputation, 
100and the binding force of international law are factors that help decrease 
uncertainty among states as to what the other state will do. These factors serve to 
increase the credibility of the credibility-assessments about the behaviors of other 
states. In other words, these factors make it reasonable for a state to perceive or 
assess other states’ burden-sharing and commitments as more reliable or less 
uncertain in contrast to situations where they are absent. 
Although even treaties may not always guarantee accordant state behavior, 
alliances (as treaty-based organizations by definition) decreases the uncertainty that 
causes the security dilemma. Future concerns may well constrain state behavior. 
Shadow of the future has always been a big question mark for states because they 
do not know for sure what other states will do in the future. That uncertainty is a 
result of mutually constituting sovereignty and anarchy.  
The security dilemma (the dilemma that the more states seek security, the 
more insecure they become) leads to several kinds of groupings among states. 
Alliances and alignments short of alliances, then, are ways to ease the security 
dilemma. Throughout history, alliances have been regarded as the best way to 
respond the dilemma, simply because it is seen as the most binding and reassuring 
arrangement in the face of uncertainty caused by the anarchy of the international 
                     
100‘Reputation’ is a very important concept used in the analysis of policy-making. Yet, the academic 
theoretical accumulation on reputation is shallow. For the importance of the understudied concept, 
please see Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War trans. Rex Warner. 1979. New York: 
Penguin- The Melian Dialogue is the epitome of ‘reputation’ in realist terms; Sartori, Anne E.2005. 
Deterrence by Diplomacy New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Cashman, Greg. 2000. What Causes 
War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict Lanham: Lexington Books; Jervis, Robert. 
1982. “Deterrence and Perception” International Security Winter 3 pp.9-11; Mercer, Jonathan. 1997. 
“Reputation and Rational Deterrence Theory” Security Studies 7-1, 100-113;   Schelling distinguishes 
between resolve and capability and he relates reputation to ‘resolve’ of a nation-state. Schelling, 
Thomas. 1966. Arms and Influence New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.199-124; Kahn, Herman. 
1960. On Thermonuclear War Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.550-556; Alt, James, Randall 
Calvert, Brian Humes. 1988. “Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoric Analysis” 
American Political Science Review June; Wagner, R. Harrison. 1992. “Rationality and Misperception in 
Deterrence Theory” Journal of Theoretical Politics 4-2, pp.115-141.  
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system. 
Although states have historically allied with one another as a means to 
address the security dilemma101, not all alignments result in alliance formation. 
Coalitions are informal alignments devoid of treaties. Alignments or certain 
juxtaposition of states become alliance only when they are institutionalized under a 
treaty-organization. Defensive alliances are the most studied alliance form due to 
the US-former USSR rivalry of the recent-past Cold War. The NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact are alliances in point.  
 
3.2.3. Differences between Defensive and Security Alliances 
As stated, alliances may take defensive or collective security forms. One of 
the criteria to distinguish between a security and defensive alliance is their 
orientation: Collective security alliances are inward-looking while defensive 
security alliances are outward-looking. The UN can be seen as a collective security 
organization or alliance in the sense that member-states try to protect themselves 
from one another through the intermediary of the organization.  
A collective security alliance is, then, an inward-looking 
alliance/organization because it is designed by the members of a group to protect 
themselves from each other. A security alliance is concentrated on the security 
dilemma within alliance itself as opposed to the defensive alliances, which are 
more concentrated on the security dilemma originating from outside. Defensive 
alliances are those alliances to protect member-states from a specific ‘other’, which 
is a specific non-member state or group of states. Defensive alliances are outward-
looking in that they are established against threats emanating from the out-group. 
                     
101 Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, second part in 
particular.   
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Collective security alliances are usually based on a formal agreement among 
states to provide mutual assistance in the event of specified aggression or threat of 
aggression toward one or more of the alliance members. The threat is not sought 
outside the alliance for it is contemplated from within. Therefore, security alliances 
such as the UN or Shanghai Cooperation Organization represent self-establishing 
agreements among members who agree to lessen the pursuit of their narrow self-
interest to the broader goal of system stability.  
System stability may be regarded at regional or global level by the member-
states. In accordance, a security alliance or a collective security alliance is 
fundamentally regarded as an idealist conception following Woodrow Wilson. The 
root of the concept originates in the idea that stability can be obtained through the 
consent of member states. Woodrow Wilson’s maxim puts security alliances as, 
“there must not be a balance of power, not one powerful group of nations set off 
against another, but a single overwhelming group of nations who shall be the 
trustee of the peace”.102 It goes without saying that this conception has confronted 
difficulties, first of which came from Wilson’s nation whose Congress refused to 
ratify the League of Nations. Wilson wished for establishment of the League above 
all other concerns of the World War during the Paris Peace Talks, and thus 
compromised with other Allied leaderships on many issues.103  
The League was established in Europe by ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles. However, Wilson's own American Congress refused to ratify the Treaty 
of Versailles and thus to establish the League. However, the idea that peace could 
be enforced by means of mutually pledged protection among its members did 
reflect well especially upon Europe. Throughout Europe’s evolution into the EU, 
                     
102Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp.45-47. 
103Wilson, Woodrow. 1916. “An Address Before the League to Enforce Peace”, May 27 in Arthur S. 
Link ed. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press vol.37. 
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European statesmen who developed the political norms that avoid use of force as a 
tool for resolution of conflicts are inspired also by Wilson alongside other 
cornerstone political thinkers and politicians. Wilson's diplomatic policies had a 
profound influence on shaping the world as diplomatic historian Walter Russell 
Mead has explained: 
“Wilson's principles survived the eclipse of the Versailles system and they still 
guide European politics today: self-determination, democratic government, 
collective security, international law, and a league of nations. Wilson may not have 
gotten everything he wanted at Versailles, and his treaty was never ratified by the 
Senate, but his vision and his diplomacy, for better or worse, set the tone for the 
twentieth century. France, Germany, Italy, and Britain may have sneered at 
Wilson, but every one of these powers today conducts its European policy along 
Wilsonian lines. What was once dismissed as visionary is now accepted as 
fundamental. This was no mean achievement, and no European statesman of the 
twentieth century has had as lasting, as benign, or as widespread an influence.’104 
 
Consequently, collective security approach to alignments among states also 
includes ‘security alliances’ that aim to lessen violence among its member-states, 
whereas defensive alliances (as the other form of collective organization) do not 
necessarily have a quest to eliminate or attenuate violence. Members of defensive 
alliances accept instances of violence as inevitable facts of life, and they do not try 
to eliminate violence or aggression per se.  
They assess in advance that violence may well occur, and that it must be 
deterred or countered in kind when survival of states are severely threatened by a 
predetermined adversarial state. Anticipation and contemplation of war among 
states is the basic reason for defensive alliance formation in the very first place. To 
diminish concerns of war-anticipation-of-states is a basic driving-force underlying 
both defensive alliance formation and its effective functioning. The members 
choose to cope with the security dilemma originating from an out-group of states; 
and their response is to align against the threat for which they prepare in case of a 
                     
104Mead, Walter Russell. 2001. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the 
World. NY: A.A. Knopf, p.133. 
118 
 
direct military assault, brinkmanship or an out-of-control crisis escalation into open 
warfare. Thus, defensive alliances anticipate use of force from the outset of their 
alignment under an international treaty-based framework.  
In other words, state-members of defensive alliances do not shy away from 
using force as a principle because in an environment where states contemplate war, 
military prudence is generally what followed throughout history. Concurrently, 
defensive alliances are most effective when war is perceived to be in the offing. 
Accordingly, the conceptual elements of balancing, bandwagoning and the 
logic of alignments among states are all defined differently by different seminal 
works and scholars. The most distinguished approaches, which determine the 
dominant tone of the scholarly work on alliances, are under review here. These 
approaches can best be separated by their initiators: those approaches of Waltz, 
Walt, Liska, Synder, Riker, Altfeld, Bueno de Mesquita, Russett, Mastanduno, 
Schweller and Schroeder.  
 
3.3. The Mainstream Theories of Alliances 
3.3.1. The Theories of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt 
The first approach that is used to explain alliances depends upon ‘the 
balance of power theory’.105 Waltz, following Morgenthau, underlines that 
alliances are formed to balance power in the international system. However, he 
systematized the balance of power analysis above the nation-state level. The act of 
                     
105For the latest theoretical and empirical developments and problems regarding balance of power 
theory, William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, 
Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing 
Balance-of-Power Theory in World History” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 13-2, 
155-185; For a succinct, yet comprehensive explanation of ‘balance of power’ with crucial references, 
Evans, Graham. 1990. The Dictionary of World Politics-A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas, and 
Institutions. New York: Simon & Schuster, p.30-32. 
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balancing ‘power’106constitutes the main axis of the balance of power theory 
explanation of alliances. Although Morgenthau laid the basis for the connection 
between balance of power theory and study of alliances, arguments by Kenneth 
Waltz and Stephen Walt dominate the international relations field to explain self-
help great power politics and consequent alignment choices of states. Waltz’s 
balance of power is followed by his student Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat 
theory’. 
These two (Waltzian and Waltian) theories of alliances share some common 
features: States are rational unitary actors with self-help behaviors in an anarchic 
system. The primary mode of behavior is assumed to be “self-help”, not as ‘other-
help’.107 Both Waltzian and Waltian explanations of alliances are systemic in that 
the self-help approach of the traditional alliance literature dominated by Waltz and 
Walt is primarily based upon neo-realism.108 Since neo-realism or structural realism 
does not take small states into account, traditional alliance literature centers only on 
great power politics and alignments to increase security and stability. Needless to 
say non-state entities are outside of the confines of neorealism. Although Waltz 
himself maintains that neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy and does not 
purport to explain or predict what individual states will do,109he nevertheless 
asserts that states do not pursue power per se, but security is what they primarily 
                     
106Kenneth N. Waltz’s balance of power conception defines ‘power’ as “capability defined as military 
force in particular”, and thereby evaluates the distribution of capabilities across nation-states. Capability 
is an aggregate metric or approximation taking economy and particularly the military resources of a 
nation-state as the basic components of its power. Military-balance schemas of countries are in point 
here: indeed, the academic journal entitled Military Balance (which provides a quantitative assessment 
of military strength and defense spending of most countries) illustrates how power is understood within 
the confines of balance of power theory. 
107‘The other-help behaviour of states’ is conceptualized in a recent study, Spero, Joshua B. 2009. 
“Great Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Middle Power Bridging” Contemporary Security Policy 
30:1,147-171.  
108The reason for using two separate sentences for marking the systemic approach of neorealism is 
because neorealism is just one of the systemic approaches. The most notable other is world-system 
theory.  
109Kenneth Waltz’s exchange with Colin Elman. 1996. Security Studies, 6 Autumn. 
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seek.110This is a systemic given or axiom of neo-realism different from the tenets of 
classical realism.111 
The significance attached in neorealism to security rather than to power is 
important to understand the underlying logic of mainstream alliance theory, which 
regards major states (not all states) as having dispositions to protect status quo in 
any given period of time. Herein alignment is meant to convey either balancing 
(opposing the most powerful state by coming together with other lesser states) or 
bandwagoning (accommodating or coming together with the most powerful state). 
The kind of actors involved in alignment behavior, namely weak states in relation 
to strong states112 are just seen as compact and same unitary actors that are 
functionally similar. Two binary templates are used within the framework of the 
theory: balancing versus bandwagoning and weaker/smaller states versus stronger 
                     
110Waltz explains the reasons for why ‘security’ is assumed to have more theoretical significance in 
neorealism than ‘power’ in Waltz Kenneth N. 1988. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History Vol. 18, Spring No. 4, p. 616. ‘Power’ has the pride of place in classical 
realist accounts especially following Morgenthau. About the resilience of neorealism, Waltz argues that 
neorealism is vindicated even after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, Waltz, Kenneth. 
“The Continuity of International Politics-Chapter 31” in Booth, Ken and Timothy Dunne eds. 2002. 
Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 348-
355; Waltz, Kenneth. 1993. “The New World Order” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 22-
2; for a sophisticated theoretical account and critique of neorealism, Suganami, Hidemi. 1996. On the 
Causes of War. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-80. 
111There are other versions of neorealism, which assumes that states are not satisfied with achieving 
security. Waltz is a defensive realist; offensive version of neorealism is associated with J. Mearsheimer 
who argues that ‘security’ is not enough, but hegemony is what states seek to achieve. For a taxonomy 
of realist theories, Snyder, Glenn H. 2002. “Mearsheimer’s World - Offensive Realism and the Struggle 
for Security” International Security Vol. 27, No. 1 Summer, pp. 149-173. 
112‘Aligning with’ is to make state policies congenial to other (partner) state in cooperation. ‘Aligning 
against’ is coming together and implementing congenial policies with other states against a threatening 
or powerful third party. Aligning against a state or groups of states means trying to undercut the policies 
and preferences of the opposed state against which balancing occurs. In balancing, then, balancer states 
cooperate to resist another state/s. Thus, ‘alignment’ is the condition of being in partial or certain 
agreement with a state either to bandwagon (accommodate the threatening state) or balance (resisting 
the threatening state). Alignment is to cause to arrange and adjust according to a line of understanding 
or political standing. This is achieved through coordination and adjustment of policies by taking into 
account the preferences of other states that are involved in the condition of coming to congenial 
viewpoints in the sense that even if their goals are not identical, their behaviours are adjusted or 
arranged so as not to prevent other cooperating states from achieving their goals and interests. Aligning 
with other state is to make the policies of the two more congenial or congruous to each other in a way 
to serve both states. That is not direct help; however, it is not clashing, confrontation or open 
competition in full either. In that sense, alignment and cooperation is closely related in that alignment 
shows the direction of cooperation in the balance of power theory as to whether it is the bandwagoning 
or balancing strategy that states employ. 
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states/major powers. To elaborate, balancing is aligning with other weak or middle 
power states against the strongest one, while bandwagoning is aligning with the 
strongest one.  
Waltz following a suggestion from Stephen Van Evera introduced the term 
‘bandwagoning’ into the international relations literature from domestic politics.113 
According to Waltz, balancing and bandwagoning and the distribution and re-
distribution of power within the systemic balance of great powers leads to weaker 
state alignment with the strongest state. A state whose power is increasing will 
attract support rather than repulsion. However, Waltz stresses that states seek less 
to maximize power rather than to maintain their positions; thus, balancing against 
rather than bandwagoning with the stronger state is the behavior primarily induced 
by the system. Although Waltzian system design or construct is not directly 
determining the behaviors of states, it ‘shapes and shoves’ them by presenting 
structural permissive or constraining causes with which states have to cope in 
making policies.  
Waltzian Theory of International Politics114 assumes that although 
bandwagoning is the natural tendency towards the state with increasing power, the 
system is not conducive to bandwagoning behavior or aligning with the superior 
side in the hope of picking up benefits defined as increasing power: Since neo-
realism views system-induced behavior of states as being towards maintaining 
system stability and maintaining their prevailing status, ‘security’ is the main 
systemic driving-force of behaviors. Behaviors are not fixed on maximizing power 
as is mainly argued by the classical realists. As a corollary, the behavior that is 
                     
113Keohane, Robert O. 1998. “Review: Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism” International 
Security, Vol. 13, No. 1. Summer, p.172. 
114Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley; Kenneth 
N. Waltz. 2000. ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’ International Security Vol. 25 No. 1 summer, 
pp. 5-41. According to Waltz, neorealism is still largely vindicated after the Cold War. 
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‘shaped and shoved by the system’ is assumed mostly to be “balancing”. It is not 
bandwagoning. Secondary states ‘flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger 
side that threatens them.’115Balance of power theory claims that states often 
balance against power defined in terms of military capability because ‘balance’ has 
a connotation of preserving system stability and security. Thus, neorealism views 
states as status quo-oriented in the sense that ‘playing safe’ is assumed to be the 
behavior of states that is induced by the system. Playing it safe is not exactly 
compatible with increasing power whereas maintaining security and position is. 
Maintaining position rather than acquiring more power is taken as more prevalent 
in the system even if there are revisionist tendencies. Crucially, the nation-state is 
not alone in the system: The system, much like the economic market mechanism, 
reaches equilibrium or pareto-optimal to sustain itself only to be taken down in 
time by subsequent rising hegemon/leader state. When a group of rising states 
balance against the strongest state, balance of power replaces hegemony. The latter 
two concepts, namely ‘hegemony’ and ‘balance of power’, are binary opposites that 
describe distinct international power configurations. Since their conceptions work 
in diametrically opposed ways, arguing for one of them negates the other.116   
Neo-realism is basically a translation and application of economic theory 
upon ‘politics among nations’, which is seen by classical realists as including more 
complicated elements that cannot be reduced to merits of economic metrics or 
calculation whether it is systemically put or not.117 A classical reading of balance of 
                     
115Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 125-127. 
116William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria 
Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-
Power Theory in World History” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 13-2, 155-185. 
117Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2000/01. “Power, Globalization, and the End of the 
Cold War” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 5–53; Walt, Stephen. 2005. “Conversations with 
History- Balancing American Power in the Post-9/11 World” Institute of International Studies, UC 
Berkeley, the part about Realism Nov 15, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Walt/walt-con3.html. 
The case for ideas that is underlined by Wohlforth and Brooks has already been included in realism 
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power is rather different; however, this overview concentrates on the mainstream 
approaches to alliances. Then, it is worth underscoring that balance of power theory 
via neorealism sees balancing more prevalent than bandwagoning.  
Balance of threat theory theoretically follows in the foot-steps of the 
balance of power theory. It takes issue with both great powers and lesser states 
different from neorealism and balance of power theory. It does not assume away 
the roles of lesser states. To the contrary, Walt includes the analysis of the Middle 
Eastern states’ alignment strategies in his seminal work the Origins of Alliances.118  
Waltz defines bandwagoning as the opposite of balancing alignment with 
periodic balancing of would-be leaders among states. For Kenneth Waltz, states 
decision to whether balance against or bandwagon with another state is mainly 
based on the strongest state. In Waltz’s argumentation, determining which state or 
group of states appears strongest is vital. However, for S. Walt, this consideration 
of the balance of power is not enough to understand alliances. Stephen Walt varies 
from K. Waltz on the merits of states’ calculations. He argues that balance of threat 
is more important: States measure or calculate the merits of bandwagoning with or 
                                                                
represented by Morgenthau, which has been labelled Classical Realism after Neorealism came to be 
dominating the field. Interpretative tradition, putting oneself in the shoes of the decision-makers and 
looking over their shoulders is what Morgenthau maintains to be necessary for effective analyses. That 
line of thought presents space for ideational and perceptional factors still to be explored and developed 
within the classical realist horizon. It does not totally exclude ‘the understanding approach’ of the 
political philosophy as contrasted to that of ‘explanation’ variant, yet it keeps its realist tenets, too. 
Niebuhr, Herz and Carr deals extensively with non-quantifiable factors such as intentions, wisdom, the 
role and manipulation of the society, power over people (which is labeled as ‘soft power’ later on), 
peaceful change and the quality of leadership. Besides, Classical Realism is not totally focused on 
‘balancing’ alone. The roles and limits of institutions and ideas are discussed not to refute them 
altogether and not to leave them aside for good, but realism just points out the limitations in their 
service to national interests and security. In other words, Classical Realism (as the oldest tradition) is 
rich and sophisticated with grays or fine-grained arguments, yet it has been underappreciated with 
reductions to mere cost-benefit analysis. Classical Realism is so much nuanced with foresight that 
classical figures even predicted that nation-states, as other political organization forms such as city-
states and empires, may wax and wane over time. That is especially reminiscent of Edward H. Carr. 
Reputation and prestige, national honor and glory are factors that are discussed widely because they do 
shape policies. For instance, Thomas Schelling, building on the classical realist principles, famously 
claimed that it is perfectly sensible to die for keeping the reputation of adamant ‘resolve’, which is one 
of the most precious power-resources of a nation-state to exercise power over other states - that is to 
deter them via reputation for reliability of posed threats. 
118 Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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balancing against other states by determining not only which state or group of 
states appear strongest, but also they consider which state or states appear most 
threatening. Therefore, if serious threats appear, Stephen Walt asserts that state 
leadership need to consider risks and to calculate towards the threatening state.  
Origins of Alliances is a valuable refinement of traditional balance-of-
power theory by persuasively arguing that states form alliances not simply to 
balance power, but in order to balance threats. His underappreciated contribution is 
to start a debate about the clarification of the ways states respond against threats. 
Walt argues that states respond to threats in one of two ways: they either 
balance/oppose or bandwagon/ accommodate.  
As will be seen shortly, there are several other proposed ways of state 
responses that are detailed by other scholars. Stephen Walt’s framework is very 
parsimonious in that there are only two options for states, either balancing or 
bandwagoning. Different from Kenneth Waltz’s argument, Walt argues that states 
do not balance against ‘power or strongest state’, but rather their alignment 
strategies are based on the perception and calculation of the external ‘threat’. 
‘Balancing’ is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat of 
hegemony while ‘bandwagoning’ refers to aligning oneself with the source of 
threat. According to Walt, balancing has been the dominant tendency in 
international politics, while bandwagoning has been the opportunistic exception. 
Finland's relations with the Soviet Union are given as a rare example of 
bandwagoning in the Origins of Alliances. 
Both Waltz and Walt conclude that states balance more than they 
bandwagon. That is, they often balance against greater capability or against 
threatening state rather than bandwagon, namely the behavior of aligning against 
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the source of power (power being defined as capability) or against the source of 
threat. Stephen Walt separates himself from Kenneth Waltz and other realists such 
as Arnold Wolfers and Hans Joachim Morgenthau119by insisting that states balance 
against threat, not power alone. He includes ‘power’ in his conception of ‘threat’, 
claiming that threats are determined both by capabilities and aggressive intentions 
of other states. Walt points out that since the United States has been stronger than 
the Soviet Union in global terms throughout the era after World War II, one would 
expect to observe many of the allies of the US align with the Soviet Union if states 
are solely balancing against power. Therefore, balance of threat theory has a broad 
concept of ‘threat’ in that threat includes aggregate power, proximity to a target, 
offensive capability, and perceptions.  
Needles to say, what offensive and defensive capabilities are and how 
exactly state perceptions of threat are gauged and understood are open questions. 
Nevertheless, Walt improved neo-realism by aligning it with cognitive processes of 
perception. Balance of threat also paved the way for a discussion of the role of 
ideology in realism. That is a step towards both classical realism and 
constructivism in the sense that although Walt argues that ideology does not play 
important role in alliance formation, the formation and role of ideas is brought 
forward to the extent state decision-making and perceptions are concerned. 
Aggressive intentions and perception are the doors to further realist refinement of 
the concept of threat, and the next step is taken by other scholars. ‘Two-level 
analysis’ that studies the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy 
making does not have a short history120 or they are not rare in alliance literature as 
                     
119Wolfers, Arnold, 1962. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 117-131; Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1985. Politics among 
Nations-The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf, pp. 224-228. 
120Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” 
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is the case for studies that urge to combine material and ideational factors in 
international relations.121Although these are the contributions that enlighten the 
way for further theoretical research, there are critiques.  
As regards to Walt’s seminal work - the Origins of Alliances, Robert 
Keohane marks the pitfalls as follows: Walt finds that (Middle Eastern) states 
indeed react to threats than simply to power: they take proximity, offensive 
capability and perceived intentions into account as well as aggregate power. This is 
not surprising, since (Kenneth) Waltz’s overly parsimonious account to construct a 
theory on the variable of capability alone was never very convincing. Yet balance 
of power theory requires so much information – about state perceptions as well as 
objective facts – that it has relatively little theoretical power of its own. It restates 
what we already believe more than providing us with new insights.122 
Given alleged problems in his thinking about ‘threat,’ Lebovic argues that 
Walt overstates the usefulness of balancing and bandwagoning as behavioural 
contrasts and understates the impact of ideology on alignment.123 Similarly, Barnett 
criticizes Walt in the following vein. In constructivist terms, Walt’s efforts to 
incorporate ideology into his theory are regarded as being half-hearted. Walt’s 
balance of threat theory, as Barnett and Lebovic argue, makes room for ideology 
only to the extent that it can be tied to ‘aggressive intentions’, which is arguably 
‘underspecified and under-theorized’.124 
                                                                
International Organization 42-3, pp. 427–461; Young, Joseph K. 2006. “Simulating Two-Level 
Negotiations” International Studies Perspectives 2006 7, 77–82  
121Sørensen, Georg. 2008. “The Case for Combining Material Forces and Ideas in the Study of IR” 
European Journal of International Relations Vol. 14-1, pp. 5–32. 
122Keohane, Robert O. 1998. “Review: Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism” International 
Security Vol. 13, No. 1. Summer, p.172. 
123Lebovic, James H. 2004. “Unity in Action: Explaining Alignment Behavior in the Middle East” 
Journal of Peace Research Vol. 41-2, p. 168. 
124Barnett, Michael N. 2003. “Alliances, Balances of Threats, and Neorealism: The Accidental Coup” in 
John A. Vasquez & Colin Elman eds. Realism and The Balancing of Power: A New Debate. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 222–249. 
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3.3.2. Liska, Riker, Atfeld, Bueno De Mesquita, Russett and Snyder 
The above-mentioned kind of critiques led to the development of different 
alignment conceptualizations with different definitions of bandwagoning and 
balancing. Despite the critiques, it is crucially important to emphatically evaluate 
the improvement that Walt introduces in both mainstream international relations 
theory and alliance theory in particular. It may seem half-hearted from a 
constructivist standing, however it is revolutionary from a realist stance. Walt is 
one of the rare realists who try to marry realism and constructivism in contrast to 
some constructivist accounts that do not even bother to involve in bridge-building 
between realism and constructivism. Thus, a balanced and objective view that is at 
equal standing both to realism and constructivism would underline that balance of 
threat theory is much to be appreciated. It is the first stepping stone towards more 
rigorous theories and research programs that aim both to explain (in the way neo-
realism and neo-liberalism are concerned) and understand (in the way 
constructivism is concerned with) alliances. Indeed, other scholars press on from 
that point onwards.  
Liska, as one of the most cited and eminent scholars on alliances, has asserted 
that the prerequisite for alliance cohesion is the presence of ‘an alliance ideology’: 
alliances are formed mostly “against, and only derivatively for someone or 
something.”125Riker, on the other hand, studied how alliances are formed. He 
argued that alliances are built economically in the sense that prospective members 
consider the “marginal utility” of joining an alliance. They base their decision on 
the expectation of benefits or rewards versus potential costs. What is more, the size 
of the alliance is assumed to be commensurate to balance power, not more than 
                     
125Liska, G.F. 1968. Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, pp. 10-15. 
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necessary to balance power, creating “a minimum winning coalition.”126 
Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita followed the line of Liska and Riker, and 
they argued that nation-states form alliances only when they see ‘utility’ in it. In 
other words, alliances are only formed when states perceive potential benefits of a 
decision to join an alliance outweigh the costs and risks. Glenn Synder, who built 
on this line of argument by using game theory, argued that states form or join 
alliances if they gauge or assess ‘the payoffs’ from the decision to form an alliance 
be greater than the payoffs from not forming such an alliance.127That led to the 
game-theoric pay-off matrixes. Bruce Russett underlined significant limitations 
though. Regarding the formation of minimum winning coalitions, he cautions that 
its limitations are severe: When more than just a few actors are involved, it is 
almost impossible to determine what a minimum winning coalition would or should 
be. The complexities of measurement, weighting, perceptions, and levels of 
commitment are multiplied by both the numbers of allies and adversaries being 
considered. Game theory models of alliances assume a zero-sum "terminal" 
situation with fairly clear information on relative costs and payoffs, but 
international politics is not generally regarded as zero-sum and is “a continuous 
game, not an episodic one”.  
Moreover, communication and perceptions are usually imperfect, which 
makes knowledge of relative payoffs difficult, especially for individual members of 
an alliance.128Nevertheless, Stephen Walt sees alliances arising as a response to 
“threat”. He defines “threat” as a combination of capabilities (power) and intent 
(both motivations and perceptions). “Geographic proximity” and “offensive power” 
                     
126Riker, W.H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, Cr: Yale University Press, 
pp.176-183. 
127Snyder, G.H. 1984. “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics” World Politics 36-4, pp. 83-103. 
128Russett, B.M. 1968. “Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 12-3: 285-301. 
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are also included as components of threat. According to him, balancing against a 
threat is far more common than bandwagoning. He concludes that the greater the 
threat, the less ideology and common culture matter, asserting the central role of 
threats in alliance formation independent of ‘ideology’.129  
Theories that are brought forward by K. Waltz and S. Walt have, by and 
large, dominated the alliance (strategies of nation-state alignments) literature. 
Succinctly, both authors claim that nation-states would often balance rather than 
bandwagon with the stronger or more threatening power, either to preserve 
themselves or maximize security in a self-help system.  
 
3.3.3. Hegemonic Stability Theory 
Hegemonic Stability Theory is applied both by political economists and 
realists in analyzing international affairs. It rose to prominence in international 
relations literature (especially in the US) during the 1970s as part of an effort to 
explain the stability and instability in the world economy. After the Cold War, it is 
particularly used to assess the US foreign policy in the absence and power vacuum 
of the former Eastern bloc, and, to explain the policies of nation-states in 
general.130The 1991 Gulf War, the Balkan interventions in the late 1990s, 
expansion of the NATO and structural polarity after the Cold War have all often 
been examined through the hegemonic theory lenses.  
Hegemonic stability theory is separable from, but correlated to ‘leadership 
theory’ and ‘hegemony theory’.131Hegemonic stability theory argues that 
                     
129Chiu, Daniel Y. 2003. “International Alliances in the Power Cycle Theory of State Behavior” 
International Political Science Review Vol. 24 No. 1, Power Cycle Theory and Global Politics, January, 
p. 124.  
130Sheetz, Mark S. and Mastanduno, Michael - Correspondence, Michael. 1997-98. “Debating the 
Unipolar Moment” International Security Vol. 22 No. 3, p. 172. 
131Sheetz, Mark S. and Mastanduno, Michael - Correspondence, Michael. 1997-98. “Debating the 
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international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a 
single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last 
hegemonic war.132The hegemon establishes an international order that promotes its 
own particular interests and values and supplies public goods such as international 
security and international economic order.  
There are two versions of hegemonic stability theory. The liberal version, in 
which a ‘benevolent’ or ‘benign’ hegemon neither excludes other states from the 
benefits of public goods nor forces them to share in the costs, is mostly associated 
with Kindleberger and Keohane. A realist version, in which a ‘coercive’ hegemon 
can both exclude other states and compel them to pay the costs of public goods 
through the use of selective incentives and punishments, is associated with Gilpin 
and Krasner.  
The hegemon provides stability in international security affairs by acting as 
a balancer of last resort, and supports international monetary and trade regimes by 
acting as lender and market of last resort. Over time, the hegemon overpays for 
international public goods in order to maintain its dominance. Meanwhile, 
differential rates of economic growth and diffusion of military and technological 
means around the world lead to diffusion of power and the rise of challengers. As a 
response to its challengers, ‘a declining hegemon’ attempts to make other states pay 
for the costs of the international public goods such as stability of international 
security and international economy. It does so by exacting tribute, by reducing its 
share of the costs, by changing the rules of the international order it established 
after the last hegemonic war it won. Finally, it may resort to preventive war so as to 
                                                                
Unipolar Moment” International Security Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 168-174. 
132Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press; 
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. The World in Depression. Berkeley: University of California Press; 
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maintain its dominant position.133 
 Mastanduno argues that to explain the foreign and security policy of a single 
state through hegemonic stability theory, predictions should be established for state 
behaviors based on the position of the state in international structure, especially the 
extent to which a state is hegemonic. 
This is important since the theory makes a differentiation between 
‘hegemonic states’ and ‘declining hegemons’. However, the task of determining the 
relative position of a powerful state is complicated due to the conceptual ambiguity 
of the term ‘hegemon.’134Concurrently, scholars disagreed on the extent of the 
declining position of the US in the aftermath of the Cold War: Robert Gilpin, 
Stephen Krasner, Richard Haas and Paul Kennedy argued for the relative decline of 
the US that makes it a declining hegemon whereas Susan Strange, Bruce Russett 
and Joseph Nye argued for the enduring hegemonic position of the US. The basic 
argument goes on to posit that when a hegemon turns into a declining one in time, 
the primary regimes and institutions that are created under its auspices wane, and 
international stability regarding security and economy deteriorates because of the 
declining hegemons’ anti-status quo policies that risks system stability and war. 
As the last note of notice, Mastanduno argues that hegemonic stability theory 
is controversial in that it is less a theory, but more a research program that cannot 
be tested or refuted.135  
 
 
                     
133Sheetz, Mark S. and Mastanduno, Michael - Correspondence, Michael. 1997-98. “Debating the 
Unipolar Moment” International Security Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 168-174. 
134Snidal, Duncan. 1995. “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory” International Organization, Vol. 
39, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 579-614. 
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3.3.4. Alignment Strategies as Policy Choices in Response to American 
Policy Behaviour after September 11, 2001 
Labeling actions as ‘terrorism’ promotes condemnation of groups or actors; a 
definition may be regarded as reflecting ideological and political bias derived from 
peculiar interests. As the primary actors of the international system, nation-states 
have different interests to pursue and they define issues in ways that favor them. 
Their definitions differ because states have different perceptions, preferences and 
goals over time. Consequently, lack of a standard definition of terrorism is mainly 
due to disagreements among nation-states in pursuing their national interests, which 
may not be same at all times. Furthermore, each state has a list of national interests. 
The interest that is associated with (not necessarily countering) terrorism is just one 
of the interest that is pursued. Some states may see interest in the continuation of 
terrorism or it may not take action against it and simply turn a blind eye. France-
Spain relations pertaining to ETA is a case in point. France did not take any action 
against ETA until after Spain undertook covert operations against the organization 
in French soil.  
The bottom line of the issue is that definitional controversy about terrorism 
points to different interests of nation-states. It, then, goes without saying that 
terrorism is highly political. As a politics-laden issue that pinpoints enemies, the 
term ‘terrorism’ has numerous definitions each of which is designed for political 
use by its definer/an actor in international politics. More often than not, major 
powers of a particular historical period have the ascendancy of determining what 
terms or concepts stand for. 
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Given such considerations, Laquer in 1977 argued that,  
 
…a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist and nor will it be found in 
the foreseeable future. To argue that terrorism cannot be studied without such a 
definition is manifestly absurd136. 
 
Laquer in 1999 underlines that working-definitions remained restricted to the 
work at hand and have not found general acceptance among those studying the 
subject. That point seems largely valid. In passing, Laquer underlines, via 
Nietzsche, that  
‘…only things that have no history can be defined; terrorism, needless to say, has had 
a very long history. Furthermore, there has not been a single form of terrorism, but 
many, often with few traits in common. Today there are more varieties than existed 
thirty years ago, and many are so different from those of the past and from each other 
that the term terrorism no longer fits some of them. In the future, new terms will 
probably be found for the new varieties of terrorism.’ 
 
In accordance with Waltz’s and Walt’s arguments, alignment scheme of the 
post-Cold War era would have seen great powers allying to balance more than to 
bandwagon to protect themselves in a self-help world from either the strongest or 
most threatening state. This line of argument came under severe critique because of 
the post-Cold War climate of academic debates: controversy on systemic and state 
preservation was common, and alleged alignments among non-state entities and 
nation-states risked analytical clarity. Relationship of Hamas and Hezbollah with 
the Middle Eastern states presented seemingly insurmountable analytical problems 
owing to the inclusion of violent non-state entities, their control, motivations and 
means. Al Qaeda is an altogether unique phenomenon in that it instigated huge 
debate as to anything related to terrorism at large with remarkable repercussions for 
foreign policies of nation-states.  
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The most important historically recent development for international relations 
is the end of the Cold War. The second most important development for 
international relations at large and alliance politics and cooperation in particular is 
the September 11, 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks around the world. These 
terrorist attacks enforced the consideration of non-state actors and terrorism world-
wide. Terrorism became a serious foreign policy problem instead of just a nuisance. 
Since terrorists interpret Islam peculiarly and explain their atrocities in the name of 
Islam, Islamism or political Islam (both in its licit/political and illicit/violent forms) 
came to be recognized as the enemy or the suspect. However, whether this is true or 
justified is not a concern of this study. Rather, what is important for international 
relations and security is that Islamism has become a counter-hegemonic movement 
or ideology in opposition to those states which have up to now defined the 
ideological, economic and military contours of the international system and 
order.137 
In parallel, epistemic arguments for the role of ideas in conducting state 
policies, private violence or illicit use of force that breaks state monopoly on the 
use of force, the influence of domestic politics on foreign-policy making, the 
impact of international organizations on states and the impact of non-state actors 
(corporations, NGOs, criminal and terrorist organizations, economic black markets 
and unregulated funds) all come to have influence over state alignments in ways 
different from the days of the NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. These are some of 
the important issues that have provoked numerous discussions.138These discussions 
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also have important repercussions on alliance theory and cooperation, which have 
been detailed starting from the very beginning of the first chapter of this study. 
Significantly, cooperation, alignment and alliance behaviors of states are affected 
by the increasing political clout of non-state entities. Security cooperation has 
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become vital in protection from and fight against terrorism. Alliances evolve into 
having more political substance rather than remaining as mere military structures, 
while coalitions are emergent ways of responding contemporary threats. Thus, 
balance of power and threat theories appear to have some shortfalls despite their 
crucial contributions. That is primarily because the source of contemporary threats 
is not always a nation-state. The threat is ambiguous and the security landscape is 
different from that of the Cold War as detailed in previous chapters.  
 
3.3.4.1. Schroeder: ‘Self-Help Behavior Is Relatively Rare’ 
In the face of the changing conflict and security environment, other 
theoretical developments such as that of Paul Schroeder’s may help analyze these 
problems. Although Paul Schroeder’s work is underutilized, it opened the door to 
Randall Schweller’s sophisticated follow-up scheme of alignment strategies.  
What Schroeder basically posits is that self-help behavior is relatively rare. 
He asserts that self-help behavior does not always explain how states survived from 
their Westphalian origins up until now.139According to Schroeder, ‘self-help 
means, at least generally, the potential or actual use of a state’s own power along 
with that of other units for the purposes of compellence, deterrence, and other 
modes of controlling the actions of one’s opponents’.140 However, his definition of 
‘self-help’ is counter to that of Waltz and Walt in that he defines it as a last resort 
alignment strategy or a fallback policy. Self-help, unlike Waltzian and Waltian 
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conceptions, is not defined as balancing against an actual or potential hegemon. In 
contrast with Waltzian analysis, self-help does not automatically lead to balancing 
either. He argues that balance of power theory is not that simple enough to equate 
self-help with balancing persistently. Instead, he persuasively claims that alignment 
strategies other than bandwagoning and balancing exist: five alignment strategies to 
which states turn are ‘hiding’, ‘transcending’, ‘bandwagoning’, and ‘specializing’, 
and sometimes in combination with others, self-help as the fifth alignment 
category.  
 
3.3.4.2 Hiding 
It is important to underscore that self-help and alignment strategies are 
conceptualized differently from the way balance of power theory is understood by 
Waltz and Walt. Schroeder argues that balancing may be prohibitively costly, and 
this may coerce states to look for alternative options. Facing the hardship of 
sustaining long-term self-help strategies, states turn to develop armed forces 
(internal balancing), forge temporary military alliances, or initiate deterrence by 
diplomacy. Enhancing the concept of Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen’s 
‘buck-passing’141, he posits ‘hiding’. Hiding is done by ignoring or declaring 
neutrality during crises. The objective of hiding as a defensive alignment strategy is 
to eschew war or conflicts short of all-out war that includes full mobilization of 
mass armies, while gaining or increasing ‘security’. Again, the goal is not 
revisionist such that the state is not aiming to gain power, but hiding state is 
attempting more defensively to maintain position and security. If states escape from 
joining into an alliance and avoid using force, they hide from other states by 
                     
141Christensen, Thomas J. & Jack Snyder. 1990. ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance 
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seeking security trade-offs through diplomatic visits, cordial and friendly relations 
and non-military support. Formal military commitments or commitments induced 
by a military alliance membership are thereby avoided by the hiding state.  
 
3.3.4.3. Transcending 
Another alternative alignment is ‘transcending’. It is applied to solve 
problems rather than hedging against them. States, Schroeder argues, may achieve 
transcending by stopping threats or thwarting them. Yet, an institutional framework 
is seen as necessary, one that is based on international consensus or formal 
agreements. Norms, rules and procedures are included to be active in the 
implementation of the transcending alignment. This is where Schroeder establishes 
a link to regimes. This establishes another connection to Glen Synder’s ‘third-party 
ties’, through which Snyder explained the cooperative and appeasing strategies of 
states against domineering or threatening states without entering into alliances. 
Domineering state is what Waltz sees as more capable state to be balanced, and it is 
what Walt sees as most threatening state to be balanced. Schroeder sees 
conciliatory or cooperative strategy on the one hand and the 
compromising/appeasing alignment strategy on the other. He focuses on the study 
of cooperation as a strategy of survival in contrast to Waltz and Walt. He comes out 
of the arguably extreme parsimony of the hypothesis that balancing is the only 
prevalent alignment strategy leaving no room for any other alignment types and 
policies.  
In lieu of hiding and transcending alignments, he opposes the Waltzian and 
Waltian arguments that balancing happens more than bandwagoning. For Waltz 
and Walt, military alliances dominate international relations; bandwagoning occurs 
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less than balancing and bandwagoning signals insecurity and loss of independence. 
For Schroeder, throughout the Westphalian era nation-states both small and great 
are aware of their vulnerabilities and they seek survival not only by balancing, but 
also by bandwagoning, hiding and transcending. Contrary to Waltz, Schroeder 
argues that bandwagoning occurs more than balancing. He goes on to argue that 
‘specializing’ is yet another alignment strategy that may be applied instead of 
balancing.  
    
3.3.4.4. Specializing 
‘Specializing’ is fulfilling vital roles or functions that no other state could 
do or do so as well. Specialized states are performing roles that provide other states 
‘support of assistance’. Schroeder claims that such functions and roles often 
modified the behavior of states, including great powers, and significantly changed 
their purposes and methods in using power.’142 
Randall Schweller expands on some of the above-mentioned strategies of 
Schroeder.  Different configurations of alignments are discussed. However, as a 
unique concept, Schweller coined underbalancing in 2006 (Unanswered Threats) 
that shed light on cooperation among states during the war on terrorism campaign. 
Another depiction is Walt’s scheme of strategic reactions of states to American 
power after September 11 (Taming American Power), which is discussed further 
below.  
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3.3.4.5. Schweller: Bandwagoning for Profit and Underbalancing  
Schweller argues that bandwagoning is not the opposite of balancing. A 
state not only bandwagons with a stronger nation-state to increase power, but also 
to gain a reward or profit by responding to an opportunity, not just responding to a 
threat. Therefore, bandwagoning may be expedient. With resemblances to 
Schroeder’s transcending alignment, binding behaviour restrains them in engaging 
in balancing against the stronger states. This is so simply because a state may have 
bilateral rivalries with commensurate states which can be viewed either as potential 
allies to balance against the strongest or threatening state or as rivals against which 
advantages could be obtained by bandwagoning, which is allying with the strongest 
state. As a result, binding may even lead to new alliance formation in order to tie 
down revisionist states within an institutional framework because it allows lesser 
powers to attempt to acquire greater ‘voice’ within the alliance, promote 
cooperation and consensus, or entangle and prevent systemic disruption. This may 
be repeated within an already existing alliance, too. 
In the light of above-mentioned arguments, alliances in collective security 
terms can be seen as intra-restraining institutional tools that aim to integrate or 
manage the revisionist state. Lesser states may try to attract or even include the 
revisionist state into an alliance if it is not already within it. Congruently, post-Cold 
War NATO can be seen as an institutional tool for binding the US through intra-
alliance dynamics.  Binding as such is restraining the strongest state without openly 
challenging it in capability or power terms. This is done without resorting to 
traditional external military balancing. Then, binding is bandwagoning without 
remaining subservient to the greater power. That is what the EU states tried to do 
regarding the American power after the Cold War.  
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Balancing is, according to Schweller, allying with a weaker state or with a 
coalition of them against a stronger revisionist state. However, balancing is not 
contrasted to binding and bandwagoning. Indeed, Schweller argues that balancing, 
binding and bandwagoning are not mutually exclusive. They are overlapping. Why 
the three alignment strategies are regarded as overlapping becomes clear when 
aggression is introduced. 
Balancing may lead to aggression, which is itself an altogether different 
alignment designed to wage war. Balancing may precede aggression and most of 
the time, claims Schweller, big crises or tensions such as World War I and II are 
the result of balancing turning into aggression. Aggression is different from 
bandwagoning and balancing: Bandwagoning may be for profit rather than to 
increase power. Binding happens to ease out or tame revisionist state 
institutionally. Neither bandwagoning nor binding maintains or increases tension 
for long; rather they gradually extinguish fire in relations. In contrast, since 
balancing is lucid challenge to the revisionist state unlike binding and 
bandwagoning, it maintains or increases tension. If the tension is kept relatively 
stable or cold, it may not lead to all-out war as in the case of the Cold War. Thus, 
balancing does not always precede or give way to aggression, which is the war-like 
or war-prone state behaviour. Within such delimitation, balancing though different 
from other strategies is associated with binding and bandwagoning as one of the 
alignment strategies to manage conflictive and tense relations. Thus, Schweller 
presents strategies other than bandwagoning and balancing that manage the 
revisionist or stronger states.  
Importantly, balancing and bandwagoning are not categorized as binary 
opposites but as overlapping strategies of power management. States may not 
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always clearly or notably balance against the strongest state due to tremendous 
costs and risks attached. However, that does not mean acceding to strongest state 
preferences at all times. This approach includes a synthesis of bandwagoning and 
balancing that merges and fine-tunes the policy of giving in or compromising and 
the policy of obstructionism, which is resistance without external military 
balancing. 
Another explanation of alignment and cooperation among states is made by 
Stephen Walt who has studied the reactions of nation-states towards the US foreign 
policy, especially after the initiation of the 2003 American intervention in Iraq. 
Walt argues -in Taming American Power, the Global Response to US Primacy- that 
at a time when America’s dominance abroad is being challenged as never before, 
the strategies that rival-states have devised to counter the US is important for 
alliance studies. The book evaluates anti-American alignment strategies. That 
evaluation also is equivalent to why and how cooperation among states is limited 
even when they are eager to fight against terrorism. Therefore, the book’s 
significance is that it focuses on intra-alliance and intra-coalitional setbacks in 
states’ fight against terrorism. 
His book makes the case that the ever-increasing tide of opposition against 
the US not only could threaten the America’s ability to achieve its foreign policy 
goals in the present but also may undermine its dominant position in the future. He 
argues that while Americans tend to see US pre-eminence as benign or positive, it 
arouses fear, worry and resentment around the world. It also explains why 
American influence and soft power have declined during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. 
 
143 
 
3.3.5. Opposing Alignment Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era 
Walt divides the responses of countries into two main groups: Opposing 
strategies and accommodating strategies. Opposing strategies are balancing, 
balking, binding, delegitimation and blackmailing. Accommodating strategies are 
bandwagoning, bonding and penetration. These strategies are also strategies that 
are used by states for solving intra-alliance problems. Therefore, they explain how 
and why states become ‘uncooperative’143, if not conflictive. 
 
3.3.5.1. Balancing 
‘Balancing’ is the strategy of opposing the threatening state and it comes in 
two traditional forms, ‘internal’ and ‘external balancing’. As a rather new-comer 
concept of alignment strategies coined by R. Pape, ‘soft-balancing’ is also used by 
Walt. 
Internal balancing is the build-up and mobilization of internal sources of a 
country in its opposition to the threatening state. External balancing is allying with 
other states against the threatening state, which is the US throughout the book. 
External balancing includes formal alliance formation while internal balancing is 
done through symmetric and asymmetric strategies. Symmetric strategy is mainly 
conventional military procurement and arms-build up of other nations that oppose 
the US. Asymmetric strategies includes transnational terrorism without a state-
sponsor, state-sponsored terrorism, terrorism with weapons of mass destruction and 
the states’ ambition to acquire weapons of mass destruction making the issue of 
horizontal proliferation an opposition leverage against the hegemon or the primary 
power in the system.  
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one to six of this chapter. 
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‘Soft-balancing’ is a rather new concept developed by R. Pape so as to 
explain the reactions of the rest of the world against the US polices after the 
September 11 attacks.144 So as to start explaining, soft-balancing might be defined 
roughly as an opposing strategy short of traditional military balancing. 
Qualifications and further delimitation of the concept are necessary though, and 
they are mainly fourfold; they are explained below shortly. However, the definition 
of soft balancing must be developed in advance to the qualifications or goals to 
which it serves.  
‘Soft-balancing’ can best be understood in comparison to ‘hard balancing’: 
Walt defines hard balancing as that strategy of alignment among states that 
‘concentrates on the overall balance of power and seeks to assemble a 
countervailing coalition that will be strong enough to keep the dominant power in 
check.’145In other words, hard-balancing seeks to change the distribution of 
capabilities to balance the revisionist state and maintain equilibrium thereby. Soft-
balancing, however, does not expect to alter the distribution of capabilities or does 
not aim at a re-distribution. Distinguishingly, soft-balancing accepts the current 
balance of power, but aims to obtain better results within it.  
The US is still regarded as ‘the preponderant power’, but that does not 
inhibit opposition strategies by other states. That causes a problem of American 
power.146 To understand the salience of soft-balancing, it is essential to briefly 
elaborate what a preponderant power refers to. ‘Preponderant power’ or position of 
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primacy is not meant to denote unipolar power. As the term preponderant implies, 
the US is just greater than other states in terms of different types of power; 
however, its influence and the ability to achieve its objectives is structurally limited 
as discussed in chapter 3 on non-polarity. Yet, preponderance is no small advantage 
on its side. Apart from the polar logic of analysis, it is especially tenable to 
maintain that the US is far and away in its own league in terms of military 
capability with forward defense bases all around the world. Its power-projection 
capability is simply unrivalled. Yet, military capability alone (the capacity to 
compel or deter and punish when deterrence fails) does not equal to achieving goals 
and compliance or having remarkable influence over the rest of the world in a 
nonpolar era. This is exactly why soft-balancing succeeds. Consequently, soft-
balancing is the response strategy of states against the US in a nonpolar era. Soft-
balancing can only be possible in a non-polar era where power is diffused, where 
power has acquired additional uses by states and non-state entities.147 Thus, soft-
balancing is the strategy that is directly linked to and follows from the structural 
factors discussed in the first three chapters. Accordingly, waning of major war 
explains why hard-balancing did not occur regarding the post-September 11 US 
foreign policy. Instead of raising armies, states soft-balanced: conscious 
coordination of diplomatic action so as to obtain outcomes in contrary to US 
preferences. Those outcomes could not be achieved unless states that oppose the 
US gave each other mutual support. Then, cooperation to manage the US is soft-
balancing. The cooperation centers on the conscious attempt to deny or limit the 
US ability to impose its preferences on other states.  
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Soft-balancing must be qualified. It has four goals. First, states soft-balance 
in order to increase their ability to resist US pressure including, according to Walt, 
the use of force. It is, then, seen also as a preliminary phase leading to military hard 
balancing. Exchange of intelligence information is a way to resist US pressure 
exemplified by Serbia-Iraq, North Korea-Iraq, China-Iraq and Russia-China.148  
Secondly, joining forces with others is a way of improving bargaining 
position in negotiations whether conducted bilaterally or multilaterally. The 
bargaining issue at stake may be of both low and high politics, such as 
environmental precautions, genetically modified food, economic and trade talks or 
the use of military force and manoeuvres. During forums under the aegis of 
international organizations, soft-balancing or conscious coordination of policies 
against the threatening state may prove to be strengthening the bargaining power of 
states. Soft-balancing states can consciously choose to play into their hands with 
the expected benefit of resisting or limiting the imposition of strongest state 
preferences upon them. The example is the World Trade Organization 
arrangements among India, Brazil, China, and South Africa representing a group of 
twenty-one developing countries. They came together to force developed states to 
cut trade barriers. It paid off and developed countries made concessions in 2004.  
Third, soft-balancing may be a warning to stop doing something. Sino-
Russian Friendship Pact of 2001 is an example. Russia and China demonstrated 
that they had other options than to concede to US demands, and that it is a 
prospective hard-balancing in the making. It may be evaluated as an indication of a 
potential hard-balancing in the future. In 2004, Russia and China announced a joint 
military exercise involving all three force structures, land, air and naval forces. 
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Moreover, in response to the alignment of US with its allies such as Israel, Turkey, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, Russia showed behaviours of near-alignment 
with Iran. Iran and Russia, as a strategic response of soft-balancing, joined efforts 
to limit the influence of the US and its allies regarding the Central Asian and 
Middle Eastern power contestation: Russia and Iran is not in a conflict with each 
other with regard to energy security and Iranian nuclear ambitions.149 
Fourth goal and usage of soft-balancing is that it serves to obtain relative 
independence from the strongest power or reducing the interdependence between 
the soft-balancing states and the threatening state. European efforts to develop a 
unified defence force would make Europe less dependent upon the US protection. 
This would enable it to defend its own interests on its own and in a way it sees fit - 
that is multilaterally. That would also strengthen European bargaining hand in 
international organizations and institutions. 
Best example to soft-balancing, according to Stephen Walt, came with “the 
Bush administration’s failure to acquire UN Security Council authorization for its 
2003 preventive war.”150 He views it as a perfect example of soft-balancing. The 
US was able to persuade only three states within the Security Council to support its 
call to arms against Iraq. This was due to both American heavy-handed diplomacy 
and to soft-balancing among France, Germany and Russia. The latter anti-war 
group of states did not balance traditionally or in the classic sense. They did not 
send armies to resist the US militarily. They did not send military support or aid to 
Iraq. Yet, their opposition made it safer and less costly for other states to follow 
suit and oppose the US policy softly. Turkey refused US requests to use its soil 
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during the war. Mexico and Cameroon were encouraged by the soft-balancing 
alignment among Russia, France and Germany and opposed diplomatically. By 
adopting a unified position, all these nations denied the US the legitimacy that 
came with the UN mandate.  
 
3.3.5.2. Balking 
Second opposition strategy is ‘balking’. It has three variants. Balking is 
ignoring the strongest state’s requests or demands, or doing the bare minimum to 
avoid an overt clash. It is a close cousin of balancing. When states balance against 
the strongest power, they seek increasing or bettering their position relative to the 
hegemon or the leader state. Balking is not seeking to acquire a better position; 
rather it is just trying to avoid compliance with the demands of the hegemon 
because balking state perceives that compliance is not in its interest. Turkey’s 
refusal to give access to US forces prior to 2003 Iraq intervention is an example to 
balking. It is assessed that America lacked either the will or the capacity to compel 
obedience. Another example is premiers Sarkozy’s and Merkel’s refusal to accept 
the demands of President Obama regarding Turkey’s accession to the EU. Iran’s 
refusal to allow further inspections of its nuclear activities is still another 
example.151 
Although balking is mostly ‘just saying no’, it is a surprisingly effective 
strategy of opposition. Moreover, it can take two additional forms or variants, 
namely ‘dragging one’s feet’ and ‘free-riding’. Dragging one’s feet is not saying 
no, but it is doing the minimum necessary and prolonging the so-called process of 
cooperation. The EU member states are arguing that they are fighting against 
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terrorism but they are delaying the necessary steps to be taken. EU initially did not 
recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization unlike the US. After a long time, 
PKK was added to the terrorist organizations list. However, at almost no time, 
extradition problems are solved and European Union denied transferring terrorists. 
In this case, the definitional problem of terrorism does not matter because the EU 
does not take the necessary steps to cooperate with Turkey even after its acceptance 
of the PKK as a terrorist organization, as the remarks of Joost Lagendijk 
indicates.152 American pledge to fight against the PKK in Northern Iraq and yet its 
commitment to its pledge at a bare minimum is another example.  
 
3.3.5.3. Free-Riding 
Free-riding is the third form of balking according to Walt. In free-riding, a 
state genuinely supports strongest state’s policy, but it does not want to contribute 
its share of costs. It is akin to ‘foot-dragging’ variant of balking, yet free-riding 
states do not try to thwart the policies of the strongest state. Free-riding states just 
try to make the strongest state and other states pay for the agreed course of action. 
This is how Walt conceptualizes free-riding as a variant of balking.  
The term ‘free-riding’ is basically of the collective goods theory jargon, and 
its equivalent in alliance literature is ‘burden-sharing problem’. Free-riding is lack 
of burden-sharing: obtaining something with no or very less effort or cost. It is 
benefiting without contribution, by taking advantage of the efforts of the rest. In 
other words, it is taking a share from the final-product with low or no participation 
in its production - taking without giving. If all attempt to free-ride or freeload, 
however, there is no provision and no ‘ride’. The job, defined along the agreed 
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course of action among allies, is not done; producing no benefits for anybody. Free-
riding is a common problem of collective action whose logic is that of the N-
Prisoner's Dilemma. Free-riding is also a common burden-sharing problem within 
alliances.  
According to Stephen Walt, ‘free-riding as the third variant of balking’ 
largely explains the setbacks in the current effort to control ‘international 
terrorism’.153With just one reservation, this study follows the validity of ‘free-
riding’ in explaining the limits of cooperation and intra-alliance problems among 
states in their struggle against terrorism. The reservation is that contemporary 
terrorism is not international, but it manifests mostly ‘transnational’ characteristics. 
154‘International’ signifies the cooperative struggle of states, not the threat. 
‘International’ denotes the current effort of nation-states against transnational 
terrorism. Thus, an international effort of nation-states against the non-state centric 
transitional threat is at issue.  
The confrontation of the different scales and scope of efforts, namely 
international versus transnational, is crucial. It is crucial because the nuance 
between international and transnational explains the limits of cooperation among 
states. Balking and free-riding must be evaluated within this framework, a point 
which is not studied in any of the alliance literature studies as yet. The international 
effort of nation-states confronts transnational effort of terrorists. All of the above-
mentioned alignment strategies must be evaluated within this scheme. Unless this is 
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done, intra-alliance cooperation problems cannot be understood well enough. 
Accordingly, this raises the difficulty that faces the traditional alliance literature: 
how to integrate the non-state centric transnational threat formation into the 
literature so that implications of the threat for the literature will not weaken but 
improve the approaches that are reviewed in this chapter. The point is detailed in 
the next chapter about strategies of states in cooperation against terrorism. 
In the light of that point, it is turned to ‘balking’ strategy of alignment 
again. Why do states balk? In other words, why do they become uncooperative by 
saying no or by prolonging the implementation of their share, or by free-riding? 
States balk particularly because there are conflicts of interests between the primary 
power and the rest of the states. However, rather than balancing, balking is 
preferred to minimize costs and damage to interests even where common goals 
exist between the strongest state and the rest. Balking is not open hostility or strong 
opposition; rather it is a strategy to manage the primary power or the leader state. It 
is an attempt to channel policies of the strongest state or primary power in a way 
that makes it consider the interests of others. Although the US pressured Russia to 
stop helping Iran to build a nuclear reactor in Bushehr, the Russian government 
politely refused and balked. The US simply could not get what it wanted: crippling 
the means with which Iran struggles to become a nuclear power. Balking forced the 
US to devise policies that calculate the interests of other states too. 
 
3.3.5.4. Binding 
Binding is the strategy used by states that do not want to balance, but still 
want to restrain the use of strongest state’s use of power. It is a strategy to limit 
dominance. Binding is the use of norms and international institutions to restrain the 
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strongest state or the threatening state. This strategy is most effective in non-
military issues. While balancers oppose the primary power by distancing 
themselves, binders embrace and pull it in an institutional and normative 
framework. The metaphor for binding is the Gulliver lying on the beach tied down 
by numerous Lilliputians, who are weak to oppose him openly. Thus, they bind the 
primary or strongest state. The logic of binding lies in the perception of some states 
that international institutions play a powerful role in sustaining international 
cooperation. The prevailing view of institutionalism is that states that would like to 
cooperate can do so more easily when they establish rules, norms and procedures 
among each other to regulate their relations. These rules help states determine 
whether their partners are living up to the specified terms of cooperation. The rules 
and procedures also make it easier to negotiate agreements and provide 
mechanisms that distribute the benefits of cooperation. Equally important, 
international institutions confer legitimacy on actions of the most powerful states. 
The institutionalist approach argues that if weaker states perceive that the strongest 
state will use its power when there is broad international backing, they will be less 
concerned about the asymmetries of power between themselves and the strongest 
state. Binding, then, is to place institutional and normative limits on the unilateral 
use of the strongest state’s power.  
 
3.3.5.5. Blackmailing 
Under certain conditions, weaker states can blackmail stronger ones. Any 
benefit obtained by threat or pressure is the basis of blackmailing. The 
blackmailing state threatens to take some action that the victim or blackmailed state 
wants to prevent, but at the same time declares that it will quit taking action if the 
153 
 
victim complies with the blackmailer’s demands. 
North Korea’s interaction with the US is an example. North Korea is a 
tragic economic failure and uses its nuclear aspirations as a blackmailing leverage 
against the US. It uses the threat to acquire weapons of mass destruction as a 
blackmailing instrument and obtains several of its demands. From 1994, the US, 
Japan and South Korea agreed to provide North Korea with two light-water nuclear 
reactors, fuel, food and economic assistance. The US, during the Clinton 
administration years, came very close to exchanging high-level visits. 
How does the blackmailing strategy work? Initially, it is worth noting that it 
is tempting to blackmail a rich state or, via Rosecrance, ‘a trading or a virtual state’ 
then a poor one.155Since this is a strategy to make the blackmailed state to pay up, 
blackmailing a weak state is relatively rare. A latent blackmailer has to meet 
several conditions. First, it must have the ability to do something that the 
blackmailed state does not want to happen. Secondly, the unwanted action that is 
threatened by blackmailer cannot be easily prevented by the victim or blackmailed 
state. Third, the demands of the blackmailer must not be too large. Otherwise, the 
victim state may decide to fight rather than pay up the blackmailer. Finally, the 
victim state must be assured that paying up will prevent the threatened 
action/blackmailing to disappear. Additionally, what North Korean behavior from 
1994 onwards showed is that blackmail strategy is not likely to work if the 
blackmailer refuses to be bought.  
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During the Cold War, Soviet and American clients blackmailed their 
superpower patrons. Egyptian leader Nasser in early 1970s and South Vietnamese 
leaders during most of the Cold War threatened to re-align with the other 
superpower or resign from alignment and stay neutral if they do not receive greater 
benefits in return for acceptance of their patron’s preferences.156Recently, several 
states have exploited the US preferences regarding the war on terrorism in order to 
receive concessions and benefits that serve their own interests. Russia, China, 
Pakistan and Uzbekistan are examples in point. They all asked for concessions on 
human-rights issues so as to cooperate with the US against terrorism. The US 
turned a blind eye to human-rights conditions, and has given political and economic 
support to these countries in exchange for cooperation against terrorism. The 
details are examined in the following chapter about the nation-states’ declarations 
and actions taken on the ground. 
 
3.3.5.6. Delegitimation 
 Delegitimation is a restraining strategy that seeks to erode the soft power of 
the primary nation-state in the system. Normative and ideological dominance of the 
system is by and large sustained by the hegemon or the strongest state in the 
international system. The aim of delegitimation is to erode the influence of the 
strongest state by portraying it as an irresponsible state or one that does not live up 
to its own norms. Since the norms of the hegemon are also the norms that shape the 
basic values of an international order, delegitimation is especially effective when 
used in combination with the strategy of binding. The delegitimation strategy 
pictures the strongest state as being extremely selfish that does not pay any 
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attention to others’ interests. Moreover, it portrays it as violent or aggressive. As 
such, delegitimation strategy aims to erode the legitimacy of the targeted state. 
 The belief throughout history that the kings rule by ‘divine right’ 
strengthened their control over their societies because when the society saw the 
status of royalty and aristocracy as God-given, no reordering of society or 
challenge to status quo emerged such as riots along the democratic lines. Thus, 
reordering any system of rule requires picturing it as ‘corrupt’, or ‘illegitimate’. It 
goes without saying that legitimacy is different from being legal.  
Similar concerns arise when a state enjoys a dominant position in the 
international system. If other states see the existing international structure of power 
as ‘legitimate’, they are less likely to challenge the dominant nation-state and its 
values along which the international system is largely shaped usually after major 
wars.157However, if states see the prevailing power distribution and the use of it as 
illegitimate or ‘unfair’, they start to look for ways to change it. Thus, being ‘a force 
for good’ matters to persuade states that the use of power is acceptable. That is the 
use of force will not be used arbitrarily without recourse to standards of state 
behavior described in the codes of international organizations. International 
organizations form a web of standards with which states manage their relations 
especially decreasing the uncertainty and security dilemma. When international 
organizations are left aside, some states perceive to be left out in the cold because 
they assess that their interests are violated by unilateral behaviours with no credible 
assurances given in advance.  
 What characteristics or behaviours make a policy seen as legitimate? First, 
conformity with established procedures is a key condition of acquiring legitimacy. 
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If actions result from a previously agreed-upon process, they are more likely to be 
assessed as legitimate in comparison to a situation where such a process is lacking. 
In democracy, the authority of leaders is formed by winning fair elections. New 
laws are regarded as legitimate if they follow from legislative procedures. 
Similarly, conformity with established procedures is a condition for acquiring 
international legitimacy. When a state acts in accordance with the established 
international norms, procedures and modalities, its actions are likely to be 
perceived as legitimate. This basis of legitimacy depends upon the logic of 
appropriateness. 
  Secondly, nation-state actions will be perceived as legitimate if the effects of 
them are largely beneficial for others. This source of legitimacy depends upon ‘the 
logic of consequences’. Thirdly, actions will be seen as legitimate when they are 
perceived as being ‘moral.’ That presumes that ends do not always justify the 
means. Walt explains it in the following vein: 
Actions that produce net positive consequences may still be illegitimate if they violate 
widely accepted moral principles. The removal of a despot might be wholly desirable, 
for example, but not if one has to slaughter hundreds of innocent children in order to do 
it.  In other words, the ends, the ends do not necessarily justify the means. Even when 
its actions yield positive results, therefore, US primacy will appear more legitimate if it 
also appears to conform to prevailing moral norms.158 
 
 The efforts of an international coalition of lawyers and human rights groups 
to prosecute the US for violating the laws of war with the claim that it used illegal 
weapons and targeted civilians during the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2003 war 
against Iraq  is an example. Another example is the European and Arab criticisms 
that the US support for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is 
in conflict with the basic principles that the US argues to be defending. They argue 
that the support for Israeli occupation is against the principle of self-determination 
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and basic human rights. The United States is also delegitimized by the argument 
that it failed to act in the case of the Rwandan genocide. As the US proclaims itself 
as the leader of the free world and beacon of hope for security, stability and 
democracy, these criticisms are not argument-wise totally in vain, resulting in the 
erosion of legitimacy. 
 
3.3.6. Accommodating Strategies 
3.3.6.1. Bandwagoning  
 ‘Bandwagoning’ occurs when a state aligns with the strongest or most 
threatening state it faces. Bandwagoning occurs if a state perceives another state as 
powerful and potentially aggressive and if it is also convinced that the only existing 
option to avoid punishment is to align with it. According to Walt, bandwagoning is 
a form of appeasement unlike Schroeder’s and Schweller’s above-mentioned 
conceptualizations of bandwagoning. Bandwagoning states hope minimize the 
damage to their interests by convincing the threatening state that they are loyal 
supporters. Walt argues that bandwagoning has been rare throughout history 
because aligning with the source of the threat emboldens the aggressive state. 
Therefore, he argues that states usually balance against threatening nation-states 
rather than being cowed and bandwagon. 
 
3.3.6.2. Regional Balancing 
 Another alignment strategy is ‘regional balancing’. When a state wants to 
acquire advantages to be used against a regional threat or rival, it seeks to obtain 
the support of the strongest state in the system. Although this strategy comes close 
to be a bandwagoning strategy when viewed from dynamics of the regional power-
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to-global power relations, it is a balancing strategy at the regional level when two 
regional states are rivaling each other and one of them is getting outside help from 
the global power. 
  Regional balancing is not a new strategy. During the Cold War, regional 
states sought superpower support in order to balance against adjacent or nearby 
threats. North and South Korea in the East; Angola, Ethiopia and Somalia in 
Africa; Cuba and Latin American states in the Americas; Egypt, Israel and Turkey 
in the Eurasian rimland all sought the US or the Soviet help to meet a proximate or 
nearby threat. The proximity to threatening state was determining. Nearby states 
were generally perceived to be threatening while those that are far away were less 
likely so. Turkey sought American support against the nearby threat of the Soviet 
Union as was the case for Europe. The US separated by two oceans form the rest of 
the world was perceived to be less likely to invade the countries in Asia or Europe. 
Rather countries turn to it for assistance against neighboring threats in their 
backyards. This made the US an off-shore balancer. The same was true in the case 
of the Soviet support for Cuba during the Cold War. 
 Same motivation seems to be evident today, too. The preferences of Poland 
and Hungary and Baltic states to join the NATO are an act of regional balancing 
against the long-term threat of a resurgent Russia. The presence of American troops 
in Europe can be seen as an off-shore balancing by the US and simultaneously a 
regional balancing of each European state to one another to prevent any re-
nationalization of foreign policies reminiscent of the days before the Cold War. 
Yet, the latter point of view is controversial in that those who see Europe as a 
distinct entity different from all other states claim that Europe will not and cannot 
return to the days of the real-politik even without the American troops stationed on 
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European soil. The neorealist view is at odds with it arguing that any power that is 
unbalanced will be balanced sooner or later. This is a corollary of two paralleling 
assumptions, which namely are that international system does not welcome power 
vacuums, and that all states are functionally same and neither of them is distinct. 
  In Asia and the Middle East, support of the US as the dominant power is 
sought to balance against the regional rivals and nearby threats. China is the 
country against which American assistance is sought by Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Singapore and Japan. Even without the 
current rise in Chinese economic and military power, these states need the US as an 
off-shore balancer in their interactions with one another. In the Middle East, the US 
support for Israel translates to an obvious regional balancing on the side of Israel 
against its neighbors. However, it is also central for the relations of Jordan, Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia with the US.159Although security cooperation with the US creates 
serious domestic political problems, they nonetheless perceive benefit in 
cooperating with the US against internal and external threats and challenges.160The 
same holds true for Turkish-American relations with a twist. Turkish state 
perceives that it needs to cooperate with the US in order to manage the nearby 
threats despite the dramatic rise in its society’s anti-Americanism.161However, in 
this case the Turkish state needs regional balancing not against a state but against 
terrorist non-state formations such as the PKK. Regarding the political re-
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arrangement of Iraq after the 2003 American intervention, cooperation with the US 
became inevitable to have voice over the course of developments which affect both 
internal and external security of Turkey. However, Turkey does not seem to be in 
need of American support against Syria and Iran as much as Israel does. Therefore, 
non-state threats appear to be domineering over the Turkish alignment strategies 
and policy-making agenda especially throughout the 2000s. The fight against Al 
Qaeda is another cooperation field in which the US and Turkey jointly work. The 
latter point is detailed separately in the last chapter.  
  
3.3.6.3. Bonding 
 Another alignment strategy that accommodates the strongest or most 
threatening state is bonding. It is trying to form close personal ties with the 
strongest state officials and lending support for its policies in the hope of gaining 
influence over what the strongest state does. The typical example is Britain’s 
alignment with the US. Especially after September 11 2001 then Prime Minister 
Blair established close relations with the Bush administration leadership cadre and 
supported its policies with the hope of changeling the actions that are taken to fight 
against terrorism with global reach. Integrating themselves with key decision-
makers and the leader of the primary power, prime ministers of other countries try 
to cultivate a close strategic relationship with the strongest state of the system. This 
may potentially give them ‘a place at the table’ and encourage the hegemon or the 
leader state to consult with its bonding partner. Although bonding state cannot 
reverse its hegemonic partner’s policies to which it is firmly committed, it may 
aspire or prefer to influence how it sees the problems, how it define them and 
which methods it employs to reach its goals. By doing so, bonding strategy aims at 
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minimizing the possible damage incurred by the policies of the hegemon on its 
interests. In that vein, British-American relations reflect a conscious British choice 
to enter into an unequal partnership with the US, starting from the end of the 
nineteenth century up until the beginning of the twentieth century. It has done so to 
connect its declining power to the perceived rising power of the US. When the 
hegemony or the dominance changed hands from the British to the Americans, the 
former did not prefer to stay aloof to the US in interests. Although ‘the special 
relationship’ between Britain and the United States of America is based on 
common or similar traditions, language and political culture, the conscious choice 
of Britain to align with the US is worth highlighting. These latter commonalities 
ease out the bonding decision without which commonalities cannot be affected to 
have a connection with and influence over the US to a certain extent. 
  
3.3.6.4. Domestic Political Penetration  
 An active accommodating alignment strategy is domestic political 
penetration. States that adopt a pro-strongest state position do so to assure that 
dominant state is using its soft and hard power in a way that further their interests. 
Instead of silent loyalty to it, they try to channel a way that primary state’s power 
serves them.  
One way to do so is through traditional diplomacy. Trying to influence what 
other states do is the aim of conducting diplomacy. Another way, as Walt argues, is 
through manipulation of domestic politics. Manipulation of domestic politics is 
realized by lobbying activities and public opinion management.  
The accommodating alignment strategy of penetration to influence and 
manipulate US politics resulted in significant debates in the US domestic arena 
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especially after the publication of the book entitled The Israel Lobby and US 
Foreign Policy co-authored by Mearsheimer and Walt. The book, as claimed on the 
front cover, aims to explain “how a powerful American interest group has created 
havoc in the Middle East, damaged Israel itself and now threatens an even more 
perilous future”.162Another example given by Walt in Taming American Power is 
the activities of the Armenian lobby to influence specific American legislation with 
policy consequences for other states.  
As an alternative method of penetration, foreign governments may join 
forces with sympathetic domestic interest groups or lobbies, especially with ethnic 
diasporas, so as to reach ethnic-oriented policies.163Still another way is to conduct 
propaganda or public out-reach efforts such as media campaigns. The Saudi 
government launched a multimillion dollar public campaign that tried to fight the 
perception that Saudi Arabian royal family was involved in the September 11 
terrorist attacks.164 
 
3.4. Cooperation and Alliance Theories: Strengths and Weaknesses  
3.4.1 Two Contexts of Interaction  
There are currently two contexts of interaction in international relations: 
Nation-states aligning against other nation-states (the traditional alliance literature 
template) versus nation-states aligning against non-state formations (the 
contemporary problematic). The dynamics of nation-states’ cooperation against 
terrorist groups is different from the previous dynamics of cooperation and 
                     
162Mearsheimer, John J. & Stephen M. Walt.  2007. The Israel Lobby and the US Foreign Policy 
London & New York: Penguin Books. 
163Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy. New York: 
W.W.Norton & Company, p.195.  
164Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy. New York: 
W.W.Norton & Company, p.196. 
163 
 
alignment of nation-states against other nation-states. The different dynamic 
between the two settings lies in the form and source of contemporary threats, which 
are not emanating from a nation-state.165The form of the contemporary threat of 
terrorism -its transnationality- is the heart of the differences between ‘nation-states 
versus nation-states context’ and ‘the nation-state to non-state entities context’. The 
former context is the one in which states view threats as originating from other 
states, while in the latter context the threat has no address for nation-states to 
retaliate accurately.  
In accordance, the main difference is the transnational entities and the threats 
they pose. This is crucial to bear in mind for the latter context is an under-studied 
and under-conceptualized one in the alliance and cooperation literatures. Although 
that is due to the recent advance of terrorist entities and threats into foreign policy 
agenda of states, it nevertheless has become the main weakness to be met by 
alliance and cooperation analyses. 
Previously, states have had counter-terrorism policies; yet former counter-
terrorism policies did not have much publicized national security priority over other 
state policies. In the wake of a series of terrorist attacks against the US and Europe, 
terrorism became a matter of high security concern for the major states, too. As for 
the rest of the world, terrorism has been a constant concern for long. However, by 
the turn of the century, it seems that counterterrorism acquired higher priority in the 
list of state policies. In due course, the study of the above-mentioned difference 
(between the traditional focus of literatures on state-centric threats and the new 
problematic that comes with the non-state threats) corresponds with the research 
question of the present dissertation, namely, to what extent states can show 
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previously demonstrated cooperation and alignment behaviors against terrorist 
groups (that pose non-state centric threats)? The focus tends to be on the behaviors 
of major actors. There are two principal reasons of it. First, the mainstream theories 
of cooperation and alliances focus on major states, and significantly less on smaller 
ones. Secondly, the internationalization of cooperation and alignment against 
global terrorism is mostly realized by the activation of major powers’ capability to 
set the world agenda.166 The threat against which inter-state cooperation is urged is 
the one that is truly transnational or global. Regional or local threats are involved as 
sideline-concerns of the lesser states to the extent lesser states impact upon 
cooperation against global terrorism through bargaining. 
Unit of analysis of the alliance and cooperation literatures has traditionally 
been the nation-state. In other words, the literature has long been state-centric. The 
threat of transnational terrorism (either in its form/modus operandi or source) is not 
nation-state-centric. Thus, inter-state cooperation against terrorism is tried to be 
realized against deterritorialized, non-national, sovereignty-free, diffused groups of 
people, operating at the inter-societal level, within and across different state-
borders. The incorporation of the non-state factor in alliance and cooperation 
theories has yet to come. 
Keeping on with the literature shortfall, it goes without saying that terrorists 
do not operate at the nation-state level and they are largely unattached to the state 
supervision because they are relatively freed from the previous manipulation or 
control of nation-states that took place during the Cold War167; and particularly 
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because they are empowered by the structural factor of ‘globalization’ (themes that 
are examined in the following chapters). 
Second structural factor that is to be reconsidered in the literature is the 
arguments of ‘polarity’ denoting the status of the international system structure. 
Given that bipolar structure of the Cold War is over by late 1980s, inter-state 
cooperation against terrorism is carried out in a different structural configuration, 
which is argued to be ‘nonpolarity’ in the present study. 
Explaining these developments is both a challenge and weakness to be met by 
the traditional cooperation and alliance literature. To conceptualize these 
phenomena including the transnational threat, it might be possible to think that the 
threat of transnational terrorism is shaped at an interface-level between the three 
traditional levels of analysis (a conflation of systemic, unit/state, and the individual 
levels of analysis). A better formulation is that of ‘the two frameworks’ put forward 
by Rosenau and Aydinli: While ‘the state-centric framework’ comprises the main 
premises of the dominant realist research program of International Relations, ‘the 
multi-centric framework’ seeks to meet globalization-driven analytical 
challenges.168The relation between the two frameworks points to the need to study 
them in tandem and deserves attention. 
Transnational terrorism corresponds to the multi-centric framework of world 
affairs. It does not have a headquarters unlike those of the conventional armies. 
Terrorism is a diffused or scattered mode of operation with no central 
base.169Determining whereabouts of terrorists or finding them are a hard task for 
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intelligence services of nation-states, simply because terrorists are not resident in 
one particular location for long. That is an analytical challenge not only for policy-
making, but also for international relations theories including those of alliance and 
cooperation.  
Most common forms of contemporary warfare deserve clarification within 
the above-mentioned course of developments. Iraq and Afghanistan are just two of 
the geographic pieces of the terrorism puzzle. Terrorism, as a form of 
unconventional warfare, is scattered all around the world. If perpetrators of 
violence hold portions of territory as in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, then it is 
appropriate to name such formations as guerillas or insurgents, as often named as 
such in the literature differentiating ‘insurgency’ from ‘terrorism at large’. Seen 
from the military strategy literature, the Afghan and Iraqi imbroglio of the start of 
the twenty-first century are conflicts that range mostly across a spectrum of 
unconventional tactics or modes of warfare from insurgency, terrorism to civil war. 
In other words, Iraq and Afghanistan are not only show-cases of terrorism, but they 
are geographies where several forms of unconventional warfare occasionally take 
its turn. The cases where ‘transnational terrorism’ exemplifies itself clearly are 
September 11, 2001 New York City and Virginia; 12 October, 2002 Bali; 
November 15, 2003 and November 20, 2003 Istanbul; May 16, 2003 Casablanca; 
11 March 2004 Spain; September 1, 2004 Beslan; 7 July, 2005 London and 26-29 
November, 2008 Mumbai. These attacks are manifestations of a global scale of 
                                                                
political. The name of ‘Al-Qaeda’ itself means ‘the base’. The term refers to its so-called universal 
ideological claim to authority and to its radically peculiar interpretation of Islam, rather than to a 
specific territory. The name denotes the centrality of its ideology. It neither refers to its centrality of 
command nor to unity in organizational structure with clear hierarchy. Its ideology is central in its 
mobilization and operational efforts. In that sense, ‘the base’ is more in the abstract and ideological 
rather than being territorial. This, inter alia, underlines the transnational form of the threat with its 
ideology resonating across boundaries. For details, Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad-The Terror 
Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
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operations, rather than hitting a single country at a regional or local scale.  
As such, non-state threats and entities significantly influence the 
contemporary cooperative relations of nation-states against terrorism. Non-state 
entities and the threats they pose have understudied repercussions for the state-
system conception or the state-centric framework, which does not regard terrorist 
entities as actors. Therefore, the structural condition in which inter-state 
cooperation is attempted becomes a must to ponder over. ‘Structural factors’ are 
those that are inherent in the international situation, whereas the ‘strategic factors’ 
are those that are more manipulable by actors. Alliance and cooperation literature 
must press on with the repercussions of non-state entities both for the state-system 
and alignments of states. The literature is in need of such a systematic analysis. 
Apart from decisions or policies of nation-states, the structural factors need to 
be considered to answer the research questions involving non-state entities. Both 
the literature on cooperation and the literature on alliances, more often than not, 
ignore either the systemic level or the unit/nation-state level of analysis: The works 
in the alliance literature mostly argue from the system-level outlook, while the 
studies about cooperation among states focus on policies and strategies of nation-
states per se. A systematic study that involves both the systemic-level and unit-
level analyses of terrorism became necessary because there is no established theory 
to benefit from in advance. The absence of such systematic studies is another 
weakness of the literature. 
As stated above, the problem with applying the traditional outlook upon the 
question of nation-states’ cooperation against terrorism originates in the non-state 
threat. End of the Cold War and September 11, 2001 attacks moved international 
relations into a relatively new security terrain; while keeping some traditional state-
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centric features intact, transnationality and globalization influenced the way power 
is exercised. 
Impact of globalization has tipped the scales of violence and levels of 
analysis. Terrorism, global economy, religionization of politics and politicization of 
religion under the process of globalization affected international security and the 
nation-state system. Customary concepts and analyses of state-to-state relations 
offer guidelines as to the impact of these developments on security; however they 
are hard-pressed for development. But if the established theories of international 
relations and foreign policy have little to say about the causes or nature of 
terrorism, they are to tell more about how states respond. It is one of the aims of the 
present study to lay bare how states responded terrorism through alignments and 
cooperation with one another. States’ policy-responses and strategies against 
terrorism and their cooperation and alignments with each other are not carried out 
systematically either. This study tries to take a modest step in that direction. 
 Another weakness of the extant literature is that they ignore the development 
of ‘the security community among the most-industrialized nation-states’. At the 
same time, the alliance and cooperation literature underestimate a corollary 
development: the effect of the absence of war within the security community. One 
of the consensual points of the alliance literature is that defensive alliances such as 
the NATO are most effective when war is perceived to be in the offing. However, 
the contemporary trajectory of warfare within the shifting security environment 
presents war not as large-scale military confrontations of armies in battlefields, but 
mostly as economic and normative competition or rivalry. The enemies are not at 
the gates. Contestation of politics among the Western powers shifted from the 
military form to non-military form: Not battle-formations of armies, but 
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corporation, finance and investment formation of white-collar workers throughout 
the liberal economic market is the name of the game in the US and Europe. This is 
the essence of Thomas Friedman’s works on globalization, under which the power 
of ‘the digital herd’ and ‘attitudes’ refer to the war of economics and the role of 
ideas respectively.170 His works found much echo in the world academic 
community. 
Unlike the centuries-long conflict environment that was resilient until after 
1945, major powers such as the EU member-states, Canada, the US and Japan do 
not even contemplate war among each other today, let alone anticipate one.171 
When conventional warfare does not even come to mind as an instrument to reach 
political goals, waning or declining of major war and conquest, via Jervis, came to 
be “a change of spectacular proportions in the history of international 
relations”.172Robert Jervis sees ‘the security community’ and accompanying 
‘absence of major war’ as more important for international security than the 
September 11, 2001 attacks or terrorism at large. Lack of fear of war or no 
contemplation of war gives a hard time for balance of power theory. New accounts 
are initiated to fill the void.173Thus, the waning of major war argument has to be 
factored in the discussion of cooperation in general and alliance formation and 
maintenance in particular. The alliance theories did not come to terms with the 
absence of war neither in Europe nor among the US, EU member-states, Canada 
and Japan.174 
                     
170Friedman, Thomas L.  1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; Friedman, 
Thomas L.  2003. Longitudes and Attitudes-World in the Age of Terrorism NY: Anchor Books. 
171The argument of decline of conquest and major war is examined in Chapter 3. 
172Jervis, Robert. 2005. American Foreign Policy in a New Era. London& New York: Routledge, p.13.  
173For ‘soft-balancing’, Pape, Robert. 2005. “Soft Balancing against the United States” International 
Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 Summer, pp. 7-45; Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power - Global 
Response to US Primacy. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 24, 126-132, 143, 178. 
174Goldgeier, James M., Michael McFaul. 1992. “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the 
Post-Cold War Era” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 467-491.  
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The current international setting is composed of the interactions among 
nation-states, international organizations, non-state entities and economic and 
financial markets. In this setting, nation-states are resilient and they continue to 
define their stake and position by their power. Their use of power can be either 
cooperative or confrontational or an incoherent fluctuating policy between 
cooperation and conflict. Analysis of cooperative or confrontational state behaviors 
changes depending upon the conceptualization of ‘power’ and ‘threat’- the terms on 
which there is hardly extensive academic consensus especially after the Cold War. 
A theoretical opening that incorporates these developments-especially about the 
nature of power- is yet another weakness of the traditional literatures on 
cooperation and alliance. When wars are absent among the states that have the 
greatest means to inflict destruction and even annihilation, defining power mainly 
in terms of military capability appears to be a shortfall of the alliance and 
cooperation literature. This has implications for the NATO’s transformation, and it 
is discussed in the last chapter. 
Still another weakness of the literature is summarized by Stephen Walt who 
is one of the prominent scholars of alliance politics: When there is hardly an 
external balancer to the dominant state in the system, the balancer turns out to be 
emerging from within the dominant state itself. Walt argues that   
 
The stronger the US is relative to the rest of the world, the more latitude it has to define 
priorities for itself. Setting priorities is an intensely political activity, however, and 
domestic factors will exert relatively more impact when the external environment does 
not impinge very powerfully.175  
 
 
 
                                                                
 
175Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy. New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, p. 146. 
 
171 
 
The role of domestic politics and the increasing American latitude to set 
priorities are factors that must be accounted for by the alliance theories. Most states 
confront threats unlike the ones experienced during the Cold War: The age-old 
uncertainty among nation-states regarding intentions and behaviors of one another 
is the main cause of the security dilemma rooted in anarchy. Utmost significantly, 
that uncertainty has increased owing to unclear threats. 
With the former Soviet Union’s self-dismemberment, international security 
lost the security context that is conducive for centralized threats. This is crucially 
important. A clear threat gives direction to state policies and behaviors. During the 
Cold War, the overwhelming concern of the United States and the Soviet Union 
was to deter one another and contain each others’ sphere of influence. The states 
that aim to take advantage from the superpower rivalry did so by positioning 
themselves, either intentionally or not, as strategic assets. That provided major 
powers of the Cold War a control mechanism that kept international relations state-
centric: terrorism was relatively controlled through the bipolar structure of the Cold 
War and the peripheral alignments of states around the superpowers. This is no 
more possible to the extent it once was before 1989: A hierarchy of power is not 
clear due to the difficulties of exerting influence as of 2009. This is possibly the 
result of the contemporary absence of clear threats that is not state-centric.176Allin 
et al. argue that transnational terrorism posed by Al Qaeda is too diffuse a threat to 
provide strategic clarity or unity of purpose among states.177Within such an 
international environment, it is hard for decision-makers to determine what the 
main priorities and tasks of states should be.  
                     
176Pressman, Jeremy. 2009. “Power without Influence - The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy 
Failure in the Middle East”  International Security, Vol. 33, No. 4 Spring pp. 149-179. 
177Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. “Chapter One: Beyond 
the War on Terror” Adelphi Papers, 47:389, 17-34. 
172 
 
Consequently, domestic factors increasingly weigh in the definition of 
interests and the allocation of resources. This is because the threats and alliance 
commitments are not only determined by the distribution of power or solely by the 
location of threats. They are determined relatively more by whichever political 
group is able to exert more influence upon the domestic body-politic of states. 
When compared to the bipolar Cold War environment where the external threat 
was existential and clear enough to silence internal political competition, the role 
domestic politics increased. That is how “domestic political penetration” is 
explained by Stephen Walt.  
The structural limits of cooperation, which are detailed in consequent 
chapters, are diffusion of power-resources world over and the ambiguity of the 
contemporary threats including that of terrorism. Other limits of alignments and 
cooperation are the additional ways through which power is used. Power is 
horizontally used at the societal level by non-state actors, whereas nation-states 
exercise power differently due to separate political cultures. The transatlantic 
divide between the EU and the US is a sample of the latter. In his study entitled 
Taming American Power - the Global Response to US Primacy, Walt also gives 
persuasive reasons for why the US is not influential as it was during the Cold War. 
These reasons are the state strategies employed against the US power. They are the 
unit-level factors conditioning inter-state cooperation.  
As Walt claims, “the opposing and accommodating strategies that are used 
mainly against the US enable other states to prevent American foreign policy from 
exercising absolute hegemony or dominance over the international system.”178This 
is why raw power or capacity does not equal to influencing other states or 
                     
178Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy. New York: 
W.W.Norton & Company, p. 217. 
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achieving results. The point is elaborated in Chapter 4 on the unit-level factors 
affecting international cooperation. The American power is seen as differentially 
greater from other states, but it is not seen commensurate to absolute dominance of 
the system. The latter point is discussed in Chapter 2 about the structural factors of 
‘globalization’ and ‘non-polarity’. 
 
3.4.2. What Is to Be Done for the Weaknesses of the Literature? 
Searching For a Balance between Theory and Praxis amid the Academic 
Discord 
The long-held debate on how best to capture world events and on the 
analytical tools to be used resulted in many perspectives and in an academic 
discord regarding research-design. Therefore, a section on issues of methodology, 
epistemology, and ontology is essential. As a corollary, it extends to issues of 
paradigm, theory and ideology whose discussions among scholars have become 
expansive especially after ‘the social turn’ in the study of world politics. Starting at 
the late 1970s in the West, studies of International Relations that took advantage of 
this social turn or reflectivist concerns found its way into respected academic 
circles and curriculum almost all around the world in time. According to those 
studies, contributions to literatures should not be non-practical ivory-tower 
extrapolations and should base themselves not only on solid theoretical ground, but 
also on solid practical ground as well. Being too much conceptual may be 
impractical. Being too-much practical makes scholars quasi-technicians, not 
developers of literatures with meaningful contributions. These two grounds can be 
made to enmesh with each other though. Otherwise, scholars are said to be 
ostensibly confronting the risk of either being too 
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empirical/practical/pragmatic/technical/conceptually weak or shallow or being too 
theoretical/abstract/conceptual and impractical that is unwise to implement or 
maintain in practice, lacking policy-relevance and leaving academia too much of an 
intellectual pedantry.  
The departure point of the recent understanding in contemporary 
International Relations follows two maxims: Contributions should be intended for 
the people of the world at large. Science is ultimately for people whatever political 
formations they are clustered in. Ideally, this should be the driving motor of 
theoretical and empirical endeavors without indulging too much into either strict 
empiricism or into too much theorizing and conceptualization, nevertheless 
engaging the two in a fine-grained manner. This dissertation tries to make an 
original contribution to the International Relations literature by striking a balance in 
the intertwined nature of theory and praxis. 
 
  3.4.3. On Ideology, Paradigm and Theory 
It is worth noting that no fundamental ideology whether conservatism, 
liberalism or radicalism is taken as a given throughout the study. Another equally 
important benchmark of this dissertation is that it does not take it for granted that 
any paradigm whether positivism or post-positivism is to be strictly followed 
without question.179 As a corollary, none of the theories (that is to say, any 
                     
179Postpositivism is an umbrella term for those theoretical perspectives that are skeptical of the 
positivist project in general.. ‘Reflectivism’ and ‘post-positivism’ are used interchangeably. 
Postpositivism should not be conflated with postmodernism. Postmodernism is only one variant of this 
skepticism. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff use the term “post-empiricist” for post-positivism, while the 
terms “rationalism” and “reflectivism” are sometimes used for positivism and post-positivism 
respectively; however the latter are more common in the literature. ‘Reflectivist’ or ‘post-positivist’ 
concerns are mostly regarded as immutable with ‘positivist’ or ‘rational’ schools of International 
Relations in terms of their different approaches towards ontology, epistemology and methodology used 
in analyzing world affairs. Reflectivist-oriented studies mostly echo in theories of constructivism, 
feminism, postmodernism, the Frankfurt School, and to a certain extent in the English School tradition. 
Reflectivism, among its other benchmarks, reflects upon the importance of the political and social 
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theoretical extension derived from ideologies of conservatism, liberalism or 
radicalism) such as Realism, Liberalism or Marxism is the ‘only template’ in 
understanding and explaining world politics180. Realism, Liberalism and Marxism 
and their neologisms and the reflectivist schools of thought are only different tools 
in the scholars’ toolbox of analysis. None of them, taken on its own, is thoroughly 
successful regarding explanatory power and omnipotent in understanding every 
phenomenon in full. However, this does not amount to lack of standard of 
analytical judgment. It does not lead to a form of epistemological anarchy. It just 
recalls that academic study must include certain knowledge and awareness of all 
different perspectives whatever the researcher’s theoretical leanings are. Keeping 
away from theoretical debates and argumentations may risk theoretical paralysis 
and repetition. It curtails theoretical development and understanding change. If 
change is not understood, academia cannot help delivering vain commentaries.  
Reflectivist critiques inform that scholars should be conscious of their own 
leanings and tendencies. They emphasize the connection between power and 
university/knowledge. That is the reason why it becomes essential to indicate the 
self-consciousness of the doctoral candidate about the reflectivist concerns 
alongside the positivist approaches. More often than not, categorizations such as 
‘Realist’, ‘Liberal’ or ‘Radical’ create academic rifts. They do not help develop the 
social science undertakings. It creates rifts among scholars that lead them to talk 
pass each other. Yet, that is not necessarily the case at all times. By way of 
                                                                
circumstances within which the researcher is shaped and conditioned. It argues for the vital need on the 
part of the researcher or scholar to be cognizant of it. Hence, reflectivist literature brings forward that 
writing process and speech acts (or discourses constructed) are political, and in turn, argues that writers 
of any kind are political actors. 
180 Keith L. Nelson & Spencer C. Olin, Jr. 1975. Why War? Ideology, Theory and History Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press. As an all-time seminal academic work, Nelson and Olin 
demonstrates that ideologies, theories and history are intertwined and that they are not totally disparate 
however different they are.  
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example, a scholar who writes with realist-slant or realist lenses can well take 
advantage of the constructivist literature, at least of ‘an empiricist’ or ‘coercive’ 
brand of constructivism.181 Nevertheless, scholars mostly have reached out to a 
single paradigm and its due methodology more often than they refer to others. 
Ideally, this should not inhibit the scholar from using all theories. Scholars should 
not shy away from an attempt to find a conceptual and analytical roadmap to lessen 
academic disputes among adherents of opposed paradigmatic perspectives.182  
The paradigmatic perspective that approximates the theoretical outlook of 
this dissertation is found in the tenets of classical realism. These tenets are much 
less quantified, less ahistorical, actor-wise more open to be inclusive, and less 
deterministic unlike neorealism.  
It is also vital to underscore that E. H. Carr has also constructivist leanings 
alongside his Realism. That is apparent in final chapters of his seminal treatise, 
namely The Twenty Years Crisis. It is, above all, important to point out that Carr 
was not merely a realist as often told. On due reflection, his sophistication not only 
includes Realism, but also it is way beyond mere Realism, and includes ‘realism’ 
with both ‘R’ and ‘r’183. 
3.4.4. The Non-State Entities and International Relations Theory 
A history of different perspectives and their disciplinary development in 
relation to each other are not the subject-matter here. Its elaboration is beyond the 
                     
181 For ‘coercive constructivism’ please see, Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 
‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 13; 3 , 2007 
182A number of texts have overviews of disciplinary history and describe the ways in which theories 
developed in relation to one another. These texts offer views on lessening academic disputes. These 
include Alker and Biersteker 1984, Kahler 1997, Olson and Groom 1991, Rothstein 1991, Schmidt 
1998, Wæver 1997, and Wæver 1996. For works that compare US IR as a discipline to the study of IR 
in other countries see Crawford and Jarvis 2000, Jørgensen and Knudsen 2006, Smith 2002, and Wæver 
1998. 
183Jones, Charles A. 1998. E.H. Carr and International Relations : A Duty to Lie  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. ‘Realism’ is taken to be referring to the theory of international relations 
while ‘realism’ denotes a branch of philosophy. 
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scope of this study. Yet, it is important to address what is meant by an International 
Relations (IR) theory within the confines of the above-mentioned academic 
discord, and of ideology, paradigm and theory relationships. This will shed light on 
why some academics view these three as enmeshed, and also on what is meant by 
IR theory in general. 
Not surprisingly, scholars approach these issues differently. James 
Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff define theory as “systematic reflection on 
phenomena, designed to explain them and to show how they are related to each 
other in a meaningful, intelligent pattern, instead of being merely random items in 
an incoherent universe”.184 Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi define theory “as a way of 
making the world or some part of it more intelligible or better understood,” by 
going “beyond mere description of phenomenon observed and engage in causal 
explanation or prediction based on certain prior occurrences or conditions”.185In 
both definitions, there is a common assumption that there is a pattern to 
international relations. International Relations theory is about revealing those 
patterns.  
Rosenau emphasizes the importance of revealing patterns by putting 
forward an important question regarding a specific event, a question which has 
become an academic motto by now: ‘Of what is it an instance?’186 This question is 
the starting-point of thinking theory thoroughly. There are, of course, contrary 
habits of research as Rosenau underlines: ‘We often have a hard time building up 
this habit’ [habit of revealing patterns] due to an inclination “to probe for the 
special meaning of an event, to explore it for what sets it apart from all other 
                     
184Dougherty, James E., Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending theories of international relations 
Philadelphia: Lippincott. 
185 Viotti, Paul and Mark Kauppi. 2007. International Relations Theory Prentice Hall. 
186 Rosenau, James N. The Study of World Politics Vol. 2: Globalization and Governance London: 
Routledge, p.92. 
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events, rather than to treat it as an instance of a larger pattern”.187 Certainly not all, 
but most IR theorists interpret particular events as instances of some larger pattern, 
phenomenon, or theoretical proposition and expression.  
John Lewis Gaddis, in articulating the difference between the methodology 
of historians’ and that of political scientists, stresses the concepts of ‘general 
particularization’ and ‘particular generalization’188. These two labels stand for 
different methodologies, and indeed different epistemologies used by political 
scientists and historians, which correspond to the point made by Rosenau. 
Arguably, historians are more welcoming to some reflectivist concerns regarding 
methodology, and epistemology when compared to such attitudes of political 
scientists of the positivist paradigm.  
A useful way to think about theory is the analogy of templates. Any 
historian or political scientist of whatever theoretical persuasion uses a set of 
templates / a theory. A theory is, then, a set of templates or prepackaged analytical 
tools. Scholars use these tools in multiple ways. Since they use it in multiple ways, 
different inner-categorizations occur even within a particular theory. Theory-trees 
emerge: For instance, the family of Realist theories includes different strands 
within itself such as defensive realism or offensive realism. The analytical tools/a 
set of templates which are used in multiple ways serve mainly three purposes: First, 
conceptualizing/making definitions, and relatedly realizing categorization. 
Secondly, understanding, and thirdly explaining international and/or transnational 
phenomena. These templates are used to demonstrate the pattern in the complicated 
                     
187 Rosenau, James N. The Study of World Politics Vol. 2: Globalization and Governance London: 
Routledge, p.93. 
188 Gaddis, John Lewis 2000. ‘In Defense of Particular Generalization: Rewriting Cold War History, 
Rethinking International Relations Theory’ in Colin and Miriam Elman eds. Colin, and Elman, Miriam 
F. eds. Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International 
Relations Cambridge: MIT Press. 
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bombardment of data. 
Via Sterling-Folker, another common analogy that is used to explain what is 
meant by theory and what use they have is the analogy of a camera. Alternative 
lenses of a camera portray different pictures of the same phenomenon. Basic lenses 
provide a shot of landscape and its setting to its front, back, and sides. A panoramic 
lens makes the landscape seem smaller in relation to its surroundings, which are 
now more expansive and more important to the image. A series of close-up lenses 
draw attention ever nearer to the landscape, enlarging it until its surroundings no 
longer seem relevant and details that had escaped attention before are noticeable. 
Tinted lenses of different colors highlight different shadows and features that had 
not seem noteworthy189. In much the same way, an IR topic can be seen from 
different theoretical perspectives. With different focus (unit of analysis), and 
different templates (different methodologies and epistemologies), disparate theories 
may either tackle only with an instance in a fashion similar to a sui generis 
approach, or they may be more suitable to see the pattern represented by the 
event/s. 
Each IR perspective consists of various assumptive building blocks, some 
of which are shared across perspectives, but which are put together by each in 
specific ways in order to identify and highlight particular patterns in IR. Each 
perspective thereby illuminates slightly different elements of a given topic or event 
and hence patterns relevant to it, revealing aspects and details that were not obvious 
or particularly pertinent in other perspectives. The advantage of studying and 
understanding IR theory as an analytical domain distinct from any particular 
empirical event or topic is that it acquaints you with the multiple ways of seeing 
                     
189Folker, Jennifer Sterling ed., Making Sense of International Relations Theory, Lynne Riener, 2007, 
pp.2-10.  
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and understanding the various contexts for any particular event or topic, whether it 
is a historical, current, or future scenario. These contexts are the “bigger pictures”. 
The camera analogy is useful here. While an amateur photographer does not need 
to know photography in detail in order to take a picture, a professional 
photographer does need to know the specifics to manage zooming between 
different scales or levels. It is important not to push the camera analogy too far 
since one does not need to subscribe to a particular worldview, ideological 
perspective, or philosophical position in order to be a photographer/scholar or 
produce a zoom lens/new approach or use it in one’s own photography/scholarly 
analysis. While the type of camera lens you use might depend on why you are 
taking the elephant’s photo in the first place, whether you should use a zoom or 
panoramic lens to photograph it is usually not a matter of heated debate or the 
source of sharp divisions among colleagues. IR theory, however, is premised on 
alternative philosophical, ideological, and normative commitments, many of which 
are antithetical to one another and hence diverge sharply over how to understand 
IR. These commitments undergird the assumptive building blocks and analytical 
frameworks of IR theory. They typically involve disagreements over the nature of 
being (referred to as ontology), how we know the things we know and acquire 
knowledge about being (referred to as epistemology), and what methods we should 
adopt in order to study being (referred to as methodology).190 
 
 
 
 
                     
190Folker, Jennifer Sterling. 2007. ed., Making Sense of International Relations Theory, Lynne Riener, pp.2-10; Cohen, Louis. 2007. 
"Research Methods in Education", British Journal of Educational Studies 55: 9. 
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3.4.5. Two Grand-Paradigms Leading to Two Worlds of Theory-Design   
and Due-Policy-Making: Positivism and Post-Positivism 
Two grand-paradigms are positivism and post-positivism. Each leads to a 
different theory-design. They are disparate comprehensive templates helping to 
understand and explain politics. How to differentiate them from one another? The 
most fundamental epistemological and ontological divide is that of whether one can 
know ‘fact/s’ objectively and whether there is an objective reality or not. 
Approaches to the argument of ‘a fact is a fact’ help determine the main 
paradigmatic dividing line.  Those scholars who insist that there is an objective 
state of being, an objective “reality,” that is relatively obvious and can be 
accurately known and measured, are commonly referred to as positivists. Post-
positivism, on the other hand, refers to IR scholars who are skeptical that “a fact is 
a fact” or that it can be objectively known and measured. 
For most positivists, the primary activity of an IR theorist is to test IR 
theoretical perspectives against one another. This is done by collecting data and by 
devising methods that would be the equivalent of an experiment in the hard 
sciences. In undertaking such activity, the positivist hopes to produce more 
explanatory theories, which in an ideal world would make both prediction and 
better foreign policy making possible. As for the post-positivists, all events are 
subject to interpretation. Interpreter’s own situation, context, and language often 
determine how an event is characterized and explained. Since neither language nor 
the act of communication is hold to be ever unproblematic or value-free, post-
positivists challenge the notion that scholars could objectively know or access 
reality by relying on methods drawn from the hard sciences. 
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For positivists, ‘If A, then B’ as hypothesis must be subject to empirical 
tests. Hypotheses are tested against real-world or factual data so as to make modest 
predictions about the nature and direction of change. Although many theoretical 
inner-differences exist among positivists, consensual focal point among them is the 
acceptance of the objective accessibility of reality and scholars’ ability to discover 
universal laws that are amenable to causal explanations and prediction. This paves 
the way to common analytical tools, namely levels of analysis.191 
Post-positivists would define the nature and purpose of IR theory very 
differently in comparison to positivists. Testing competing hypotheses, developing 
causal explanations and making predictions are seen as the dominant and relatively 
destructive ways in which we have purportedly come to interpret the world or 
impose meaning and continually re-create particular patterns of knowledge and 
behavior in IR. 
Steve Smith argues about IR that “what we think about these events and 
possibilities, and what we think we can do about them, depends in a fundamental 
sense on how we think about them. In short, our thinking about the ‘real world, and 
hence our practices, is directly related to our theories”. Although post-positivists 
eschew the notion that there are universal laws that are objectively discoverable 
with scientific methods, they do see patterns to the way positivists describe and 
theorize IR. Such patterns could derive from the values of eighteenth-century 
European Enlightenment (which promotes a faith in science), or the politics of 
identity within IR (which is dominated both in practice and in theory by men)192. 
                     
191It goes without saying that levels of analysis involve identifying where causal variables are located. 
They enable grouping variables according to a micro-macro spectrum for the purposes of explanatory 
organization. Although there is variety of ‘levels’ used in that direction, IR scholars have typically 
relied on three primary levels: the individual, the nation-state, and the system. 
192Folker, Jennifer Sterling ed., 2007. Making Sense of International Relations Theory. Lynne Riener, p. 
9. 
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If we turn to the camera lenses/photography analogy, both positivists and 
post-positivist are photographers. Both types of photographers would be engaged in 
revealing larger patterns and in answering Rosenau’s question, “of what is it an 
instance?” Positivist answers would involve a conviction that they were 
documenting the patterns of reality itself, whereas post-positivist answers would 
involve revealing, as a pattern in itself, the positivist’s conviction that reality was 
being documented. Both positivists and post-positivists hold one another 
responsible for using tainted color lenses. Thus, they find it hard to work 
cooperatively. 
As stressed at the very beginning of the present chapter, the world is 
growing together, but those studying it are growing apart. This is due to different 
world-outlooks applied to theoretical design in the way explained just above. As it 
is argued almost everywhere from various academic journals, magazines to 
newspapers, globalization is leading to a shared culture to an important extent. 
However, academics whose specialization is the investigation of global politics are 
dividing into segregated schools of thought. This is why K. J. Holsti back in the 
mid-1980s described the international relations community of scholars as the 
dividing discipline193. 
Today this disunity is much more pronounced. The reason of this academic 
disunity owes to different ontologies (the study and understanding of the nature of 
being) and different epistemologies (the study and understanding about how we 
know the thing we think we know) underlying theories. Accordingly, the issue of 
how to capture new international and transnational developments creates rifts 
among scholars. This kind of philosophical and theoretical topics discussed among 
                     
193Holsti, Kalevi J. 1987. The Dividing Discipline:  Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, 
Unwin Hyman. 
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scholars has paradigmatic importance, because they have the potential to improve 
International Relations studies. 
 
3.4.6. The Inside/Outside Distinction:  
More Space for the Historical Context? 
R.B.J. Walker underlines that the way the discipline of International 
Relations is structured has been defined by notions of territory. Inside the 
boundaries of states exists the ordered world of the political, and outside those 
boundaries is the anarchical world of international relations. Borders do not just 
divide states, but they also divide the discipline194. Given this situation of the 
discipline, the dissertation at hand concentrates on the alignment behaviors of states 
against terrorist violence committed by non-state actors. However, policies and 
behaviors of states are not the only data to work on: Since the targets or addressee 
of states’ response-policies are not nation-states but non-state terrorist groups, it is 
vital to take these non-state entities into account as well. The reasons for this 
inclusion are their capacity to influence both state policies/strategies, and societies 
around the world or the international public opinion. State and non-state entities 
with different capacities abound. Therefore, the divide between inside and outside 
may not always be applicable as an analytical separation in reflecting upon the 
terrorism of our era: a two-way dynamic relationship exists. It is this dynamic 
relationship between states and non-state entities that give clues in understanding 
why states acted the way they did. That is why it is important to study the impact of 
globalization on national security. Besides, owing to terrorists’ simultaneous 
inside-out and outside-in operations, territorial borders appear to be rendered less 
                     
194Walker, R. B. J. 1995. Inside-Outside: International Relations as Political Theory Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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relevant by being transgressed. 
The two-way dynamic is worth explicating. It is the dynamic between states 
and violent non-state actors. It is asymmetrical in nature because the sides of the 
conflict are disparate. The structure, strategy and territoriality status of the two 
sides of the conflict are dissimilar. Whereas states work mainly on a government-
to-government basis, terrorist groups work through citizens of different countries 
around the world, and they cause citizens to question their states’ policies in the 
aftermath of the terrorist atrocities committed195. Indeed, terrorism is used to 
change the attitudes of popular audiences against their governments in order to 
make open the governments’ alleged incompetency and so-called ‘unfairness’. In 
turn, governments, especially democracies, try to mobilize public opinion against 
terrorism. Again, public opinion is to a certain extent another agency through 
which policies become un/successful. At times, public opinion becomes an 
intervening variable between states and non-state actors. 
Terrorist tactics -unlike the working-mechanism of strategies such as 
compellence and deterrence- influence publics. Compellence and deterrence are 
meant to influence leaders and leadership cadre of states. Unlike states’ demarcated 
and known territories, leadership and relatively predictable methods of fighting, 
global terrorism has no address and no specified territory, and no dialogical and 
communicative accessibility to its leadership. Lack of territory and address on the 
side of the terrorists increases (borrowing a term from the conventional warfare 
literature) ‘the fog of war’ for the states, but reduces it for the terrorists. Increased 
                     
195Victims of the terrorists attacks are instrumentalized by terrorists so as to obtain their goal, which is 
changing the attitudes and ideas of the wider public, and turn the public against their governments. It is 
also about expanding terrorist constituency via acquiring more followers of the terrorist cause. Thus, 
terrorists force two addressees to change their course of action: governments and domestic/international 
audiences; their addressees are actually beyond the foreign/domestic frontier, and are whole community 
of peoples' minds. 
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fog of war (increased uncertainty of from where, when and how the terrorist attack 
could come, unobservability of their evolving capabilities or how they are adopting 
to the measures that states take against them) is an enormous advantage for the 
global terrorists. The conventional fog of war mechanism among belligerents works 
asymmetrically in this case. 
With the benefit of this advantage, ‘twenty-first century form of 
terrorism’196 changes the rule of the struggle for the states by driving them from the 
battlefield into a virtual battlespace. For they have no headquarters, outposts or 
address, terrorist acts occur at anywhere terrorists deem possible, without a clear 
and uncontroversial location to retaliate at. Virtual is used in reference to things 
that mimic their “real” equivalents: For instance, a virtual library is a library in 
electronic form. Likewise, ‘virtual territory or battlespace’ exist and result in 
essence or effect, though not in actual form. Thus, although terrorists do not have 
any clear and demarcated territory or battlefield in the common sense of the term, 
the terrorist virtual battlespace is almost anywhere not well guarded197. Although, 
borders and territories are still staunch hurdles against conventional security 
                     
196‘The twenty-first century form of terrorism’  is the current manifestation of terrorism, which is 
basically not a new phenomenon. It has being evolving since human beings existed. Therefore, there are 
'terrorisms' of different time periods throughout history. The difference among ‘terrorisms’ is about the 
intersection of particular terrorist methods and the international structure. As for the nature of terrorism, 
it is intact: The nature of terrorism is political. Historical sensitivity to understand the change in 
methods used by perpetrators, that is understanding the changing features of terrorism, entails a 
perspective to look for the past, present and possible future of an event in a dynamic and interrelated 
manner. Historical sensitivity seeks to understand whether there is an evolutionary process or not. 
Otherwise, analysis becomes static within parameters of time and space, and understanding 'change' is 
curtailed. Seen in that vein, the fundamental nature of any of the ‘terrorisms’ taken place in different 
time periods throughout history did not change, but their manifestations and methods did. That is why 
adherents of the new terrorism debate labels contemporary terrorism as new. However, that is more 
about style and method, not nature and essence. Thus, when viewed intrinsically contemporary 
terrorism is not new in nature, but it may be defined as new in terms of form, method or manifestations 
(of the essence). They are all political and an unconventional violent means of change forced upon 
strong centers of power.  
197Even well-guarded locations like embassies or military vehicles, or aircraft-carriers or ministries (as 
the Pentagon was in the September 11, 2001) are hit by terrorists. 
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concerns, their effectiveness and utility in protecting from transnational threats198 
becomes diminished. This is one of the reasons why the disciplinary divide of 
inside/outside does not help much in analyzing threats that has transnational mode 
of operation and effect. Since the virtual battlespace is almost everywhere, our 
conceptual models should cover and meet almost everywhere. In other words, our 
models should not be territory-centric entirely, at least not all times.  
Terrorist groups also cause states to devise new security strategies to deal 
with terrorism because terrorists adapt their behavior to changing conditions and 
responses, and may evolve to use new methods. That is why, not only states, but 
also sub-state and transnational entities and their movements become essential to 
examine in order to understand who did what, how and why. This is why mere 
state-centrism or etatism is not helpful. The borders may divide states, but it should 
not be dividing the discipline if we are to understand security in the 21st century. 
This being the case, the conventional analytical distinctions worth pondering. 
Before explaining how to replace inside-outside distinction with ‘historical 
context’, and what is meant by 'contextualizing or historical context', it is important 
to keep on explaining why such a replacement is required. The very first chapter 
put forward the current state of international relations; the current events, actors, 
topics and the dynamics among them. These events require not-totally-new 
theoretical lenses: It rather writes research-design anew, in a different manner and 
form. Some of the conventional assumptions are loosened. A slight shift to a more 
contextualizing and issue-specific approach is welcomed to capture the 
developments. For example, such a perspective aims to avoid ahistorical 
explanation, that is, it appreciates that every phenomenon has its past to it. The 
                     
198 “Transnational threats” denotes threats that transgress national borders, territories and interests. A 
discussion of ‘transnationality’ and related concepts can be found in the following chapters. 
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issue of whether current manifestation of terrorism is a new terrorism underlines 
the question of historicizing. Present situation or the present manifestation of a 
particular phenomenon is related to how its past is perceived. Perceptions of any 
event or a phenomenon like terrorism or alliance-making are dynamic and 
constantly built on a daily basis. To be sure, although such change is in the making 
on a daily basis, its repercussions do not become recognizable overnight. In other 
words, past, present and future are intellectually intertwined in the making of how 
we understand the current world affairs. Various understandings emerge through 
agencies of different actors, which perceive and interpret issues quite differently 
due to different interests, identities and loyalties. 
How an actor perceives the present situation, and how it utilizes the current 
situation shapes the future to certain extent among other perceptions’ role in 
shaping the future. Similarly, the views that claim to explain the present has a past, 
and in turn past is linked to the present and to the future: To illuminate, post-
modernism cannot exist without modernism, and likewise modernism cannot exist 
without pre-modernity. This kind of relation among ideas is valid for any '-ism'. 
Then, ideas have their own cycle, but not necessarily unidirectional. Past and future 
merges at the present. This is so because ideas, conceptions and theories are as 
much a product of the human intellect as they are intangible activities, first 
emerging in the mind, and then carried out in behavior. We may perceive less than 
the truth out there, but it does not necessarily mean that there is not a truth out there 
which is to be explained with enhanced theory. Used in this framework, the term 
'perception' inheres in philosophical realism tenets, not outside of it. It is just that 
the formation of ‘the truth’ or ‘fact’ is complex with many actors and processes. 
This translates to the assumption that the truth is knowable. 
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Although it cannot be logically argued that a phenomenon or a policy 
thereof does not exist if it lacks effectiveness, potential forces are overlooked to a 
certain extent until they have a net effect for the sake of parsimony. That is where 
effectiveness and capacity are interrelated. In other words, the interworking of 
different perceptions and due different policies is effective to the extent that actors’ 
have influence or the capacity to carry them out. In this light, capability/power and 
influence can be separated. Herein, capacity is meant to comprise both tangible and 
intangible sources of power, which is taken to refer to the ability to manipulate 
others ‘behavior. Thereupon, ideas/perceptions/interpretations, interest, capacity 
and time as dynamic factors are inter-linked. The dynamic relation between past, 
present and future is sustained through the interpretations of actors, which link a 
current situation to an event or trend in the past. Some actors establish such a link 
and behave accordingly. 
For instance, the US response-policy against terrorism is by-and-large a 
military one, mainly interpreting the current international fora as being similar to 
that of the Cold War era. It linked terrorism of the day with state-sponsors. It 
claims a right to preventively strike a state that is presumed to be sponsoring 
terrorism and/or going nuclear.199 The Cold War mentality is state-centric. It sees 
no alternative but interpreting terrorism via state-centrism or via ahistorical lenses 
that is not interested on how change occurs. When the change is not peaceful, 
conflict occurs. Conflictual change brings forth the current form of terrorism with 
no headquarters or territory. The source of present-day terrorism originates at sub-
state level, but operates trans-nationally largely without state-support.  
How to supplement the weaknesses of the literature? Theories have been 
                     
1992002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002 Washington: 
White House, p.6; 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America March 2006 
Washington: White House, p.18. 
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customarily revised or rejected as theorists have sought to catch up with and 
capture changing global contexts. The rise and fall of paradigms can be accounted 
for by their relative capacity to interpret the global realities emerging at the 
time.200Reconsideration, then, starts with the question: What are the main analytical 
tools/distinctions that are being used and at the same time challenged by different 
researchers of both a positivist and post-positivist persuasion? International 
Relations studies have worked through the conventional distinctions between: 
- The public and the private 
- Domestic and foreign affairs 
- National and international issues 
- Economics and politics 
Multidimensionality of our shrinking globe becomes possible owing to great 
advancement of microelectronics, microbiology, medicine, real-time news and 
information processing, telecommunication and transportation. Travel of ideas and 
people enhances the impact of capital flight, movement of labor, goods and 
investment across borders. This is a snapshot of how globalization made the actors 
interdependent. As important political formations, nation-states are not alone. 
National polities are not the sole clusters of people who have national identities and 
loyalties to a particular state. They are penetrated by sub-national, supra-national 
and trans-national forces. Loyalty to the state is under challenge from various non-
state entities. Thus, actors other than states are also actively trying to have a say in 
world politics. That directly means they seek power, too. With the empowerment of 
acquired allegiances and with the availability of improved telecommunication, they 
operate transnationally and force states to counter-attack. Hence, politics are not 
                     
200Kegley, Charles W. “Bridge-Building in the Study of International Relations-How “Kuhn” Do We 
Do Better?” in Donald J. Puchala ed. Visions of International Relations-Assessing an Academic Field 
South Carolina: University of South Carolina, p.64.  
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only among nations, but amidst different power-foci. 
 
3.4.7. Degrees and Scaling 
It is worth noting that not only International Relations alone, but for all the 
phenomena in life, the issues of conceptualization and usage of theories are about 
‘degrees’, not about ‘absolutes’. This is an important point in conceptualizing 
phenomena. In addition to the use of the historical context, viewing phenomena in 
scales or degrees is necessary to have explanatory power. As a commanding 
articulation of “the conceptualization of security” debate in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, David A. Baldwin’s conceptual lenses in approaching to ‘security’ can 
be seen as an urge to build a bridge between positivist and post-positivist schools of 
world politics201. These benchmarks of conceptualizing security also help 
considering the specific historical conditions and the need to conceptualize in 
degrees together.  
Leaving aside the operational definitions, he attempts to elucidate ‘security’ 
as a concept by proposing questions such as: ‘Security for whom?’, ‘Security for 
which values?’, ‘How much security’, ‘From what threats’, ‘By what means’, ‘At 
what cost?’, and ‘In what time period?’. One reason to specify the degree of 
security a country or any political entity has or seeks is that absolute security is 
unattainable. In a world of scarce resources of various kinds, allocation of 
resources among competing objectives, none of which completely attainable, 
entails asking the question of ‘how much is enough?’ This is an inescapable 
question. Thus, the issue of concepts and conceptualization and likewise that of 
theories and their usage must be seen as a matter of degree and not absolutes. 
                     
201Baldwin, David A. 1997. “The Concept of Security” Review of International Studies 23, 5-26.  
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If security is conceived as a matter of degree, then complicated problems 
arouse disabling people to decide when to say ‘enough’. However, this is precisely 
the question to be answered and the reason why social science exists. What is more, 
there is nothing unique about the concepts used in IR, because any phenomenon 
and objective to obtain in life and academia is subject to degrees, whether it be of 
anthropology, history, political science, economics, relations among people in an 
institution like Foreign Ministry or Army, or of even the institution of marriage. 
Not only security of state is about degrees, but also even security of marriage or 
happiness in life is a matter of degree. This is the ontological outlook of the thesis 
about the need to specify degrees of what we study, or what we hold as a ‘fact’ 
and/or ‘phenomenon’. 
 
3.4.8. Conditions, Interests and Definitions 
As discussed in the above section on the historical context, changing 
conditions change interests, and in turn they change definitions. Not only 
definitions -such as definition of terrorism- change time and again, but what is seen 
as constituting ‘the political’ changes also. Thus, permanent academic definitions 
and conceptualizations, which are held to be valid throughout all history of human 
beings seems to be almost impossible. With our models, we can only try to 
approximate reality of a particular era within a particular period of time. This is so, 
because time neither stops nor progresses or develops in a linear fashion. 
Eventually, our definitions alter to be behind the times. They become insufficient to 
describe and explain the phenomena and actions on the ground.  
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The question of ‘what is political’ cannot adequately be explained without 
situating it in its particular setting or historical context. The contemporary context 
within which activities of various sorts take place is crucial in studying global 
terrorism of the beginnings of the 21st century and the behaviors of state 
responders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS CONDITIONING INTER-STATE 
COOPERATION AND ALIGNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM: 
GLOBALIZATION 
 
 
 
4.1. Globalization and National Security 
 
The end of the Cold War has been a watershed development in international 
relations with continuing implications for policy world and academia. The end of 
the bipolar structure of the system presented a new international security context 
which paved the way for contestation of fundamental concepts of International 
Relations and nation-state policies alike. Bothe the concept and practice of 
sovereignty, nation-state policy responses against new threats, and international 
organizations such as the United Nations have faced criticisms of ineffectiveness in 
the aftermath of the Cold War. Significantly, the international environment has 
changed in a way that led to a reconsideration of ‘polarity’ and ‘power’.202  
 What has been added to the new security environment is the new form of 
contemporary threats, which are mostly transnational: Manifestations of 
globalization have been diverse over different realms; however, from the 
                     
202Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics” International 
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 Winter, pp. 39-75. 
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international security perspective, globalization appears to be particularly 
influential upon the formation of current threats. Twenty-first century threat 
formation seemed correlated to the process of globalization, and meanwhile also to 
the end of the bipolar structure of the international system. Thus, the post-Cold War 
structure of the system and international security is marked both by the demise of 
the bipolar political-military landscape and by globalization.  
Utmost importantly, making threat-assessments and defining adversaries 
became harder for states due to the distinctive contours of the current security 
environment after bipolarity. Making threat assessments and gathering intelligence 
were relatively easier during the Cold War when threats were perceived to be 
mainly concentrated within the adversarial bloc. The former Soviet Union was the 
focal point of threats for the United States of America and vice-versa. With the 
source of aggregate threats dispelled, nation-states ceased to be the sole referent of 
threat assessments albeit still being considered. Terrorists move across borders, and 
sometimes they are within their home-country as sleeping cells. Because financial 
sources are splintered and whereabouts of perpetrators are not clear-cut, leitmotif 
for threat assessments is not necessarily nation-state-oriented any longer. National 
intelligence services work on two different realms that may only rarely overlap 
with each other: intelligence-gathering and assessment on conventional threats 
emanating from other nation-states and those assessments on threats emanating 
from non-state entities such as terrorist groups, criminal groups, and the methods-
exchange and evolving merger between the latter groups.203 
 Non-state actors and specific issue-areas such as transnational terrorism, 
cross-border activities of organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass 
                     
203Bjornehed, Emma. “Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror” 
Global Crime Vol. 6, No. 3&4, August–November 2004, pp. 305-324. 
196 
 
destruction and light-and-small weapons came to be pronounced as subject-
specific-threats with their hard-to-identify possible and actual perpetrators scattered 
around the world. Perpetrators are hard to identify especially because they may 
reside in the target-country as citizens and immigrants. Perpetrators with no 
criminal record may travel from other countries to the selected target-country. That 
is why use of biometrics system and wire-tapping are frequent particularly in 
Europe and the US. As an operational method, terrorists may choose among 
remote-controlled bombing, truck-bombing, suicide-bombing, detonating nuclear-
suitcases, critical sites bombing (such as dams, public transportation vehicles and 
routes, sports, entertainment or art shows that pool tens of thousands of people into 
a fixed area, bombing power-generators, nuclear silos, or factories and facilities 
that use industrial-grade nuclear materials to achieve radiological dispersal) or 
disrupting complex urban systems such as breaking into shopping-malls’ air-
conditioning systems with biological weapons agents, poisoning city water, 
jamming/hacking air-traffic control to cause to crash planes through simultaneous 
landing or intersecting flight destinations). Among these possibilities, suicide 
bombing is are the kind of decentralized threat formation is added to those 
traditional threats emanating from nation-states themselves. The addition of 
decentralized threats into national security threat and intelligence profiles is much 
likely to be mainly originating in globalization. This is why globalization has 
become a subject-matter of high priority in international and national security. 
Since the alliance and cooperation literatures have been traditionally studying 
threat formation and the threats against which states align, the globalization process 
that factors in current threats requires examination. Globalization - alongside its 
implications on arguments of polarity- is studied mainly due to its influence in 
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threat formation.  
At initial examination, the post-Cold War period -while it is still in need of 
a better term- witnesses no power-blocs or alliances in the framework of the 
Warsaw Pact versus the NATO. After the self-dismemberment of the former 
USSR, the rivalry between nation-states is blurred owing to lack of clearly 
identified threats unlike the case of the Cold War:  
The current system of international security, including the UN Security Council, has 
become "broken" - not least because it was never designed to handle the threats of 
this century. Second, traditional rules of warfare are not going to protect us against 
the kinds of rogues and terrorists who have been set loose by the end of the Cold 
War and advances in technology…We have never in history had a situation where 
small groups, unaffiliated with any state, and embracing radical, death-loving 
ideologies, could do vast-scale damage to us all.204 
 
4.2. What is Globalization? 
Formation of threats under globalization is being accepted as a decisive 
factor in explaining the limits and prospects of inter-state cooperation against 
terrorism; since contemporary threats are globalization-induced, it is a must to 
examine the process of globalization.  
'Globalization' is a value-laden concept as most concepts in politics are. It is 
neither succinctly nor clearly defined. It is inconsistently and interchangeably used 
as a noun, an adjective or a verb. It refers alternatively to a process, a policy, a 
philosophy, a prescriptive theory, and a propagandistic ideology. Whatever its roots 
and different usages are, globalization marks a core part of both the academic 
terminology and the policy jargon.  
Since political trends prospectively appear to be bringing forward the 
resilience of the ongoing merger of the world’s people in an ever tightening web of 
interdependent relations of various actors and create transnational threats thereby, 
                     
204Nichols, Thomas M. 2009. “The Move toward Preventive Military Action is an International 
Phenomenon” Thomas M. Nichols on his book, Eve of Destruction: the Coming Age of Preventive 
War. Rorotoko. 
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study of globalization seems inevitable.  
In an ever tightening web of interdependent relations of various actors, there 
are methodological approaches which see globalization as a singular economic 
process.205 However, it seems appropriate to conceptualize globalization as a multi-
dimensional process, not as a singular one. Regarding globalization as merely an 
economic issue resembles defining the tools humans use, not what people think 
about themselves and others, or why and how they act with these tools. In other 
words, globalization does not only affect economic relations or defense-industries, 
army-modernization and weapons technology, but it also affects the status and 
political clout of ideologies and political regimes that are projected by rivaling 
nation-states and non-state entities.206 As a consequence of such single-dimension-
                     
205 Hay, Colin. 2002. “Globalisation as a Problem of Political Analysis: Restoring Agents to a ‘Process 
without a Subject’ and Politics to a Logic of Economic Compulsion” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, Volume 15, Number 3. 
206As for nation-states, two incompatible ideological groupings of states are purportedly emerging 
(exemplified via China and Russia versus the continental Europe, Canada, and the US). These 
incompatible groupings proposed by Kagan are differentiated by the nature of the political regimes 
involved. Russia and China ostensibly espouse politically authoritarian state-capitalism that is not 
against economic liberalism; yet, they are claimed to be against the political liberalism urged by the 
West. This is asserted to be a clashing point for the long-haul. Ikenberry lends support to Kagan’s 
argument regarding the evolution of political regimes in the world. As for the nation-states versus non-
state entities and especially on global ideologies, Ayoob’s and Adamson’s arguments are globalization-
driven, by which both are underlining the two transnational ideologies that are in current rivalry, 
namely Liberalism versus Islamism. Kagan, Robert. 2008. “The End of the End of History-Why 
the Twenty-First Century Will Look Like the Nineteenth” The New Republic, April 23; Ayoob, 
Mohammed. 2007. “Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North–South Divide” International 
Studies Review 9, 629–643; Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. “Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: 
Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics,” International Studies Review 7, 547–569; 
Ikenberry, G John. 2001. “American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy” Review 
International Studies, 27: 191-212;   Judt, Tony and Denis Lacorne. 2005. With Us or Against Us: 
Studies in Global Anti-Americanism, New York: Palgrave McMillan; Lewis, Bernard. 2003. The Crisis 
of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, Toronto; Kagan, Robert. 2008. The Return of History and the 
End of Dreams New York: Alfred A Knopf; Kagan, Robert. 2007. Dangerous Nation: America's Place 
in the World, from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20th Century. New York: Vintage Books; 
Mihalka, Michael. 2004. “Globalization, the Liberal Imperative, Islamism, and the Future of Conflict in 
the 21st Century,” The Quarterly Journal 3(3): 57-67; Jervis, Robert. 2002. “September 11: How Has It 
Changed the World?” Political Science Quarterly 117(1): 37-54; Kissinger, Henry. 2007. Does 
America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, New York: Simon & 
Schuster; An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger, 
www.charlierose.com; Haas, Richard N. 2008. “The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US 
Dominance?” Foreign Affairs, May/June; Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005–06.  “The Impending Demise of 
the Postwar System,” Survival 47(4): 7–18; Goldgeier, James & Michael McFaul. 2003. Power and 
Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War, Brookings Institution Press; Centre for the 
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dependence, the roles and domains of ideas, human nature, learning, socialization, 
philosophy, violence and culture are largely ignored. In spite of the fact that it is the 
enmeshment of these domains of life with economy that forms politics under 
globalization, this study does not aim to be exhaustive or comprehensive enough to 
cover all of these facets of politics - only pinpointing that globalization has never 
been only economic.207 Globalization is evident across economic, social-cultural, 
political, military and ecological realms.  
This being the case, different dimensions of globalization is examined to the 
extent they pertain to contemporary threat formation and to inter-state cooperation 
and alignment against terrorism. While this section engrosses on descriptive 
technical dimensions of globalization, namely economic and technological 
processes as underwriters of it, following sections deal with ideational or seemingly 
abstract factors regarding loyalties and political space.  
As for the repercussions of globalization for culture and on the interface 
between culture and politics,208 it has become increasingly popular to argue that 
                                                                
Study of Global Governance. 2000. Round Table Debate on the Global Significance of 1989, Public 
Lecture 12, http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global 
207Kennedy, Paul. 2007. “Global Transformations but Local, 'Bubble' Lives: Taking a Reality Check on 
Some Globalization Concepts” Globalizations 4:2 267 – 282; Laidi, Zaki. 2002. “Does Globalisation 
Threaten the State? Thesis on the Fractal State” Cambridge Review of International Affairs Volume 15, 
Number 3; Ruggie, John Gerard. 2003. “The UN and Globalization: Limits and Patterns of Institutional 
Adaptation” Global Governance 9, 301-321 
208 ‘Culture’ is not used as a term that is related to religion as it is notoriously so used in the 
Huntingtonian Clash of Civilizations to refer to clusters of religious beliefs replacing nationalism as the 
basic parameter of conflict and cooperation in the post-Cold War period. Rather, it is used here to 
denote economic and political forces that give way to an ideological walk of life or world-outlook. In 
that sense, it reflects a political approach studying ideological hegemony, not an eclectic approach 
seemingly comprising theology and politics. Ayoob illustrates the issues of culture as ideological 
hegemony and so-called cultural argumentations as obfuscation of the real issue of ideological 
hegemony cloaked in the Huntingtonian Clash of Civilizations: “Ideological hegemony is an essential 
component of political and economic domination since it legitimizes the existing order, no matter how 
iniquitous it may be, and makes inequality palatable to those at or close to the bottom of the heap. The 
absence of ideological hegemony or its significant erosion provides the subalterns with the opportunity 
to mobilize and translate their opposition to structures of domination into effective political action. In 
the absence of alternatives in the current epoch, political Islam has become the leading anti-hegemonic 
ideology representing the South’s resistance to the domination of the North. This provides the clue to 
why leading scholars and analysts in the United States, in a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the real 
issue, have referred to this confrontation between hegemonism and resistance as the ‘clash of 
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twentieth century is one of a clash between ‘Jihad versus McWorld’ by which 
Benjamin Barber argued that the globalizing powers of capitalism (“McWorld”) are 
confronted with or resisted by the forces that Barber labels “Jihad” - the variety of 
tribal particularisms and “narrowly conceived faiths” opposed to the homogenizing 
force of capital. With the main separating benchmark being the ideologies that rival 
each other, namely the rivalry between anti-hegemonic political Islam and 
economic liberalism respectively, “Jihad vs. McWorld” is still one of the strongest 
depictions of the colliding world-outlooks. However, it seems sadly mistaken. It 
appears to be the case that twenty-first century is marked by ‘McJihad’, not by 
‘Jihad vs. McWorld’. McJihad denotes mechanism of capitalism, which appears to 
operate in certain critical instances only by adopting the social force and moral 
authority of conservative Islamic movements. It is argued by Mitchell that the 
Islamic movements are not diametrically opposed to globalization of capital, and 
they are not always fighting against the West unlike what Benjamin Barber’s ‘Jihad 
vs. McWorld’ argument has it.209 Islamic movements seem to have been awkward 
associates of the West especially since 1945.210 
As for the political level that works in parallel to ‘cultural realm’ construed 
as the realm of rivalry for ideological hegemony, on the one hand, there is arguably 
a wave of liberal democracy around the world that urges states to ‘go global’ 
through democratic regime and free-market-economy principles. This wave of 
liberal economic democratization is ostensibly interconnecting ‘states’ (as 
                                                                
civilizations’ resulting from ‘Muslim rage’ ” in Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. “Challenging Hegemony: 
Political Islam and the North-South Divide” International Studies Review 9, p. 632. 
209 For the details of ‘McJihad’ and an historical examination of politics of oil, or the relations between 
Western governments and the Middle Eastern states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, Mitchell, 
Timothy. 2002. “Islam in the US Global Order” Social Text 73, Vol. 20, No. 4 Project Muse-Duke 
University Press. 
210 Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. “Islam in the US Global Order” Project Muse-Duke University Press, 
Social Text 73, Vol. 20, No. 4.                         
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aggregate of bureaucratic and governmental institutions) and ‘nations’ (citizens or 
laymen) economically and culturally.211 On the other hand, there is a contending 
global wave of tribalism and/or sectarianism. The two trends are not necessarily 
mutually-exclusive at all times. They seem to both clash and overlap, and give birth 
to different forms of political conflict and warfare.212  
On the social level, mass-migration is a manifestation of globalization, 
which evolved to be a national security issue for it may provide a potential pool of 
terrorist constituency and criminal activity.213 On the environmental realm, climate 
change and environmental degradation are worth mentioning since it is related to 
various industrial products including the military-industrial complex. It is related to 
international security in that military-industrial sectors (especially those of nuclear 
reactors) are regarded as the interface between security and environment. Thus, 
globalization comes as a package. Although parsimony cannot be discarded totally, 
it is hard to choose to study only the tail or the head of ‘the globalization-elephant’. 
There are parsimonious approaches that favor ‘the tail approach’ risking issue-
linkages and grasping the complexity of the political terrain, and those alternative 
approaches which tend to be more holistic that does not strictly fit into a particular 
theory in order to study implications of globalization on security. Concurrently, 
there are methodological disputes as to how the multi-dimensional process of 
                     
211The reason to mention ‘state’ and ‘nation’ separately is that transnational terrorism originates in the 
dissonance between state and nation: In the complex terrain of political violence, contemporary 
terrorism is the darker side of seemingly civil society that may not always remain ‘civil’ as it is 
comprehended in any western connotation of the term. The point is discussed in the second chapter, 
which deals with the ambiguous nature of the contemporary threat of transnational terrorism along with 
the shifting loyalties of citizens across different societies. 
212Kaldor, Mary. 2004. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, pp. 69-90. 
213Adamson, Fiona B. 2006. “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security” 
International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 165–199; The 9-11 Commission Report-Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. NY: W. W. Norton, pp.47-86; 
Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad - The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
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globalization is best analyzed. Lack of agreement in the academia on the 
methodology and epistemology of studying globalization cautions us against 
privileging one realm or aspect of globalization against other realms of it.   
Given that caution, the working-definition of globalization here is primarily 
the flow of inanimate and animate objects across borders with tremendous velocity 
and in tremendous volume; whether these objects be ideas, information, people, 
capital, labor, drugs, conventional arms, tanks, artillery, small arms, AK47s, fissile 
material, know-how or greenhouse gases or endemic diseases such as AIDS, 
SARS, or bird-flu. Focal point of globalization is ‘mobility’. The ‘flow’ or 
‘mobility’ of objects is the main feature of globalization that interconnects the 
world, though not necessarily interconnecting the minds of people at all times. This 
mobility is correlated to economic interdependence and technological innovations; 
innovations especially in communication and transportation.  
Another definition of globalization can be made by taking ‘borders’ as the 
yardstick of defining: Borders (political dividing-lines of nation-states) are not 
nature-given or natural parts of the planet earth; they are drawn by human beings. 
In that sense, borders are useful abstractions that delineate nation-states. Then, an 
alternative rough definition may read as follows: Globalization comprises most of 
the phenomena which cannot be considered through the abstraction of borders for 
its inner-logic recognizes almost no borders whatsoever. 
The term ‘global’ refers to different foci-of-power within different issue-
areas. The fundamental point is that ‘global’ not only qualifies specific political 
associations such as nation-states, but all political processes, formations, and 
entities beyond the limits of territoriality. Globalization may be seen as a process 
whose modus operandi are beyond the limits of territoriality. More often than not, 
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political units’ actions and related processes operate on a basis that cannot be 
confined into one specifically demarcated geographical area or territory.  
Globalization is about mobility among, through, in and outside of the borders. 
Therefore, its reflection on analysis and research is of a deterritorialized 
imperative: These actions and processes take place on a level, which cannot be 
analyzed using only ‘territorial lenses’.214Because transmission of ideas, 
information, money, weapons, goods and even sometimes travel of people 
recognize no borders-as-filters, borderlines that separate territories are gradually 
rendered less relevant for the security of the homeland. Most of the time, it is not 
the armies (conventionally conceptualized regular armed-forces of nation-states) 
crossing borders; it is the non-military and civil elements, namely, information, 
money, goods, dual-use items and civilian people that transgress the borders and 
form the threat. Civilians may be insiders with foreign connections. These elements 
are not military-oriented in the customary sense. By the traditional international 
security jargon, they may be seen of non-military or low-politics. 
Yet, they increasingly evolve to share the crux of security concerns alongside 
traditional security concerns of military nature. The distinction between 'civil' and 
'military' is challenged today and gradually wearing thin: Peace operations and 
nation-building efforts or 'the war on terrorism', private military companies and 
various terrorist attacks are some of the telling examples presenting the erosion of 
the distinction between civil and military sectors.215Nevertheless, from most policy-
makers viewpoint, security is still conceptualized mainly as safety of citizens, 
                     
214 2005. Hegemony and Its Discontents: A Symposium-Reflection, Evaluation, Integration. 
International Studies Review, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 525-629.  
215NATO officials opened a Joint Staff College at Ar Rustamiya in Iraq on September 27, southeast of 
Baghdad. 2005. “Private Firm to Protect NATO in Iraq,” Agence France Presse May 4; Sharp, Jeremy 
M. and Christopher M. Blanchard. 2007. Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, 
Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, September 25, 
p.3 www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32105.pdf 
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protection of welfare, order and values of a society and above all as raison d’état. 
Often and congruent with the geopolitical lexicon, national security simply refers to 
protection of territorial indivisibility and political independence of a sovereign 
nation-state. Thus, Machiavelli’s central proposition of raison d’état is resilient; it 
is that every other value is subordinate to the survival of the state. In parallel 
though, political independence and sovereignty of nation-states recently became a 
controversial subject-matter among scholars that try to explain the impact of 
globalization on states.216  
Issues of political independence and sovereignty are being reconsidered given 
the gradual transcendence of the safety and control provided by territory (territory 
as demarcations of authority-zones or who rules where and territory as protective-
filters or whether passage or actions are allowed by authorities of sovereign state). 
Territorial defense shield became ineffective to the extent that transcendence of the 
security provided by territory gives no permission to think about security along the 
classical concept of territory. In other words, state authorities often cannot capture 
or manipulate information, people and materials in contrast to the previous times 
when they were relatively more successful in doing so.  
Power resources such as economic and financial wealth, and ever advancing 
instruments of power and manipulation such as technology and information met not 
only with nation-states but with non-state entities as well. The marriage of 
technology and increasingly skilled people continuously multiplies and the 
marriage becomes ever pervasive and comprehensive around the world. ‘Virtual 
threats’ apply to threats that are created and carried out by means of information-
                     
216 Although 'independence' became a contested term in the economically interdependent world of the 
twenty-first century, 'political independence' might be taken to denote 'noteworthy relative 
independence from other actors in decision-making'. "Noteworthy relative independence" can further be 
conceptualized as having a noteworthy bargaining-power/volition and capacity to refuse. 
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technology (IT). Information-technologic virtual threats target national security.217 
It goes without saying that virtual conversations are real conversations that take 
place over computer networks. In that respect, virtual communities or various 
epistemic communities are genuine social groups that assemble around the use of e-
mail, blogs, and other networked-IT in different parts of the world. Use of 
cyberspace and the Internet as virtual battleground or as battle-space is one of the 
most effective methods that global terrorists use to recruit fighters, communicate 
with each other and devise plans.218 
The World Wide Web is a relatively new front to fight on. It conveys both 
public authorities and private entities, whereas nation-states have no monopoly in 
controlling all information-technologic exchange.219However, virtual threats are not 
only those that are related to the Internet or to generic computer technology. 
‘Virtual threats’ might be expanded to comprise those deterritorialized threats and 
entities against which actual or threatened use of force has limited efficacy. 
Terrorism is like a computer virus or hacker attack in that both are surprise attacks 
with no addresses. The same is also valid for radical ideologies of terrorism. They 
cannot be successfully deterred physically.  
Power resources such as the Internet, conventional armament, know-how, 
facilitation of logistics, communication and travel went increasingly private. These 
resources were more in the control of nation-states during the Cold War era. In the 
post-Cold War of today, private or non-state entities take advantage of these power 
resources and instruments in abundance. Black and gray markets of finance and 
                     
217Bailey, Timothy D. and Michael R. Grimaila. 2006. “Running the Blockade: Information 
Technology, Terrorism, and the Transformation of Islamic Mass Culture” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 18:523–543. 
218Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
219Drissel, David. 2006. “Internet Governance in a Multipolar World: Challenging American 
Hegemony” Cambridge Review of International Affairs Volume 19, March Number 1.  
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trade220 feed into private use of power resources. The issue chiefly pertains to the 
illicit and violent non-state entities, which are the dark side of the civil society 
empowered by globalization.221The dark side of the civil society not only uses arms 
and weapons, but civil resources of power as well. Transnational terrorism uses 
non-military or civil features in the build-up of its both physical and ideological 
(and also educational, propagandistic) attacks. Terrorism seems to thrive upon civil 
features and instruments especially empowered by the Western confusion of 
freedom to practice faith with disrupting the political and constitutional order of 
countries.222 It goes without saying that strong counterterrorism measures are 
vitally needed to correspond to the globalization-induced form of the threat.  
 
4.3. Impact of Globalization upon  
the Backbone of Territory and Strategy 
  
4.3.1. Deterritorialization: Parting of Time from Space as a 
    Challenge to the Customary Understanding of Warfare 
Distance is the cornerstone of classical military strategy. Earlier works of 
strategy recorded that ‘distance’ has been a staunch criterion to be used both in the 
calculations of offense and defense.223Traditional threats such as an invasion of a 
country are studied widely in military strategy literature.224However, in the current 
                     
220‘Black market’ is mainly taken to be illegal transactions of private persons whereas ‘gray market’ is 
the illegal transactions between private individuals and public authorities that are corrupt. 
221The phrase, the dark side of the civil society, belongs to Anthony Giddens; Huntington, Samuel & 
Anthony Giddens. 2003. “Iki Bati” NPQ, Vol.5, No. 4, p. 40. 
222Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. “Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological 
Frameworks in International Politics” International Studies Review 7, 547–56. 
223Hence, the terms such as heartland, hinterland, world-island, tier, flank, outpost, periphery, trench, 
battle-ground, no man’s land or forward defense. However, it is important to note the development of 
new jargon such as the cyber-space or battle-space supplementing the traditional term of battle-ground. 
Moreover, breaking the fighting-will of opponent, a la Clausewitz, is complemented by ‘winning heart 
and minds of the non-combatants’ partly because the state and society separation does not seem to hold 
in the unconventional form of warfare such as the fight against terrorism. Winning hearts and minds is 
about the soft power or intangible power, which is discussed in the following sections. 
224General Sir Mike Jackson UK. 2007. “Traditional Warfare Techniques on Their Way Out” 12 
September.  
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state of international politics as of 2009, strategic exposure of nation-states includes 
those threats that cannot be responded by national means alone. Since September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, it has come to be commonly 
pronounced in national capitals that national means are not sufficient to curb global 
threats such as terrorism and that international cooperation is needed. This point 
became common-sense and seems obvious. However, common-sense is not enough 
and nuance appears to be necessary in the academe225: The reason why national 
means are not sufficient is crucial and requires emphasis.  
 
The reason is plainly that threats such as terrorism neither recognize 
borderlines nor are totally congruent with the classical distinction between inside 
and outside politics of a nation-state. The latter reason for why national means are 
not enough to deal with the terrorism of our era has become a cliché in academia 
since the September 11 attacks.226 However, like most clichés it captures an 
essential part of reality. The conventional analytical distinction in International 
Relations between inside/domestic politics and outside/international politics (as the 
organizing principle of the state-system template) can still be used for studying 
terrorism but only with a shortcoming that must be borne in mind: When 
confronted by such threats that transgress borders, the distinctive characteristic of 
‘territoriality’ becomes reduced (though not vanished) in practicality and 
importance.  
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225Barnett, Michael.  2006.  “In Need of Nuance-What the Academe Can Teach,” Harvard International 
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September 11. NY: Basic Books. 
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Why does the decline of practicality and importance in territoriality or 
territorial-thinking occur? It occurs because transnational terrorism is a 
deterritorialized threat: A deterritorialized threat in that, first, it presents the 
weakening of ties between time and space, and secondly, it presents the conflation 
of the scales of violence. Weakening of the ties between time and space denotes 
that conduct of terrorist attacks became less dependent on the parameters of 
territorial-defense due to interconnecting transportation and communication 
capabilities worldwide. Physical distance became less burdensome. Accordingly, 
the logistics, skill and organizational capacity of private actors increased due to 
globalization.  
As for the conflation of the scales of violence, it becomes hard for states to 
decide whether it is homegrown/domestic, international, regional or global 
terrorism that they face. Constantly changing scale of violence complicates the 
exposure of threats. International terrorism evolved into transnational terrorism 
because nation-states’ affiliation or sponsorship may lack in the conduct of some 
terrorist groups. These compounded aspects may roughly be defined as 
‘deterritorialization’,227 which enables some non-state entities to run away from the 
control and authority of nation-states.  
Deterritorialization has important implications for cooperation and 
alignment of states against terrorism. As it is further discussed in the following 
sections, deterritorialized threats are hard to perceive, define and fight against. The 
elusiveness or ambiguity of the threat is one of the fundamental reasons why states 
perceive the threat differently. The deterritorialized and intrinsic features of 
transnational terrorism (its incongruence to territorial-defense parameters and its 
                     
227Patman, Robert G. 2006. “Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror” Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 6, pp 963-986.  
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conflated scale of violence) circumscribe international cooperative behaviors of 
states that aim to curb it. The form of the threat itself is a limit to cooperation 
among states. The nature of the threat itself as an obstacle against international 
cooperation is detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
4.3.2. Zooming in on Deterritorialization 
Territory, location and proximity of enemy forces are vitally important 
determinants of classical war assessments. Likewise, contingency-planning and 
territorial defense are mainly based on force-on-force confrontations of armies. 
Territory as such is at the heart of territorial-defense, and it is central in deterring 
conventional war among states. In spite of that, territory is not that central in 
deterring nuclear war because contingencies of nuclear war are also largely 
deterritorialized in nature. Thus, deterritorialization of defense is not a novel issue. 
It has been studied and explained by Cold War strategists.228 Likewise, 
transnational terrorism is a deterritorialized threat against which concepts of 
conventional warfare such as borders, geographical proximity, and mobilization of 
armies have limited efficacy.     
How distance is defined within the conceptual scheme of territorial-defense 
helps demonstrate ‘deterritorialization’ and the difficulties that transnational threats 
present: The subject-matter of classical military strategy is the conventional 
challenges between armies. It is basically an actual or contemplated clash of wills 
between opposing military forces on the battlefield. The meaning of 'distance' is 
geographical, and territorial defense pertains to external threats that are originating 
outside the territory. Thus, traditional notions of war (or concepts regarding 
                     
228Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, J. Robert Oppenheimer and Thomas Schelling are among the notable 
military strategists of the Cold War. Brodie, Bernard. 1946. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and 
World Order. Harcourt; Brodie, Bernard. 1959. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton University Press. 
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warfare in the form of armies-fighting-armies in vast confrontations) present the 
meaning and utility of ‘distance’ as basically geographical. Distance as a measure 
of territory has key importance for the customary understanding of territorial 
defense and war.  
In the case of unconventional war demonstrated by transnational terrorism, 
practical and analytical utility of the concept of ‘territory’ is different. It is 
analytically and practically useful only when terrorists are located or their 
whereabouts are identified. The problem is that their headquarters or simply their 
whereabouts cannot be predetermined before a terrorist attack unlike the case 
where armies in conventional warfare are geographically detected. When terrorists 
do not have any address, retaliation becomes controversial at best and impossible 
at worst.  
Territory is more of a static term than a dynamic one. However, 
continuously mobile terrorists (who do not always reside in and fight for a 
particular territory) are dynamic units. Since terrorism does not have any address to 
retaliate at, difficulty of locating terrorists or discovering place of terrorist hubs is 
disrupting the conventional mode of warfare. Thus, deterritorialized and 
intrinsically dynamic transnational threats challenge the territorial lenses of 
conventional defense-planning and warfare.  
The way terrorists fight tries to break the fighting-will of states and force 
governments to make concessions. Since that is an attribute of warfare in general, 
terrorism is a form of warfare, albeit an unconventional one. As one of the forms of 
warfare, it certainly operates on some territory. Yet, transnational terrorism cannot 
be entirely seen through the territorial-defense lenses because it oftentimes cannot 
be located clearly. The threat is not settled, but mobile. It is not institutionalized 
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and organized like national armies or even like guerilla fighters who cling to a 
certain portion of territory. Terrorism is a threat without address. 
 Globalization of the present era adds up to a change in the dynamics of 
time and space, which in turn, creates an additional meaning and military-strategic 
utility of ‘distance’. The traditional utility and meaning of distance are still valid 
for conventional threats, but an alternative meaning and utility of distance seem to 
occur through deterritorialization. Technology via telephones, electronic-banking 
systems, satellite phones and satellite-broadcasting videos, jetliners, fax, the 
Internet communication and also multifaceted weapons and weapon systems 
ranging from small arms to nuclear know-how and materials may come under or 
already are at the service of both civil and violent aims. With the availability of 
power instruments for non-state formations and given that technology renders 
physical distance suspended or shrunk to some extent, it seems vital to develop a 
different understanding of defense and strategy for states.  
To put ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘additional meaning of distance’ into the 
security perspective, several past cases can be considered: A nuclear submarine 
silently heading towards its target under the Arctic in proximity to a country, a 
computer espionage/hacker attack on any critically strategic national laboratory of 
any nation, satellite surveillance of military targets in Afghanistan, a cyber attack 
on power grids, the use of electronic cash in the Far East, broadcasting in languages 
other than English almost all around the world without much limits (non-Western 
channels joined the rivalry of agenda-setting and propaganda as opposed to the 
previous Western monopoly of international broadcasting and agenda-setting) and a 
cyberspace ‘meeting’ of exiled Burmese opposition leaders229. Furthermore, 
                     
229Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach. Remapping Global Politics-History’s Revenge and 
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September 11 terrorist attacks constitute another deterritorialized attack sample. It 
is also important to ponder over the possibilities and probabilities of terrorist 
attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.230  
In addition to the above-mentioned show-cases of ‘deterritorialized threats’ 
(those threats that defy traditional national security understandings of inside-
outside, civil-military, national and international), additional examples can be listed 
as follows: 1993 (Feb.): Bombing of World Trade Center (WTC)- 6 killed; 1993 
(Oct.): Killing of U.S. soldiers in Somalia; 1996 (June): Truck bombing at Khobar 
Towers barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19; 1998 (Aug.): Bombing of 
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; 224 killed; 1999 (Dec.): Plot to bomb 
millennium celebrations in Seattle foiled when customs agents arrest an Algerian 
smuggling explosives into the U.S.; 2000 (Oct.): Bombing of the USS Cole in port 
in Yemen; 17 U.S. sailors killed; 2001 (Sept.): Destruction of WTC; attack on 
Pentagon. Total dead 2,992.; 2001 (Dec.): Man tried to denote shoe bomb on flight 
from Paris to Miami; 2002 (April): Explosion at historic synagogue in Tunisia left 
21 dead, including 11 German tourists; 2002 (May): Car exploded outside hotel in 
Karachi, Pakistan, killing 14, including 11 French citizens.; 2002 (June): Bomb 
exploded outside American consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 12.; 2002 (Oct.): 
Boat crashed into oil tanker off Yemen coast, killing 1; 2002 (Oct.): Nightclub 
bombings in Bali, Indonesia, killed 202, mostly Australian citizens; 2002 (Nov.): 
Suicide attack on a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killed 16.; 2003 (May): Suicide 
bombers killed 34, including 8 Americans, at housing compounds for Westerners in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; 2003 (May): 4 bombs killed 33 people targeting Jewish, 
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230Graham Allison. 2004.  Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe New York: 
Times Books. 
 
213 
 
Spanish, and Belgian sites in Casablanca, Morocco; 2003 (Aug.): Suicide car-bomb 
killed 12, injured 150 at Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia; 2003 (Nov.): 
Explosions rocked a Riyadh, Saudi Arabia housing compound, killing 17; 2003 
(Nov.): Suicide car-bombers simultaneously attacked 2 synagogues in Istanbul, 
Turkey, killing 25 and injuring hundreds; 2003 (Nov.) Truck bombs detonated at 
London bank and British consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, killing 26; Terrorist attack 
to the US consulate in Istanbul on July 9, 2008, killing 6.   
Do these attacks fit the orthodox national security concepts and schemes 
which are mostly against an external armed attack? It goes without telling that the 
answer is negative. It is not surprising that the list demonstrates a common tactic, 
namely terrorism. However, deterritorialized threats do not stop at terrorist attacks 
where location of the perpetrators is mostly unknown: such threats are imbued with 
the logic of military technology, too. Deterritorialization also penetrated the high-
technology of nation-states’ weapon systems. 
A nuclear-armed or conventionally-armed submarine in vicinity to a nation-
state creates a strategic vulnerability for national defense: In this way, national 
defenses (that are based on territory whether it is territorial waters or heartland) can 
possibly be transgressed. Such strategic exposure is possible due to the 
advancements in military technology and military-industrial complex. If a 
technologically-complicated submarine could not cruise under water, nuclear 
weapons would not be carried to a location that forms a strategic threat. The same 
holds true for ballistic missile technology. Accordingly, conventional submarine 
technology alone demonstrates the vulnerabilities of national defenses. Sonars that 
detect submarines can be overcome with higher offensive technology. 
Technological means rival with each other. 
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It is the competition of technological prowess among nations that tilts the 
balance between defense and offense. Defense and offense appear to be susceptible 
to ever advancing technology. High-technology may well surpass territorial 
boundaries of states; and that is an advantage that can be exploited by nation-states 
and by non-state entities alike. Therefore, security and technology are intertwined, 
the latter being one of the main drivers of globalization and deterritorialization. 
Thus, deterritorialization of security is not limited to terrorist attacks; it may be 
realized by holders of advanced means of technology that strain territorial defense. 
 
4.3.3. The Nuclear Age, September 11 and Deterritorialization 
In an op-ed in 1992 early-on, Strobe Talbott wrote about globalization and 
its implications for nation-states and sovereignty; pointing also to different 
manifestations of deterritorialization including those that are realized by states’ 
advanced means:  
… Stalin's conquest of Eastern Europe spurred the Western democracies to form 
NATO, history's most ambitious, enduring and successful exercise in collective 
security. The U.S. and the Soviet Union also scared each other into negotiating 
nuclear-arms-control treaties that set in place two vital principles: adversary states 
have a mutual interest in eliminating the danger of strategic surprise, and each 
legitimately has a say in the composition of the other's arsenal of last resort. The 
result was further dilution of national sovereignty and a useful precedent for the 
management of relations between nuclear-armed rivals in the future.231 
 
He was mainly referring to sovereignty-eroding effect of the second-strike 
capability of the superpowers which led to the nuclear arms-control treaties during 
the Cold War. The technology available for the major states was commensurate to 
rule out the basic prerogatives of sovereignty based on territoriality. Technology 
did not wait for the settlement of political quarrels.  
 
                     
231Talbott, Strobe. 1992. “The Birth of a Global Nation,” Time, July 20. Retrieved 16 August 2008;  
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That high-technology may surpass territorial boundaries and sovereignty is 
all the more apparent when other examples such as proliferation of nuclear, 
biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery-means are scrutinized. 
Among the delivery-means of NBC weapons, inter-continental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) have already eroded the effectiveness of traditional national defense. 
Nuclear sub-marines and inter-continental missiles are just two examples that put 
undue strain on national or territorial defense. It is instructive to study them, 
especially the evolution of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs): ICBMs rule 
out the defensive nature of geographical distance, and render landmasses or oceans 
defensively vain to missiles carrying atomic or thermonuclear warheads232. After 
all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed 
out, “speed of kill and mutual kill irrespective of the landmass”.233  
Initially, possession of nuclear weapons was confined only to the United 
States. Yet, the genie was out of the bottle and the nuclear technology proved 
difficult to stop and other countries followed the US in acquiring the necessary 
materials and know-how: Hence, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The USSR followed the United States with its first test in September 1949. In time, 
many more weapons are produced and stored by both the United States and the 
USSR. The introduction of the hydrogen bombs in 1952-3 welcomed the vision of 
unlimited destructive power. The nuclear age was also the nuclear age of plenty 
and both superpowers produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons during the 
Cold War.  
 
                     
232The perception of being left alone out in the cold regarding the nuclear balance constitutes the main 
underlying logic behind the Russian Federation concern against the missile defense project of the US, 
which was continuously debated during the George W. Bush administrations.  
233Thomas C. Schelling. 1967. Arms and Influence New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, chp. 1. 
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Regarding the issue of globalization’s impact on national security and 
sovereignty, the delivery means of nuclear weapons are also crucial. Based on the 
ones developed by Germans during World War II, in 1960s the range of ballistic 
missiles had been increased to deliver a hydrogen bomb from any point on earth to 
another, pointing to the globalization of the impact of weapon-systems in 
particular. In the 1970s, the missiles became accurate enough not just to hit ‘area 
targets’ (entire cities), but also to hit ‘pinpointed targets’ such as military bases. 
Computerization gave way to the advent of multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) and 
multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) making it possible to put ten 
warheads on top of a single missile.  
What is important for the subject at hand is not the increase in the number 
of warheads that can be carried by a missile: For the subject-matter of 
deterritorialized threats what is important is the fact that national defense and 
territorial security was first breached by the states themselves via advanced 
technology. Later on, high technology in armaments, weapons systems   and 
advanced means of communication and travel became available for private actors 
or entities other than nation-states.  
Technology empowers violence and broadens the probabilities of illicit use 
of force: By way of example, terrorist groups can base conventional missiles, 
radiological devices and especially rockets on the ground, in the air, and at sea. 
Technology, first produced by states themselves, surpassed territorial defense logic 
long before non-state entities took advantage of it: International high seas and the 
outer-space were potential war-zones during the Cold War. Territory-centric 
defense template was not the sole strategic concept even during the 1970s. With the 
advent of ballistic missiles flying at hypersonic speeds, and with the cruise missiles 
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flying so low that they could not be detected by ground-based radars, the problem 
of defense against attack became huge. Second-strike capability234of the US and the 
former USSR was of a deterritorialized nature, too. The nuclear age of the 1960s 
and 1970s has already eroded the classical territorial-defense logic before the 
terrorism wave of the early twenty-first century surpassed it. 
Territorial defense logic erodes in parallel to the use of advanced 
technology. Since technological advancement does not hold a distinction between 
civil and military realms, civil and military usages of high-technology tax national 
defenses with additional resources. This is manifest in the case of a computer 
espionage/hacker attack on any critically strategic national laboratory of any nation 
or in the case of a satellite surveillance of military targets in any country as done 
for Afghan targets before the beginning of war in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. 
A cyberspace ‘meeting’ of exiled Burmese opposition leaders, the hacking of 
defense ministries' databases, electronic robberies of national and private banks are 
all examples of deterritorialization of security emerging via technology. In these 
above cases and in that of ballistic missiles, no traveling of people occurs, and 
territory-centric approach to defense is reduced in utility. When the nuclear-
suitcase contingencies, attacks by suicide-bombers and truck-bombs are 
concerned, it becomes clearer that such threats are not even external. Territory-
centric national security approach defines threats as external, and it does not 
correspond to above-mentioned threats well.  
 
                     
234By basing nuclear weapons with their delivery vehicles on the ground, in the air and at sea 
simultaneously (the strategic triad) the nuclear weapons themselves would be protected against a first 
attack to ensure that enough of them would survive after a possible first strike to deliver a second-strike 
as retaliation. As long as second-strike capability was assured, actual exchange of nuclear weapons 
would be meaningless because both superpowers would be annihilated. This arrangement caused ‘the 
balance of terror’ that inhibited the actual use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War.  
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Other cases such as September 11 2001 terrorist attacks mark the same 
point. September 11 shows how an airliner was turned into a missile-like weapon 
and how it was weaponized against civilians. Terrorists did not possess missiles, 
but turned aircrafts into vehicles functionally similar to missiles. The overcoming 
of the national security defense shield of a country was not breached by pure 
technology alone as in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but it was 
breached through a compact use of deceit, secrecy, notorious innovative thinking 
and technology.  All in all, commonality of all above-mentioned threats including 
that of September 11 is that they are deterritorialized threats that do not 
correspond to territory-centric national security thinking. Conventional armies and 
conventional war-planning are mostly sidelined. 
Deceit, secrecy and notorious innovative thinking by terrorists led to erosion 
of the distinctions between civil and military, and between domestic and 
international. Seemingly civilian people (none wore uniforms) hijacked airliners. 
When perpetrators of September 11 hijacked airliners, they also hijacked high-
technology. Although they appeared to be civilian passengers, they were not 
civilians since they acted out of bellicosity. Yet, they were not soldiers in the 
regular sense of the term either. Thus, terrorism as a tactic hardly sees a distinction 
between civil and military realms or between inside and outside of a state. This is 
exactly the characteristic that makes terrorism what it is, namely a gray area 
phenomenon.235  
Yet, not only deceit, secrecy, innovative thinking and taking control of high-
technology airliners played into the hands of September 11 perpetrators, but 
availability of free movement helped them succeed in the same manner. Open-
                     
235Chalk, Peter. 2000. Non-Military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence, 
and Chaos on National and International Security Oxford: Macmillan Press. 
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societies welcome free movement of goods, people, services and ideas. Unlike an 
environment of dictatorship that controls almost every interaction,236 an 
environment of open interactions coupled with the availability of high technology 
increase the possibility of unconventional forms of warfare.237 
As for the high technology which went global, it is important to underline 
terrorist use of cell phones, fax, and the Internet as effective means of 
communication. Yet, it is also true that September 11 perpetrators weaponized box-
cutters into tools of hijacking without using sophisticated high-technology weapons 
such as automatic-rifles or bazookas. This is arguably put forward as the superiority 
of the low-technology tactics or human-agency using crude methods against high-
technology defenses. There is a reality to this argument. However, it seems 
incomplete. It is not only the box-cutters they used that give the impact of the 
attack. It is also the civilian aircrafts that are weaponized into killing machines. 
September 11 would not be a mass-casualty attack without the big airliners crushed 
and exploded. Complementing the picture was their successful deceit in boarding 
the plane, learning how to fly airliners in advance, and from an operational point of 
view, their innovative idea and success in execution to crush aircrafts into towers.  
September 11 was the demonstration of the fact that technology drastically 
empowers educated laymen. It brings forward the violent initiative power of the 
private or non-state entities.238 September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a blunder 
                     
236Laquer, Walter. The New Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.6. 
237Crenshaw, Martha. Terrorism in Context. PA: Pennsylvania University Press; Stern, Jessica. 1999. 
The Ultimate Terrorists. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; Stern, Jessica. 2003. 
Terror in the Name of God-Why Religious Militants Kill NY: HarperCollins. 
238Nevertheless, there is a qualification to be made: not every individual is capable of exerting such an 
influence. Individuals or groups must be educated enough to use technology; for without learning how 
to fly an airliner it was not possible to conduct the attack in the case of September 11. Without such 
education and indeed the technology, human agency is nil. But, education rates of populations and 
schooling around the world increased and gave way to a skill revolution in human capital. There is a 
revolutionary increase in the number of skilled individuals all around the world. As Rosenau underlines, 
not only technology, but also education and skills went global.  
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of the high-technology and low-technology, a mix of inside and outside of the 
national borders, a mix of the national and the international and a conflation of civil 
and military realms along with the complementary factors of spread of education 
and technology. In the jargon of geopolitics, hinterland and heartland conflated 
into each other. Consequently, September 11 demonstrated the notorious dark side 
of globalization.  
The deterritorialization of security in the process of globalization (which 
might be also put as the constant shifting of scales of violence back and forth from 
the national scale to the transnational scale) underwrites the dark side of 
globalization:  
Since September 11th when the World Trade Center was felled by hijacked 
commercial aircraft and a wing of the Pentagon similarly destroyed, and especially 
since October 7th when US retaliation against Afghanistan commenced 
(notwithstanding that none of the hijackers was Afghani), we have been living through 
a further dramatic evolution in the meaning of terrorism. Here too the question of 
conflated scales has been crucial. In one sense, the attack on the World Trade Center 
was strictly local insofar as the affected site itself measures no more than 16 acres. Yet 
this was obviously and equally a global event: the hijackers from several countries led 
multinational lives; victims were of 83 nationalities; the unfolding catastrophe was 
instantaneously broadcast on television screens around the world; the economic, 
political and cultural fallout has been global. It was not, however, a clearly defined 
national event in the moments immediately following the attacks. For all that they 
were on US soil, the targets were symbols of global as much as national economic and 
military power, and such obvious symbols of US national and cultural power as the 
Statue of Liberty, Hollywood and Disneyworld were not targeted. If indeed Osama bin 
Laden and the al Qaeda network are responsible, the perpetrators have no coherent 
national identity either.239 
    
Considered in the light of the question of conflated scales, national defenses 
appear to be clueless about the seemingly civil sources of transnational threats. 
They are clueless because national defenses are mainly configured to work against 
military threats, not against seemingly civil-oriented ones. National defense experts 
speak the language of ‘territory’ while non-territorial threats appear to be all 
Chinese to them. National security is conceptualized against an external threat to 
                                                                
 
239Smith, Neil. “Global Executioner: Scales of Terror”, Social Science Research Council, September 11 
Writings Database http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/nsmith.htm italics added. 
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the state. However, as summarized by Smith, ‘external-internal’ or ‘inside-outside’ 
conflated into each other in most of the terrorist attacks. Hence the reiteration for 
the sake of emphasis: a blunder of the high-technology and low-technology, a mix 
of inside and outside, and national and international, civil and military realms of 
the nation-state-centric approach to International Relations.  
  Following Rosenau, it is then appropriate to ask: ‘Of what is this an 
instance?’ The answer for states appears to be the implication of globalization on 
national security. The implication is mainly the declining -not dying- significance 
of physical distance for states’ channeling and managing their national defense and 
influence. Declining significance of physical distance for territorial defense 
deserves singling out because it has important repercussions for national security 
strategy. Although it is by no means certain that this situation will prevail forever, 
it is likely to be tenable until the return of major conventional wars among states. 
This is so, Brzezinski argues, because unconventional threats come in 
unconventional forms so long as major conventional confrontations are absent and 
leave room for unconventional formations to operate.240  
To elaborate the conflated scales of violence and security under 
globalization, and reflect on the declining (not dying) significance of physical 
distance in nation-states’ ability to manage their national defense and influence, it 
may be useful to further consider territorial defense. Territorial defense is, to be 
sure, not an unconventional form of defense. Yet, it is particularly vulnerable to the 
changing relationship of time and space in the conduct of unconventional and 
illegal forms of violence, namely terrorist operations. In the strictest sense of the 
word, national defense means the protection of a territory against an external 
                     
240Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1993. Out of Control - Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century. Ontario: 
Maxwell Macmillan Canada, Inc, pp. 85-116. 
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enemy. ‘Enemy’ is conceptualized at nation-state level as being a belligerent state 
or adversarial soldiers of an opposing army. After the emergence of the nation-state 
as the main international actor, the military is usually organized at ‘national level’ 
and territorial defense is mainly synonymous with national defense. Confronting 
such an underlying logic of territorial defense, unconventional threats are neither 
territorially-oriented nor nationally-oriented at the unit-level. Such threats do not 
operate on a territorial basis as illustrated by the above-mentioned examples of 
terrorist attacks. Victim-states are intellectually and operationally nation-state-
centric unlike the aggressors. Alternatively put, victim is thinking through nation-
state analytical lenses whereas aggressor takes no strict nation-state template for its 
operational plans. Viewed this way, fighting-templates of the two sides are 
asymmetric.  
 
4.3.4. Time and Space Relationship in Warfare 
Seen from the basic mechanism of conducting military operations, the 
distance between the center (home-base) and the periphery (the theater of 
operation) creates a time-lag. This time-lag originates during the transmission of 
news of the developments on the ground. Sending data entails time. In other words, 
there is a time-lag between when developments taking place in the periphery and 
the generation of commands at the center to be sent back to the periphery. 
Commands move back and forth between center and periphery; however, change in 
the periphery surpasses communication with the center, resulting in the on-the-spot 
decision-making. This was mainly the case with the Western colonies in the 
previous centuries. Nineteenth-century colonial outposts of the British implemented 
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on-the-spot decision-making.241  
In our era, the time-lag is remarkably shortened. This causes the parting of 
time from space. Giddens formulates it as ‘dislocation of space from time’.242To 
demonstrate what is meant, it should be considered how the Roman Empire or the 
Ottoman Empire exercised its authority over a vast geography: Both empires built 
roads and waterborne channel-transport systems to overcome the limiting effects of 
physical distance. Without such artifacts of technology, physical distance placed 
huge limits on central authority to rule. The extent to which empires overcome 
limits of geographical distance through available technology determined their 
imperial life-time. In other words, the capacity to project power is an important 
indication of imperial life-time.  
Limits of geographical distance are steadily overtaken by progress of 
science and technology throughout history. During the Cold War, firing-protocols 
of nuclear submarines (submarines ready to use submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles) of the United States were initially not totally dependent on the decision of 
the center/the president. The decision to launch a nuclear missile was to be advised 
by the commanding officer of the submarine, and a consultation between the center 
and periphery followed. Less-advanced technology of the time back then put 
immense pressure on the head-officer of the submarine to fire nuclear weapons 
even without the approval of the president in a rightly or wrongly perceived count-
down crisis situation. Above-mentioned time-lag was a strategic deficit for the 
country that perceived itself to be under attack. Again, national defense was mostly 
about the technological means and deterritorialization. Today advance-technology 
                     
241Ferguson, Yale H., Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. Remapping Global Politics-History’s Revenge and 
Future Shock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 227-238. 
242Ferguson, Yale H., Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. Remapping Global Politics-History’s Revenge and 
Future Shock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.69. 
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shortened the time- lag between center and periphery with the consequence of 
empowering the center243. This example points to the parting of time from space. 
The once close link between physical distance and time is wearing thin because 
limits of geographical distance are overtaken by progress of science and 
technology. Consequently, deterritorialized forms of threats are the state-of-the-art 
threats of the contemporary era. 
Command and control go through its electronics-age and terrorists take 
advantage of advanced technology, too. Encrypted websites, simple e-mailing and 
mobile phones are among the modern facilities alongside age-old tactics of face-to-
face money and message exchange, informal payment methods of hawala or hundis 
that operate in the absence of legal and juridical surveillance244. Obvious and 
distinctive feature of terrorist groups is that they take their tactical decisions and 
conduct operations without the hindrance of legal systems and supervision of 
states. To the extent deterritorialization means states’ eroding or diminished state 
control over economic transactions and over means of physical violence in their 
sovereign sphere (due to the uncontrolled flow of weapons and money), use of 
high-tech medium and non-technological methods free terrorists from national 
control. To name a few, high-technology such as mobile-phones, pay-phones, fax, 
electronic-banking used by firms and charity associations, satellite communication 
or the Internet; and non-technological or traditional methods of payment such as 
hawala245 are all together means of breaking-free from national control. 
                     
243 To be sure, the will to use such capacity of the center to direct the operations from far away locations 
depend on the decision-makers at the center. They retain two alternatives: to authorize the on-the-spot 
decision-making or control it from the headquarters at the heartland. Nevertheless, the latter alternative 
is enhanced ever more than the previous eras. American forces in Iraq from 2003 onwards, most of the 
time, are not given license to act independently. Different operations in separate districts are connected 
to the main headquarters in Iraq, which is in turn accountable to Pentagon. 
244For the explication of the issue, Aydinli, Ersel. 2006. “From Finances to Transnational Mobility: 
Searching for the Global Jihadists’ Achilles Heel,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18: 301-313. 
245Aydinli, Ersel. 2006. “From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists’ 
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High-technology reduces difficulties emanating from physical distance, and 
reduces the effective control of law enforcement authorities. Master-plan, logistical 
preparations, communication and actual conduct of a terrorist attack are facilitated 
owing to the available technological sophistication and know-how on the side of 
the terrorists. Thus, it is not only the terrorist's seemingly civil outlook or lack of 
uniforms that helps them to operate in disguise, but also it is the reduced need to 
meet in person. With growing availability of technology, terrorists needn’t come 
face-to-face. This is especially the case for Muslims in Europe contacting militants 
in states other than Europe.246The radicalization of Ahmed Omar Sheikh, whose 
parents once expected the Queen of England to knight him, was known to have an 
idyllic life. He was known by his friends and family as ‘the kindest, most gentle 
person that you could meet’. He was remarkably successful at school, the Forest 
School in England. He was the beloved young man for his friends, family and 
professors. However, as Sageman explains his circumstances in detail, he ended up 
being convicted of kidnapping Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl who was 
beheaded. The Ahmed Omar narrative highlights the issues facing those who wish 
to neutralize global terrorism.247 
Successful use of that advantage in the fight against terrorism seems 
questionable248. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the fact that, if rightly applied, 
high-technology reduces difficulties of physical distance, time-lag, and on-the-spot 
decision-making. This may possibly be turned into an advantage for an army. 
                                                                
Achilles Heel,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, p. 302. 
246Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
247Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 3-12. 
248Report on Wilton Park Conference. 2006. WPS06/5 “Towards A Community-Based Approach To 
Counter-Terrorism”  Monday 20-Wednesday 22 March in partnership with Demos and with the support 
of The Home Office (Faith Community Unit); United States Institute for Peace; Economic and Social 
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However, this advantage confronts another difficulty. Since illegal travel or 
mobility of weapons, money and information is widespread, gathering intelligence 
about wherewithal of such materials and terrorists is a highly-dynamic process that 
fluctuates constantly. Although the time-lag of the counter-terrorism operations 
diminished, turning that into an advantage is still difficult. Put bluntly, ‘seek and 
destroy missions’ face difficulties in locating terrorists. Reliable human-
intelligence is crucial to locate and separate them from the innocent civilians. 
However, fast change or fluctuation in the definition of the situation249 originating 
in the conflated scale of the terrorist modus operandi is a big problem. In other 
words, the way authorities perceive the situation they are in is constantly changing. 
Terrorism operates in and through civil society. It basically operates at the 
societal level, not at the state-level. A likely conclusion to be made is that every-
day activities of people who intentionally or unintentionally get involved entail 
surveillance. That is why there is a dilemma between security and freedom: the 
more one of them, the less the other. Without credit-cards, off-shore accounts, the 
Internet traffic and mobile phones, communication would be limited among all 
people including terrorists. Airliners, cruise-ships, fast trains and other 
transportation vehicles enabled the movement of people, including terrorists, to be 
more agile. If tight security is to be applied, nation-states should oversee all these 
interactions. Even if rigid surveillance was possible, it might become self-defeating 
because it limits basic freedoms and values that terrorists want to harm in the first 
place. 
 
 
                     
249Evans, Graham. 1990. The Dictionary of World Politics. NY: Simon & Schuster, p. 82. 
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4.4. How Is The Threat Formed Under Globalization?  
         ‘Psychological Distance’  
 In such a conundrum between security and freedom, how can states 
approach the fight against terrorism and political disagreements within society 
without indulging in any ideological blunder of sorts? How can cooperation against 
terrorism be sustained? The answer may be hidden in the use of the concept of 
psychological distance. Psychological distance is the degree of dissimilarity amidst 
cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, assigning meaning to, and coping with 
the world regardless of geographical distance.250 If psychological distance is high 
among individuals or different segments of the same society, then the probability of 
experiencing misunderstandings and misperceptions becomes high. This causes 
both the possibility and probability of conflict and violence to rise. Then, the 
probability of sustaining an orderly community is low.  
 Perceptions of difference and availability of empathy (two main 
determinants of psychological distance) do not necessarily increase with physical 
distance. People living around the world are geographically dispersed. However, 
advanced communication and transportation helped a big portion of the peoples 
(especially the rich and the middle classes) create “overlapping economic and 
cultural systems”251. Hence, technological change made it possible to obtain 
intimacy among people living far away from each other.  
The enabler of intimacy and friendship or of at least acquaintances among 
people living far away from one another is the result of the parting of time from 
space. People need not come together at a particular location to get to know each 
                     
250 Ferguson, Yale H., Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. Remapping Global Politics-History’s Revenge and 
Future Shock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 69. 
251 For the details of why and how overlapping economic and cultural systems exist, please see 
Christopher Hill, 2007. ‘Bringing War Home: Foreign-Policy Making in Multicultural Societies’, 
International Relations, 21-3, pp. 259-279.  
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other, devise plans or join in a civil or violent activism. Distant geographical 
locations and territory do not axiomatically constitute obstacles that stand in the 
way of communication, psychological sameness or similarities. The high velocity 
and volume of exchange via telephone, fax, satellite phones and video connections, 
television and the Internet (e-mail, blogs, chat rooms, and high exchange of data in 
image, text, audio and video form) help citizens of different societies establish 
psychological affinity or low psychological-distance that equals to thinking and 
acting similarly. Moreover, such technologies enable electronically-based 
seemingly charitable, epistemic or terrorist and criminal communities to make 
common-cause. They also enable people to breed sympathy or animosity towards a 
certain ‘other’. ‘The othering-process’252acquired an enormous platform and 
facilitator in the Internet. 
Communities that are formed through technology regardless of physically 
faraway places are geographically dispersed around the world. Although people’s 
reach to technology are unevenly scattered around the world, those that can access 
to the Internet acquire the opportunity to establish ties with each other: When 
minds meet, politics start to take place simultaneously with no regard to vicinity or 
geographical proximity. Thus, psychological affinity is independent from vicinity 
or geographical proximity, and electronic highway or cyberspace is the on-line or 
virtual roads where people can meet. The communication of masses via 
technological medium is among the points of departure for the formation and 
organization of different non-state actors with which states tackle.  
 
 
                     
252Diez, Thomas. 2004. “Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs Volume 17, Number 2. 
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Online communication is the relatively new platform where politics are 
carried out. Accordingly, disinformation, terrorist-propaganda and organization of 
criminal and terrorist operations through mostly encrypted-coding found a new 
platform to become effective against states’ law enforcement and military 
capabilities. Previously, meeting of individuals in the same location was a must to 
coordinate an attack; now, it is relatively easy to organize and coordinate terrorist 
attacks without territorial safe havens. This is especially the case for homegrown or 
domestic terrorism.  
Citizens of any state may make common cause with a transnational 
ideology and may contribute to the cause even without talking to the terrorists in 
person. When similar-minded people reach out to use high-technology for 
communication, the need to be within the sight of one another greatly diminishes. 
This is a corollary to the above-mentioned parting of time from space. It is possible 
via real-time communication and business transactions, TV, mobile-phones, fax, 
Global Positioning System/satellites usage, encrypted and non-encrypted Internet 
websites for communication, planning and propaganda. These are the main 
technological media through which various polities empower themselves to 
communicate, organize, cooperate among each other and co-opt or 
propagandistically clash, disrupt and attack states. The above-mentioned 
technological mediums are among the components of the transnational threat 
formation. 
As of the beginning of the twenty-first century, people are able to devise 
plans among each other without limits of physical distance/territories and facilitate 
their mode of operation. This advantage modifies the age-old obstacles and costs of 
organizing criminal and terrorist attacks. It enables people in faraway locations to 
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make common cause with each other. Anarchists of the past centuries would 
certainly get mesmerized by the technologically advanced means of realizing 
terrorism or realizing ‘propaganda by the deed’. For anarchists, terrorist operations 
and objectives would only get facilitated with the progress in science. 
Unfortunately, time seems to prove them right as of the end of the twentieth-
century. 
Since it is relatively easy to organize and coordinate terrorist attacks 
without territorial safe havens, a different line of defense seems necessary. Simply 
put, the Internet is the online transnational space where any contact among people 
may either result in a clash or cooperation among them against an authority of their 
own choosing including the nation-states. Without any state control, direction or 
manipulation, citizens of different countries are empowered to choose which 
information to accept and use, get self-taught on a subject, set goals, organize, and 
conduct propaganda and counter-propaganda253. This is the crucial enabler of the 
Al-Qaeda social movement whereby citizens of any state decides to support Al-
Qaeda’s goals without contacting the Al-Qaeda Central254. In that vein, an 
individual surfing the Internet is a micro actor trying to have a voice in 
international politics albeit seemingly a miniscule one. In hindsight, the seemingly 
miniscule role may prove to be a grave threat when preparations of the September 
11 attacks are considered255. Globalization appears to be empowering violent 
individuals. 
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At the other side of the fence, although people around the world may come 
close psychologically or they may come to have similar leanings, this is not 
unconditional: Socio-economic processes arguably determine the probability of 
establishing affinity among people. As Marc Sageman explicates in detail, 
establishment of affinity or accepting a common cause entails socio-economic 
commonalities. Socio-economic commonality is necessary for low degree of 
dissimilarity amidst cognitive frameworks of people. 
Socio-economic commonality (that may arguably be seen as a necessary, 
but not a sufficient cause for establishing psychological affinity or making 
common-cause) demonstrates itself in common tastes, norms or walks of life. For 
instance, tastes and norms of urban populations who are integrated in the global 
economy have little in common with poorer underclass that is bereft of contact with 
the global economic market and due job opportunities. The better-off people in 
Caracas, Karachi, Istanbul, Berlin, Tokyo, Milan, Singapore or New York -though 
living in distant places from each other- can come to have relative intimacy and get 
on well with each other. Another example is China where political and social 
tensions arise between modernizing and entrepreneurial elite in coastal cities such 
as Shanghai and the rest of the society which is still overwhelmingly agrarian or 
not-fully modernized. In the United States, heartland states of the country are 
socio-economically different from the coastal ones. This is even demonstrated in 
most elections, coastal states of the US mostly voting for Democrats while the 
inner states preferring Republicans; the same goes for the March 29, 2009 Turkish 
local elections. Put differently, a certain community of a country may be 
experiencing the modern era and its due social institutions (norms and way of life 
among individuals) while simultaneously another community of the same country 
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may be following pre-modern or feudal-like mind-maps and institutions. Still 
another portion of that country may be going through a mixture of both contexts, 
constituting a transition from one to another. One may consider the contrasting 
snapshots of Hong Kong and the rest of China. Alternatively, the contrast between 
tribes’ feudal way of life in eastern and southeastern Anatolia and the walk of life 
in Western Anatolia makes the point. Tribal life in eastern and southeastern 
Anatolia is shaped by kinship relations. Feudal-tribal social norms and institutions 
still overwhelmingly reign despite the repercussions of globalization such as in-
flow of different ideas, life styles and economic trajectories upon this region. Blood 
feuds continue to take place. Today, most of the societies are torn between 
parochialism and globalism and between their respective values. Torn between 
these trends, societies go through a transition that portrays unique blends of the 
traditional and the modern. By way of example, psychological distance may 
arguably be high between New Yorkers and the inhabitants of a rural American 
county, while rural Americans may get on better with some of the rural or middle 
class Turks.  
To sum up, people living face to face in cities may be psychologically 
remote from each other owing to age, education and income level. In contrast, 
people living in different parts of the world having similar characteristics may feel 
psychologically close. This is part of the main underlying logic of what Rosenau 
calls distant proximities.256When people make a common-cause, and especially 
when they come together against a government, it does not seem untenable to 
assume that they have common motivations owing to the low psychological 
distance among them. Arab-Israeli conflict, the conflict in Afghanistan, Iraqi 
                     
256Rosenau, James N. 2003. Distant Proximities-Dynamics beyond Globalization New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
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inferno or the September 11 attacks all create different kind of affinities among 
people living away from each other.257 People have different interpretations of 
ethics, customs, law or religion. The point is that common values, lifestyles and 
philosophies in giving meaning to life may create affinity, liking and even 
attraction in several facets of life such as politics, religion, trade, art, science or 
sports. Therefore, formation of affinity becomes crucial in understanding the nature 
of lasting transnational ideologies such as jihadist militant Islam, or neoliberalism 
for that matter. Psychological distance is a term that helps avoid ideological 
argumentations in analysis and facilitate understanding of how transnational groups 
come into being. Formation of affinity among people or the concept of 
psychological distance has very important implications for understanding the 
structure of transnational terrorism in that it has direct relevance for national 
security today.  
 
4.5. Political Space and Transnationality  
Having defined psychological distance, another definition of globalization 
is proposed involving transnationality: Globalization is the process of alteration in 
psychological distance occurring independently from physical distance, which 
paves the way for alternative polities to emerge and their respective political 
domains/spaces to rise all around the world. This definition builds and improves 
on the deterritorialization of international politics. Whatever definition of 
globalization is put on the front burner, one common feature of all such definitions 
should emphasize non-territorial aspects of politics. The definition above 
invigoratingly points to the emergence of deterritorialized ‘political spaces’ that 
                     
257Sluglett, Peter 1982. “The Review- Rubin, Barry. The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict”, 
International Affairs Vol. 58, No. 4 Autumn, pp. 709-710. 
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both overlap and clash. The concept of psychological distance is intertwined with 
the concept of political space in that the former gives way to the latter.   
It is essential to clarify the concept of political space. The confusion of 
territory with political space has arguably caused limitations in recognizing change 
in world politics. Political space is the extent of a polity's political (not physical) 
domain. Political space refers to the ways identities and loyalties are distributed. 
In that regard, territory is just one of the manifestations of political space. Territory 
is the physical marker or indication around which certain loyalties and identities 
gather. Therefore, a territorial political space is formed by people within the 
boundaries of a certain territory. Identities and loyalties are focused upon a 
landmass and upon the cultural body mainly situated within that landmass. 
However, not all political spaces focus upon a delimited territory or land.  In other 
words, territory is not the only way of profiling political space. Spaces of authority 
or ‘domains of the political’ needn’t be territorially defined. For example, 
transnational terrorism, especially the Al Qaeda-type of it, exemplifies a non-
territorial form of a polity. Its political space is not territorial. Its ideology has a 
purportedly universal ideological claim that is argued to be applicable everywhere. 
Similarly, mechanisms and transactions of market economy and finance-capital are 
most of the time freed from territory. Transnational corporations are not 
operationally enclustered within a territorial political space. Their economic and 
political playground is mostly non-territorial. They are beyond borders and operate 
across the territorial political spaces of nation-states. 
‘Territory’ is a concept that denotes a demarcated land attached to a 
political unit, namely the state as institutionalized bodies of political organization. 
Otherwise, without a political organization attached, it is merely land. As such, 
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every nation-state has a dominant ideology and set of values to which it anticipates 
loyalty from its citizens. Territory draws the borders of that anticipation. However, 
not all citizens may recognize the values of a particular nation-state. Certain 
portions of a society may come to develop their own loyalties and identities. Thus, 
even where political space is territorial, that is to say even in the political space of a 
nation-state, there may also be other clusters of identities and loyalties or political 
spaces different from that of the nation-state in question: Nation-states’ political 
spaces are both co-inhabited and rivaled by other identity groups and loyalties. In 
other words, different political spaces may coexist within the same specific 
territory of a nation-state.  
People may join polities other than those of nation-states. This may not be 
in a legal framework as in the case of citizenship. Yet, citizens may develop 
different loyalties while keeping their citizenship. Loyalty to the nation-state and 
acceptance of the identity or the formal socio-political ideology of the state do not 
seem to be automatically forthcoming. Citizens, while living in their homeland, 
may choose to refuse social, political, cultural or economic status quo that they 
experience. Although they may inhabit the same geographical location with their 
fellow citizens, some of them can choose to be loyal to different authorities and pay 
loyalty or allegiance to different ideological groups. Accordingly, different political 
spaces or identity/loyalty groups may exist side by side within the same society. 
This is how terrorism is both inside and outside and across nation-states or most 
appropriately how terrorism becomes ‘transnational’.  
How do different groups of people who have different identities and 
loyalties co-exist side by side and yet at the same time contact transnationally? This 
is possible due to globalization that provides people suitable conditions under 
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which they define and redefine their sense of belonging and identity independently 
from physical distance. The process of globalization (or the high velocity and 
volume of people, goods, capital, information, ideas, and weapons moving across 
borders) changes policies of states, the way people think about those policies, and 
the way they behave and react to developments in much shorter a time span than is 
the case in previous eras. Significantly, globalization affects and gradually changes 
the way people define and redefine their sense of belonging and identity 
independently from physical distance. Hence, groupings and regroupings of 
citizens or new polities are continuously shaped and reshaped under the multitude 
impacts of the process of globalization. 
Under the empowering conditions of globalization, especially via 
information technology (IT) and media, they may develop loyalties to a variety of 
authorities. Citizens may contemplate, consider, devise, propagate and activate 
novel allegiances. Since the borders of the mind are not necessarily physically-
bounded or geographically-oriented, these allegiances may transgress national 
borders. Examples to disparate groups that constitute political spaces other than 
that of nation-states abound. Feminists conceptualize political space along gender 
lines. Marxists think of it in terms of class. Nationalists organize their 
understanding of polity as nation and see their loyalties via ethnicity or legal 
citizenship. Indian tradition sees it through caste-system. The Communist 
International in the past was another polity operating beyond the national borders. 
Religious extremists in general organize various polities and show devotion to 
particular authorities with reference to a peculiar interpretation of a religion, sect or 
cult. By and large, these and other possible categories of identity are non-territorial 
and point to other possibilities of political space that are already in effect.  
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Gender, class, caste, ethnicity, religion or sects denote units of analysis. 
They are also identity-markers which define and point to separate loyalties or social 
glues. Different loyalties and social glues form different political spaces. 
Regardless of the fact that they have established themselves into nation-states or 
not, they exist and have authority and autonomy to certain extent. The challenge for 
each of these contending political spaces is to prevail over the others, including the 
ones that have established themselves into a nation-state formation. More often 
than not, states try to contain, suppress or co-opt them when they present threats to 
the citizenry and political survival of a regime. This process of containment or co-
option is itself a gradual process of change for better or worse. Nation-state values 
are not necessarily constant or unchanging. They also change, but they do so slowly 
in the long haul seen from the historical continuum. States try to protect their 
establishing principles and values to the extent possible. Such protection is a matter 
of survival because it comes down to national unity both sociologically and 
territorially. Although rival political spaces do not always manifest themselves 
physically or violently, they are existential threats for states when they are 
perceived to be disturbing the prospects of political survival. 
State values and its political space thereof are regarded as psychologically 
distant by other political spaces that comprise rival values and loyalties. However, 
it is not easy for states to single out and target an adversarial polity since people 
have several identities and loyalties, and work through different political spaces 
that overlap. In a democratic system that operates under the rule of law, it is not 
easy for states to isolate the persons that are believed to be endangering the well-
being of the general population or political survival of the state. The dilemma 
confronting democratic states in fighting terrorism is that the more security 
238 
 
precautions take place, the more basic freedoms of individuals are likely to be 
hurt.258 In an atmosphere of overlapping political spaces -that is in a context of 
overlapping identities and loyalties- it is not easy to figure out whom active and 
passive terrorists are.  
 
4.6. The Rise of the Global Middle Class 
The rise of non-national entities accelerates with the end of the Cold War. 
New entities or polities gradually become more assertive after the end of the Cold 
War in parallel to the rise of societal elements in politics. This appears to have a 
strong correlation with the rise of the global middle class.259 According to Clark S. 
Judge, rising middle classes of the world are far more important than the global 
corporations, fall of communism in USSR and the rise of markets all around the 
world. From Europe to the Middle East to Asia and Latin America and also in 
Africa, new classes are rising. Where local societies are rigid and local elites are 
entrenched, these rising classes are disturbing to established ways. They are 
shopkeepers, the small craftsman, the local manufacturer or people with mostly 
similar jobs. Judge argues that these people, more than other people in their 
societies, are likely to be breaking away from the restrictive past. They are reaching 
out to a future open to ambition and innovation. That is why new parties, whose 
support-base comes from mainly this kind of people, obtain power and govern 
many countries.  
Such societies come to have new kind of elites reflecting the values of the 
new rising middle class. However, not all trade and business transactions of these 
                     
258For a proposal of getting out of this dilemma, Müllerson. Rein. 2005. “Being Tough on Terrorism or 
Respecting Human Rights: A False Dilemma of Authoritarian and Liberal Responses”, American 
Behavioral Scientist, Vol.48, No.12 August pp. 1626-1656. 
259Judge, Clark S. 2002. ‘Hegemony of the Heart: American cultural power and its enemies’, Policy 
Review, December-January, p. 9.  
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classes are within the law, resulting in corruption. Clark Judge sees them as 
political and social phenomena that suggest ‘a titanic tide of human ambition and 
intellectual and financial power pounding at the ancient walls of Third World social 
structures’.260 He goes on to argue that “the rise of the middle classes in almost all 
around the world suggests an entrepreneurial revolution that has transformed the 
US economy, society and politics in the past. Since 1970s, the American 
intellectual and financial entrepreneurship has a global counterpart scattered over 
the world”.261 According to Seymour Martin Lipset, the rise of the global middle 
classes originate in the decline of the national working classes and the increase of 
middle-class numbers, the availability of advanced education, growing productivity 
and political consciousness that has diminished the lifestyle differences in the 
society, the decline of unionism, the rise of knowledge and service industries and 
the growing appeal to young people of self-employment and entrepreneurship.262 
This is an important change that has policy-implications. In response to 
such change, states are forced to adapt gradual transformation of its past values. 
Then, globalization should not be seen as an external threat to states, which remain 
intact and never changing. Globalization affects all actors including the 
relationships of authority within states. On the one hand, authority of nation-state is 
illegally challenged by terrorist groups, and on the other hand, it is legally 
challenged by non-governmental organizations, interest groups of economic and 
ideological origin and by the above-mentioned middle classes that deny the status 
quo in the society. Moreover, political parties with their different ideological 
                     
260Judge, Clark S. 2002. ‘Hegemony of the Heart: American cultural power and its enemies’, Policy 
Review, December-January, pp. 10-12.  
261Judge, Clark S. 2002. ‘Hegemony of the Heart: American cultural power and its enemies’, Policy 
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agenda continuously try to shape society through democratic politics. Thus, taking 
globalization as an external factor that impacts upon the nation-state may inhibit 
studying its different dimensions. The debate on whether to expand the definition 
of ‘security’ to include the issues of identity becomes related to the political 
security of states at this juncture. As states inevitably deal with such issues so as to 
protect their authority and internal stability, the effects of globalization becomes 
internal. 
The erosion of states’ role in providing security means a decline in its 
economic and coercive capacity. The erosion has become obvious after the end of 
the Cold War. During the Cold War, politics and security were perceived as highly 
nation-state-centric and military-oriented owing to the existence of two blocs that 
vie for world-domination. The aftermath of the Cold War liberalized the issues 
which were sidelined previously because existential problems relatively lessened in 
imminence and external military threats to the political survival of states 
diminished. Internal problems came to surface in the absence of external threats 
that had unifying effects upon the different perspectives within societies. 
It is important to bear in mind that while states clash or cooperate with these 
above-mentioned political spaces and polities, they themselves go under a process 
of change owing to this particular clash. States sometimes opt to cooperate or 
reconcile with these polities. Clash is not the standard reaction that every state 
gives to non-state and non-national polities and authorities: Some states choose not 
to clash with transnational companies or rising segments of the civil society. They 
establish some sort of rapprochement or compromise with them, and through 
compromises they try to achieve their goals of economic and political survival. 
Different institutions inside the state react differently to the developments caused 
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by globalization: This alone shows that not only external political environment of 
the nation-state, but its internal politics is also changing. Put differently, not only 
the context within which state operates change, but state itself is also transforming 
as it adapts to change.   
How does a society get political? The adherents of different polities can 
occupy the same geographical location where distinct identities and allegiances 
overlap and clash. Those identity categories which develop sufficient informal 
capacity to mobilize their followers become polities with a certain authority over 
their proponents. This is the case with Islamism. Mostly as a source of blind or 
unquestioning devotion to a particular conception of umma and sharia where God 
is presumed to be the legislator, Islamism as an ideology and activism (not Islam as 
a religion) provides an alternative to citizenship and to the rule of law of the secular 
democratic state in its Western image. Those who claim to act and issue orders in 
the name of God strive to have authority over people.263 When they obtain 
allegiance and loyalty of a certain mass, they start to become political especially if 
they also acquire financial power. These are the general characteristics of the 
politicization of religion in any part of the world.264 
When some declarations of Islamists are taken into consideration, it does 
not seem hard to understand why governments perceive a threat. As an alternative 
and challenging form of political regime and polity to the Western secular 
democracy as it is came to be perceived by the Western nation-states, Islamism in 
its violent or so-called civil manifestations are held to be imposing its preferences 
on the generic state structure and on other fellow countrymen who do not agree 
                     
263Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God-Why Religious Militants Kill NY: HarperCollins, 
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with its idiosyncratic tenets. Intolerance of 'difference' and undemocratic attitudes 
create difficulties for states in sustaining democratic political order. Therefore, 
disagreements among different political spaces and polities may be seen as 
increasing psychological distances among people, 265and indeed at the extreme 
cases, such distances may become the harbinger of violence.  
 
4.7. Transnationality as Overlapping Political Spaces 
The political spaces of polities other than nation-states (such as 
nongovernmental institutions, transnational corporations or terrorist groups) need 
not be entirely territorial. Roughly, this makes them transnational and that is where 
transnational relations come in: The adherents of different polities and political 
spaces can occupy the same geographical location where distinct identities and 
allegiances both overlap and clash. This seems possible because political space is 
the mental map of a group that can coexist with other mentalities/political spaces. 
Transnational relations are, then, the political and abstract highways on which 
political spaces both overlap and rival each other. The concept of political space is 
explained in previous sections. Pressing on with that, the enmeshed mobility or the 
activities of the overlapping political spaces can be called transnationality. 
Thereby, ‘transnationality’ is defined in a deterritorialized way at the societal level 
through the term of political space.  
Within this backdrop, nation-states aligning with each other to counter 
terrorism actually try to ameliorate clash of different overlapping political spaces 
within and across their borders. Not only the activities within the borders of State A 
is important for its security, but also the activities taking place within the borders of 
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other nation-state become important for State A due to overlapping political spaces. 
In due course, Europe, the US and Turkey are connected regarding radicalism. This 
is why transnationality defies the inside-outside distinction. 
Importantly, political spaces cannot only be understood as religious or 
cultural groups and labeled as ‘civilizations’ because religions or cultures are not 
the sole determinants of a political space. Religion is not the sole attribute of 
culture or identity. Religions do not determine political spaces on their own, most 
often than not, ideologies and secular doctrines interfere. Interference of ideologies, 
secular or mundane doctrines are inevitable because the bottom line of all ideas and 
interpretations are man-made.266In the final analysis, any doctrine or code is 
inevitably interpreted by human beings. Thus, religion is one of the interpreted 
code of behaviors and rules of a culture while culture refers to all physical and 
ideational products of a given society. Furthermore, religions and cultures are not 
unchanging monolith sociological structures.267They are under continuous impact 
of other factors such as education, everyday social learning, politics, use of force, 
economics, migration, and various disparate worldviews propagated through mass 
media and the Internet. Globalization is the contact of all political spaces as 
different mental clusters of worldviews, identities and loyalties that overlap with 
one another everywhere in the world. This enmeshed mobility of physical and 
ideational products within the world-wide amalgam of overlapping political spaces 
can be called transnationality. 
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4.8. Diffusion of Authority and Power as the Impact of Globalization on   
Sovereignty and the International State-System 
The men who intellectually invented the modern-state, more than any other 
cornerstone figure, were Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli.268 For centuries, one of 
the most important functions of the state was to wage war. This was very well 
elaborated by Charles Tilly who examined political, social, and technological 
change in Europe from the Middle Ages to the present. Charles Tilly, who 
attempted to explain the huge success of the nation-state as the dominant polity in 
international politics, explained state-formation as “War Makes States and Vice 
Versa”.269 According to his theory explicated in a prolific literature of his own, 
military innovation, gunpowder and mass armies in pre-modern Europe made war 
extremely expensive, and only states with a sufficient amount of capital and a large 
population could afford paying for their security and ultimately survive in the 
hostile environment of international anarchy or the non-existence of a supra-
sovereign above nation-states.  
In a nutshell, institutions of the modern state (such as taxes) were created to 
allow war-making. If the need to wage war did not exist, as the argument goes, the 
centralization of power in the hands of the great monarchs and later-day leaders 
would be hard to accomplish. If the need to wage war did not exist, as Tilly and van 
Creveld argue, the development of bureaucracy, taxation or services such as 
education and health would be much slower. In one way or another, the gist of their 
arguments converged at one point: all these state services were created to make 
                     
268The Leviathan and his other seminal writings can be shown to have created the state on philosophical 
and theoretical grounds.  
269Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol eds. 1985. Bringing the State Back In Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; “Sweden, the First Modern State: Tilly's Assertion, ‘War Makes States, and Vice 
Versa’ ”. 
245 
 
citizens more able and willing to fight wars for their state. Therefore, it seems 
tenable to argue that throughout history, war and the possibility of war in several 
forms enabled political organizations such as city-states, empires, and then nation-
states to control and regulate almost everything whether it is of economic, military 
or social matters. For instance, the Bank of England as the first institution of its 
kind emerged as the means to wage war against Louis XIV.270 This was especially 
the case for nation-states in the aftermath of the Westphalia Treaties of 1648.271The 
need to wage and prepare for war caused the centralization of power in the hands of 
monarchs, ministers or presidents. 
The centralization of power has been greatly enhanced by the French 
Revolution and by the accompanying nationalist international ideological wave that 
has resonated across the world. The authority and power of ‘nation-state’ 
dramatically increased as levée en masse272 was emulated by all states in time. In 
parallel to French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars’ application of levée en masse, 
nationalism came to be fostered by both nation-state authorities and intellectuals 
such as Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, and Hegel who saw the state as a unifying factor. 
Nation-states acquired a great authority over the control of almost all aspects of life 
within their territories.  
 
 
                     
270Van Creveld, Martin. 1991. The Transformation of War, New York: Free Press, P.3. 
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Most important of all was the nation-state capacity and legitimacy to wage 
war for which other institutions worked. Early in the nineteenth century, first 
modern income taxes were again the product of war. So were the legal tender and 
the greenback. The abandonment of the Gold Standard in 1914 or the Bolshevik 
Revolution (as an attempt to assure total state control over economy and create a 
strong nation vis-à-vis its neighbors) would not be realized in the way they did, had 
it not been for the need of state to mobilize its resources to wage war against its 
neighbors. 
Till 1945, the centralization of authority (legitimacy) and power (capability) 
at the hands of the civil and military bureaucratic apparatus and governments had 
already become common international practice. Nation-states, though with 
dissimilar capabilities, enjoyed considerable authority over economic, social, 
cultural, political and military affairs. However, states’ authority over these realms 
evolved to scatter or diffuse particularly during the second half of the twentieth-
century. The orthodox forms of economic and political organization started to be 
discredited gradually, and a transformation in these forms took place due to 
globalization of economy, technology and the spread of cosmopolitan ideas.273  
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the search for new forms of 
political and economic organization is still on.274 Nation-states, as the resiliently 
first and foremost polities in international relations, are in the process of adaptation 
to the ongoing diffusion of authority and power among different kinds of entities. 
Seen in historical continuum, states are still powerful actors. Yet, their authority 
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and autonomy appears less by comparison to earlier eras. Their authority just 
seems less, yet it is not lessened: The authority of states is not reduced; it 
apparently fakes observers owing to the amplified or broadened total realm of 
political authority to include several power-foci other than nation-states. In other 
words, the political clout of non-state entities increased relative to that of nation-
states; but, in the absolute sense, nation-state is still the formidable actor.  
The factor that gave way to the amplification of the political realm to 
present relative gains for non-state entities is the waning of major war among most 
developed nation-states, which is also named in the literature as the leading power 
peace argument by prominent scholars.275 
Waning of major war or a gradual decline in frequency of conventional war 
paves the way for the enlargement of political space to include non-state entities 
into the power-play of international relations. Where major conventional powers 
clash in major battles, non-state entities would not be as significant as is the case 
today, for in that case they would succumb or surrender to major powers that use 
extensive force in the event of a conventional war much like the times of the World 
Wars. Alternatively put, if major states continued to make war with each other as is 
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the case before the second half of the twentieth century, non-state formations could 
not find much room to flourish owing to the nation-state domination of the conflict 
environment in its entirety.  
The reason why waning of major war occurs, and in turn creates a 
permissive cause for non-state entities to have political clout is principally the 
diffusion of authority and power world over. The diffusion of authority and power 
can briefly be put as the process of spreading power-resources such as technology, 
economy and information world over. In addition to the diffusion of authority and 
power around the world as one of the factors that lead to waning of major war, 
several other factors or possible causes of waning of major war exist as explained 
hereafter. 
Since studying waning of major war is also studying the impact of 
globalization on sovereignty, autonomy and authority, it is necessary to clarify 
these former concepts in the first place. It is in the aftermath of this clarification 
that the argument becomes clear: The argument is that the diffusion of power and 
authority is the permissive cause that leads to waning of major war among the 
major powers. I 
t also led to the emergence of new entities such as global terrorist groups. 
Accordingly, the following sections briefly review the concept and practice of 
sovereignty and how authority, autonomy and territoriality (as the constitutive 
elements of state sovereignty) are affected by diffusion of power or the 
globalization of power- resources. 
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Spread of technological prowess and interconnected financial and trade 
markets with global reach is at the core of globalization that diffused power and 
authority.276 Diffusion of authority and power is the result of globalizing economy 
and technology. Globalizing technology and economy means the diffusion of 
power-resources around the world. Then, diffusion of authority and power is the 
diffusion of power-resources around the world, first of which is economic and 
technological advancement.  
When power is diffused and used in ways different from the ways states use 
it, transnational crime and terrorism have become credible threats. Moreover, 
diffusion of power resources such as money and technology enables non-state 
entities to have influence, which questions state sovereignty. In short, globalization 
of power-resources and their transnational usage changes the configuration or 
distribution of power and authority in the world. Power and authority are both 
contested and shared among several entities including non-state ones. Such 
contestation affects state-sovereignty. Then, the question is: How has sovereignty 
been affected? Answering such a question helps explain why the threat of global 
terrorism is hard to deal with, how the threat works and why states find it difficult 
to cooperate against terrorism. Last but not least, answering the question helps 
demonstrate that sovereignty itself may become an obstacle against cooperation 
among states against any transnational threat including that of terrorism. 
 
 
                     
276Kiras, James D. 2001. “Chapter 21: Terrorism and Globalization” in John Baylis & Steve Smith ed. 
Globalization of World Politics Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
250 
 
4.8.1. Sovereignty: The Original Concept 
One of the basic concepts in International Relations is sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is the enabling concept of international politics whereby states 
theoretically assert not only ultimate authority within a distinct territory, but also 
they assert membership of the international community thereby.  
The literature on sovereignty focus on two kinds of it: Internal sovereignty 
and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty refers to a supreme decision-making 
and enforcement authority regarding a particular territory and population. External 
sovereignty refers to the antithesis of internal sovereignty: the absence of a 
supreme international authority, and thus the independence of sovereign states. 
Therefore, the doctrine of state sovereignty leads to the concept of international 
anarchy, non-existence of a supra-sovereign above the state. Lack of a supra-
sovereign above the state originates in the idea of a supreme authority within the 
state. Sovereignty involved the rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified and 
supreme rule within a delimited territory. It was exclusive in so far as no other ruler 
had the right to intervene in the sovereign affairs of other nations; unqualified in 
that within their territories rulers had complete authority over their subjects; and 
supreme in that there was no legal or political authority beyond the state.277 
4.8.2. Sovereignty: The Practice 
In practice, the denial of a supra-sovereign authority beyond the state has 
never meant that sovereign states are free to do as they please. For many, especially 
for weak states, sovereignty -as the legitimate claim to rule- has not always 
empirically translated into effective control within territories. As Krasner asserts, 
                     
277 Evans, Graham. 1990. The Dictionary of World Politics. NY: Simon&Schuster, pp. 369-371. 
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'sovereignty' has for many states been little more than a form of 'organized 
hypocrisy'.278 Thus, the useful characteristic of sovereignty is taken to be the idea 
of formal or legal equality of states. The notion of unlimited absolute sovereignty, 
according to Krasner, was only a convenient fiction throughout the development of 
the modern state system.  
 
Conventional sovereignty assumes a world of autonomous, internationally recognized, 
and well-governed states. Although frequently violated in practice, the fundamental 
rules of conventional sovereignty—recognition of juridically independent territorial 
entities and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states-have rarely been 
challenged in principle. But these rules no longer work, and their inadequacies have 
had deleterious consequences for the strong as well as the weak.279 
 
 
The main inhibitor of a state’s sovereignty comes from its peers, namely 
other nation-states: reciprocal nature of international law, diplomatic and economic 
policies of nation-states limit them on a quid pro quo basis. Alignment policies of 
states (balancing or accommodation policies) undercut the influence of one another 
and arrange the politics among them.  
Still, another factor that circumscribes states’ room of maneuver is the 
influence of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs such as the UN or NATO). In 
addition to IGOs, other non-state actors such as Amnesty International or Green 
Peace, and also transnational corporations and illicit organizations interfere and 
limit state’s room of maneuver to certain extent.280  
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Press. Hobbes, Thomas. 1991. Leviathan. Richard Tuck, ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
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279 Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. “Sharing Sovereignty” International Security Vol. 29, No. 2- Fall p. 85. 
280National Intelligence Council Report. 2007. “Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and 
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4.8.3. Past and Present Status of Sovereignty Elaborated 
Explication of the qualifications to state sovereignty and what has become 
of the Westphalian international order entail browsing the doctrine of sovereignty 
further into the corollary concepts, namely territoriality, authority and autonomy. 
Westphalian constitution of sovereignty and international state-system is marked by 
these three concepts, first of which is territoriality.  
Territoriality refers to the organization of people principally into exclusive 
territorial (political) communities with fixed borders. In this case, political space is 
territorially drawn unlike transnational political spaces that operate at societal level 
devoid of territorial demarcations. Secondly, within the constitution of the 
Westphalian politics, sovereignty means that states and  governments have an 
entitlement to supreme, unqualified and exclusive political and legal authority (the 
right and legitimacy to command and make decisions) within their borders. Finally, 
autonomy refers to independence from external authority whether this is spiritual 
(divine institution such as church or caliphate) or a temporal one (another nation-
state or empire). Autonomy simply means capacity for self-governance.  
The Treaties of Westphalia are held to be marking the beginning of the 
autonomy of the nation-state; hence the anarchic nature of international system 
came into being. However, numerous commentators and scholars argue that a few, 
if any, nation-states are autonomous in the true sense, and that all display 
dependence or penetration to certain extent.281 Autonomy has taken on a much more 
relativistic implication, as a matter of degree rather than absolute. Thus, autonomy 
is no longer used as a substitute for sovereignty but as an alternative criterion. 
                     
281Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. “Sharing Sovereignty-New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States” 
International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 85–120; Lupidoth, Ruth. 1992. “Sovereignty in Transition” 
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While the concept of sovereignty excludes all but nation-states, the concept of 
autonomy might arguably include any entity which is not completely controlled by 
another.282  
Different from autonomy but still within this scheme, authority is the person 
or institution which legitimizes acts or commands. It can also be differentiated from 
power which indicates capacity rather than right. Although used interchangeably 
with power, authority has a nuance: Authority is about common acceptance of the 
right to judge and to make decisions. It is about perceiving an institution or person 
as having the right to judge and legitimize. As such it is mostly about legitimacy. 
What of now? What has happened to state sovereignty, state autonomy and 
territoriality, or, what has become of the Westphalian order? Our era might be 
viewed as a Westphalian state of affairs relativized by the diffusion of power, 
authority and autonomy.283 It witnesses a gradual transformation of state 
sovereignty.284 The sovereignty and authority of national governments, which is 
entitlement of states to rule within their own territorial space, is being both 
challenged outright and co-opted; thus being transformed without being 
disappearing. Today as of 2009, sovereignty varies or alternates along the spectrum 
between statism/etatism and globalism or between self-government and the 
interplay of several actors (nation-states and non-state entities) that does not 
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necessarily take place within a legal framework. Autonomy (capacity for self-
governance) today is increasingly seen as a matter of metrics or degree. Autonomy 
can be regarded as the contestation and shared exercise of authority (right or 
legitimacy sought from followers) among national, regional and global entities. 
Both terrorist organizations and nation-states vie for loyalty of people. 
State-sovereignty is not in decline however, it is being transformed because 
non-state actors dilute and gradually exploit nation-states’ autonomy and authority. 
In due course, however, nation-states are not alone in politics but rather they are 
locked into a system of several entities or foci of power. Put differently, nation-
states are not the sole players that have autonomy and authority in the world: 
Nation-states are an important part of the multitude of actors that internationally 
and transnationally engage each other in managing and determining international 
developments.  
Institutional and non-violent power bargaining through diplomacy or violent 
power-bargaining through armed conflicts over the management of international 
affairs involves both nation-states and non-state entities. It is also important to note 
that nation-states have the advantage of asserting their sovereignty as a legal claim 
to supreme power. They have legal authority or the upper hand of deciding upon 
the legality of political acts, including those acts labeled as terrorism.  
Yet, nation-states are challenged by IGOs, NGOs and by financial or 
terrorist groups in both decision-making and implementation of their foreign 
policies. Increasing number of people around the world contest the authority of 
nation-states regarding terrorism. Thus, state autonomy and authority are being 
challenged.  
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Terrorist claim to authority exists to the extent that they influence state 
decision-making and to the extent they manage to sustain their mass of followers. 
Since they have followers or constituencies, they have authority albeit an illegal 
one. In lieu with these points, actor-ness is debated as to whether it comprises, via 
Rosenau, both sovereign-actors (nation-states) and sovereignty-free actors (non-
state entities).285 Transnational corporations, transnational criminal networks, 
transnational terrorist groups and non-governmental organizations can be lumped 
together as sovereignty-free actors. If the concept of being autonomous is taken to 
be referring any entity that is not wholly controlled by another, they seem to be fit 
to be regarded as actors that feed into politics. Consequently, actor-ness may 
arguably be conceptualized to include deterritorialized entities.  
In the light of the real-world developments discussed in Chapter One, the 
traditional actorness criterion of possessing territory purportedly does not appear to 
be a sine qua non anymore for it seems hard to deny the existence of 
deterritorialized sovereignty-free entities that have some influence over nation-
states to the extent they force nation-states to change policies. Such a denial 
exacerbates explaining the influence of non-state entities over nation-states. It is at 
least not easy to deny the non-state influence over states.  
For instance, Spanish government’s decision to withdraw its troops from 
Iraq in the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 Madrid bombings indicates the non-
state influence upon governments. World-wide economic and financial crises are 
out of the control of governments, too. Transnational corporations are focus of 
attraction for states to get wealthier. Transnational corporations are vital to obtain 
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investment, employment and market credibility opportunities. States pass laws to 
obtain such opportunities. More significantly from a security perspective, overall 
change in American foreign policy in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks is 
another indication of non-state political clout.286  
Transnational Corporation (TNC) is arguably another candidate entity that 
vies for actor-ness: As pointed-out above, nation-states try to attract investments 
and bargain with TNCs. Indeed, states pass laws in order to prepare the conditions 
that transnational corporations demand.287 Transnational mafia is yet another 
power-focus, though it is illicit.288 It has autonomy on its own simply because states 
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cannot annihilate or control them effectively. Black markets are transnational 
economic mechanisms from which crime syndicates, mafia and terrorists are fed. 
Since states cannot always control (that is stop or reduce) or manipulate their 
operations effectively, activities of crime and mafia organizations translate into 
illicit authority and autonomy to some extent.289 
Leaving aside the debate whether non-state entities can be named as 
‘actors’, what is important for the distribution of power and authority in the world 
is that there are several formations that challenge nation-states.290 To be sure, 
states are resiliently important actors owing to their sphere of influence over other 
entities. But they are frequently challenged or forced to share their autonomies 
(their capacity for self-governance) and authorities (their acceptance and legitimacy 
to rule over lands and people).291 As a result of non-state challenges and threats, the 
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world-wide diffusion of authority and power scrolls down to non-state market, 
illicit and moral authorities that contest states' authority and autonomy to varying 
degrees.  
The contestation of politics became increasingly visible in the post-Cold 
War period. The contestation of power accelerates due to the above-mentioned 
diffusion of authority across the world. It is the diffusion of authority and the 
challenge of non-state entities that matter about international cooperation among 
nation-states. In the very first place, the need of nation-states to cooperate and align 
against terrorism arises out of the existence of non-state challenges.  
Secondly, non-state challenges are significant in that they shuffle 
cooperation and alignment dynamics of nation-states. As detailed in the following 
pages and chapters, actors and issue-linkages of foreign and security policy 
increased in number and the geopolitical arena became more complicated when 
compared to the Cold War era during which non-state entities could not act rather 
independently from states. The political playground was mainly of nation-states, 
and it was not fertile for taking action without the control of states.  
Particularly after the end of the Cold War, non-state entities grew stronger 
and found a fertile ground to operate. This was possible because superpowers’ 
control over conflicts in their peripheries faded away and unchecked world-wide 
spread of power-resources such as economy, technology and weapons enabled 
wanton destruction by terrorist groups without clear sponsorship of nation-states.  
What does that diffusion lead to? It causes the concept of international 
anarchy to include non-state entities: For many states, and especially for weak 
states or for less than major ones, sovereignty -as the legitimate claim to rule- has 
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not always empirically translated into effective control within territories. All states 
have been open to penetration and influence from other states to certain extent. 
Today not only states penetrate and influence each other, but non-state entities 
penetrate and challenge states as well. Sovereignty has not been supreme in 
practice; it is less so in the twenty-first century. That is why presidents or prime 
ministers make declarations about the domestic politics of other nations. That is 
equally why terrorists announce their demands with regard to state policies. In the 
twenty-first century, domestic and foreign policies of any state are permeable and 
penetrable or yields to passage to certain degree.  
 Nation-states face a formidable generic problem: Nation-states have to 
fight several non-state entities in different interlinked issue-areas all at once. 
Inclusion of problems such as coordinated terrorist and mafia actions, border 
security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into the traditional agenda of 
energy conflicts and regional rivalries complicated geopolitics. This complication 
has important implications upon the international state-system. In order to 
understand those implications such as the nature of contemporary threats and the 
states’ policy-responses, the backdrop of the wider political landscape should be 
clear. Contemporary political landscape is especially contextual regarding the 
general status of power, authority and autonomy at world large with implications 
for states’ cooperation and alignments.  
Big-picture of the world political landscape presents that power diffused 
into non-state mechanisms. Law-enforcement, financial surveillance, intelligence 
and military operations are carried out inter-nationally at the nation-state level, 
whereas non-state operations mainly work trans-nationally at the societal level. 
The big picture also includes intergovernmental organizations such as the North 
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (the UN) that 
pressure states to follow certain norms and legal procedures. Admittedly, 
international organizations are composed of states without which enforcement of 
resolutions is nil. Nation-states enable international anarchy by rejecting any 
overarching authority above them including the authority of intergovernmental 
organizations. Although intergovernmental organizations are not all-powerful to 
enforce states, there is a fine line: In spite of the fact that intergovernmental bodies 
are state-controlled to an important extent, states’ control of institutions is not 
absolute. Such institutions are not always controlled by major states due to their 
institutional operating-codes and norm-making role. To the extent they are 
institutionalized, they become rule-based and thereby question the states’ volition 
to act as they please.  
Such influence of institutions is strongly felt, particularly regarding matters 
of legitimacy. The fact that international legitimacy is significant is demonstrated 
by the attack against Iraq in 2003.292Both before and after the Iraq war, the US had 
difficulty in acquiring legitimacy and the UN mandate. Its hardship with regard to 
curtailing negative international public opinion or acquiring cooperation of other 
states about Iraqi intervention, sustaining law and order and nation-building in 
post-war Iraq were testimonies to the importance of acquiring international 
legitimacy mainly given by states through the use of international institutions. 
Thus, institutions are not totally out of cooperative context even from a realist 
perspective. They still matter as instruments of bargaining and soft-tools of 
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restraint. As such, they partially constitute the debate on ‘soft-balancing’ in alliance 
politics.293 
In sum, authority and power in world politics is diffused: nation-states are 
circumscribed by international organizations, transnational corporations, criminal 
and mafia networks, nongovernmental organizations and terrorist groups. The 
reverse is also true, nation-states are in a constant contest against these entities; 
they are fighting back. Indeed, all these above-mentioned entities including nation-
states form different combinations of alignments among each other. The war or 
fight against terrorism cannot completely ignore the alignments taking place within 
this scheme of entities for the sake of parsimony. If such alignments among 
different kinds of entities are ignored altogether, theoretical lenses would be 
crippled in matching real-world developments taking place especially after the 
Cold War.294 
 
4.8.4. Globalization and Trade-offs in Policy-Making 
The ways in which nation-states exercise their autonomy and power seem to 
go through a structurally forced-upon transformation or adaptation to the 
contemporary strategic environment. The need for adaptation originates from two 
fundamental developments: increase in the number of autonomous players and the 
inextricably linked issue-areas that present trade-off among policies.  
As for the former, adaptation of states to the strategic environment is forced 
by the existence of inextricably linked foci-of-power, each of which contributes to 
a variety of threat and counter/policy permutations. Transnationally active 
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262 
 
corporations, sovereign funds of states, individual financial actors, criminal and 
terrorist organizations are fed by licit economic markets and illicit black markets of 
finance and weapons smuggling. Having information-technology facilitated 
communication and travel alongside spread of black markets of finance, small 
weapons and CBRN weapons, violent non-state entities are served a terrorist-
friendly environment. The terrorist-friendly environment forces nation-states to 
adapt and transform accordingly.  
Such an environment enables sovereignty-free non-state entities to exercise 
power in a way different from that of states. That is particularly why adaptation of 
states to this environment loaded with several power-foci and interlinked issue-
areas is taking place so long as states contact and transact with other entities. 
Contacts among entities are on interlinked issue-areas such as law enforcement, 
border security, law, human intelligence, intelligence gathering and sharing, 
financial surveillance, economic transactions and use of force. In the global 
interconnectedness of our day, states inevitably contact with each other on these 
interwoven issues.  
Since autarky or full self-sufficiency is next to impossible in a world of 
limited resources, twenty-first century existence of a web of interconnecting 
authorities is forcing actors to contact among each other. This seems inevitable as if 
caught in a fish-net. Such an environment is similar to interdependence in that all 
actors are affected by others’ policies that aim to constrain or permit. However, it 
goes beyond interdependence because the political playground is also full of non-
state entities that are not bounded by international rules and norms.  Non-state 
entities do not have addresses to locate and retaliate at or to apply legal retribution. 
Since they are not accountable to their transnational constituency and lack 
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sovereignty, territoriality and a national constituency, they defy most of the 
characteristics of international state-system such as diplomacy, rule of law, 
sovereignty, reciprocity, democracy, international organizations, legal economic 
transactions and the conventional form of warfare. Thus, the cooperation and 
conflict environment is more than ‘the concept of interdependence’ 
explains.295Interdependence literature does not study non-state entities’ role 
satisfactorily enough so as to place them in a theory of state-nonstate interaction. 
Still, non-state entities interact with nation-states, forming an uneasy gathering. 
Neither nation-states nor non-state entities are able to move without either directly 
or indirectly affecting the other. Via fish-net analogy, movements of one entity 
directly affect another when their policies and behaviors collide or they indirectly 
affect each other by tilting the fish-net, that is by tilting the strategic and political 
environment in which they all act. 
The complications of the conflict environment do not end in the increased 
number of power-foci that play into politics: Issue-areas are so much interlinked 
that there are trade-offs between them. However, faced by scarce or limited 
resources, states must prioritize to achieve results. Strategizing requires 
prioritization as a fundamental precept of strategy. However, prioritizing on one 
issue-area such as law-enforcement undercuts intelligence and military operations. 
There is a trade-off among law-enforcement, financial surveillance, intelligence 
and military operations.296 
   
                     
295Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2001. Power and Interdependence. 3rded. New York: 
Longman. 
296Bensahel, Nora. 2006. “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, p. 38; Norris, John H. 2003. “When Alliance and Self-Interest 
Collide” Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol.16 No.2 July. 
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Nation-states, among other entities, become ever more embedded in 
regional and global economic, financial, environmental, legal and military 
frameworks. In a world of global enmeshment of the interrelated issue-areas at 
varying scales, achieving domestic objectives and national security interests of 
nation-states are conditional upon engaging in extensive collaboration, co-option or 
clash with several entities at different times.297The trade-off among issue-areas 
increased due to the increasing magnitude of issue-linkages. Therefore, law-
enforcement, financial surveillance, intelligence and military operations have 
become interfaces among domestic and foreign policy of states. That causes a 
hardship for strategic design and implementation.  
There are different possible permutations of regional and global policy 
responses to respond to multifaceted threats and issue-linkages involved. Fields 
within which counterterrorism is carried out are law-enforcement, financial 
surveillance, intelligence and military operations. These fields are the fields of 
counterterrorism cooperation within and among states. With the issue-areas that are 
strongly tied to each other and became interfaces among domestic and foreign 
policy of states, the permutations among these fields increased both on the side of 
threat formation by terrorists and on the side of devising response policies by 
nation-states.  
Consequently, strategizing or designing response policies and their 
implementation become a conundrum for states. The hardship of ‘designing 
strategic response policies’ in the sense of strategic design and concept such as 
                     
297 Pearlman, Wendy. Winter 2008-09. “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the 
Middle East Peace Process” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 79–109. 
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containment and ‘the implementation strategy’ of policy-responses in the sense of 
executive planning is aggravated.298  
What is worse, nation-states face ‘an autonomy-dilemma’ in addition to the 
traditional security dilemma: Since acting out of the current strategic environment 
is impossible, the more states get embedded into the current strategic environment, 
the more their state autonomy -their capacity for self-governance- gets 
compromised. Nevertheless, this may not be regarded as a surprising development 
if E. H. Carr’s warning is followed. He points to the historical evolution of the 
authority and autonomy diffusion: By way of E. H. Carr’s depiction of nature of 
politics, the authority and autonomy diffusion is the consequence of continuous 
struggle between satisfied foci of authorities and unsatisfied foci of authorities.299 
Compromised nation-state autonomy is only the present manifestation of such a 
diffusion, which cannot be taken for granted at all times. 
This being the case of compromised nation-state autonomy, globalization 
has upsides and downsides contingent upon the specific political context: It may 
increase both cooperation and conflict. Cooperation and conflict may empower the 
forces of integration and fragmentation respectively. 
The issue centers on the agent-structure debate and the micro-macro 
debate:300 Globalization has a structural effect conditioning actors, but it is itself a 
consequence of the actions of nation-states alongside the actions of non-state 
actors; presenting a two-ways street with one lane. When compared to the 
individual, state and system levels of analysis, micro-macro levels of analysis 
                     
298Watts, Barry D. 2008. US Combat Training, Operational Art, and Strategic Competence Problems 
and Opportunities the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments of the US- the Strategy for the 
Long Haul Series, pp.55-67. 
299 Carr, Edward Hallett. 1964. Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939. NY: Harper & Row, p. 99. 
300Rosenau, James. 1990 Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press;  
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seems to be more in tune with the current real-world developments because 
globalization’s impact is not only at the system level, but it is effective at the state 
level as well.301States’ territories are used by different transnational entities 
regarding different issue-areas leading the territory of a state become a globalized 
political space through which different loyalties and developments are experienced.  
In that vein, globalization is a macro process sustained by micro level 
agents. These agents are in turn conditioned by it. Conditioning occurs as 
presenting opportunities and constraints for state actions but it does not determine 
behaviors on its own directly302. However, intensity and impact of globalization on 
agents does not manifest itself in a standard and unidirectional way. Agents can 
manipulate the conditions and contexts, too. 
Above all, political willpower/volition or simply intentions reside with 
agents or entities of several sorts that occupy territories as globalized room of 
maneuver. As a corollary, it is theoretically unwise to see globalization as 
irreversible. In other words, if it is not reversed, that basically means major 
actors/entities do not want it to be reversed. Bereft of the analyses of globalization 
with an ideological slant, it must be defended on an objective basis that it is not 
                     
301Individual, state and system levels of analysis are arguably left insufficient and too-much state-
centric due to the increase in the number of entities that play into international politics and security. The 
interactions of different entities or units that operate at varying scales appear to be better analyzed with 
the criterion of being either micro or macro. Since level of analysis should not separate between states 
and non-state entities to study the response policies of states in return for terrorist actions, micro-macro 
levels of analysis might help observers out. Such a scaling may help approximate the magnitude of the 
influence of entities and casual variables. Fine-tuning levels of analysis from ‘the individual, state and 
international’ into ‘micro-macro’ seems to allow explaining interaction between different units. 
Leveling and evaluating different entities along the micro-macro spectrum is still a nascent and pending 
perspective that appears to be more eclectic and holistic than the traditional levels of analysis because it 
allows entities other that states and it does not necessarily differentiate among individual, state or 
system. Arguably, it is likely to be better suited to study the impact of globalization and terrorism upon 
both national security and international security.  
302 This point associates Waltzian analysis, but neo-realism does not bother to study non-state entities 
and it ignores the state-level analysis on purpose. Waltz himself declared that his theory is not one of a 
foreign policy prescription. Besides, globalization and transnational activities are excluded from his 
theory. Yet, Waltzian theory is precious within and of itself despite the drawbacks.   
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impossible to reverse globalization. The 2009 global financial and economic crisis 
is a testament to that; the crisis was ignited by Western states themselves.303  
Although the process of globalization spreads crises around the world, it 
may prove to be fruitful as well. Liberals argue that since globalization is ever 
tightening interconnectedness and high flow of tangible resources (such as 
commercial goods) and intangible resources (such as new ideas, information, 
know-how and intelligence) transgressing borders with tremendous velocity and in 
tremendous volume, it may bring prosperity, cooperation and lessening of disputes. 
It may help getting to know more about 'the other' through dialogical contact. It 
may bring forward a sense of community with shared or similar values in the long 
haul.  
The characteristics of globalization empower constituencies of any terrorist 
group.304 It enhances the hope and commitment of terrorists through facilitating the 
conduct of their propaganda operations and atrocities. If we use ‘increased 
transactions and contact among people’305 or via Coker, simply 
‘interconnectedness’ as a buzz-word for globalization at the risk of 
oversimplification, interconnectedness empowers individuals for both ends: 
cooperation and conflict. From a security perspective then, globalization is a force-
multiplier for both peace-making and war-fighting. 
 
 
                     
303“World Financial Crisis What it Means for Security”,    
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/EN/index.htm last accessed on May, 2009. 
304‘Terrorist constituency’ is of two kinds: Passive combatants are sympathizers of a terrorist cause who 
do not turn violent, and active combatants are terrorists on the ground. It is largely because of the 
former that the latter survives, because it constitutes the international public opinion favoring terrorists 
and it forms the harboring-ground for financing, logistics and man-power. 
305Coker, Christopher. 2002. “NATO as a Post Modern Alliance”, in Ramet, Sabrina Petra and 
Ingebritsen, Christine, eds. Coming in from the Cold War: US-European interactions since 1980. 
Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 16-30. 
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Returning to alleged positives of globalization, emergence of a sense of 
community (a marker of integration) might be regional or global in scale. 
Ironically, globalization enables forces of fragmentation and integration to be 
active simultaneously. One of the manifestations of globalization in the form of 
integration is the evolution of the European Union. Putting aside neo-functionalist 
explanations such as 'spill-over effect' that details technical economic mechanisms 
that made such integration possible, the issue politically and theoretically appears 
to be coming under the Anarchical Society thesis of Hedley Bull. At least, it seems 
plausible to maintain that English School perspective is mostly congruent with the 
developmental aspects of the European Union. Due to scope and space limitations, 
and since the details of that subject are studied vigorously elsewhere, it is not dealt 
here.306 Suffice it to say that the EU as a project is the European adaptation to the 
diffusion of power and authority in the world. 
The expansion of the European Union aims at preventing armed-clashes and 
sustaining prosperity among its new member-states alongside the older members. It 
aims at a particular endeavor and approach towards regulating diffusion of 
authority. The EU is trying to expand the European zone of peaceful co-existence 
devoid of wars. It still remains to be seen whether the EU will reach fully 
supranational status with formal sovereignties of its members ever more reduced 
such as in the form of con/federation of states with a common constitution. 
Nevertheless, the EU constitutes a sample of authority pooling or accumulation in 
progress.307  
                     
306March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders” International Organization 52, 4, Autumn, pp. 943–969; Fettweis, Christopher J. 2006. The 
Forum-“A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?” 8, 677–697. 
307Nesser, Petter. 2006. Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational 
Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
29:323–342.  
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As briefly pointed out by above-mentioned agent-structure connection, 
globalization helps states form a context in which it becomes increasingly possible 
both to diffuse authority and to accumulate it. Europe has experienced localization 
through local and federal formations within itself and in that sense it regulates the 
diffusion of authority. At the same time, this localization is tied up to the 
accumulation of authority in higher institutional bodies of the EU. The EU is trying 
to manage globalization’s impact (power and authority diffusion) by pooling the 
different localizations together under the auspices of common supra-institutional 
bodies. Hence, its distinctive feature: The EU attempts to regulate the diffusion of 
power and authority within. In other words, the EU just tries to achieve a regulated 
or rule-based co-existence of diffused power foci within its political space. The 
expansion of the EU is about spread of such a political space and political culture 
avoiding conflict and war. 
Yet, all states whether they are EU members or not, confront two main 
problems that challenge their sovereignty: First is the problem of keeping their 
economic autonomy, and secondly, preventing illegal violence from taking place 
inside their sovereign boundaries. When confronted by successful terrorist assaults, 
sovereignty of states is challenged because any terrorist attack breaks the state 
monopoly on the use of force.308 Consecutive terrorist attacks break it ever more.309  
This break-down of state monopoly on the use of force challenges states’ 
authority and leads them to pursue raison d’être policies that puts the primacy and 
centrality of states above all other concerns. Although it is being argued that states 
                     
308Leander, Anna. 2001. “Globalisation and the Eroding State Monopoly of Legitimate Violence” 
paper was presented at the conference The Global Constitution of Failed States University of Sussex, 
18-20 April. 
309Al Qaeda conducted a series of simultaneously-conducted operations one after another with 
only a small time between attacks, showing the hardship of preventing them by good intelligence-
gathering the consecutive and simultaneous attacks, one attack after another in the very same day, 
and one more in the following day challenges sovereignty significantly.  
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are challenged by non-state entities and ostensibly became weaker, the challenge is 
not revolutionary: States became more concerned about their national security 
rather than human security, and the urge for centralization of power increases while 
nation-states fight against terrorism. As Tilly asserts, ‘war made nation-states and 
nation-states made war’:310 proliferation of conflicts, no matter they are 
unconventional, could only strengthen state-power. Nevertheless, there is a 
qualification to be made: Although centralization of power at the hands of states 
and nationalism may increase in the face of terrorist attacks, the application of state 
influence is not easy because the use of force and authority is relativized311: the 
mode of the conflict shifted from conventional to unconventional. The enemy is not 
a state and it does not have a territory. Enemies of governments are among civil 
societies of different nations, and their modus vivendi is societal and transnational 
unlike states.  
The emphasis of centralization of state power when faced by terrorist threats 
does not necessarily speak to the threats emanating from non-state entities. The 
political space within which actors contest each other broadened to include non-
state entities. It seems that non-state actors gained relatively more power when 
compared to states. Thus, non-state entities came to have some influence over 
states that are forced to respond. However, that does not necessarily mean that 
states became weaker or that non-state actors enjoy great influence over states. In 
absolute terms, states are still stronger. As yet, non-state entities of our era have 
huge nuisance-value unlike the case of the Cold War. States are forced to respond 
                     
310Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”. 1985. in Bringing the 
State Back In edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
311Karaosmanoglu, ali, in Ali Karaosmanoglu and Seyfi Tashan eds. 2004. “Globalization and its 
impact on Turkey’s security” the Europeanization of Turkey’s security policy: prospects and 
pitfalls, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, Turkey, pp. 19-21. 
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to terrorist groups scattered around the world at the societal level. 
State responses are not completely novel though. States are still states: 
raison d’être assumes that when well-being of state is deemed to be at stake, all 
other considerations are subordinate to its ultimate interest, namely survival. In 
such cases, survival of the state is dominant over every other value, such as societal 
security or human security. This is how the family of realist theories mainly 
conceptualizes security. There seems to be a tension between the traditional 
approaches and the relatively new approaches centering on human security. The 
societal aspect and the human security approach mainly argues for a different kind 
of state response against terrorism in that state supremacy over society must not be 
taken for granted because in the current state of politics not only the division of 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ erodes, but also the division between society and 
state must not be interpreted as state having absolute power over its own citizens.  
Up until the last decades of the twentieth-century, ‘human security’ was not 
studied much in the academe or pronounced in popular jargon of politics, and the 
state was usually the sole unit in international security. Current landscape of 
politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century presents human security as an 
uneasy companion to the national security approach and consequent policies, 
especially in the continental Europe and UN diplomatic lexicon.312Raison d’être 
policies may conflict with states’ need to legitimize its actions in the eyes of 
domestic and international public opinion, and as such public opinion might be 
seen as an intervening-variable in the fight against terrorism.  
 
 
                     
312Charter of Paris for a new Europe, Paris 1990. Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, available on http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/paris90e.pdf. 
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From an historical perspective, public opinion was not much of an 
intervening-variable effecting policy in the previous centuries. States were much 
freer to authorize their domestic and foreign policy behaviors because a global 
consciousness (that demands correction of policies) was previously weak. Unlike 
previous centuries, as elaborated by Coker in ‘Globalization and Insecurity in the 
Twenty-First Century’313, there appears to be a rise of global consciousness: 
‘Globalization has prompted more interest and moral engagement on the part of a 
global citizenry which is more aware of the wars fought, insisting on the 
articulation of global norms. Where these norms are challenged, it demands 
intervention.’ Two examples to this argument may be the American intervention in 
the former Yugoslavia in 1999 or the international public opinion against the 2003 
American intervention in Iraq.  
Coker’s argument begs the question whether there is a ‘global community’ 
or even an ‘international community’ that defends particular norms unselectively. 
Other questions may follow: Does international community go beyond the 
transatlantic area of Europe and America? In whose community are the people of 
the world living? What do China, India and Russia, or the Middle Eastern states 
and their respective societies think about that? Another question that challenges 
Coker’s argument is whether U.S. policy in the Balkans is separable from the drive 
for global hegemony as late Alfred Sherman (the adviser to Margaret Thatcher) 
asserted. Therefore, Coker’s argument is not uncontroversial. Despite above-
mentioned debatable points, it underlines the rising awareness and consciousness 
on the part of the people all around the world: Wide international coverage and 
public discussion about Balkan interventions in the 1990s, the 2003 American 
                     
313Coker, Christopher. 2002. “Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the 
Management of Risk” Adelphi Paper October 345. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
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intervention in Iraq and Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 are some of 
the indications about rising interest in the conflicts throughout the world. All in all, 
the bottom-line is that the awareness increased; yet success of global awareness and 
activism to change nation-state behaviors -or its influence- remains questionable 
and requires further rigorous study. It appears to be the case that it is at best a good 
candidate for being an intervening variable or determinant, rather than an 
independent variable. Independent variables seem to rest with states and non-state 
entities with economic and violence potential. 
Leaving aside the question of whether global awareness change state 
policies or whether the drive for interventionism is rooted in power politics or in 
normative politics, Coker’s observation that people have become more conscious 
and interested in international political developments seems tenable, and it is worth 
highlighting. Since laymen or civil society could not find much available room for 
criticizing state policies in the past, that is relatively new. The rising global 
awareness against conflicts in particular and international security in general, no 
matter it is selective or weak, must be factored in the security assessments of 
nation-states. States can manipulate this world-wide interest in conflicts; failing to 
do so, they may become partly inhibited in implementing their policies.  
Another reason to include the rising awareness factor in security 
assessments of nation-states lies in states’ need to gain domestic and international 
legitimacy for their behaviors. The need of states for international legitimacy to 
sustain their economic and military strength cannot be overstated especially for 
developing nations. International and domestic public opinion is a factor of 
legitimacy without which states cannot prolong their economic power or prolong 
their military interventions in our interconnected world. Acquiring legitimacy or 
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affirmative domestic and international public opinion is also critical in sustaining 
cooperation and alignments of nation-states.  
The need of nation-states for affirmative domestic and international public 
opinion is itself an indication of authority diffusion alternating between the levels 
of below-the-state, nation-state and above-the-state. Before world-wide economic 
and financial interdependence locked nation-states into a networking structure of 
relations, states were previously more comfortable in streamlining their policies. 
Nation-state was the sole epicenter of power and authority both economically and 
militarily. Significantly, state apparatus or institutions were relatively much more 
capable of controlling the information-flow, which was a crucial advantage of 
mass-control. However, this seems to be gradually changing with the inclusion of 
other focal points of authority including the global media, the World Wide Web 
and most importantly the global finance-capital: Demands of transnational 
corporations and investors are crucial for governments. Economic leverage is an 
important power-resource to have voice; it forces governments to take transnational 
corporations into account and treat them seriously. This is especially the case for 
developing countries for which international economic contracts and foreign direct 
investments are matters of economic survival. 
Another manifestation of diffusion of power occurs within the realm of 
political violence and terrorism: violent non-state entities are more independent 
even when devoid of state-sponsorship. Terrorist organizations question the nation-
state monopoly on the use of force, which is legitimized by perceptions of citizens 
about their security, safety and prosperity supposed to be protected by 
governments. State monopoly on the use of force is eroding under terrorist conduct 
of violence and propaganda. In order to prevent the erosion, doctrine of raison 
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d ̀etat (every other value is subordinate to the survival of the state) is followed by 
most states. This is argued to be creating a tension between basic individual 
liberties and security measures because, as the argument goes, the more a state 
ostensibly becomes a national security state, the less democratic it becomes.314  
This tension between states’ need for legitimacy in the eyes of domestic and 
international public opinion and their need to assure survival gives way to separate 
views regarding the strategy to be pursued in the fight against terrorism. The 
tension is compounded by the influence of the international public opinion which 
can be manipulated by different actors. The 2003 intervention in Iraq and the 
dispute that it enflamed in Europe and the Middle East or the debate on Abu Gharib 
prisoners abuse and legal disputes over Guantanamo Bay detention camp are cases 
in point. 
To reiterate for the sake of emphasis, international public opinion evolves to 
be a hurdle against states’ domestic and foreign policy implementation. Before 
1945, the media was relatively more silent on informing about the developments 
taking place in any part of the world. Advancements of information-technology 
(IT) that spread almost everywhere on earth enable citizens to learn about and react 
to international developments with real-time access. Citizens, alongside nation-
state-apparatuses, are reacting ever more by comparison to previous centuries 
despite global political violence-rate is going down. 
What difference does that make for cooperative policies of 
counterterrorism? The answer is: The more ordinary people react and question 
state policies, the higher the probability of recruiting terrorists. The pool of 
                     
314In academic literature on the EU and democratic-peace, national security state arguably denotes 
undemocratic states that do not pay much attention to the human security concept in designing their 
policies. National security is regarded as referring to an authoritarian approach to politics. Alleged 
opposite is a liberal state. Although these terms and their usages seem problematical, the terms are 
nevertheless used in foreign policy discussions. 
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potential combatants grows bigger and states’ cooperation against terrorism 
becomes complicated. Secondly, democratic states narrow down their room of 
maneuver when their voters react harshly. Spanish government’s decision to 
withdraw its troops from Iraq in the aftermath of Madrid bombings is a case in 
point. Thirdly, states may not be willing to participate in collective efforts without 
international public support. The case of Kosovo in late 1990s lacked UN mandate, 
but still the NATO operation was, by and large, regarded as legitimate due to 
affirmative international public opinion. The intervention was not de jure legitimate 
owing to lack of legal mandate by the UN; nevertheless, it was de facto legitimate 
throughout the world - despite Russian opposition.315Therefore, rising global 
awareness regarding conflicts must be overseen by states for it may darken or limit 
prospective cooperation of states against terrorism, especially prospective 
cooperation among democracies where individual voters have a say in contrast to 
theocratic states of the Middle East.316 
Although there is an international dysphoria pointing to the increase in the 
number of conflicts and casualties after the end of the Cold War, the International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that the number of wars and the number 
of casualties on the global scale both within and between countries are fewer in the 
post-Cold War period when compared to the Cold War era figures.317 A more 
recent scientific research of the Maryland University in 2008 reports that, from the 
1990 onwards, total conflict, internal conflict and interstate conflict are steadily 
                     
315The primary coalition of the ‘unwilling’, which is the countries that clearly opposed the 2003 
intervention in Iraq are Germany, France and Russia Federation.  
316Tago, Atsushi. 2009. “When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of 
Troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 219–234; 
Cooper, Andrew F. 2005 Stretching the Model of “Coalitions of the Willing” The Centre for 
International Governance Innovation Working Paper No.1October.  
317SIPRI Yearbook 2009 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, pp. 2-10. 
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declining.318 Confronted by the decline in organized violence, it is appropriate to 
ask, as does Coker, ‘why are we more sensitive to global violence than we were in 
the past?’ The answer he provides is the rise in the global consciousness, awareness 
and interest both in violence and politics all around the world. The wide-spread fear 
of mass casualties and economic disruption caused by terrorist attacks creates 
global awareness about political violence. More people understand that every 
instance of violence (whether far away from them or not) affect them existentially, 
politically and economically. 
Although non-state actors seem disputably weaker than states in that they 
have no legal authority, the fact that they are not bounded by the rules of the 
international state-system is a great advantage for them to assert their influence, 
which is indeed taken into consideration by states most notably as demonstrated by 
‘the war on terror’. Suffice it to mark here several manifestations of such an 
advantage especially for terrorist organizations: unregulated financing that is 
supported by black markets, being devoid of international law requirements and 
sanctions, the lack of a territory and lack of responsibility to protect a population, 
lack of an address to be retaliated at, being unaccountable to constituency, and the 
upper-hand of surprise attack against states. Therefore, although arguably still 
weaker than states that have legal authority, non-state actors have some illicit 
authority and capacity to influence state policies. Capacity to challenge state 
authority might be seen as a partial attribute of actorness.  
The reason why it is arguable whether non-state entities are actors is 
because non-state entities are not acting according to the game-rules of the 
international state-system. This fact is demonstrated and recognized by states with 
                     
318Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2008. Peace and Conflict 2008. Center 
for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland, pp. 1-14. 
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the designation of terrorist groups as illegal entities. Illegality marks an asymmetric 
and immutable relationship where comparisons are hard to establish between the 
capacities of states and those of non-state actors. Nevertheless, terrorist groups defy 
states. They force new military doctrines to be implemented. They force state 
authorities to redesign international law comprising the legal status of terrorists. 
Subject-matters such as reconsideration of legal and political definitions of war, 
legal questions on prisoners of war, the laws of war-initiation and the concept of 
just war demonstrate the influence of terrorist groups. They cause states to question 
the principle of sovereign non-interference or the norm of non-intervention into 
sovereign states. The procedures of financial surveillance, economic and political 
rights of firms and individual liberties are hotly debated issues alongside the above-
mentioned traditional international laws and norms.  
Previously, domains such as law, military, media and most economic 
transactions were mainly regulated by states. Control of states over these realms 
gradually became questioned and came under pressure. Non-state pressures upon 
nation-states impede the conventional working-mechanism of the international 
system. In other words, not only terrorist groups but all non-state actors impose 
their game-rules upon states and the international state-system. Alternatively put, 
they live in and function through the illicit domain where state regulation is absent 
or ineffective. By doing so, they challenge and impede not just states themselves, 
but also the state-system. States started to fight back in return and applied measures 
to tighten its control over almost all realms of social and political life. That is how 
fighting terrorism re-energizes nation-states via centralization.  
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Nation-states and non-state actors are not easily comparable to each other, 
because states and non-state actors (IGOs, NGOs, transnational corporations and 
illicit organizations such as mafia and terrorists) have different sets of game-rules 
or modus operandi. Non-state entities do not play according to sovereignty-based 
rules of the international system. At different issue-areas, they have different 
advantages making generalizations hard to maintain for long. This is why 
relativization of power exists. Where non-state actors are deemed weak may turn 
out to be their strength. The criteria that determine the degree of power, authority 
and influence of states and non-state entities become relativized to certain extent 
when two kinds of entities (sovereign states and sovereignty-free non-state entities) 
are compared.319  
In the light of these points, there are mainly four non-state entities against 
which turning a blind-eye would not be prudent for nation-states: First, 
transnational corporations (as the new actors born out of the dense and ever 
increasing economic interdependence made durable especially through voluminous 
finance, trade and commercial transactions beyond the control of any particular 
state), secondly, criminal networks and transnational mafia (that operate in the 
relative absence of legal and juridical regulations and controls of governments via 
black markets and parallel economies); thirdly transnational terrorist organizations 
that challenge states’ monopoly on the use of force. Terrorist organizations 
reportedly also cooperate with the transnational mafia320. Last but not least, the 
non-governmental organizations and the media (such as Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace or the ‘Al Jazeera-effect’ and the ‘CNN-effect’) impede, force, 
                     
319 States, alongside other adversarial states, confront non-state groups. Whereas states have legal 
authorities, non-state actors have illicit authorities. The mismatch of legal status between states and 
non-state actors is another demonstration of their different political spheres. 
320Napoleoni, Loretta. 2004. Modern Cihat-Teror Orgutlerinin Kasalarindaki Dolarlar Nereden 
Geliyor Istanbul: Bulut Yayinlari, pp. 41-85. 
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manipulate or embarrass states to change their policies through influencing 
national, regional and global public opinion.  
These entities or power-foci qualify state sovereignty. They sometimes defy 
national economies and national security and at other times co-opt or exploit them. 
Consequently, states are no longer the only power-foci albeit still being powerful 
and resilient actors. The political realm of the world comprises non-state actors, 
too. Indeed, that is why Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu asserts ‘a relativization of 
the importance of the states in world politics’ regarding the connection between 
globalization and security:  
There is a consensus among the scholars researching on globalization that its effects 
on international security involve ‘more than looking for new threats’. Laurent 
Goetschel emphasizes three distinct phenomena that are central to understanding new 
transformations in world politics. First, globalization suggests that ‘many chains of 
political, economic and social activities are becoming inter-regional or inter-
continental in scope’. Second, interaction and interconnectedness have intensified 
between states and civil societies, emphasizing not only ‘individual security’, but also 
‘societal security’ which involves the protection of the community cultures and 
values. This has, in turn, increased ‘global awareness’ among individuals and 
societies. Third, globalization has brought about ‘a relativization of the importance of 
states’ in world politics, compared to non-state entities, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations. A fourth development should be added to the list: the 
relativization of geopolitics.321 
 
Following Karaosmanoğlu, it seems possible to press on with actors’ 
political spaces. Non-state entities have relativized the concept of authority and the 
importance of nation-states’ territorial and political sphere of influence. Non-state 
entities have been slowly asserting themselves as having non-territorial political 
spaces and influence of their own. As a corollary, states and non-state entities 
together form concentric circles of authority and influence that overlap one another. 
As yet, that does not mean that states’ influence on international politics is small or 
that states are weak. It is just meant to underscore the inclusion of other focal 
                     
321 Karaosmanoglu, Ali L. 2004. “Globalization and Its Impact on Turkey’s Security”, in The 
Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 
p.12, italics added. 
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points of influence and authority into the calculus of international politics through 
the relativization of power, authority and autonomy. 
As long as these non-national polities have influence on nation-states 
forcing them to change their policies, they emerge to have relative illicit authorities 
of their own. As long as and to the extent they obtain active support or indirect 
support as sympathy from people, they evolve to exercise de facto authority that 
challenge states. So long as they mobilize people and create new focal points of 
loyalty and identity without completely depending on a state-sponsor as 
exemplified by Al Qaeda, they gradually assert to have authority in international 
politics.322 
It is, then, important to discuss criteria for actor-ness. What determines an 
actor? If we do not consider the issues of deterritorialization, overlapping political 
spaces and the relativization of the importance of states that are addressed 
previously, we have the traditional theoretical approach and answer at hand: 
Nation-states are actors. This is the classical approach centered upon the 
conceptualization of state sovereignty, which is gauged in absolute terms. Within 
such absolute measurements that are largely devoid of the recent implications of 
globalization, non-state entities cannot be seen as actors and the unit of analysis is 
conventionally thought as nation-states. However, this theoretical stance does not 
always seem to be matching the facts. Although the concept of sovereignty is 
theoretically thought in absolute terms, absolute autonomy has never been possible 
in practice because every actor is dependent on other foci of power to certain 
extent. Even before the globalization came to dominate the agenda of international 
politics, absolute autonomy was impossible. Sovereignty, in practice, did not mean 
                     
322 The 9-11 Commission Report - Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States. NY: W. W. Norton, pp. 47-63. 
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that states are islands that are absolutely self-reliant, totally autonomous autarkic 
units. Even after the Westphalian praxis came to be the order of the day, states were 
never totally freed from political and economic intervention. Since this has been the 
case, globalization only intensified the interconnectedness of different polities or 
groups. Globalization enhanced the fact that states are not islands that are closed to 
economic, political-military influence and penetration coming from other entities. 
On the one hand, globalization interconnected states to one another ever more; on 
the other hand, it arguably gave way to emergence of new actors that share, exploit, 
co-opt and challenge states’ authority and physical territory with the result of new 
actors being non-territorial entities that lives within and through states. 
To sum up, states’ grip on the control of their economy and security is not 
as tight as the case in earlier periods of history owing to the implications of 
globalization on sovereignty. Implications of globalization on sovereignty manifest 
themselves in deterritorialization of economy and security and in overlapping 
political spaces (or transnationality) that can only be roughly measured without 
clear delineations. 
 
4.9. The Impact of Globalization on the Contemporary Conflict 
Environment: The Declining Form of Conflict and Warfare  
   4.9.1. Waning of Major War  
(The Leading-Powers-Peace Argument)  
A number of scholars, John Mueller and Robert Jervis foremost among 
them, argued that inter-state war among the armies of most developed industrial 
states such as the US, members of the EU, Canada and Japan did not take place 
since 1945 and it is not likely to take place for the foreseeable future.323The gist of 
                     
323SIPRI Yearbook. 2009. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute. Major war as vast force-on-force confrontations of armies on the 
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the argument is that conventional war among these states is not contemplated by 
them against one another, and as a corollary war does not occur among them. The 
argument’s departure point is the fact that there are no military threats among the 
above-mentioned countries.324The argument exclusively refers to the advanced 
industrial countries (AICs),325and it excludes the rest of states. Since these states 
are among the most powerful set of nation-states in the world, the likelihood of war 
among them has important repercussions on the prospects of global security. Most 
importantly, it complicates the application of balance of power theory; and as 
Robert Pape maintains, it opens the theory’s validity into question particularly 
because balance of power theory works best where expectation of war looms 
large.326  
 
4.9.2. What Waning of Major War Is Not? 
‘Waning or decline of major war’ does not mean that international politics 
is necessarily going towards a more peaceful world. Indeed, viewed globally, world 
affairs are not rid of conflict.327 While there is a literature arguing that a more 
peaceful world is likely328, the argument of the waning of (major or regular or 
conventional inter-state) war among the most developed industrial nation-states is 
limited in scope. It does not convey the whole world. The argument is just viewed 
from the historical perspective, and it is simply that countries such as Canada, the 
                                                                
battlefield is absent since World War II. 
324Mouritzen, Hans. 2006. “Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical 
Theory” European Security, 15:2, p. 163-footnote 78. 
325As the formal acronym for the Advanced Industrial Countries, ‘AIC’ is the United Nations 
abbreviation for the North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australasia. These regions and the 
states within are often referred to as ‘the North’ in the UN documents. 
326Personal conversation with Professor R. Pape, Bilkent University Address, Ankara-Turkey, 2009. 
327SIPRI Yearbook. 2009. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute. 
328Goldsmith, Benjamin E. 2006. “A Universal Proposition? Region, Conflict, War and the Robustness 
of the Kantian Peace” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12-4: 533-563. 
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US, the EU member-states and Japan did not go to war with each other since 1945. 
It is presumed that they are not likely to wage conventional wars against each other.  
Secondly, it does not point to obsolescence of war. It does not mean that 
nation-states other than those mentioned-above are not likely to wage war.329 In 
other words, the observation of waning of major war just underlines that waning of 
major war is only valid for the US, Canada, the EU, and Japan. For states other 
than Canada, the US, the EU member-states and Japan, war is still considered to be 
a probability. The argument is that interstate war is down, but not out. It 
experiences an off-season, but it is specified for the above-mentioned countries. In 
other parts of the world, potential for war still resides: For instance, India and 
Pakistan has been contemplating and preparing for war, and constantly planning 
war-contingencies (including contingencies of nuclear war) and practicing 
maneuvers. Waning of major war simply does not comprise such nation-states. 
Then, war is not out, but it is currently down mostly in the western environs. 
According to Colin S. Gray, one of the most seminal military strategist and 
philosopher of our times, waning of major war exists.330 Yet, it is not eternal. 
Rather, he argues that waning of major war is contextual where there is no strategic 
necessity. 
 
It is sensible to conclude both that there has been a notable debellicization (lack of 
war) of the West, of Europe outside the Balkans in particular, but that that trend is 
vulnerable to contextual change. To regard war as uncivilized, unacceptable, and 
even all but unthinkable is a luxury permitted by the absence of dire strategic 
necessity. The taboo against war, if such it is becoming, will evaporate like the 
morning mist if, or more likely when, bad times of strategic insecurity return. In 
this case at least, culture is shaped by circumstances.331 
                     
329Fleming, Colin M. 2009. “New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 32:2 213-241. 
330Gray, Colin S. 2005. “How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?” Parameters, Spring, 
p.24. 
331Colin S. Gray. 2009. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; 
Gray, Colin S. 2005. “How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?” Parameters, Spring, 
pp.14-26 
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Although the emphasis on the strategic necessity is clear, Gray’s above 
argument seems to be lacking a crucial factor that also play into determining the 
future of the taboo against war or waning of major war. When it is to the point that 
culture is shaped by circumstances especially in the immanency of war, it is also to 
the point that culture is also shaped by the strategic decisions or behaviors of states. 
The circumstances are partly created by the actors/agents and partly by the 
structure. Thus, the return of bad times of strategic insecurity depends also on the 
choices of states. If war (outcome) comes despite the efforts to avoid it (behavior), 
then the taboo will be broken.332 Yet again, strategic necessity for war does not 
emerge by itself independent of the behaviors of actors. Gray also misses the 
crucial factor in the strategic culture literature that circumstances do not emerge 
from out of the blue, state/s take actions under the conditioning effects of the 
structure.  
However, states take actions, too. The circumstances that create strategic 
necessity to go to war are subject to strategic or geopolitical culture which is 
shaped more by past experiences than by circumstances. That does not translate to 
an argument that decline of war is a permanent situation. Rather, it does show that 
the neorealist lenses have a predisposition to overestimate the weight of the 
structural explanations and underestimate the weight of the agent or the state’s 
determining behaviors in the two-way street of the agent-structure dynamic. If the 
unit-level variable or actors’ behaviors were not important, it would not be possible 
to explain the rise of any hegemon throughout history. Hegemons or the most 
                     
332As Mouritzen makes clear, Waltz differentiates between ‘the behavior’ and ‘outcome’. Both the 
structural effects and the unit’s behavior determine the outcome. The system is more than the sum of its 
parts, but it is also the parts and their behavior. This is the complicated point of Waltz’s theory. Waltz 
escapes from this troubled waters of the intersection of the two levels of analyses by claiming that neo-
realism refrains from explaining individual foreign policies of states. Nonetheless, many neo-realists 
including Waltz engage in foreign policy explanation. Mouritzen, Hans. 2006. “Choosing Sides in the 
European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory” European Security, 15:2. 
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powerful state in the system comes to occupy a paramount position by pursuing 
particular policies of economic development and military procurement - even if the 
strategic insecurity or necessity induced by the system required the otherwise. In 
other words, a state could not rise to a hegemonic position if it chose to abide by 
the system at all times. Making war is also a choice of states. The decision to go to 
war does not come up immediately; rather it has a developmental course. If the 
predisposition of a state is benign rather than war-prone, the risk of war becomes 
smaller.  
Third, waning of major war does not mean that violence or political conflict 
vanished altogether in every corner of the world. The full spectrum of ‘warfare’ 
includes regular warfare and the irregular warfare. While ‘war’, as the regular 
warfare waged by nation-state military battalion formations, is experiencing a 
downward tendency, ‘warfare’ continues in its irregular forms: intrastate conflicts 
and terrorism abound. The several complex wars of Yugoslavian succession, the 
wars of Soviet succession in the Caucasus region, and the near perpetual warfare 
across West and Central Africa including the Sudan and Somalia testify to it. 
Finally, the fact that the Cold War has not turned into a ‘hot’ one, or, the 
fact that war among the two blocs as force-on-force vast conventional military 
clashes of armies did not actually occur does not weaken the waning of major war 
argument that addresses the post-Cold War conflict environment. Waning of major 
war is not a feature of the Cold War. It is a feature of its aftermath. Lack of major 
war during the Cold War is not related to a lack of war-anticipation during the Cold 
War whereas the waning of war of the post-cold War era is. It was exactly the 
anticipation of war itself during the Cold War, not its actual occurrence that led to 
defensive alliances formation. The political conflict had to be kept ‘cold’ due to the 
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balance of terror established by the superpowers’ second-strike capabilities 
alongside strategies such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the flexible 
response and treaties such as Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. 
Therefore, waning of major war is more about whether there is contemplation and 
anticipation of war among states than it is about actual occurrence of war. Major 
war among advanced industrial countries (AICs) occurred neither during the Cold 
War nor in its aftermath; however, with different reasons. Lack of war is an 
offshoot or by-product of declining anticipation of war in the aftermath of the Cold 
War while it is was the result of nuclear deterrence or ‘the balance of terror’ 
between the superpowers during the Cold War. 
4.9.3. Determinants of the Waning of Major War 
To put ‘waning of major war’ into perspective and briefly explain how it 
occurred, following correlated determinants can be enlisted: First of all, the 
introduction of nuclear weapons (which deterritorialized the conflict among nations 
as discussed in the first chapter) is determining: Military technology surpassed 
territorial barriers of defense by ‘the strategic triad’. The world witnessed the age 
of nuclear plenty and the second-strike capability. The heart of the nuclear 
revolution is the speed of kill and mutual kill, which transgressed borders of 
nation-states.333 For the first time in history, mankind found itself in a situation that 
it could annihilate entire human life if it wanted to with missiles that could reach 
almost any point on earth. In other words, military-power-projection trajectory of 
the superpowers of the Cold War globalized, comprising the world almost to the 
full. Defense against globalized military-power-projection became possible not by 
defense on land. It became possible via second-strike capabilities of the 
                     
333Schelling, Thomas C. 1975. The Strategy of Conflict Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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superpowers of the Cold War, the strategic triad, tens of thousands of nuclear 
weapons and missiles and by the extrapolated defense projects at outer-space such 
as Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and missile defense. All these developments 
largely overruled the conventional war among states. Emergence and escalation of 
conventional conflicts risked initiation of nuclear weapons use, which meant 
mutual destruction of belligerents involved: This has been famously or notoriously 
known as the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Although the nuclear threat 
level and imminence decreased after the Cold War, the same contingency and the 
logic of deterrence are still overseen by states.334 
Secondly, horizontal and vertical proliferation accelerated throughout the 
Cold War. The proliferation of CBRN, especially proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and deterrence decreased the likelihood of conventional war.335The number of 
unconventional weapons or the number of chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear weapons (CBRN) and their delivery means increased during the Cold War. 
They still remain as a significant concern for nation-states after the Cold War.  
CBRN and the related know-how spread to the world starting from the beginning of 
the post-WWII era to the present. In particular, the spread of nuclear technology 
proved hard to stop, paving the way for understandably alarmist threat assessments.  
Nation-states have perceived the CBRN stockpiles as clear and present threats 
against their national security because CBRN were affective deterrents. 
Consequently, threat assessments of the Cold War diminished the likelihood of a 
conventional war among major states, which fear that a conventional war would 
escalate into a nuclear war. Especially from the late 1950s onwards, states found it 
                     
334Pincus, Walter. 2005. “Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan; Strategy Includes Preemptive Use 
against Banned Weapons”, Washington Post, Sunday, September 11. 
335Payne, Keith. 2001. The Follies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. Kentucky: University 
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mutually destructive to fight one another directly. Therefore, the US and the former 
USSR turned a blind eye to the interventions in their peripheries to certain extent. 
In a sense, they were obliged to fight by proxy: Terrorist groups were manipulated 
by major nation-states themselves. Indirect assistance to conflicting parties and 
covert operations short of major conventional warfare were common practice. 
Unofficial sponsorship of terrorism replaced regular warfare.336 
Third, the size of regular armies has declined to a mere fraction of the 
World War years.337 Rising costs of deploying and sustaining huge number of 
soldiers are coupled by ever advancing military technology that replaces man-
power to some extent. Use of advanced weapons and weapon-systems facilitated 
power-projection, deployment and deterrence capabilities. Computerization 
improved logistical, operational and contingency planning. In particular, 
computational research and development boosted precision, pinpointing targets 
unlike the carpet bombings of the early twentieth century. It also enhanced fire-
power and assured destruction. Finally, professionalism also contributed to the 
decline in the size of armies.  
Fourth, the conventional military theory stagnated due to nuclear weapons. 
Strategists of the Cold War period such as Thomas Schelling and Bernard Brodie 
tackled with nuclear strategy and nuclear deterrence unlike Clausewitz who dealt 
mainly with conventional war. Vertical envelopment was the sole novel concept in 
the literature of conventional warfare and military strategy.338 ‘Conventional 
                     
336Boot, Max. 2002. The Savage Wars of Peace- Small Wars and the Rise of American Power NY: 
Basic Books. 
337Alach, Zhivan J. 2008 Slowing Military Change-Strategic Studies Institute the U.S. Army War 
College External Research Associates Program-http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/, 
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military stasis’ is the departure point of analyses for defense analysts of armies in 
the twenty-first century.339 
Fifth, the post-World War II western institutional and normative order 
played into limiting war by setting ‘the game-rules’ of politics among nations. 
Initiated by the introduction and development of nuclear weapons, the decline of 
major war among most developed states were also supported by the evolution of 
international law and various international organizations. Organizations such as the 
UN, the NATO, and OSCE are latent platforms of conflict resolution and dialogue. 
In a nutshell, legal and customary rules reflected a post-World War II western 
normative order under the auspices of the US. Concurrently, Western liberal 
regimes and public opinion evolved to become dominant in the post-Cold War 
period. By and large, they have culminated to be the normative rules of the 
international arena. Customary and written rules of international law, diplomacy 
and treaty-making mainly reflect a western mode of conduct slanted by democracy 
and liberalism.340 
The post-World War II western institutional and normative order is built by 
the victors of World War II. That does not seem to be an accident: the distribution 
of capabilities after the war brought western powers forward. That is evident in 
setting up international institutions and international agenda. Major states have the 
upper-hand of setting the international agenda, which makes them up-starters in the 
                                                                
ENVELOPMENT’ IS A tactical maneuver in which troops, either air-dropped or air-landed, attack the 
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339Alach, Zhivan J. 2008. Slowing Military Change, Strategic Institute of the US Army, 
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340Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. “American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy” Review of 
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politics among nations.341 The capacity to set the international agenda is a 
significant indication of power. Setting up international institutions is another 
indication of power; and international institutions of significance are largely 
western. The Allied powers of the WWII (that have overpowered the Axis powers 
on the European continent) designed most of the economic, political and security 
institutions of the post-war international relations. The post-war international 
system adheres to the principles of international law that have been designed to 
sustain the post-war institutional order, main manifestation of which is the Security 
Council of the UN.342 Authorization of legal use of force resides ultimately with the 
Security Council, which reflects the balance of power after WWII. Although the 
restraining clout of the Security Council diminished after 1989 as exemplified by 
the US intervention in Iraq and Kosovo in 1991 and 1999 respectively; it still 
retains some political clout to limit use of force for most states.343   
Sixth and final factor is the tight-knit economic interdependence among 
most developed industrial nation-states and gradual privatization of economy 
including military-industrial complexes that tied national security considerations of 
nation-states to each other. Alongside global economic interdependence, 
privatization of economy and the eroding state monopoly on the use of force 
                     
341Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1948. Politics among Nations- the Struggle for Power and Peace New 
York NY: Alfred A. Knopf. 
342Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. “American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy” Review of 
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commemorating its dead to the political, economic, and security institutions that rose in its aftermath-
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diminished state authority and power in a relative sense when compared to non-
state entities. Although it can be argued that nation-states are more powerful than 
non-state entities in the absolute sense, transnational entities rose to challenge 
nation-states that previously monopolized and manipulated most of the economy, 
technology, information and use of force. Power resources such as money, 
technology, know-how, weapons and communication became ever more available 
around the world. The diffusion or globalization of power- resources enabled non-
state challenges and threats to arise, breaking the monopoly of states over economy 
and technology. Civil expansion of globalization regarding the diffusion and 
private application of the economy, technology, information and use of force 
empowered non-state entities. 
At the gist of all these factors that contribute to waning of major war lies 
the diffusion of authority and power at world-large. The rising unconventional 
forms of warfare such as terrorism and the rise (not emergence) of non-state entities 
are the impact of globalization on state sovereignty.344 Without studying the impact 
of globalization on sovereignty and authority of nation-states, it is hard to see why 
sovereignty appears as the obstacle to cooperate against transnational threats such 
as global terrorism. How sovereignty itself can limit cooperation against terrorism 
is explained throughout the entire dissertation.  
Rather than disappearing, geopolitics became complicated by the diffusion 
of power resources into the non-state realm. That translates into non-state threat 
exposure. Ambiguity of contemporary threats originates in their transnational 
character and it is also related to the diffusion of power around the world. The 
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current panorama of political and economic power is the permissive cause for the 
emergence of non-state entities and asymmetrical forms of warfare. The reason 
why contemporary threats are ambiguous lies in the different way power is used by 
non-state entities. Ambiguity of transnational threats or the way non-state entities 
use power is different from the way states use power. That has uncooperative 
repercussions and has become a basic limit of cooperation among states. It is these 
issues that are explained in this chapter. 
 4.9.4. Diffusion of Power-Resources and Waning of Major War  
It seems probably less debatable to relate the waning of major war to the 
diffusion of authority because the contestation among states shifted from the 
battlefields to the economic, technologic, diplomatic and normative realm. 
Diffusion of authority is the increase in the number of power- foci that use power-
resources to have a say in politics, either in a legal or illegal framework. Illegal and 
unconventional use of power-resources change the way power is used, too. 
Diffusion of authority manifests itself in the interconnected relations among nation-
states and non-state entities such as transnational corporations, terrorist groups that 
are fed by illicit financial markets, and nongovernmental organizations such as 
Green Peace. Independent from the fact that some non-state entities are legal and 
some are not, they play into politics. They are connected to the international fora 
composed of nation-states. Such connectedness or linkage to international affairs is 
possible due to the availability of power resources for non-state entities. Power 
resources such as advanced technology and economic and financial power are 
available not only for nation-states, but they are also at the service of transnational 
companies that can dictate nation-states economic packages and investment 
conditions or have private armies of their own to protect business interests.  
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Nation-states lost the monopoly or privileged control over power-resources. 
Besides, power-resources are not just conventional military capabilities. Power-
resources include availability and use of technology; a networked constituency 
composed of people from different societies that follow a particular cause; effective 
and expansive propaganda in disseminating ideologies rivaling to those of nation-
states; increased skill, education and computer-literacy in conducting terrorist 
attacks and in execution of operations of sorts including information-technologic 
propaganda; legal or illicit financial power from black markets and actual or 
potential use of small weapons and unconventional weapons. It goes without saying 
that criminal and terrorist groups take advantage of high technology and other 
power-resources mentioned-above. These are realized alongside traditional illicit 
methods such as hawala or hundis.  
In addition to the availability of power-resources for non-state entities, there 
is another significant development: As Scowcroft, Kissinger and Brzezinski 
maintain, the way power is exercised changed, too.345This is different from 
democratic-peace theory in that it is not democracy that is hold to be the 
independent variable leading to absence of war among them, but the linchpin of the 
explanation is the economic, financial and technological interdependence. This is 
congruent with but not identical to the neo-functionalist liberal economic theory 
and it seems similar to the democratic-peace theory inasmuch as economy prepares 
a fertile environment for peace. When the domestic well-being of France is tied to 
Germany, or Japan’s well-being to that of the United States or Britain’s economic 
policies are correlated to America’s economic calculations, common economic 
interests can be seen as one of the important factors that plays into avoiding war. 
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Nevertheless, it is not necessarily related to democracy per se.  
Secondly, since the diffusion of authority at world-large affects states’ 
authority to wage war, waning of major war is the result of authority diffusion, too. 
Different foci-of-power including states and non-state actors as the contenders of 
autonomy and authority, demonstrate a constant rivalry of influence among each 
other. The formation of several authorities and the rivalry thence is the result of 
ever increasing and ubiquitous economic and technological prowess around the 
world. Inner-logic of capitalism imperatively directs markets and technology to 
expand throughout the world, and that in turn causes diffusion of authority around 
the world.346That makes it unavoidable for states to forcibly share authority with 
other nation-states, but also with other actors such as transnational companies, 
international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, criminal and 
terrorist organizations and moral authorities such as Green Peace or Amnesty 
International. Because technology and wealth expanded throughout the world, 
nation-states could not help adapting to the new configuration of power-resources 
and authorities thus created. The more interconnected the world becomes; the more 
authority is contested, including the authority to wage war among developed 
nation-states.  
Technological prowess and economic interconnectedness in global scale are 
both the indicators and means of authority diffusion. Widening and deepening 
technological prowess and economic interconnectedness in global scale paves the 
way for the emergence of non-state entities to have political clout because power 
becomes diffused. Thus, economic and technological glues that bind nation-states 
appear to be creating a correlation or linkage of interests among them, prohibiting 
                     
346Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. “American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy” Review of 
International Studies, 27: 191-212. 
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even the contemplation of war: Most developed states do not fear from one another 
paving the way for the waning of major conventional war among themselves.347 
Interconnectedness is realized by the form and impact of advanced 
technology (especially on transportation and communication) and current forms of 
economic interdependence or enmeshed economies of scale that goes ever 
increasingly beyond the borders of a specific nation-state. Technological 
advancement and economic interdependence (or mutual vulnerability of national 
economies to one another and states' need for transnational corporations and 
cartels, and vice versa) also create a permissive environment for the creation of a 
multitude of actors other than nation-states. These factors also bear considerable 
marks on the creation of different political formations with loyalties of people 
shifting from nation-states to non-state power foci.348 They are also the basic 
engines of globalization. 
Consideration of technology and economy became also sine qua non when 
the issue of declining and rising forms of warfare such as terrorism becomes the 
subject-matter of study. They are also central to discussions on eroding state-
sovereignty, which is under the pressure of non-state entities taking advantage of 
                     
347Jervis, Robert. 2005. American Foreign Policy in a New Era. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 
2002. “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace” American Political Science Review 96(1): 
1-14; Jervis, Robert. 2002. “September 11: How Has It Changed the World?” Political Science 
Quarterly 117(1): 37-54; Amy Chua. 2007. Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global 
Dominance and Why They Fall Doubleday Publishing, October.  
348For an elaborative examination of shifting loyalties and how different identities appear, please see 
Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. Remapping Global Politics, History’s Revenge 
and Future Shock. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press. pp. 143-160; Berger, Peter L. and Samuel P. 
Huntington. 2002. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. Oxford: 
Oxford Uni. Press; Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996.The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press; Lapid, Yosef. 1996. “Culture’s Ship: Returns 
and Departures in International Relations Theory” in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The 
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 5-10; Mayall, James. 
1990. Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press. pp. 27-31; Linklater, 
Andrew. 1982. Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. London: Macmillan; Walker, 
R.B. J. 1990. “The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations” in Jongsuk Chay, ed., 
Culture and International Relations. New York: Praeger, pp. 10-13; Hall, Rodney Bruce. National 
Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems. 1999. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
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illicit violence and economic power. 
The factors of technology and economy are so much intertwined to each 
other that it is compulsory to view them as one compact motor of change. Although 
these two factors are not agencies (such as individuals or states), and are just 
processes overwhelmingly led by agents in the first place, it is those two factors 
which condition various agents or actors. They condition and contextualize all 
actors or entities of world politics, whether they are nation-states or non-state actors 
(non-state power foci). As such, economy and technology and the organizational 
skill to put them into use are among the most vital power resources in the world.  
Viewed within such a framework, adaptation to globalization came in 
different guises and forms. Some states, such as the EU member states chose to 
pool some of their autonomy and authority together so as to get wealthier without 
the use of force among each other. Through their inseparably conjoint economic 
procedures and policies, they become more durable or less susceptible against non-
state economic actors.  
They increased their bargaining-power with regard to other states and 
transnational organizations over which they do not always have effective control on 
their own. Yet, like almost all other states in the world, the EU member-states are 
still vulnerable to terrorist organizations, which are again the result of authority-
diffusion. When states lost their firm control over the means of violence and over 
economic production as an imperative of the advanced free market economy, 
numerous other entities emerged to challenge them. 
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4.9.5. The Origin of the European Security Community 
In addition to economic enmeshment as a cause of absence of war among 
developed nation-states, states’ decision to avoid war also helped form security 
communities in which disputes are resolved without resort to threat or use of force. 
The waning of major war among Canada, the US, Japan and the EU member-states 
or the security community that they form can also be seen as the result of a shared 
rebuttal of war among them after having experienced the two World-Wars. The 
continuation of absence of war between European states such as Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War era is also of an indication of the 
importance of the intentions and decision of European states to avoid war. The 
decision and goal of eschewing war paved the way for economic integration, and 
was the driving motor of integration that helped to overcome difficulties of 
integrating the economies of European states, first starting off as the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The ECSC was first proposed by French 
foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 as a way to prevent further war 
between France and Germany. It was formally established in 1951 by the Treaty of 
Paris, signed not only by France and Germany, but also by Italy and the three 
Benelux states: Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
As the motive for the establishment of the ECSC, European states perceived 
a need to tie down Germany. The decision to avoid war was initially a French 
desire after having been twice battered by Germany. Originally a French effort to 
tie down Germany militarily, common steel and coal production was principally an 
idea of controlling the German military industry. Therefore, peace was not the 
result of democracy, but rather democracy was the result of peace which was 
established by enmeshment of French and German economies. It is not the 
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democratic values and relations among European states, but economic 
interconnectedness that was seen as a way to prevent war. Indeed, prior to 1945, 
democracy did not prove to be very successful at stopping major wars or the wars 
that were waged through force-on-force confrontations of the most developed 
Western armies. Therefore, although there has been a normative initiative and 
decision to avoid war in Europe that may be analyzed at the state level and 
individual/leaders level, this decision to eschew war is not directly related to 
democracy. The decision to prevent war on the side of the European states was the 
objective, and that objective was carried out with the strategy of economic 
enmeshment.349  
When the survival of economically-interconnected states became 
inseparable from one another, war becomes costly and reduced in functionality. Put 
alternatively, each state’s survival is linked to those of others. States (such as 
Japan, Canada, the EU member-states and the US among whom major war wanes) 
cannot survive without one another’s survival. If war is to be waged to maximize 
economic gains, and if the political instrument of war itself demolishes such 
maximization, then war becomes too costly and meaningless to be even 
contemplated. Hence, economic interdependence or complex interdependence leads 
to waning of major war. This has been valid for the EU member-states, too. 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
349Mousseau, Michael. 2009. “The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace” International Security 
Vol. 33, No. 4 pp. 52-86. 
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4.9.6. Waning of Major War, Security Community 
 and Complex Interdependence 
The concept of security community is particularly debated for the politics of 
Western European states among which complex interdependence has contributed to 
lack of war considerably since 1945. The strategy of economic enmeshment to 
achieve absence of war turned into being an objective on its own after the 
establishment of the relative absence of war in time. Since there remained no fear 
of military aggression for European states, the objective became further economic 
integration leading to political unity under the conditions and pressures of global 
economic competitiveness.  
Since, no single nation-state is capable to survive economically on its own 
under the current economic circumstances of globalization, it becomes compulsory 
for states to accumulate at least some of their sovereignty into an authority-pool. 
Surviving economically in a world of significant economic, technological and 
cultural rivalry, states need partners. That is why once a strategy to achieve absence 
of war, economic enmeshment turned into being an objective on its own after the 
establishment of the relative absence of war since 1945. Not only there was an 
intention to avoid war on the part of the founding fathers of the EU that passed on 
to latter generations, but also in time there appeared a different need, namely the 
need for pooling of sovereignties to remain economically powerful vis-à-vis 
transnational companies and other states.  
The need for economic power became compulsory as a consequence of the 
way market economy evolved. Finance-capital, trade and investment do not 
recognize borders, and they are not successfully encapsulated into national 
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economies due to the expansionist inner-logic of the market system.350 Therefore, 
the idea of European unity that once started as a decision to avoid war was carried 
out and strengthened by the pooling or accumulation of sovereignties and 
autonomies of states which were also the imperative results of complex 
interdependence. Taken as an agent/state decision to establish absence of war, 
interdependence is voluntary.351  
 
4.9.7. Nuclear Deterrence and the Waning of Major War 
Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence also contributed to the waning of 
major war during the Cold War, and it still plays a certain role in avoiding conflict. 
Decline of major war during the Cold War was very much related to the balance of 
terror, and the second-strike capability of superpowers.352After the end of the Cold 
War, nuclear deterrence continues to play an important role, but not a role as 
significant as it once had. The reason for the continuation of the absence of war in 
the post-Cold War, according to Schweller, is the fact that all major powers still 
regard the international order as advantageous for themselves. It is hard to deny 
that European states, Canada, the US and Japan still depend upon the globally 
                     
350Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. “American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy” Review of 
International Studies, 27: 191-212. 
351Technically speaking, economic globalization forces states to respond in some way. However, states 
may respond by methods such as a political integration process (exemplified by the EU), fragmentation 
(the Balkanization), war-profiteering (2003 Iraq War) or just concluding economic treaties such as 
Mercado Común del Sur-South American Economic Organization (MERCUSOR), which does not 
integrate sovereignties of states unlike the fundamental logic of the EU. However, what sets the EU 
member states distinct is that they did not just seek economic welfare: They seek it in the absence of 
war. Although waning of major war and stability were the preliminary requirements for economic 
development, economic parameters are not the only determinants. If it were so, there would be no 
integration and nothing much would be different from the era before the World Wars. The foundational 
fathers of the EU (alongside the economic necessities/material factors that give way to the EU 
formation), chose to make a difference by taking a lesson from the two World Wars and they did not 
turn to the states-configuration of the pre-World Wars era where power-politics reigned. They could 
have returned to the pre-war geopolitics, but they did choose and decide not to. As such, the EU process 
also emphasizes the ideational factors as independent variables alongside the material ones.  
352Vasquez, John A. ed. 2000. What Do We Know About War? Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 
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interconnected free-market economy and there is no reason to challenge one 
another militarily as long as doing so brings more costs than benefits. Even India 
and China, (that are not regarded as major powers in the literature owing to their 
different political and economic regimes from that of the western ones) as 
economically rising states, do not seem to be remarkably challenging the dominant 
rules of the political status quo for now.353They may challenge it in the future, but 
that does not refute the argument of waning of major war among most developed 
states, because herein India and China are not regarded as major or most developed 
powers via the debate on the argument of waning of major war - due to their 
continuing relative economic and political weaknesses compared to the US, the EU, 
Canada and Japan. 
The post-Second World War international order established by the United 
States with its economic and political institutions, while in need of reform, helped 
form a status quo that punishes an aggressor both economically and militarily. 
Economically, the IMF, World Bank, the interconnected financial system, and the 
high flow of goods and services make it imprudent to use force while states are 
economically in need of each other. As for the military realm, transnational 
corporations are involved in the arms procurement and military-industrial complex 
that serve many client-states. Arms-build up is not an entirely national business 
anymore.354The preeminent military power of the United States of America is 
another deterrent for the major powers who would intend to use force. However, no 
major power, Japan, Canada or the EU member states show any serious sign or 
intention of challenging America militarily. In fact, they do not need to do so as 
                     
353 Jervis, Robert. 2005. American Foreign Policy in a New Era. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 
2002. “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace” American Political Science Review 96(1): 
1-14. 
354SIPRI Yearbook. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. 2009.  Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute. 
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long as their vital interests are not threatened severely.  
In sum, waning of major war can be attributed to two main factors: first, 
economic and technical causes, and secondly, voluntary or agency-based causes 
regarding the intentions of the state bureaucracy, leadership. In other words, 
economic enmeshment was the strategy to achieve the objective of avoiding war. 
On the side of the governments’ political adamancy and decision, especially on the 
side of the EU states, to set the goal as war avoidance is the normative and agency-
based cause for waning of major war. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS CONDITIONING INTER-STATE 
COOPERATION AND ALIGNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM: 
POLARITY 
 
 
 
5.1. Three Challenges and Three Answers 
 
As follow-on to the previous chapter on structural factors conditioning 
inter-state cooperation, this chapter examines the concept of polarity from the 
viewpoint of balance of power theory. It focuses mainly on current non-polar state 
of international affairs, which condition the policy, cooperation and treaty 
behaviors of states.355 Before explaining what nonpolarity is and why the system is 
not unipolar or multipolar today, some of the policy-challenges non-polarity brings 
forward are discussed so as to ponder over the implications of nonpolarity. This 
                     
355 Barletta, Michael ed. 2002. After 9-11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons 
Proliferation Occasional Paper No.8, Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group-Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies http://cns.miis.edu Although this early-on evaluation of the post-September 
international security context is weak in that it fails to distinguish between terrorism and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction as two distinct issues, it evaluates the implications of the September 11 
attacks for major-powers relations well. It also partly discusses the shifting ground of security into non-
state threats; Chayes, Antonia. 2008. “How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security” 
International Security Vol. 33, No. 1 Summer, pp. 45–81; David M. Andrews ed. 2005. The Atlantic 
Alliance under Stress: US–European Relations after Iraq Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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will also help clarify what nonpolarity is. Then, second half of this chapter presents 
the argument of nonpolarity explicitly. Nonpolarity has crucial repercussions on 
cooperation and alignment among states, which are further detailed on state 
policies and behaviors in the following chapters based on the analysis herein. The 
chapter is trying to show how nonpolarity affects cooperation and alignments 
within and among states through a discussion of its problematic implications for 
policy-making and strategic design. 
Non-polarity manifests itself as the unconcentrated and diffuse power 
scattered around the world among several kinds of players.356 The challenges 
nation-states face thereby is related to the current security context that involves 
private violence of non-state entities alongside traditional geopolitical concerns of 
nation-states. The complication of contemporary threats is manifested in the 
ambiguous form of contemporary threats.357 
For instance, specific tactics and techniques such as ‘swarming’ or the 
temporary massing of people and resources for operational purposes is a new 
functional approach of terrorists. Their organizational style is likened to ‘netwars’, 
which is identified as a societal level counterpart to cyberwar. It is named as the 
networked relations of organizing. Literature on ‘the Network approach’ in 
examining transnational terrorism has made an upstart in 1996 before September 
11, and it is still on358.  
                     
356Arquilla, J. and D. F. Ronfeldt. 1996. The Advent of Netwar. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation; 
Arquilla, J. and D. F. Ronfeldt. 2001. Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime and militancy. 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation; Adamson, F. B. April 2005. “Globalization, transnational 
political mobilization and networks of violence” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, 1, pp. 
35-53; Chalk, P. 2000. “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) international organization and 
operations-A preliminary analysis” Canadian Security Intelligence Service Winter Commentary No. 77. 
357 ‘The ambiguity’ of current threats is discussed in Chapter 6. 
358 As one of the latest of that literature, Leaderless Jihad stands out as a must-reading, please see 
Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad-Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. The book demonstrates the diffusion of power into 
non-state leaderless radical Islamist movement- a social movement alongside but distinct from the Al 
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For the scope and purposes here, it is important to underline the landscape 
of the threat: it is argued to be networked. It is important because states build their 
strategies and policies, whether they are cooperative or not, according to their 
perception of the threat or the landscape of the threat. 
Transnational terrorism poses ambiguous, deterritorialized, horizontal, 
societal threats with ‘a no-return address problem’. It can hardly be deterred by 
states’ traditional deterrence policies.359 Absence of a clear balance of power in the 
system means ‘non-polarity’, which is the non-existence of poles in the still 
anarchic system. It is in this security context that international relations are 
characterized by nonpolarity, which gives way to the formation of the ambiguity of 
transnational terrorist threats. In reverse reading, transnational terrorism would 
arguably not be influential enough to change state polices if the polarity argument 
of sorts (balance of power arguments) could account for the current international 
affairs. If the world was unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, there would be one, two or 
several concentrations of power among only nations-states. The politics among 
them would rule out or severely limit the fertile conflict environment conducive to 
the influence of non-state entities much as the situation of the Cold War. However, 
ranging from economics, transnational advocacy causes of secular, moral and 
religious issues to employing violence, non-state/non-sovereign formations have a 
voice and de facto political clout albeit being illicit in criminal and terroristic cases. 
The increasing activation of hybrid and ambiguous threats (that is threats whose 
structure, ideological basis, location, material and human sources are not as clear to 
nation-states as those of the Cold War threats) cannot be restrained by nation-states 
                                                                
Qaeda central. 
359 For the epitome examination of the difficulties of applying deterrence against terrorism, Mustafa 
Kibaroğlu, “11 Eylül’ün Ardından Strateji, Tehdit ve Caydırıcılık”, Foreign Policy, Kış 2002, İstanbul, 
ss. 30-38; Kibaroglu, Mustafa. 2006. “Kitle Imha Silahlariyla Teror: Kiyametin Yeni Esigi mi?” 
Avrasya Dosyasi Cilt 12 Sayi 3.  
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effectively. These threats are extant and wide-spread. In the face of these threats, 
resistance against devising new models, theories or improving already established 
approaches with modified research programs does not make contemporary threats 
disappear. In realization of this fact, the current security and threat environment 
caused different viewpoints to emerge pertaining to the implications of 
transnational political movements in general and especially of terrorism for the 
power-analysis at large and for major powers in particular. 
The opening salvo of the twenty-first century is clearly the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks. Three main challenges can be evinced for nation-states’ 
policy-making and academic analysis:  
First and most significantly, on September 11, a non-state entity 
demonstrated that it could have a strategic impact on world affairs, even without 
the use of mass destruction weapons. The regional and global implications is 
almost endless: the reshaping of the Middle East and Central Asia, global financial 
system overview, immigration policies, border security, intelligence, human rights 
and democracy, law enforcement, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the 
transatlantic relations of the EU and the US, the US-Russia-China relationship, 
energy politics, the economic North-South divide, and without doubt, its 
implications on terrorism and counterterrorism on a global scale. For nation-states, 
violent non-state actors became a sine qua non of policy-making, a policy factor 
much more important than it has ever before.  
What 9-11 demonstrated for nation-states is that in coming decades states 
might well face non-state groups that can inflict destruction on them on a scale that 
was unprecedented in peacetime among states. Peace or absence of war among 
nation-states was not enough to be secure against violence. The 9-11 terrorist 
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assaults and subsequent terrorist attacks such as those in Istanbul, London, Madrid, 
Bali or Beslan reflect a long-term trend, rather than an ephemeral one. 
Globalization or spread of economy, trade and knowledge enables the means of 
annihilation to fall into the hands of more and more people.  
Secondly, regional conflicts and problems do not always remain minor 
ones. Sooner rather than later, they come to have global impact with implications 
for all states. However, major powers have a gradually decreasing voice in regional 
conflicts. Neither is the case that the US or any other state can effectively control or 
influence regional conflicts and intra-state skirmishes as was the case during the 
Cold War. Politics of peripheral spheres of influence of the Cold War superpowers 
has largely faded away. Europe, which once was the main theatre of rivalry, has 
been acting as a normative-and-economic soft power, albeit not united and 
concentrated as a bloc with its multi-headed organization without a constitution. 
Check and balance system established by the superpowers has eroded: Neither the 
problem of Kashmir, Lebanon, Palestine, North Korean and Iranian ambitions of 
nuclear weapons nor the conflict in Chechnya, Karabagh or Ossetia/Georgian-
Russian tension are conducive for much major power influence. This is due to the 
rise of the middle powers and of the global middle class with the spread of power-
resources such as economic, technological and educational advancement – the 
diffusion of power around the world. For instance, the insurgency in Iraq and 
failing state control in Pakistan for that matter is not in meaningful control or 
influence of even the allegedly hegemonic power of the US.360 Third, new players 
are emerging: new states are aspiring to join the major power club-elaborated 
below; and non-state entities vie for political power and influence. 
                     
360 Kaldor, Mary. 2003. “American Power: From ‘Compellence’ to ‘Cosmopolitanism’?”, International 
Affairs Vol. 79, No. 1 Jan., pp. 1-22;  
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Three viewpoints of the literature try to explain this new strategic 
landscape. First view is that post-Cold War era, especially after the September 11, 
2001, is no more a world of major powers. It is rather about the transnational 
political and advocacy groups of both violent and non-violent methods. The main 
determining factor is the networked relations among states and non-state entities. It 
does not rule out the importance of states, yet they are not the sole unit of analysis. 
Secondly, a sharply different view is that the traditional power politics game 
continues; indeed it returned to its basics, freed from the restraining impact of the 
Cold War upon genuine balance of power politics.361 Nationalism is on the rise in 
almost every corner of the world. Authoritarian regimes, with self-help calculations 
of national security, go unabated when they lack clearly identified strategic threats. 
The international economic crisis of 2007-2009 has heightened nationalism as each 
nation looks out for itself. All nations have been left to fend for themselves. 
Finally, third view is a synthesis of the two views mentioned-above with a 
difference of emphasis on the modest possibilities of international cooperation. The 
security landscape does not exclude the impact of networked movements or violent 
and non-violent political advocacy groups in both regional and global scales. For 
instances, human rights movement, land mines movement, environmental green 
movements under the auspices of the transnational moral authorities of the 
Amnesty International, Green Peace or the Red Cross and many groups alike 
represent the non-violent political movements across countries, trying to impose 
particular policies on governments. Sometimes they succeed to certain extent, too.  
The fact that they pressurize governments is important because same 
horizontal organizational line (across countries among laymen at the societal level, 
                     
361 Delpech, Therese. 2002. “Major Powers in the Twenty-First Century” in Barletta, Michael ed. 2002. 
After 9-11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation Occasional Paper No.8, 
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310 
 
not at governmental agencies level) has a violent counterpart manifesting itself as 
terrorist groups and criminal mafiaso organizations. Thus, both nationalist states 
and non-state transnational violent and non-violent activism is on the rise without a 
clear structure that streamlines them into a patterned relationship - that is 
‘nonpolarity’ denoting absence of a traditionally understood international 
‘structure’. Structure, that is, patterned relationships among the parts (or patterned 
configuration of the parts of the systemic whole of world politics) is not easy to 
identify as complexity and chaos theorists such as Robert Axelrod maintains. 
Nevertheless, nation-states have the potential to cooperate among each other to the 
extent they can converge on their expectations and adjust their policies in a way 
that do not harm each others’ pursuit of different goals. 
 
5.2. Implications of Nonpolarity  
‘Power’, ‘great-power status’, ‘actorness’ and ‘polarity’ has become 
essentially contested after the Cold War, and more notably so after September 
11.362 The end of the bipolar era led to an uncertain conflict environment where 
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real-world developments on the ground and the need to explain them in academia 
shook traditional concepts. Ostensibly, traditional concepts and analytical 
frameworks not only largely failed to predict the end of the Cold War, but they are 
seen as insufficient to answer the post-Cold War era.363 At the very least, the 
academic literature includes extensive debates on analytical frameworks and 
conceptualizations in order to answer contemporary challenges and threats. In due 
course, the world academic community experienced a shake; a shake that mixed or 
loosened debates that framed analysis.364 The situation seems to be an urging 
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The Social Sciences Research Council September 11 Essays 
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process for both policy-makers and academics to design better analytical 
frameworks, conceptual and practical responses as E. H. Carr and Morgenthau 
argued so decades ago.365  
The current international environment is the departure point of many 
assessments. Based upon the context that is elaborated in previous chapters, current 
international environment is similar to a soup that people eat without knowing its 
recipe. Although the recipe of relations among ingredients (states and non-state 
entities) is not crystal-clear, there are some ingredients or factors involved such as 
‘increased issue-linkages’: Enhanced issue-linkages among different fields of state-
policies are determining contours of both cooperation and conflict. Issue-linkages 
that grow out of interconnectedness of globalization became a daunting policy-
challenge for it complicates designing strategic concepts. Again, complication 
originates in interconnectedness or increasing linkage among issue-areas. The 
repercussion for the fight against terrorism is that the activities within the fields of 
economy, law-enforcement, finance, intelligence and military criss-cross each 
other. 
In spite of the fact that issue-linkage is not a novel issue, it became more 
complicated: The interwoven issues intensified, became more connected, deeper 
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and expansive when compared to the Cold War era.366 They have been like 
concentric circles all along; but this time around, their overlapping is magnified. 
The state-responses, which are both to address and work through issue-linkages, are 
hardly corresponding. States still work through strict categorizations without which 
division of labor is understandably hard to establish. Yet, the threats manifest 
themselves in a hybrid form requiring different facets of counterterrorism (use of 
force and intelligence) and anti-terrorism (civil measures against terrorism short of 
force) applied together. Requirements of the civil side of the fight against terrorism 
such as nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq undercuts the requirements and 
modus operandi of military operations and vice versa. Simultaneous endeavors of 
development and security are challenging because they curtail each other.367 
The form and mode of operations of the contemporary terrorism are 
different so much so that the label of the new terrorism is often used to refer to 
transnational terrorist acts. The changing features is such that the threat 
(global/transnational terrorism) became hybrid368; hybrid in style and methods 
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employed, with its multifaceted-composure requiring responses that work through 
different issue-areas in coordination. Stylistically, methodologically it is dynamic 
across borders and works through societies of many states. Nevertheless, that does 
not translate to apoliticalness of contemporary terrorism, which activates different 
policies presuming that the terrorists are irrational madmen. 
Terrorism evolves with ever availability of violent means and international 
nonpolar political context that facilitates unconventional threat exposure and 
increases vulnerability of states. This being the case, there is tension between the 
intelligence, military, financial and law enforcement operations conducted in 
regions other than Afghanistan and Iraq where the fight against terrorism is carried 
out. The tension is such that anything that destroys terrorist networks whether that 
is blowing up their facilities, cutting off their sources of funding, or rounding up 
suspects necessarily limits the capacity to collect information about how the 
networks function. These kind of undercutting aspects of the fight against terrorism 
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constitute most of the problems in the war-on-terrorism-regions and especially in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.369Cooperation and implementation problems are detailed via 
examples in following chapters; however, a glimpse over them herein is meant to 
note that they are mainly because of nonpolarity that forms structural impediments 
against cooperation among states.  
Succinctly, the connection between nonpolarity and cooperation/alignment 
is as follows: Since nonpolarity refers to lack of power concentration to the extent 
to form of a group of states to challenge other state groupings, it also translates to 
reduced alignment cohesion among states. Moreover, nonpolarity challenges the 
reliability of alliance commitments by exacerbating the implantation of policy 
tasks. Sovereign, operations due to complex issue-linkages, are subject to trade-offs 
among state policies. Globalization-induced nonpolarity and transnationality (by 
gradually connecting the sectors of economics and politics, civil and military, 
private and the public application of violence, inside and outside of sovereign 
states) tend to overpower the working-mechanisms of nation-state operations and 
policies. By challenging above-mentioned fundamental categories, transnational 
and nonpolar threats such as global terrorism defies conventional mode of state 
operations. Consequentially, state-strategies become harder to design and 
implement.  
Traditional response-structure or response-composure of nation-states does 
not appear to be corresponding to ambiguous transnational threats well. With 
different aspects of policies undercutting each other, counter-terrorism and anti-
terrorism are battering each other, not the perpetrators. The problems that arise 
from ‘issue-linkages and trade-offs among policies’ not only exacerbated 
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implementation of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism operations, but they made it 
hard for states to reach consensus on the way strategies are carved out and 
implemented as well. Achieving agreement on how to solve issue-linkage and 
trade-off problems is a daunting challenge both within nation-states and among 
them. While coordination within a particular state itself (that is, coordination 
among state institutions or agencies) became harder, cross-coordination among the 
institutions of different states became ever harder. Nonpolar threats themselves set 
states back from effective international cooperation and alignments. 
Since the threat is multifaceted, it requires response at different fields such 
as law enforcement, financial oversee, intelligence-sharing and military 
operations.370 Significantly, the threat is not centered on a specific territory with a 
headquarters. As such, contemporary challenges and threats are dissimilar to those 
of the Cold War era. The USSR and the US knew the threat well: The nature, 
ideological and material sources, location and magnitude of the Cold War threats 
were clear and understandable to the belligerents of the Cold War. These features 
of the Cold War, alongside nuclear deterrence, kept the Cold War ‘cold’. The 
situation persisted until the 1990s that witnessed the increasing activation of hybrid 
and ambiguous threats whose structure, ideological basis, location, material and 
human sources are not as clear as those of the Cold War. Lacking fixed location 
and vertical organization unlike states, the build-up of the threat (horizontal 
organization working through societies, not via state apparatuses) enables it to 
sidestep conventional defenses and precautions taken. Via Anthony Giddens, 
transnational terrorism has become analogous to the weaponization of the civil 
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society.371 
On the one hand, nonpolar conflict environment advantaged perpetrators 
whose threats evolved to become ambiguous. The structural factor that explains 
ambiguity of the threat and the strengthened position of terrorists is non-polarity. 
Nonpolarity is a permissive structural cause for the increased and ambiguous 
profile of contemporary threats.  
On the other hand, policy-design and implementation lacks wherewithal to 
formulate an effective solution to these contemporary threats and challenges that 
mix traditional operational fields or issue-areas. Since there is huge overlapping in 
practice among categories and issue-areas that are analytically assumed to be 
separate, categorizations that are meant to match the situation on the ground are 
more difficult to make. This leads to remarkable trade-offs among policies both in 
their design and implementation phases. 
Secondly and as a corollary of the first, there are too many permutations 
and contingencies to be considered (even when the ones that cannot be anticipated 
or estimated are left aside). That underlines a rising need on the side of the states: 
There is a need to link domestic policies and foreign policies at the design-phase 
for they are linked on the ground by the current developments. In other words, 
developments require such a linkage. Current developments are linking the inside 
and outside of states because states are much more penetrated by other states and 
non-state entities in any aspect of domestic and foreign policy.  
Unlike the academia though, politicians, diplomats and key decision-makers 
go by heuristics; they are often schooled by their experiences rather than a single 
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theory prescription.372They are aware of the fact that life is more complex than a 
theory has it. Thus, they are notably inclined to fine-tune between theory and 
practice, and also between state-policy design and implementation. Although 
diplomacy and domestic politics are arguably carried out by authorities with the 
issue-linkages and trade-offs born in mind, the need to establish links increased due 
to globalization-induced interconnectedness. 
Yet, policy-making is still largely based on the main distinction between the 
domestic and foreign realms. To be sure, this is understandable: nation-states are 
sovereign authorities. Sovereignty intrinsically divides between the inside and the 
outside of the state.373 However, the complex-composure of international relations 
is conducted in a way that challenges sovereignty itself.374Although authorities are 
aware of the challenge, their answer is not good enough to craft strategies that 
effectively regulate issue-linkages and ease the trade-off among policies. 
Strategizing (both in the sense of concept-design such as containment and strategy 
as executive planning) itself became more entangled when compared to the Cold 
War era.375  
The fact that inside-outside distinction is still largely resilient does not 
change the reality on the ground or developments which rule out clear distinctions. 
It just reflects the ingenuity demonstrated by the leadership cadre of states facing 
transnational threats.376 Leaderships around the world do not seem to give an 
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impression that they understood the problems in depth.377 Despite their rhetoric on 
change after September 11,378 most nations appear to have a common pretension 
that everything is almost same as ever; as if there was not a rising need to address 
overlapping issue-linkages due to interconnectedness, and as if it thereby did not 
become essential to address the domestic and foreign policy linkage that is required 
to respond transnational terrorism. Transnational threats compel states to find a 
formula to address the transnational character (or transnationality) of threats by 
addressing the domestic-foreign policy linkage in their implementation of policies. 
Without doubt, that is a huge challenge for sovereign units. States cannot forgo 
their sovereignty that is based on the inside-outside distinction. 
One of the best ways to address this challenge of the transnational character 
of contemporary threats is strengthening international cooperation, which must be 
carried out by several agencies of different states in a horizontal line of 
communication much like the threat that works in a horizontal way. Since the threat 
works horizontally, cooperation must work horizontally too.  
The response must correspond or match the build-up of the threat. Then the 
questions are: What makes cooperation work that way? What are the related pitfalls 
and setbacks? These questions are detailed and discussed empirically in the chapter 
on state-strategies for the fight against terrorism. For the moment, the important 
point is that nonpolarity challenges the way power is exercised by states; it is to be 
horizontally used in a shared way, not vertically by a single state.  
Within this framework, unilateralism is self-defeating luxury and it is not 
even a strategic option. Addressing the domestic and foreign policy-linkage in 
states’ design and implementation of policies is a strategic predicament and an 
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implication of transnationality. That is the main burden of globalization upon 
security. The more this burden is ignored, the more it becomes interested in 
international relations. As explained in previous chapters, states must work more on 
the interfaces between traditional categorizations such as domestic-foreign affairs, 
economics-politics, national-international issues and the public and the private. 
These are the fundamental categories that are challenged by the contemporary state 
of affairs and threats. Failing to work on these challenged-categories translates to 
misunderstanding the current strategic environment. Governments and state-
institutions in general traditionally try to strike a balance between domestic and 
international aspects of problems. However, post-Cold War threats seem to require 
more sophisticated response-policies with which analysts should continuously press 
on. 
To sum up, following highlights are of the mark:  
First, globalization caused spread of power-resources to different power-
foci including non-state ones which use power in a different and non-state centric 
way at the societal level all around the world. This is the diffusion and spread of 
power and authority around the world that have gained huge impetus after the Cold 
War.379 Second and third points are the ramifications of this main point.  
Secondly, spread of power and authority or roughly the spread of power-
resources exacerbated ever-present nation-state problems of dealing with issue-
linkages and trade-offs. 
Finally, both the lenses of policy-makers and those of academia to analyze 
developments, devise concepts and due implementation-planning became 
insufficient to answer threats. To expand, parameters of power-analysis became the 
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subject-matter of debates and disputes in the academia that reflect itself in 
contending academic articles, monographs, books and academic-authored policy 
papers.380 The same contention regarding power-analysis is also valid for such 
basic concepts as ‘power’, ‘great-power status’, ‘actorness’ and most important of 
all, the concept of ‘polarity’.  
The heart of the debate mainly revolves around whether concepts -as in the 
way they are used during the Cold War- need improvement or partial modification. 
This is manifestly observed in both government publications that aim to answer 
current threats and in academic publications that try to understand, explain and 
predict. Since bureaucracies or state apparatus in general is like a huge transatlantic 
carrier that maneuvers slowly, the call for change and reconsideration of policy-
design does not come quickly from within the state itself.381 However, even some 
of the government agencies call for a change in the way they strategize and design 
policies alongside due advice of think-tanks, institutes and universities that 
underline the inadequacy of the Cold War mentality and policies of ‘polar logic’.382  
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These calls highlight the conundrum of the mismatch between analysis and 
practice or between the strategic-concept design and its implementation, first and 
foremost in the fight against terrorism. The epitome of this conundrum or mismatch 
is the concept of ‘polarity’ or polar-logic of analysis. It is also the linchpin of 
power-analysis underlying such important concepts as ‘power’, ‘great-power 
status’ and ‘actorness’.383  
 
5.3. Nonpolarity  
Arguments of polarity are derived from the balance of power theory. 
Balance of power and hegemony are two opposite concepts that correspond to 
different structural situations of world affairs. ‘Polarity’ intrinsically denotes 
rivalry. When there are no groups of states that balance each other, than polarity 
loses meaning. The situation turns to be hegemony, where a dominant power exists 
and the rest of the states are mostly complicit in its status. 
According to the balance of power theory, when there is no balance of 
power or balancing acts of states in the system, the system becomes hegemonic.384 
Wohlforth et al makes the point clear that in our day, it is hegemony and not the 
balance of power that is explanatory. While this is true, current hegemonic system 
(American hegemony) does not exclude non-state entities and their political clout. 
At times, they even undercut the hegemon’s power as seen in the imbroglio of 
Afghanistan and Iraq in human and economic toll and regarding international 
prestige and reputation in inter-state relations, and also international legitimacy-
wise regarding international public opinion at the societal level. 
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Another notable factor is the financial crises started off by the transnational 
corporations (2001 and 2008 world financial crises) and the scourge of terrorism 
and organized crime that are out of hegemonic control. These are huge power-
determining factors that American hegemony cannot control. 
That does not outright negate the hegemony of the US; yet, it limits it on 
another level: The hegemon’s power is limited by the globalization of non-state 
influence. Put differently, the US is not balanced by the rest of states at the unit-
level; however, it is checked at the transnational level by the trans-boundary 
working mechanism of the global economy that includes merger of state economies 
and corporations into one another and by the private or non-state perpetrators of 
global violence. Thus, non-polarity is the qualified hegemony where there is no 
balance of power in the system (where other states do not balance the US), yet 
meanwhile the hegemony is qualified or reserved in that it is vulnerable to the 
transnational mechanisms and entities. That is ‘non-polarity’, which does not leave 
out non-state entities as the traditional conception of hegemony does. Nonpolarity 
can be called ‘circumscribed hegemony under globalization’.  
Richard Haass provides fresh analysis that helps answer the current conflict 
and cooperation environment that leads to nonpolarity or circumscribed hegemony 
under globalization. He argues that current state of international relations is non-
polar.385 The original abstract of his article is, ‘The United States' unipolar moment 
is over. International relations in the twenty-first century will be defined by 
nonpolarity. Power will be diffused rather than concentrated, and the influence of 
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nation-states will decline as that of non-state actors increases’.386 
What did not change, however, is that there are still scarce resources at the 
disposal of states, and their ability to turn power into influence and achieve results 
are circumscribed. In other words, the way power is used or exercised has 
additional unconventional forms that defy traditional use of power. This 
circumscribing or limitation of states occurs through several developments, first of 
which is the relative rise in the clout of non-state entities. As discussed previously, 
that is a relative issue; one of degrees and metrics, not absolutes. States are still 
strong actors in the absolute sense. However, relative-gains of non-state entities 
seem to be more than those of states. That is the aggregated result of the factors that 
are elaborated and discussed in the previous chapter. Reminding them in a nutshell, 
those factors are power diffusion, waning of major war, spread of power-resources 
around the world, rise of the global middle class, advanced technology and 
transportation and unconventional usage of power by disparate non-state entities 
that co-opt/cooperate or challenge/clash with states. The effect of these factors is 
manifested as nonpolarity. Haass sums it up: 
“The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations 
is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even 
several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various 
kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past.”  
Multipolarity comprises several distinct poles or concentrations of power 
that by and large dominate international politics. Without doubt, powers are 
regarded as being nation-states in the conceptualization of multipolarity in contrast 
to the non-polar international system, which is characterized by numerous state and 
                     
386Haass, Richard. 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, Foreign 
Affairs, May/June. 
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non-state centers with meaningful power.387Haass asserts that the system is neither 
multipolar nor unipolar because contemporary state of international affairs presents 
diffusion of power, not concentration of it in a pole. Diffusion of power goes 
against the intrinsic condition of multipolarity, namely the concentration of power 
clustered around several actors, which mostly dominate international relations. 
Today, non-state power-foci accompany nation-states. Besides, no single state or 
groups of states dominate politics, and therefore power is not concentrated.388  
 
5.3.1. A Closer Look at Prima Facie Multipolarity  
Since power does not revolve around two positions as it was the case during 
the Cold War, the system is not bipolar after the demise of the former USSR. The 
system is not unipolar either, because no single power dominates it. The US is not 
dominating and controlling the world as was the case during the 1990s389; when 
compared to other actors, its relative power and influence have diminished as will 
be mentioned shortly. The system, then, appears to be a multipolar one;  
Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's world differs in a 
fundamental way from one of classic multipolarity: there are many more power 
centers, and quite a few of these poles are not nation-states. Indeed, one of the 
cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have 
lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. 
States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from 
                     
387Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance” 
Foreign Affairs p.1.; Kupchan, Charles A., and Peter L. Trubowitz. 2008 “Correspondence: Of Polarity 
and Polarization” 
[reply to Parent and Bafumi], 33:1, pp. 170–173. 
388 Maoz, Zeev. 2006. “Network Polarization, Network Interdependence, and International Conflict 
1816–2002” 
Journal of Peace Research Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 391–411.  
389Calleo, David P. 2009. Follies of Power-America’s Unipolar Fantasy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in 
many places.390 
Moreover, classic multipolarity assumes several or a limited group of states 
(not many states) that set the rules of international relations. Multipolarity does not 
convey all or most of the states in the world; it refers to several states which are 
separated from others in differential power and influence. It is the higher strata or 
group of states that are more powerful and influential than the rest. In contrast to 
multipolarity, today there are too many rising nation-states around the world that 
defy any concentration of power. No principal state or groups of state set the rules 
of the international game. Indeed, no groupings of states rival each other 
meaningfully.391 
Multipolar systems can be cooperative assuming the form of a Concert of 
Powers392, in which a few major powers work together on setting the rules of the 
game and disciplining those who violate them. They can also be more competitive 
revolving around a balance of power and it may become conflictual when the 
balance breaks down.393The current system is neither competitive nor conflictual in 
these traditional senses. It is not traditionally conflictual to give way to war among 
major states such as the US, the EU members, China, India, Russia and 
Japan.394Besides, spheres of influence are not demarcated according to a polar 
                     
390Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance” 
Foreign Affairs p.3. 
391Schweller Randall L. 2001. “The Problem of International Order Revisited-A Review Essay of G. 
John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major 
Wars.” International Security Vol. 26, No. 1 Summer, pp. 161–186. 
392Jervis, Robert. 1985. “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation” 
World Politics Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 58-79. 
393Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft & Henry 
Kissinger, www.charlierose.com; 
394Waning of major war or leading power peace argument excludes Russia, India, and China from its 
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configuration as was the case previously. Spheres of influence of the two 
superpowers included more than their immediate neighborhoods during the Cold 
War and they were clearly known to all states. The ‘cold’ war was mainly over the 
control of Europe, control over which seesawed or kept changing the balance of 
power with problems for the application of the balance of power theory itself in the 
aftermath of the superpower rivalry.395Under current circumstances, there is not a 
similar axis on which such a balance of power vacillates. Nor is the case similar to 
Concert of Powers system.396 
In the post-Cold War environment, no power or group of power disciplined 
Russian 2008 intervention in Georgia397 or the Kosovo and Iraq interventions of the 
U.S. in 1999 and 2003 respectively. The examples are meant to highlight that no 
bunch of nation-states is capable of ruling the world, setting the game-rules and 
punishing the violators. In fact, there are not commonly agreed rules either, leaving 
aside the diplomatic tact and lip-service paid to alleged commonalities. Sovereign 
non-intervention principle has already been broken.398 
Importantly, there is not even a rough consensus among major powers such 
as the US, Russia, China, India, Japan and the EU as to what the rules of the 
international game are.  This is not multipolarity as the concept has it. Rough 
                                                                
scope of peace among major states for they are not regarded as major states by the proponents of the 
argument as presented in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, it is also true that no war has occurred between 
Russia, China, India, the US, the EU and Japan since the second half of the twentieth century. 
395For an intriguing argument on the strengths and weakness of the balance of power theory and its 
usage, Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, 
Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing 
Balance-of-Power Theory in World History” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 13-2: 
155–185. 
396Rich, Norman. 1992. Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., pp. 28-44. 
397Russia fought a brief war with Georgia in 2008 and is still vexed by what it describes as NATO 
support for the ex-Soviet state, a crucial transit route for Caspian Sea oil and gas to Europe long 
controlled by Moscow. 
398Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention literature is simply too wide to be cited, yet the following 
conveys the gist of the point: Applegarth, Claire and Andrew Block. March 2009. “Acting Against 
Atrocities: A Strategy for Supporters of the Responsibility to Protect” Discussion Paper 09-03, Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. 
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consensus regarding international affairs is absent unlike the period of Concert of 
Powers or balance of power system before the World Wars. Rough consensus, 
explicit or implicit, is another component of multipolarity; yet, it is lacking as of 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.399 There is no contemporary Consensus 
among nations as similar to that demonstrated by the Concert of Powers or the 
Congress system in the nineteenth century or by the European diplomatic history of 
the times when United Kingdom was an off-shore balancer to the continental 
Europe. Non-intervention in sovereign states was one of the main elements of the 
consensus in multipolarity. Intervention in any state was a casus belli that almost 
all powers backed up unlike the case starting from the 1990s. 
There is no traditional multipolarity to gauge the system by a core of group 
of states that are to be poles. Before the Cold War, the system was multipolar. After 
the two world wars, it ended up being bipolar. With the demise of the USSR, it was 
unipolar for about a decade under American leadership during the 1990s.  
Prima facie, it has resemblances to multipolarity, yet on close inspection it 
is not multipolar. Current appearances of multipolarity are misleading: Although, 
‘the major powers - China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the 
United States - contain just over half the world's people and account for 75 percent 
of global GDP and 80 percent of global defense spending’, the picture also includes 
rising nation-states and non-state formations that are detailed in the previous 
                     
399Rough consensus on the basic contours of the international system is lacking: Sovereignty and 
nonintervention principle is challenged by Western nations, whereas Asian powers such as Russia and 
China strongly disagree with the West on the issue. Needless to remind, sovereign independence and 
noninterference are the heart of the nation-state system that is being eroded by the western interventions 
in the Balkans and the Middle East during the 1990s well into the twenty-first century. The argument is 
that liberal interventionism in the name of human rights and democracy clashes with the notion of 
sovereign non-intervention and independence. Secondly, although 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia 
was seen as a response to Balkan and Iraqi operations by the US, Russia is far cry away from balancing 
the US; it is rather reactive and on the defense. 
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chapters.400 They are also summarized by Haass in the quotation below: 
In addition to the six major world powers (China, the European Union (EU), India, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States),401 there are numerous regional powers: Brazil 
and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria 
and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; 
Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and 
Oceania. A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including 
those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World 
Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the 
International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the 
World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nation-states, such as 
California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and 
Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate 
the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion 
would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, 
Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and 
movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more 
benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, 
Greenpeace). Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than 
concentrated, power.402  
  
The crux of the above quotation corresponds to this dissertation, which 
posits the power-foci as states and non-states. States are sub-grouped as major and 
regional states. Non-states are sub-grouped as market, illicit and moral authorities: 
transnational corporations (market authority), transnational criminal and terrorist 
organizations (illicit authority) and various types of non-governmental 
organizations (moral authority).  
As to keep explaining why the system is not multipolar, the balance of 
power between western powers and middle powers are changing in a way favoring 
lesser states or subalterns. This has not, however, turned India, Brazil, China and 
other strengthening middle states into challenger or revisionist states. They are just 
relatively better-off when the power-analysts are taken into consideration.403 
                     
400The figures are of 2008 from National Intelligence Council and R. Haas. 
401Parenthetical information is added in order to remind the major powers as defined by Haass. 
Underlinings and italics are added to highlight the main theme of the quotation.  
402Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance” 
Foreign Affairs; italics and underlining are added.  
403Wohlforth, William. 2007. “Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis,” Harvard International 
Review, pp. 42-46. 
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All in all, that does not constitute a group of states that control the world by 
and large though multipolarity: There are major powers with differing vantage 
points on world politics, but there are also rising middle powers as candidates of 
major power status. Rising middle powers assert their influence countering major 
powers short of external military balancing - that is forming military alliances 
against the West. Rather, economic and political alignments such as Shanghai 
Cooperation Council are seemingly of concern to power politics. 
Yet again, that does not translate to a concentration of power among middle 
powers so as to speak of a pole-such alignments are not defensively structured 
international organizations against a commonly perceived threat-that is they are not 
defensive security alliances as was the case for the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It 
represents the urge of partner states to form collective security institutions that 
protect themselves from one another in the wake of the demise of the Soviet 
influence in Central Asia, rather than balancing other states. That is, the alignments 
do not create a tight concentration of power nor do they deter other states, playing 
effectively as a pole in the mechanisms of balance of power. They are inward 
oriented, rather than outward oriented.404  
Currently, there are centers with meaningful power but that presents neither 
a classic multipolar aggrandizement or power-distribution, nor a classic balance of 
power matrix. Power is not concentrated. It is diffused. The way power is used to 
control the world does not work through poles, but through different power-foci; or 
via Haass, it works through many power centers including both nation-states and 
non-state entities. That is why power-analysis itself and terms such as ‘polarity’ do 
not do justice to current developments. Polarity assumes notable concentration of 
                     
404Gleason, Gregory and Marat E. Shaihutdinov. 2005. “Collective Security and Non-State Actors in 
Eurasia” International Studies Perspectives 6, pp. 281-282. 
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power. If concentration is not possible, no state or grouping can control most of the 
international conduct or the mainstream international relations as is currently the 
case. When there are many nation-states that have meaningful power as is the case 
today, the scope of the concept of multipolarity enlarges too much in a way that 
makes it meaningless. In other words, power is concentrated anywhere and 
everywhere. The world is neither western-centric nor eastern-centric. This is 
because of the diffusion of power world over that makes the world out of control by 
a single, two or several states.  
The basic premise of multipolarity is the concentrated form of power by a 
small group of states that more or less agree on the implicit or customary way to 
conduct international relations via setting rules and punishing violators. When there 
are many states as listed in Haass’ quotation, the concentrated-ness of power is 
disappearing. This is because there are way too many power-foci that diffuse the 
power-concentration to dominate world politics by a system of poles.  
Regarding Iraqi imbroglio, William Wohlforth maintains that ‘…but the 
example of Iraq exhibits a balance of power dynamic between states and non-state 
insurgents, not one between several states’.405This is exactly right on the mark in 
that non-state involvement in politics and warfare (ranging from Israel-Lebanon-
Palestine conflicts to Iraq-Afghanistan-Sudan and Somalia inferno and extending to 
the series of terrorist attacks following September 11) forces observers to 
reconsider or make modifications to the traditional rules of power analysis. That is 
why Wohlforth and Haas assert different kinds of structural situations, unipolarity 
and nonpolarity respectively. The way they assess ‘power’ is different in that while 
Wohlforth is relatively rigid in taking states as the unit of analysis, Haas relaxes the 
                     
405Wohlforth, William. 2007. “Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis,” Harvard International 
Review, p. 45. 
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unit of analysis to include non-state entities next to nation-states despite keeping 
the structural outlook.  
Non-state formations are not nation-states that work in a hierarchical and 
vertical manner and it is thereby not easy to include them in the balance of power 
analysis applied for nation-states. This is so also because of the nature of non-state 
entities and the ambiguous threats they pose, which are explained in chapters one 
and two.   
Utmost importantly, what Wohlforth fails to recognize is that ‘state-to-
nonstate dynamic’ is active not only in the Afghanistan and Iraqi cases, but they are 
active in most dimensions of international relations.406Afghanistan and Iraq are 
places where state-to-nonstate conflict is magnified, especially for the military-
oriented security eye. However, without the state-to-nonstate dynamic is globalized 
around the world, Afghan and Iraqi cases cannot materialize as the way they do. It 
is not tenable to think of native insurgents and the Al-Qaeda to sustain in Iraq 
without the diffusion of power (and thereby waning of major war among major 
states, spread of economy, military, skill, education, media-informatics and due 
transatlantic divergence, advanced technology, transportation and unconventional 
usage of power as both terrorist warfare and insurgency and ideological 
propaganda) affecting state policies. The role of international public opinion and 
international organizations alongside the roles played by non-state market, illicit 
and moral authorities feed the current conflict environment. Since the question of 
how these factors affect international relations has already been detailed, they are 
not repeated here. 
 
                     
406Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics” International 
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 Winter, pp. 39-75. 
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What implication does nonpolarity have for theory (analytical schemes) and 
practice (policy-world)? The Cold War frame of the mind must not prevent 
observers from questioning and updating especially when some father-figures of 
traditional concepts are already updating their analysis to match current 
developments on the ground.407 Although Wohlforth’s usage of the phrase (‘a 
balance of power dynamic between states and non-state insurgents, not one 
between several states’) is appropriate in that the relation is one of state-to-
nonstate, the very term ‘balance of power’ is questionable in its usage to depict a 
relation among states and non-state entities.408 The way power is used is changing 
as Brent Scowcroft has put it,409 and that is why power-analysis that defines great-
power status, actorness and polarity must be reconsidered. As long as several non-
state entities influence international politics and security, the parameters of power-
analysis should be updated. Since most of the contemporary conflicts are intra-state 
and transnational short of major conventional battles between nation-states, the 
politics among nations is not easily separable from transnational threats. 
Accordingly, the facts that power and authority are diffused; non-state actors 
entered the stage of politics and security; and that the way non-states use power in a 
way different from that of states (that is at the societal levels of countries around 
the world within a mix or blurring of the categorical distinctions between national-
international, foreign-domestic, civil-military, economics-politics) constitute 
reasons for reconsidering power-analysis itself. 
 
                     
407Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria 
Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-
Power Theory in World History” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 13-2: 155–185. 
408Conversation with Robert Pape. 2009. Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. 
409A conversation with Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser and Carlos Pascual, 
Brookings vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings-
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10249 
334 
 
5.3.2. ‘Unipolar’ Moment Is Gone –  
What about the American Standing in the World? 
According to the balance of power theory and alliance theory, ‘unipolarity’ 
is a misnomer. So-called ‘unipolarity’ denotes hegemony410 because when the 
system lacks at least two poles in opposition, there is not a balancing of power by 
states.411 Hegemony, by definition, denotes lack of balance of power. Given that no 
state militarily balances the US, it seems fit to be named as a hegemon. However, 
due to the involvement of non-state entities into politics, American hegemony is 
qualified under globalization.412 This structural situation of qualified hegemony 
under globalization is called non-polarity. This structural factor appears to have a 
negative effect on alignments and alliances. It reduces the solidarity and unity of 
purpose among state groupings or alignments after the Cold War in the absence of 
a common threatening pole/state that rises as a balancer.  
For why the international system is not unipolar since the beginning of the 
twentieth-century, it is worth noting that the United States cannot channel, or via 
Pressman, control most of the international conduct as was the case during the 
1990s.413 When compared to other actors, its relative power and influence have 
diminished. Relative decline in American influence does not refer to weakness, but 
rather its tetchy and less effective policies when compared to its earlier influential 
                     
410‘Hegemony’ is used as the term that denotes preponderance of power; it is not used in any other 
sense. 
411Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria 
Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-
Power Theory in World History” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 13-2: 155–185. 
412Haass, Richard. 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, Foreign 
Affairs May/June; Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics” 
International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 Winter, pp. 39-75. 
413Jeremy, Pressman. 2009. “Power without Influence - The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy 
Failure in the Middle East” International Security Vol. 33 No. 4 Spring, pp. 149–179; Srinivasan, 
Krishnan. 2009. “International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century”, Commonwealth Journal 
of International Affairs the Round Table 98:400, 37-47. 
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status that achieved most of its goals.414 
The US, without any need to align with other states, constituted the one-
and-only pole during the 1990s. 1990s were remarkably different from the Cold 
War years in that the US was freed from the Soviet balancer and ‘the European 
chains’. Although European powers were minor partners, from the American 
perspective they constituted obstacles in the implementation of US policies. That 
European nuisance was gone with the greatly diminished Russian influence in 
Eastern Europe after 1989. The last decade of the twentieth century was unipolar in 
that the US set most of the international agenda, enjoyed wide international support 
as exemplified in 1991 Gulf War and the Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990s. It 
dominated the international arena economically, culturally and militarily. Both its 
power and its influence were overwhelming so as to control or channel the 
international affairs. However as of the beginning of the 21st century, only the 
military wing of the American preeminence survived the unipolar 1990s.415  
                     
414Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. The Post-American World. NY: Norton and Company. As the way Zakaria 
starts his book by stating "This is not a book about the decline of America, but rather about the rise of 
everyone else", it argues for the relative decline (not the absolute decline) of the US. Like Calleo, it 
substantiates other states relative rising in international arena; Calleo, David P. 2007 “Unipolar 
Illusions” Survival 49:3, 73- 78; Calleo, David P. 2009. Follies of Power-America’s Unipolar Fantasy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Andrew, Mack. 1975. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: 
The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” World Politics 27-2. The dissertation, however, includes not only 
the rising states argument but also ‘the non-state relative rise’ both of which pave the way for a 
nonpolar environment. Although Jervis, Kissinger, Chua, Pape and Scowcroft do not pronounce the 
word ‘nonpolarity’, they are not reticent or disinterested: Jervis, Robert. 2005. American Foreign 
Policy in a New Era. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. “Theories of War in an Era of 
Leading-Power Peace,” American Political Science Review 96(1): 1-14; Jervis, Robert. 2002. 
“September 11: How has it Changed the World?” Political Science Quarterly 117(1): 37-54; Amy 
Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall Doubleday 
Publishing, October 2007; Kissinger, Henry. 2007. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a 
Diplomacy for the 21st Century, New York: Simon & Schuster; An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger, www.charlierose.com; Conversation with Robert A. Pape. 2009. 
Bilkent University Address, May 5 Bilkent-Ankara, Turkey. Pape maintained that the nonpolarity 
argument with its possible implication for a reconsideration of the traditional power analysis at large is 
worth serious consideration, and that it is a smart point of academic debate. 
415For the erosion of ideological hegemony and soft power of the US, its ‘liberal’ policies, Desch, 
Michael C. 2007/08. “The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy America’s 
Liberal Illiberalism” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 Winter, pp. 7–43; by the military account 
though, no nation compares to the US-calculations based on data from International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2008 London: IISS, 2008. The combined defense budget 
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By 2010, the US preeminence is challenged culturally, economically, 
financially and through unconventional form of warfare - transnational terrorism. In 
all these latter fields, the US performs poorly.416As a result of significant changes 
that have taken place in the security environment over the past several years, as 
well as changes that are expected to occur in the future, the United States once 
again finds itself in need of allies, perhaps as much as (if not more than) it did 
during the Cold War. Although the United States still remains the world’s 
preeminent global power, the scale of its advantage over potential rivals and 
competitors appears to be in the early stages of relative decline. Nations such as 
China, India, and perhaps Russia are now emerging (or re-emerging) as major 
powers that will increasingly compete with the United States and with one another 
for influence, and are likely to have a growing impact on international affairs in the 
years ahead. As a recent report by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) 
concluded, over the next two decades the increasing economic and military power 
of China and India in particular will give rise to an international system in which 
the United States “will remain the single most important actor but will be less 
dominant.” Similarly, Fareed Zakaria has argued that, “On every dimension other 
than military power — industrial, financial, social, cultural — the distribution of 
power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance.” In short, while a multipolar 
world order characterized by several great powers of nearly equal strength is 
unlikely to take shape for quite some time, long-term trends do point toward an 
                                                                
of NATO members, Japan and Australia alone is slightly more than $292 billion, while these nations 
have an active duty military strength of 2.5 million men and women.   
416Hoffman, Frank. “Assessing the Long War”. Foreign Policy Research Institute, January, 
www.fpri.org; Warde, Ibrahim. 2007. “The War on Terror, Crime and the Shadow Economy in the 
MENA Countries”, Mediterranean Politics, 12:2, 233-248; Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Qaeda’s Scorecard: 
A Progress Report on Al Qaeda’s Objectives” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29:509–529; Martinage, 
Robert C. 2008. Global War on Terror-An Assessment Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
(CSBA)-CSBAonline.org.  
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erosion of the substantial relative power advantage the United States has enjoyed 
for nearly twenty years.417 
Culturally and ideologically, it is challenged most notably by transnational 
terrorism (as a counter-hegemonic transnational ideology, which manifests itself in 
political (governmental clout in some states), missionary (transnational non-violent 
activist movement with various educational courses and charities of allegedly 
benign or humanist nature) and militant forms of Islamism. Politically, it is 
challenged by authoritarian states such as Russia, China and Iran alongside the 
above-mentioned political forms of Islamist governments in the Middle East.418 
The EU is at loggerheads with the US about the way liberal democracy fights 
terrorism. There is a highlighting difference between the ways the transatlantic 
partners understand political norms of democracy.419 Economically and financially, 
there are sovereign funds, rising states and transnational companies that forbid the 
US apex of power. The 2008-2009 global financial crises are a telling 
example.420Last but not least, the US is markedly dependent on sovereign funds 
and Middle Eastern rulers (Saudi Arabian in particular) in managing the world oil 
market.421This suffices for the economic and financial dependence of the US, not 
even mentioning the economic interdependence between China and America.422 
The US is not able to influence the world as much as it did previously, 
mainly because of the rising clout of middle powers and non-state entities. 
                     
417Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2009. Reshaping America’s Alliances for the Long Haul The Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). 
418Robert, Kagan. 2008.“The End of the End of History-Why the twenty-first century will look like the 
nineteenth The New Republic, April 23, www.tnr.com/environmentenergy/story.html?id=ee167382-
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419Zakaria, Fareed, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008, p. 43.  
420Khanna, Parag. 2008 “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” New York Times Magazine, January 27 and 
Robert A. Pape, 2009. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest January/February.  
421NIC. 2009 Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, National Intelligence Council (NIC) Report, 
November 2008, accessed at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html on January 3.  
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Journal of Contemporary China May 12:35. 
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Following Haass, rising states that limit US power are Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; 
Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; 
Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. Turkey can be 
added to this list as the rising country in the epicenter of the Middle East, the 
Caucasus and Europe.423  
What might replace or possibly accompany the pole-analysis then? One 
strong alternative is to see terrorist groups as ‘transnational advocacy entities”: 
Victor Asal et al details the approach alongside other scholars using the concept 
that is emergent.424 Krahmann gives one of the first notes on the implication of the 
approach upon transatlantic security analysis. The network analysis (through which 
the US is seen as an only strong-power-focus alongside other nation-states and non-
state entities rather than constituting a league of its own) is a promising concept of 
contemporary terrorism analysis. Approximating to the current nonpolar world 
                     
423Turkey is a transit-country of geography, energy and cultures with skilled and dense population of 
military and economic potential. 
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new terrorism and how dangerous is it?” Terrorism & Political Violence 13-3, pp. 1–14; Zanini, M. and 
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affairs, states and non-state entities might be likened to computers of different 
natures and capacity. Trying to translate this metaphor to social and political 
relations, network-analysis helps build cross-level analysis where domestic and 
foreign linkage of state policies can be further improved, by integrating Putnam’s 
framework for two-level analysis.425  
As for a rough and brief overview of the network approach to terrorism and 
international security, it can be noted that most of the above-mentioned rising 
nation-states might be regarded as notable nodes of a networked world of 
interconnectedness. They are like big server-computers in the current networked 
world. Although all states and non-state entities are connected to the system, there 
is neither a single main computer nor a compound of computers that can control 
and manipulate the system in its entirety. There are no mainstreams, but just the 
streams.  
However, states are not the only ones that have their way. Different 
ideological movements and their operatives are active within them, too. Pictured 
within such a political landscape of networks, the US unipolar moment of the 
1990s has gone passed the apogee: The US is just a strong node in and of the 
system that must always be kept in mind; yet, its exceptionalism is over.426It is 
apparently dependent on other nation-states and nonstate entities more than it 
realizes.427 
 
 
                     
425Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” 
International Organization 42-3, 427–461. 
426Kaldor, Mary. 2003. “American Power: From 'Compellance' to Cosmopolitanism?”  International 
Affairs Vol. 79, No. 1 January, pp. 1-22; Farer, Tom. 2004. “Toward an Effective International Legal 
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The most obvious need seem to be in the politics of energy and 
terrorism.428As in the Cold War, strategic and economic considerations, as well as 
cultural affinities, may often cut against ideology for most of the nation-
states.429Nevertheless, religionization of politics and politicization of religion 
simultaneously occur as a transnational ideology that cuts across countries -if not 
state apparatuses- at especially the societal level.430 Throughout history, followers 
of Judaism, Christianity and Islam have almost always claimed three distinct 
realms of universal truth, whose peculiar interpretations cause extremism. It is not 
the religions that cause problems though; the problem is the interpretations of 
people that lead to the religious conflicts, which serve both mundane and alleged 
sacred ends. This is currently most apparent in Jihadism, the violent wing of 
Islamism worldwide. It is also constitutes the most fervent counter-hegemonic 
response to the West in general and to the US in particular.431 Correspondingly, the 
war on terrorism is a fight against violent extremism. However, the American 
scorecard does not seem to be bright432, which might be regarded as indicative of 
non-influential policies that lead to American relative decline.  
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Transnational nature of jihadist ideology has become expansive partly due 
to the waning of major war. Waning of major war is an important feature of the 
current state of affairs among leading industrial states, without which non-state 
entities could not find fertile ground to operate. Currently, non-state entities find 
fertile ground to operate because nation-states do not clash in the world wars vein. 
Especially the Western countries do not even contemplate war among each 
other.433Non-state entities, especially terrorist groups, would most probably have to 
integrate into one of the belligerents should a world war among nation-states 
occurred. Therefore, neither a single power nor a group of states can control 
contemporary non-state entities and consequent extremism. That is valid for all 
states including the US.434 
To make it clearer what is meant by the declining relative power and 
influence of the US, the correlation and nuance between ‘power’ and ‘influence’ 
must be underlined: ‘Influence’ is taken to be the ability to achieve results. It is 
correlated to and arising from, but not necessarily equal to “power” defined as raw, 
latent or potential capacity. Accordingly, “influence” or actual, applied or kinetic 
capacity is the successful application of power, which affects the behavior of others 
to achieve results.435Power must be translated into influence, and as such unit-level 
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leadership and diplomacy are involved in exerting influence. Nation-states may 
remain powerful without much influence at times because the behaviors of nation-
state are not only formed under the systemic effects that condition state behavior in 
a constraining or permissive manner, but they are also derived by leadership 
quality, negotiation skill, information gathering and analysis and calculations of 
benefits for domestic politicking and availability of venues for cooperation. 
Power can be seen as of two kinds: Hard (tangible) power and soft 
(intangible) power. Hard power is of military and economic capacity, while soft 
power is the ability to attract others and move opinion. Therefore, 'power over 
opinions' is an element of power. E. H. Carr described international power in three 
categories: military, economic and power over opinion. Joseph S. Nye renames and 
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enhances Carr's 'power over opinion' concept as 'soft power'.436 Soft power is the 
ability to co-opt rather than coerce others. Soft power (the ability to attract others or 
power over opinion) rests on the ability to shape preferences of others without 
tangible threats (sticks). Without the threat of military force or economic sanctions, 
a country may get what it wants because other states want to follow it: It may 
admire its values, emulate its example and aspire after its level of prosperity. It is 
thus about capability of agenda-setting, attraction, and co-opting rather than 
commanding, coercion or threats. 
American soft power in the world is said to be low since the 2003 Iraq War. 
This has a reality to it when viewed in recent historical conjuncture (the first 
decade of 2000s). However, it can be maintained that it has a big soft power when 
seen from the long historical continuum. In comparison to other states, it has been a 
bigger center of attraction. Although American foreign policy may be viewed 
unfavorably by some quarters, its vast array of products, sports, prosperity, political 
regime, multi-faceted entertainment industry, universities, scientific pioneering or 
research and development in civil and military sectors still attract people, and 
people want to emulate it. These elements add up to America's attraction or soft 
power, and they still enable America to set the world agenda to some extent. By 
Carr's standards, America's cumulative score of all three kinds of power (military, 
economic and power over opinion) is high. Nevertheless, this does not negate the 
relative decline in the American power and a decline in its influence in particular. 
From the beginning of the twenty-first century onwards, the relative decline in 
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American influence (the ability to achieve results) is manifest with regard to both 
other nation-states and non-state entities.437 
Viewed in historical terms, the first decade is just a moment. It cannot be 
foretold that the decline will continue indefinitely. Yet again, the first decade of 
twenty-first century must be included in the explanation herein: As for the relations 
of the US with other states, American ability to persuade other states to accept its 
policies or dissuade unwelcome behaviors is decreasing. As Hoffmann and Watts 
underline, even a state as powerful as the US cannot achieve results when it suffers 
from ‘strategic thinking deficiency (STD)’.438Sky-rocketing anti-Americanism at 
world large following the Iraqi war of 2003 certainly did not help the US in 
hedging against its decreasing influence throughout the world.439 Indeed, it is the 
basic indication of relative decline in American influence after 2003.440 
Nation-states are commonly argued to be behaviorally powerful/influential 
to the extent they can influence the behavior of other nations.441 Turning soft or 
hard power into influence is based upon successful strategizing and application of 
power/both in its hard and soft forms. Successful strategizing requires activation of 
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collective wisdom of a nation, which consists roughly of authorities ranging from 
seemingly minor agencies such as those dealing with water-management up to 
government and possibly extending to intelligentsia consisting of retired 
policymakers, diplomats, analysts, think-tanks and academics.442 Therefore, turning 
soft or hard power into influence is a matter of skill, vision, wisdom and leadership 
for any state. In a complex world, quality of leadership, making decisions and 
prioritization are ever vital because transnational interactions complicates the 
problems of issue-linkage and trade-offs among different policies of states. 
In a nonpolar environment where horizontally operating non-state entities 
are active at the societal level and across all nations, vertically structured nation-
states surprisingly find their sovereign structure as an unfit organizational scheme 
to respond strategically.443 Moreover, as a consequence of strategic thinking 
deficiency, the scale of violence is misunderstood. The conflated scale of 
violence444 is a conundrum for states whose responses against terrorism and their 
efficiency evolved to be controversial.  As a corollary, legitimacy questions 
especially regarding use of force did not leave unattended to the advantage of the 
terrorists. From ‘the logic of consequences policy-making perspective,’445when 
declared goals are not fast accomplished or partial or not achieved at all, legitimacy 
questions rise and new policies are sought in the face of failure, which strengthens 
violent non-state groups both at recruitment, motivational and propaganda levels.   
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Most of the international developments in the aftermath of the September 
11 horrific attacks testify to the relative decline in American influence-its ability to 
achieve results. In the very first place, September 11 itself was a clear indication 
that the world is no longer unipolar for what kind of a hegemon could be hit in such 
a magnitude: Ashton B. Carter put it succinctly,  “On 11 September, 2001, the post-
Cold War security bubble finally burst.”446 Iraq and Afghanistan imbroglio turned 
unsuccessful to a large extent, arguably creating failed states rather than states of 
democracy and stability. The latter perspective on failed states became a 
fundamental reason for transatlantic disagreement after 2003. Those interventions 
ostensibly increased the hotbed of terrorism and insurgency rather than curtailing or 
crippling terrorism.  
Financial control is out of American hands, too. Post-war international 
system (whether economically, normatively, financially, international 
organizations-wise or militarily) is eroding fast in a way that leaves no nation-state 
in charge. It is hard to see any hegemony of any nation-state leaving aside 
observers’ emotional wishful thinking originating in biased likings or favoritism.447 
Simply almost all political developments at world large indicate a relative decline 
of American influence, most obviously reflected in worldwide anti-Americanisms. 
The United States lost its ‘hegemony of the heart’448 and antagonized the world. 
‘Hegemony of the heart’ is not mere literal fine-wording. It denotes the eroding 
credibility and reputation of the US. Credibility and reliability is one of the most 
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precious power assets for states in international relations. That is also why America 
still stands tall as a major power, but not a hegemon owing to the above-mentioned 
reasons - save the military realm. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
UNIT-LEVEL FACTORS CONDITIONING INTER-STATE 
COOPERATION AND ALIGNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM 
 
 
 
    6.1. Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism 
6.1.1. The Concept of ‘Strategic Culture’ 
The two sides of the Atlantic represent the major international actors that 
have a history of close cooperation. Since the EU-member states and the US have a 
significant weight in sustaining the international system economically, financially, 
ideologically and militarily, their cooperation in defending against transnational 
terrorism is one of the most determining factors in the wider international fight 
against terrorism. In accordance, the divergence and convergence between the US 
and the EU is examined through the concept of ‘strategic culture’.  
Strategic culture denotes that states are predisposed by their historical 
experiences to deal with security threats. Hans Mouritzen defines ‘strategic culture’ 
as “past geopolitics in the minds of the foreign policy elite”.449 The historical 
experience of a nation-state carries the biggest burden in the concept of strategic 
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culture.450 Although a state’s strategic decisions may be affected by its level of 
technological sophistication, economic prowess or military readiness, the concept 
usage presumes that strategic choices of a state will mostly be determined by its 
past experiences. Institutional memories will shape how threats are assessed, and 
they will condition the responses.451 Institutional memories are assumed to have 
greater weight in determining policies in the case of an unprecedented threat 
experience than in the case where threat profile is low and seen as usual. Meidinger 
maintains that officials internalize norms associated with a strategic culture, which 
determine the way policy courses are chosen. He asserts that a suggested policy can 
be ruled out on the grounds that it is incompatible with ‘the way we do things’.452 
Caroline Ziemke’s explanation of the concept sees it as state’s self-conception, 
mediated though the historical experience of its past conflicts. Historical experience 
and strategic culture are often argued to be connected though a process of reasoning 
by analogy. ‘Decision-makers tend to focus strongly on the commanding heights of 
their past strategic experience, navigating in terms of major episodes which are 
regarded as successes or failures’.453 These guiding experiences ‘have burned 
themselves deeply into the national psyche and have significant unconscious 
meaning’.454 Munich and Suez, Vietnam and Somalia and more recently 
Afghanistan and Iraq are examples for the Reiter’s term ‘the shadow of the 
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past’,455which refers to past experiences of geopolitics or simply the strategic 
culture’s evolution. ‘Strategic culture’ is a conceptual tool that mainly addresses 
military security. Strategic culture or strategic personality of a nation has been 
closely connected with defence affairs and war-fighting problems.456 
The strategic cultures of the EU and the US regarding counterterrorism are 
comparatively examined herein. In accordance, it is appropriate to note the 
counterterrorism literature’s classification of state-responses to terrorism. The 
literature mainly identifies three nation-state responses to terrorism: first, military-
led approaches focused on a mixture of pre-emption, deterrence and retribution; 
secondly, regulatory or legal-judicial responses that seek to enhance the criminal 
penalties for terrorist activities and improve civil-police cooperation; and thirdly, 
appeasing options, ranging from accommodation to concession.457The choice of 
these responses and the way they are implemented are shaped by the strategic 
culture of a nation.  The predispositions or inclinations in responding threats 
originates from accustomed ways in which states decide to act as they have been 
filtered throughout a nation’s past experiences in managing threats. These are not 
only entrenched in decision-makers’ mental-maps, but they are enshrined in the 
values of the political regime of a state. 
The US strategic culture, which has deep historical roots back to its early 
days of establishment, is congruent with the first kind of response as specified by 
the literature. Described as ‘a dangerous nation’458or ‘trigger-happy nation’,459 the 
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457 Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic 
divergence or convergence?” International Affairs 81, 5, pp. 905-923. 
458 Kagan, Robert. 2007. Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World, from its Earliest Days to the 
351 
 
gist of its strategic culture can be summarized by the belief of ‘exceptionalism’. In 
the literature, ‘American exceptionalism’ is argued to be the self-anointed belief 
that its political and moral values are superior to the values of the rest of the world 
and justify its position of leadership. ‘Exceptionalism’ as a core element of the 
American strategic culture has given it a sense of world-wide mission and an 
unquestioning confidence that its policies are in the broadest interests of 
humanity.460 
Second element of the American strategic culture is the predisposition to use 
force in carrying out its policies, which are carved out in the light of its sense of 
exceptionalism. As Wyn and Aldrich emphasizes,  
This self-belief (in exceptionalism) has been allied to strategies that seek ways to 
leverage its vast material and technological power. It has predisposed American policy-
makers towards a national security culture that privileges a military response. As a 
superpower, the US sees the use of force as an important signal of resolve within the 
international community. Its military gives the US a global reach and ensures that no 
targets are beyond its ability to strike. Since 9/11, increased American spending on 
defence (and especially defence research) relative to other major powers has 
accentuated this emphasis.461 
 
Wyn and Aldrich’s argument seems tenable given the huge military spending 
and proliferation of American foreign military bases and intelligence 
instillations.462 According to Johnston, who examined 2005 official Pentagon data, 
the US is claimed to own a total of 737 military bases in foreign lands.463In sum, 
American strategic culture is marked by keywords such as ‘Status of Forces 
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Agreements (SOFAs)’,464 ‘full-spectrum-dominance’, ‘forward-defense’465 
‘Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)’ and ‘global power projection’ with 
considerable military reach to all corners of the world. The latter terms are 
operationalized through a world-wide network of military bases. 
Third element of the US strategic culture is creating connections among 
national security threats: 
US strategic culture has also led to international terrorism being linked to a nexus of 
other threats. America’s sense of its global responsibilities has meant that it has long 
been concerned with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and states that 
reject the prevailing order (states of concern). Even prior to 9/11, the Clinton 
administration was warning of the potential linkages between international terrorist 
groups and ‘states of concern’.466 
 
 
As for the EU, its strategic culture is mostly shaped by the lessons it drived 
from the World Wars. Its strategic culture is not shaped by the World Wars per se, 
but distinctively it is shaped by the lessons Europe took from the battlefields. The 
strategic culture of Europe manifests itself in the decline of major war among 
European states. Many nations fought wars since time immemorial but it is only 
Europe that shuns the use of force as yet. Although the former Soviet threat -as a 
unifying effect for the European states during the Cold War- is no more, Europe 
has not turned ‘back to the future’.467Classical balance of power politics did not 
return to the European stage. That is, according to Jervis, the single most important 
development in the entire history of international security. Jervis evaluates it to be 
much more important than the implications of September 11, 2001 attacks for both 
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the US and other states.468 
It is accustomed by now that major powers do not go to war among each 
other. It is a development that seems to be taken for granted. However, in historical 
terms, it is a significant development that major wars do not occur. It might be seen 
as a historical aberration, but it simply exists.  
No war among the most powerful nation-states took place after the end of 
the Second World War. As important as the debates on the causes of the waning of 
major war (such as whether democratic peace theory has explanatory power or not), 
it is, in and of itself, important from the international security perspective that wars 
do not occur: Simply because war and the possibility of war among the great 
powers has been the essence of international affairs that influence the boundaries, 
shape of material advantages, political regimes and values, internal arrangements 
and the fate of smaller units. The absence of war signals a change in the way the 
latter aspects of international politics are affected and gauged. 
The decline or waning of major war is overwhelmingly the result of the 
European strategic culture. The security community that is developed by Europe 
has manifested itself in a supranational body of institutions that can be summarized 
by the EU itself. As an intertwined but nevertheless separate institutional 
arrangement from the EU member-states, the EU is institutional embodiment of the 
strategic culture that avoids use of force. It favours non-military instruments such 
as multilateral diplomacy, public diplomacy, law-enforcement, intelligence and 
humanitarian aid with a strong emphasis on the rule of law in the implementation 
of all its policies. 
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The gap between the two strategic cultures of the transatlantic partners is 
demonstrated by the different responses of the EU and the US to terrorism: 
The US declared a ‘global war on terrorism’ and directed the full resources of a 
‘national security’ approach towards the threat posed by a ‘new terrorism’. Overseas 
policy has been shaped by the identification of a nexus linking international 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WDM) and ‘states of concern’. At home the 
US has undertaken major changes to its governmental structure, tightened controls at 
points of entry into the country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement 
officers and courts, and overhauled its intelligence and security agencies. In contrast, 
Europe has conceived the problem differently. It has conceptualized radical Islam in 
less absolute terms, and accordingly its approach to counterterrorism has 
emphasized ‘regional multilateralism’ rather than ‘global unilateralism’. European 
countries’ military forces have attempted to encourage peacekeeping, reconstruction 
and security sector reform as well as partaking in gruelling counterinsurgency 
operations. Their foreign policies have continued to emphasize the containment of 
risk and consensus-building. Domestically, legal changes relating to surveillance and 
civil rights have been less sweeping, while the enhancements to internal security 
architecture have been more modest. Underpinning this different approach is not 
only a European desire to draw on some of the lessons from decades of 
counterterrorism, but also a growing conviction that the ‘newness’ of the threat 
posed by Al-Qaeda has been exaggerated. The implications of these divergent 
cultures for the future of the relationship between Europe and the United States are 
enormous.469 
 
6.1.2. Historical Experience with Terrorism 
The US did not confront a major domestic terrorist threat. The American 
experience of terrorism has been primarily restricted to its military and diplomatic 
presence overseas till the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. The small 
number of terrorist attacks makes a quick list possible: The attack on US Marines 
in Beirut in 1983 killed 240 Marines. A decade later, on June 21, 1998 rocket-
propelled grenades explosions near the U.S. embassy in Beirut topped the 
headlines. On August 7, 1998 terrorist bombs destroyed the U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In Nairobi, 12 Americans are among 
the 291 killed, and over 5,000 are wounded, including 6 Americans. In Dar es 
Salaam, one U.S. citizen is wounded among the 10 killed and 77 injured.  
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In response to the attacks on the US presence in Kenya and Tanzania, the 
United States attacked targets in Afghanistan and Sudan with over 75 cruise 
missiles fired from Navy ships in the Arabian and Red seas on August 20. About 
60 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from warships in the Arabian Sea. Most 
struck six separate targets in a camp near Khost, Afghanistan. Simultaneously, 
about 20 cruise missiles were fired from U.S. ships in the Red Sea striking a factory 
in Khartoum, Sudan, which was suspected of producing components for making 
chemical weapons.  
Yet, it was not until the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the 
federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 that the US experienced serious 
terrorism within its own homeland. This absence of a significant domestic threat 
caused domestic counterterrorism capacity to wane. There was a feeling that the 
country was invulnerable. This misperception became evident by the attacks on 
September 11, 2001. The intensity of the US reaction to September 11 attacks was 
possibly a reflection of the enormous loss of life that gave the US the political will 
to use force readily on the international stage.  
The unprecedented shock that is inflicted upon the American body-politic is 
the key accelerating or igniting factor of the age-old American national security 
culture. The attacks are fundamental in understanding American foreign policy in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.470Although it seems common sense at face value, 
it does not appear to be regarded as such by the decision-makers in other capitals 
when they evaluate post-9/11 American policies. A country that is hit and 
experienced terrorism acts differently in its decision-making compared to the 
countries that are spared from attack. At this point, national security culture or the 
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concept of strategic culture stresses the importance of ‘national psyche’, which 
drives the unit-level policy choices and the behaviors of states. 
Viewed in that light, the specter of attacks or the psychology and fear the 
attacks create in America is a unit level variable connected to strategic culture. The 
fear and great power coupled to form the responses of the US.471  
On September 11, 2001 terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners 
taking off from various locations in the United States in a coordinated suicide 
attack. In separate attacks, two of the airliners crashed into the twin towers of the 
World Trade Center in New York City, which caught fire and eventually collapse. 
A third airliner crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., causing extensive 
damage. The fourth airliner, which was believed to be heading towards 
Washington, D.C., crashed outside Shanksville, PA, and killed all 45 people on 
board. Casualty estimates from New York put the possible death toll close to 5,000 
while as many as 200 people may have been lost at the Pentagon crash site. In the 
post-September 11, 2001 although the United States has long been perceived as 
‘trigger happy’ (that is exercising poor judgment and prone to violence) around the 
world472, American administrations were nevertheless being criticized from within 
as being reluctant to use force until 9/11.473After 9/11, previous internal criticisms 
of reluctance to act changed into calls for restraint and selectiveness in the use of 
force. 
European experience with terrorism is different from that of the US. 
Accordingly, its strategic culture is different. It is different in two ways. First, 
Europe experienced terrorism along a long historical period. Some European 
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nations had wounds from the remnants of their colonial past, while some tackled 
with separatist and ideological terrorism more recently. Thus, the first difference is 
the Europe’s remarkably much longer terrorism experience in comparison to that of 
the US. Secondly, there is no European experience, but European experiences. 
History of the European experience and as a corollary its strategic culture 
pertaining to terrorism is multi-headed.474 That is mainly because each European 
state went through different terrorism contexts. Countries such as France, Spain and 
the UK have struggled against domestic terrorist movements, while others such as 
the Netherlands and Belgium did not face a major domestic threat. Each European 
state has its own particular history with terrorism.  
 
6.2. Concerns of the Intelligence Institutions:  
Identifying, Assessing and Reporting the Threat 
 There are two main concerns of the intelligence agencies in fulfilling their 
duty with regard to terrorism assessment and reporting to the governments. The 
first problem is related to ‘the organizational culture’ of a nation-state, while the 
second one is related to the nature of the threat.  
The first problem comprises the way the relationship established between 
the intelligence agency and the government. It is related to organizational culture as 
a subset of strategic culture, which is itself a subset of political culture of a nation-
state at large.475 
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As such, Hamilton cites organizational theorist Riad claiming that  
...dominant, taken-for-granted understandings of ‘organizational culture’ shape 
the conduct of both management of practitioners and researchers and disciplines 
what can and cannot be said about organizational culture.476 
 
Drawing on Riad’s argument, Hamilton examines how officials 
overwhelmingly internalize ‘organizational culture’, which is both a cause of 
intelligence failure and the reform efforts failure. In parallel, Garthoff explains a 
key Cold War pattern of reporting intelligence estimates about enemy intentions to 
be used to mobilize public support for what are deemed to be desirable 
countermeasures by the American administrations.477Often this practice has been 
narrated around incidents that portray enemy’s vices with omission of positive or 
neutral enemy attributes regarding the narrated incidents. According to Robert 
Mandel, American intelligence analysts today face tough choices regarding 
politicizing enemy intentions when developing National Intelligence Estimates 
similar to the case during the Cold War.478 
Politicizing enemy intentions estimates by using them to mobilize domestic 
public opinion is the direst problem in making a realistic assessment of the threat. 
For the present study, threat assessments are important in channelling the response 
policy of states in that similar threat assessments among countries lead to 
convergence of counterterrorism policies. However, when governments openly 
declare or leak the intelligence reports to the media so as to gain domestic support, 
there emerges a risk that intelligence analysts may oversimplify or distort their 
estimates to support the preferences of the politicians for praise and promotion. 
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That is one of the characteristics of the US strategic culture according to Mandel 
and Bean.479 
Second concern of the intelligence agencies is hardship to assess the threat 
and make realistic assessments. Unconventional warfare such as insurgency, civil 
war, guerrilla war and terrorism become the frequent choice of struggle for power. 
During the simple bipolar ‘us-versus-them’ Cold War environment, national 
intelligence estimates were much easier to make than in the current environment 
where more complex transnational threats are confronting states in an 
unconventional mode of warfare. If terrorists fought in the open rather than secretly 
attacking soft targets, they would be eliminated by the strong national capabilities. 
Consequently, the threats that perpetrators pose become unconventional for they 
cannot otherwise take on the state-of-the-art conventional capabilities of states. 
Thereby, intelligence estimates became concentrated on terrorists alongside 
conventional assessments on other states’ capabilities and intentions.  
However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is argued that ‘the dangers of the 
post- Cold War world were too opaque, too numerous, and too fluid for intelligence 
agencies to assess the terrorist threat more effectively than they did’.480 This is a 
crucial point that explains the leeway for different national threat assessments, 
which hinder the inter-state cooperation against terrorism.  
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The shortfall in the intelligence estimates of states inheres in the nature of 
the threat: 
During the post-Cold War era, international coercion has gone well beyond formal 
threats of direct military attack from states and often has taken on the guise of far 
more subtle and varied unorthodox modes of disruption by non-state groups. 
Emerging threats have been typically covert, dispersed, decentralized, adaptable, and 
fluid, with threat sources relatively difficult to identify, monitor, target, contain, and 
destroy. For intelligence analysts, in contrast to the Cold War focus on the Soviet 
Union, the post- Cold War world appears ‘shapeless’, containing a virtually limitless 
range of threats and perpetrators requiring analytical understanding; now it is often a 
major hurdle even to isolate who is in control, let alone determine what they intend 
to do. These dangers frequently involve patient and politically astute insurgent, 
guerrilla, or terrorist groups utilizing elaborate political, economic, social, and 
military communications networks to demoralize and undermine superior military 
power.481  
 
  
6.3. American and European Responses to Terrorism 
  
When the unit-level is concerned theoretically and strictly, the unit is the 
‘state regimes’ instead of simply states that are characterized by a set of ideological 
values in addition to conventional state values.482In other words, when the unit-
level is on the line, state is not a wide array of apparatus but the state regime and 
culture as explained above. Nonetheless, the specifics of responses of the EU 
member-states and the US response against terrorism must be examined. 
Both in the EU and the US, counterterrorism effort is at the ground level 
where police work with local communities. However, since terrorists operate across 
frontiers, states that resist them needed to operate in similar fashion. Both among 
the EU member-states and between Europe and the US, horizontal inter-agency 
cooperation became a strategic necessity.  
As for the cooperation within the EU, governments have created a complex 
framework for collaboration and adopted a counter-terrorism strategy in 2005. 
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Governments agreed terrorism-related laws, shared more security intelligence and 
appointed a counter-terrorism coordinator to manage inter-agency coordination and 
public diplomacy. In spite of these efforts, Europeans has experienced difficulties 
in carving out a strong or effective counterterrorism policy. This is because the EU 
as an institutional body, which is separate from the member-states, has limited role 
in internal security. The EU has mainly judicial and regulatory role in internal 
security affairs. This role was allocated as such due to the possible long EU 
processes that would take years to agree counterterrorism measures. Another reason 
for the limited role of the EU in countering terrorism is that the majority of the 27 
member-states do not perceive a serious or vital threat from terrorism.483Only a 
handful of European states feel threatened by terrorism. Besides, all EU members 
have different historical and cultural approaches to law and order. According to 
Brady, that is unlikely to change.  
Brady underlines that how a country fights terrorism largely depends upon 
how much of its citizens and parliamentarians are willing to expand the powers of 
the state to detain, question, charge and imprison suspects. In that regard, European 
countries have different records.484 The most successful example of European 
counterterrorism to date is French regulatory arrangements. French efforts have 
placed particular emphasis upon magistrates and their close cooperation with the 
intelligence services, regulatory responses and the judiciary, which have originally 
started to evolve during efforts against Baader-Meinhof and the Red 
Brigades.485The French state has wide-ranging powers to tail suspects and intercept 
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private communications that would be considered excessive elsewhere. Further, 
prosecutors are given wide authority to prosecute suspects under the mere intention 
to commit terrorism. French authorities indicate that the legal powers that they have 
accounts for their success.486France managed to coordinate the intelligence 
services, the police and prosecutors by centralizing counterterrorism investigations 
under a single special terrorism magistrate. The magistrate can control the police, 
gendarmes, internal intelligence service and the external intelligence service. This 
is a clear hierarchy of managing counterterrorism efforts of a nation. 
 In contrast, the US or other European states do not have a similar 
hierarchical structure. The counterterrorism efforts in other European countries and 
the US are multi-headed, which exacerbates coordination among intelligence, 
police and the judiciary. There are several reasons for the latter. First of all, most 
European services do not have powers of arrest or detention. They are only 
responsible for obtaining intelligence on a particular threat by continued 
monitoring and surveillance. The police have the authority to arrest and hold 
detention over suspects, yet they generally prefer to receive actionable intelligence 
in advance.  
However, intelligence services are reluctant to provide actionable 
intelligence for the police lest it will prevent intelligence leads from reaching 
significant results. The problem does not stop there and it becomes bigger because 
there are a number of police forces and intelligence services. With whom, when 
and where to share intelligence is a serious concern. This is especially the case in 
the UK and Spain where poor intelligence interagency coordination set the 
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counterterrorism cooperation back.487 
Some countries have tried to emulate the French example. The British 
government assigned the deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan Police as 
coordinator of national counter-terrorism investigations. Britain tried but failed to 
extend detention periods for terrorist suspects to 42 days. Germany established a 
hierarchy between the federal and state security structures. However, the country’s 
constitution forbids full centralization of powers in security affairs. 
Notwithstanding these complications, elements of a European style, focused on 
regulatory responses and the judiciary, may be said to have emerged during efforts 
against Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigades in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a 
hallmark of French responses to Islamist extremism during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Even the UK, which engaged in a long military campaign against the Provisional 
IRA, gradually allocated more responsibility for counterterrorism to civilian 
agencies. The repeated assertions by Gijs de Vries, the EU’s former counterterrorism 
coordinator, that Eurojust and Europol have a leading role in the EU’s 
counterterrorist effort underline this European regulatory approach with its focus on 
civil agencies. The regulatory response has suited current European needs 
remarkably well because of its strong domestic dimension. The 9/11 attacks brought 
home to Europe its own vulnerability. Not only were many of the perpetrators of the 
attacks formerly resident in Europe, but concentrations of Muslim populations in 
western Europe far exceed those in the US. For example, the Netherlands is home to 
one million Muslims, the UK to one and a half million, Germany to just over four 
million and France some six million. While the vast majority of those citizens are 
law-abiding, the July 2005 bombings in London demonstrated that small pockets of 
second generation resident Muslims can be won over to the cause of extremism and 
the practice of suicide bombing.488  
 
6.4. The Clash of National Security Cultures:  
The New Terrorism Debate and the Transatlantic Rift 
‘The new terrorism debate’ is a manifestation of the differences between the 
European national security culture and that of the US. As a part of national security 
culture, counterterrorism culture of a nation is shaped by historical experiences, and 
different past experiences end in separate present state-responses. American 
national security culture views the strategic landscape through ‘leaps and bounds or 
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strategic revolutions’. During the 1990s, this element of the national security 
outlook presented the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). After the September 
11, 2001 attacks, the assertions of a ‘strategic revolution’ were quickly transferred 
from RMA to the field of terrorism. In accordance, terrorism as experienced by 
America in 9/11 is labelled ‘the new terrorism’ that has global reach. Since it has 
global reach, it is argued that fighting it is in the interests of all states. The most 
noticeable proponent of ‘the new terrorism’ is Bruce Hoffman.489 The description 
of the new terrorism can be summarized as being in contrast to the definition of 
terrorism given by Brian Jenkins. In contrast to what Jenkins argued, terrorists do 
not any longer want a lot of people watching, but a lot of people death. 
Hoffman argued that terrorism was changing, with ‘new adversaries, new motivations, 
and new methods’ which challenged many of our most fundamental assumptions 
about terrorists and how they operate. Hoffman noted that while instances of attacks 
were going down, casualties were going up. He explained this in terms of a new 
religious terrorism which defied the old dictum that the terrorist wanted only a few 
people dead, but many people watching. Now, it appeared, killing was no longer an 
ugly form of political communication, or a form of bargaining with violence; instead, 
it was becoming a religious duty. In other words, the new terror was more apolitical 
and casualties were themselves the objective. This conjured up an alarming world 
without restraint, replacing the realist world of bargains, deterrence and rational 
behaviour, offering the prospect of terrorists who might seek to use WMD.490 
 
While ‘the new terrorism’ became the accepted understanding of the 
American counterterrorism, Europeans disagreed with the idea of the newness of 
terrorism. They argued that terrorism remains rooted in some old political and 
economic problems. This is where strategic culture based on past experiences of 
terrorism plays its part. European attitudes were to interpret rising terrorism in 
terms of a reaction to specific policies and military deployments rather than hating 
the West in and of itself. Some of the prominent realist scholars in America agreed 
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with the European approach arguing that ‘it is not who we are, it is what we do’.491 
However, they did not reflect the nation-wide sentiment including that of the two 
American administrations in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.492 While 
this is the case in America, Europeans talk also of ‘a situation in which there is not 
so much a new terrorism, but a new and more globalized environment—in relation 
to communications, ideologies and capacity for violence- which presents our 
enemies with enhanced opportunities’.493 In response to terrorism, Gijs de Vries has 
pointed specifically to lack of progress on the Middle East peace process and to 
chaos in Iraq as key factors in terrorist recruitment.494 
    
6.5. The Connection between Security Culture and Alignment Strategies 
  States can imitate other states’ behaviours for gaining influence over its 
neighbours, penetrating into its alignment partner’s decision making process, 
externalizing its domestic problems or sharing gains at the end of a campaign. 
These alignment policies have been implemented especially in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks.  
Importantly, preference of a state (whose formation is explained in the 
dissertation by the counterterrorism culture of a state) is different from the way that 
preference is implemented. The way a preference is implemented equals to the 
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alignment policy of a state. Thus, while counterterrorism culture explains state 
preferences, the way the preferences are implemented is manifested in (alignment) 
policies such as penetration or balking. The latter two are alignment policies of 
states that show how they activate their different preferences and approaches in 
relation to another state. A review of alignment policies are presented in chapter 
three. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE THREAT 
CONDITIONING INTER-STATE COOPERATION AND 
ALIGNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM 
 
 
 
7.1. The Threat Variable 
7.1.1 The Distinct Features of the Threat  
 
Just a few quick observations on how catastrophic terrorism has changed the 
security environment…It seems to me that there's been a historical reversal that 
needs to be taken into account, and that is that since the advent of al-Qaeda, it is 
clear that there are non-state actors that are at least as powerful as many states. I 
have made the argument that in fact, most states in the world could not have carried 
out an operation like 9/11. If for no other reason, that most states couldn't recruit 
that many suicide operatives. And that is an invaluable resource to a terrorist 
organization. But due to technology, the availability of materials for weapons of 
mass destruction, and the many opportunities that globalization affords to terrorists, 
they have sort of achieved a unique position in the international system. And I think 
we need to recognize that we are now in a position where there is a state of warfare, 
a state of war, between states and non-state actors. And as a result, we need to 
update our practices and possibly also our laws to take into account that change. One 
of the interesting facts about this evolution is that the prudential calculations that 
state-sponsors have traditionally made (in carrying out their terrorism calculations 
that would affect the extent of the violence that they would inflict on their foe) 
simply don't exist when you're dealing with a group like al-Qaeda or a group, say, 
like Aum Shinrikyo. They are simply operating on another level. They're not thinking 
about attracting sympathizers as much, they're not thinking about becoming 
negotiating partners, most importantly, with the United States or some other power, 
and they are not seeking an incremental revision of status quo. They want the kind 
of revision that none of us could ever contemplate. I guess I was also asked to talk a 
little bit about issues of state-complicity. My feeling is that there's been less change 
in this regard than might meet the eye despite the arguments of the G. W. Bush 
administration. Most states will continue to exercise some caution in terms of how 
much they assist groups like al-Qaeda because they can't control them. The history 
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of state sponsorship is you only get involved with someone you can control. So a 
group like Hezbollah is a case in point, it's always had to answer to its masters in 
Syria and Iran. Al-Qaeda has never acknowledged the real control of any other 
group, and that's part of the reason it eventually got run out of Sudan.495 
 
The dimensions of the threat, as summarized in the above quotation by 
Daniel Benjamin, poses a daunting challenge for nation-states, especially for 
policy-makers, law-enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, emergency first-
responders, judiciary and military. Simply any agency or institution of a nation-
state confronts a form of terrorism that poses a threat that merges traditional 
categories of both ‘the internal’ and ‘the external’. That is why it is transnational, 
not international.  
Bereft of state-sponsorship or any state-control unlike the past cases of 
terrorism during the Cold War, heading for indiscriminate mass-killings while 
active at the inter-societal level among citizens of many nations, equipped with an 
effective, absolutist and incorrigible ideology or ‘theology of hate’496that does not 
negotiate or compromise, not interested in changing the status quo but seeking the 
destruction of the prevailing state-system itself with its established values and 
institutions497and able to attract self-sacrificing followers without much recruitment 
effort, transnational terrorism is a serious irregular or unconventional threat against 
nation-states.  
Since transnational terrorism’s biggest gains come when it manages to set 
nation-state against nation-state, it is also a threat to inter-state relations and 
international stability.498 Transnational terrorism neither originates from nation-
                     
495Benjamin, Daniel. 2002. Project on International Law and International Relations and Workshop on 
International Law and International Relations November 14-15, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, italics added. 
496Esposito, John. http://vodpod.com/watch/32074-tackling-extremism-hamza-yusuf-desmond-tutu-
john-esposito-and-diana-buttu 
497Raymond, Ibrahim. 2007. The Al Qaeda Reader. New York: Doubleday. 
498Schmid, Alex P. 2000. ‘Introduction’ in the Proceedings of the International Conference on 
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states nor vulnerable to state control, manipulation or sponsorship. As such, 
terrorism is not a peripheral threat anymore unlike the past instances of terrorism. It 
is not mere sub-state terrorist activity that mostly strikes a single country.  
It strikes targets in diverse countries such as the US, Russia, Britain, India, 
Turkey, Spain, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Foiled mass-casualty plots that 
are declared by the European Union involve France and Germany as targets of 
transnational terrorism.499 Therefore, it has come to be regarded by nation-states as 
a high-level national security concern and a crucial threat to be met by foreign 
policy-making. 
Significantly, terrorism has never before played into a large group of states’ 
foreign policy agenda to considerable extent and around the same time period. 
Previously, it was chiefly a nuisance that was dealt with privately.500 It has joined 
into the mainstream subjects of international security which is addressed in national 
security strategy documents and it has become one of the foreign policy issue-areas 
both nationally and collectively in international organizations. All these above-
mentioned characteristics pave the way for the label ‘the new terrorism’. 
Transnational terrorism is distinct from other threats to national security at 
large and from other forms of terrorism in particular.501To present its differences 
                                                                
‘Countering Terrorism Through Enhanced International Cooperation’, Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy 
22-24 September under the auspices of the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council 
of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme and Terrorism Prevention 
Branch United Nations, Vienna.  
499 Brady, Hugo. 2009. Intelligence, Emergencies, and Foreign Policy. Center for European Reform 
Essays. 
500 Evans, Graham. 1990. The Dictionary of World Politics-A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas, and 
Institutions. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 388. 
501As discussed in this chapter, transnational terrorism is ‘new’ in that it has some distinct features 
separating it from other forms of terrorism. Yet, it is ‘old’ in that it is ‘political violence’ despite the 
religious ideology and rhetoric that mobilizes followers. A fine-tuned examination of transnational 
terrorism clarifies the debate on whether it is new: It has new features significant in number and quality 
that justifies the label ‘new terrorism’; however, it is not thoroughly or absolutely new in that it is 
political with its declarations and consequences of its attacks contrary to claims of apoliticalness owing 
to irrationality, nihilism, or unearthly beliefs. The operational epitome of transnational terrorism is the 
Al Qaeda Central and its franchises or outfits around the world. The ideological epitome of 
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from other threats, the literature on military strategy and defense doctrine might be 
instructive: 
 
Four types of challenging threats exist: Traditional challenges exist by states that 
employ recognized military capabilities and forces in the more conventional forms 
of military competition and conflict. Irregular challenges are the more 
unconventional ways and means to counter the traditional advantages of stronger 
opponents. Catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and possible 
use of WMD or methods that produce WMD-like effects (WMD/E). Disruptive 
challenges may be the use of breakthrough technologies to limit or negate the 
operational advantage of an opponent.502 
 
Operational mode of transnational terrorism combines irregular challenges, 
catastrophic challenges and disruptive challenges into a compact blend of 
Pandora’s Box. The scale of its destruction, its modus operandi, its finance, 
operational tactics and mobilization are outside of state-control or sponsorship.  
Distinctively, even when states cooperate or reach an agreement to curb or 
curtail it, let alone to eradicate it, they face grave difficulties.503 Thus, one of the 
main reasons why states find it hard to cooperate against transnational terrorism is 
the nature of the threat itself. The nature of the threat itself is one of the reasons for 
limits of cooperation because the threat is active on another level: In the aftermath 
of the Cold War and especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 
subsequent terrorist atrocities in Europe and Asia, threats are defined more from 
within societies than the territorial boundaries between them. Not only threats are 
within societies, but most societies are knit together through communication, 
transportation and travel that increased social contacts and the feasibility and 
probability of terrorism. Most of the societies are interconnected by means of 
                                                                
transnational terrorism is Al-Qaedaism. The New Terrorism Debate is examined more in the following 
sections of this chapter for it leads to different state approaches and policies in cooperating against 
terrorism.  
502 A Military Guide to Terrorism. 2005. TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No.1, p.10. 
503 That is dissimilar to the past cases such as ETA as a matter of dispute between Spain and France. 
For details,  
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transportation of goods, travel of people and communication of real-time news, 
encrypted websites and instant messaging. 
“Transnational terrorism” is much more disassociated with state-
sponsorship backup or with demarcated territorial bases or safe-havens when 
compared to ‘international terrorism’ on the same terms. As the 9/11 Commission 
Report emphasizes, threats have become ‘transnational’ rather than international:  
 
“From terrorism to global disease and environmental degradation, the challenges 
have become transnational rather than international. That is the defining quality of 
world politics in the twenty-first century. National security used to be considered by 
studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring 
industrial might. To be dangerous, an enemy had to muster large armies. Threats 
emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and 
units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they 
also had more to lose. They could be deterred.504 
 
Transnational terrorism is separate from international terrorism. Terrorist 
threats against national security interests ‘over there’ must be regarded as threats 
against the nation ‘over here’. In this sense, for most of the nation-states there is no 
specified frontline, no enemy at the gates; the frontlines are everywhere. In this 
sense, any homeland of any nation is the planet. Transnational terrorism is 
globalized terrorism.  
One of the distinct features of the threat of transnational terrorism revolves 
around the concept of ‘religious terrorism’, which provides the perpetrators with 
motivation to inflict indiscriminate killing and destruction. It is often claimed that 
religious terrorism (as being different from separatist or ideological terrorism) is 
incorrigible in that it cannot be rehabilitated through bargaining or negotiation. 
Religious terrorists do not seek incremental political compromises from 
governments. They seek to erase the fundamental political values, norms and 
                     
504 The 9/11 Commission Report Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p.362. 
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procedures of all Middle Eastern states. Depending upon their declarations, their 
ultimate aim is often accepted to be establishing an absolutely new political system 
in the Middle East. Since their ultimate objective is not only toppling governments 
but terminating the core principles of political regimes in absolute terms, 
negotiation is seen as impossible. Alongside its political side, transnational 
terrorism’s religious features have adamant tendencies. All of the political regimes 
in the world are allegedly corrupt and it is taken to be a religious obligation to 
pursue a universal paradigmatic transformation in the name of God.505 In religious 
terrorists’ eyes, their aims are God’s wishes; and God’s wishes are not 
negotiable.506In accordance, they are of the conviction that they have to destroy the 
world in order to save it, again in the name of God.507 
Transnational terrorism shares the latter characteristic of utter and wanton 
destruction with millenarian cults. Yet, the commonality stops at sheer destruction 
and casualty. September 11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Britain, Spain, 
Russia, India and Istanbul are much more political in itself (target-selection) and of 
its consequences (an inter-state effort started off against terrorism) unlike the case 
for millenarian or apocalyptic groups. Besides, the propaganda campaign carried 
out mostly through the Internet resonates across the world, which indicates its 
political nature unlike the millenarian cults or sects that have relatively little 
constituency.  
While this is the nature of the threat, Jervis underlines that academic grasp 
of terrorism is not secure. It is more so when compared to such accumulated 
                     
505Sedgwick, Mark , 'Karen J. Greenberg, ed. Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists', 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 19:2, 276-277. 
506Brachman Jarret M., William F. Mccants ‘Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook’ Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 29:309–321, 2006 
507Gus, Martin. 2003. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, London: Sage 
Publications. 
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knowledge on other subjects as development, poverty, ethnic conflict, law or 
conventional warfare. As Jervis asserts, terrorism grounded in religion poses 
special problems for modern social science, which has paid little attention to 
religion. Yet, religion is one of the sources of authority in social relations from 
which actors and non-state violent groups derive power over people. In other 
words, if there is a debate on ‘winning hearts and minds of the people’508 to 
effectively struggle against terrorism and if religion can be turned into an 
instrument of mass-control and atrocity, then no meaningful analysis can ignore the 
political side of ‘religious terrorism’. It has an impact upon the relations of nation-
states and the way governments rule.  
Jervis presents an insight about the reason why religion is rarely studied in 
modern social science: ‘…perhaps because they (social scientists) are not religious, 
shy away from deeply held beliefs, and find this subject unfathomable if not 
embarrassing’.509Although he touches upon a clue for finding out why religion is 
given scant attention, it is hardly to the point. Rather, the reason why religion is not 
studied much or not involved in modern social science or why social scientists shy 
away from it originates in a particular understanding of modernity. The Western 
separation of church from politics and the secular nature of science make anything 
associated with religion intellectually susceptible and fragile. Because of the 
Western separation of the state authority and apparatus from the authority of 
religion, religion is understandably held to be not much related to politics on the 
analytical level in academia albeit being related to political regimes by way of how 
                     
508Drake, William J. ,Jamie Metzl Lecture Series: Winning Hearts and Minds 
 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=428&prog=zgp&proj=znpp 
509 Robert Jervis, 2005. American Foreign Policy in a New Era, New York and London: Routledge, 
p.37. 
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political cultures of nation-states interpret secularism or laicism510. This is the 
underlying dynamic giving way to modern science, and this is why it is ‘modern’ 
social science in the first place.511The separation between the political and the 
divine must not curtail academic examination of terrorism under globalization: 
There are other versions of modernity, through which political forms of social 
organizations other than Western ones512came to play a role in world politics 
especially in the Middle East. 
There is not any apolitical religion in and of itself even without its 
politicization; all religions thrive to rule over people en masse and they are political 
in that sense. It is especially their capability and authority to rule over the behavior 
of people that makes them political: History witnesses that loyalties are diverse. 
Likewise, religious loyalties, loyalties to different companies or to other centers of 
authority such as ethnicity can surpass the loyalty to the nation-state in the present 
era. The citizenship and loyalty to the state is apparently a matter of degree and it 
has been hard to see it ever-secure. Any religion is intertwined with politics 
because it rules over people and earthly physical undertakings in the name of a 
certain metaphysics which connects the earthly and heavenly, mind and matter, and 
fact and value.  
Loyalties attached to religion enable control over people and their 
behaviors. Hence, religious authority. That is simply political; and since religion in 
that authoritative sense is related to politics, so it is to security, too. Viewed in this 
                     
510 ‘Secularism’ and ‘laicism’ are two separate interpretations and forms of such separation. Please see 
Arkoun and Mardin. 
511 John Gray. 2003. Al-Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern, Faber & Faber Limited. 
512 Western political configuration accepts a separation between public and private domains, such as 
‘civil’ and ‘military’. Today, it is observed that it is not always possible to make such a separation as 
exemplified by the cases of Hamas and Hezbollah. Accordingly, some non-Western political forms of 
social organizations do not foresee a separation between religion and state-rule as the way the relation 
between church and the state are arranged in the West. This is, to be sure, also the debate about 
‘Christianity and democracy’ and ‘Islam and democracy’. 
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light, the ‘strict distinction’ made between ‘political terrorism’ and ‘religious 
terrorism’ is nil. More than semantics lie underneath, that is there is no apolitical 
terrorism: Terrorism is spread of fear through violence and killings for achieving 
coercion. Violence is a form of coercion. At the very least, violence-driven 
coercion is political with its effects or consequences, independent of whether its 
motivation is secular, divine or a mixture of both.  
 Transnational terrorism strikes nation-states, and it demands withdrawal of 
any nation-state from the Middle East along with their political regime and system 
of rule.513 Put differently, neither the economic or military presence of Western 
states in the Middle East nor prevailing governments of the region is accepted by 
the terrorists. Thus, setting ‘religious terrorism’ as a unique type of violence 
unrelated to the means of power struggle paves the way for the fallacy of 
underestimating the political features of religiously-motivated terrorism. Religious 
terrorism, alongside its divine motivations, is in fact quite political both in its 
ideology (peculiar ideas), atrocities and states’ response in return (consequences). 
David Rapoport reminds Machiavelli in explaining the political 
community/political space or the politics terrorists try to establish514: “Machiavelli 
long ago emphasised that the process of remaking a community is similar 
regardless of whether the context is religious or secular.” Although, contemporary 
transnational terrorism is a hybrid of religious and secular features, their endeavor 
to re-create a (peculiar understanding of) community is not much different from 
‘political terrorism’. It is neither pure religious extremism similar to 
apocalyptic/millenarian sects nor pure political or ideological extremism as it is 
                     
513Ibrahim, Raymond. 2007. The Al Qaeda Reader. NY: Doubleday. 
514Rapoport, David C.  1991. ‘Some General Observations on Religion and Violence’, Journal of 
Terrorism and Political Violence, III/3 Autumn pp. 116-140 and Mark, Jurgensmeyer. 1992. ed. 
Violence and the Sacred London, Frank Cass; Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, 
No. 1 March 2008; Perceptions and Misperceptions  
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conventionally understood. It is in-between the latter two. Through its propagated 
ideology and violence, transnational terrorism is the embodiment of both 
politicization of religion and religionization of politics at the same time. 
Any terrorism is a compilation of differently-weighted underlying 
motivations of several sorts.515Labeling ‘religiously-motivated terrorism’ as mere 
‘religious terrorism’ causes to underestimate the political element both inherent in 
the ideology of religiously-motivated terrorist groups and in their actions. That 
would be missing the nature of pure religious cults exemplified by mass-suicide of 
all cult-members.516Moreover, ‘motivations’ and ‘objectives’ are not the same, and 
using only one of them as a criterion of categorization is misleading because it 
causes scholars to see religious extremists as totally irrational, which does not seem 
to be the case. Irrationality would have led to operational failure. Religious 
terrorists, as Ali Karaosmanoglu maintains, have unique rationality of their own.517   
There is nothing as ‘pure religious’ or ‘pure political’ about the 
contemporary religious extremism. An amalgam of terrorist motivations is drived 
from differently-weighted separate issues of contention whether it is secular or not. 
Terrorists are motivated both by earthly and unearthly concerns. Some try to gain 
huge amounts of money and turn into being businessmen of blood-money and 
pursue it as an end in itself as a profession. Some die willingly for their cause to see 
that an incipient idea spreading far and wide.518 The division of politics from the 
divine in understanding terrorist threats is missing the point of how terrorists see 
                     
515Crenshaw, Martha. 2003. 3th ed. Terrorism in Context. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University 
Press. 
516Laqueur, Walter. 1999. The New Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79-106. 
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the victims of September 11, 2001 attacks, Ankara, Bilkent University, Turkey, September 12, 2006. 
518Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God-Why Religious Militants Kill New York: 
HarperCollins, pp. 237-240. 
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the world and constitute the threat thereby.519But if for no other reason, this is 
where it is hard for decision-makers to understand the ambiguous threat before 
devising responses. 
 
7.1.2. Ambiguity of the Threat and Its Implications  
Although non-state actors seem disputably weaker than states in that they 
have no legal authority, the fact that they are not bounded by the rules of the 
international state-system is a great advantage for them to assert their influence, 
which is taken into consideration by states notably by the international effort to 
curb terrorism. Contemporary terrorism is not bound by the international 
system.520It has features that are not clear for state parties to cooperate against to 
curtail it. Debatable features of contemporary terrorism cause disagreements and 
different strategies that hamper international cooperation. 
The noticeable features that cause the ambiguity of the threat (and the points 
of disagreement among states in carving out a common strategy to fight it) are: 
- Multiple nation-state targets: It strikes a large group of nation-states, not a 
single nation as a fixed target 
- A hybrid ideology (or an ideology that is congruous to a political religion) 
with both religious and secular tenets and attributes. The ideology has 
spread all around the world and its counter-hegemonic claims resonate 
transnationally, not nationally or internationally. It has mobilized set of 
ideas, which encourages and achieves suicide-missions, and fuels the 
                     
519Smelser, Neil J. Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism. The Faces of 
Terrorism-Social and Psychological Dimensions. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 11-90.  
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struggle against democracy, rule of law, human rights, laicite and 
secularism.521 
- Operationally active around the world at the inter-societal level across state 
borders 
- A massive and dispersed body of followers all around the world whose 
whereabouts are unclear 
- No state-control, manipulation or sponsorship 
- Merger with organized crime and unregulated financing that is supported by 
black markets and corrupt officials522 
- Lack of a territory (base, headquarters or address) to be retaliated at, which 
cancels deterrence 
- Incorrigibility; closed to bargaining, negotiation or compromise 
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1984. “The Revolt against the West”, in Hedley Bull and A. Watson eds. The Expansion of 
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Compatibility of Institutional Islamism and the Political Culture of Democracy', Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions, 10: 2,135-164; Hansen, Hendrik and Kainz, Peter. 2007. 'Radical 
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National Socialism', Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 8: 1, 55-76; Tibi, Bassam. 2009. 
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and the Quest for a Remaking of the World', Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 10: 2, 97-
120; Vidino, Lorenzo. 2009. 'Islamism and the West: Europe as a Battlefield', Totalitarian Movements 
and Political Religions, 10: 2, 165-176; Bale, Jeffrey M. 2009. 'Islamism and Totalitarianism', 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 10: 2, 73-96; Cook, David. 2009. 'Islamism and 
Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an Ideology of Terrorism', Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions, 10: 2, 177-187; Hamadouche, Louisa Dris-Aït. 2009. ‘Europe, 
Security and Islamism: Misunderstandings and Manipulations’, Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies Vol. 17, No. 3, 339-351; Soage, Ana Belén. 2009. 'Islamism and Modernity: The Political 
Thought of Sayyid Qutb', Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 10: 2, 189- 203; Chalk, Peter 
and William Rosenau. 2004. “Confronting the “Enemy Within”- Security Intelligence, the Police, and 
Counterterrorism in Four Democracies” RAND, Santa Monica CA; Payne, Kenneth. 2009. 'Winning the 
Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:2, 109-128. 
522Thachuk, Kimberley. 2008. ‘Countering Terrorist Support Structures’, Defense Against Terrorism 
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- Open endorsement of indiscriminate killing as determined choice; pursuing 
any means that give catastrophic effect such as exploding jets into 
buildings, suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or seeking WMD 
- Possessing suicide-bombers as the smartest mobile bombs523 
- Effective combination of the pre-modern and modern skills and technology in 
carrying out attacks (the use of hawala, hundis, banking system, explosives, 
GPS and the Internet) 
- A learning curve higher than other terrorist groups, which enables to be 
adaptive to state-responses. 
- Being devoid of international law requirements and sanctions 
- Unaccountability and due lack of responsibility to protect a population or 
followers  
- Unpredictability; upper-hand of surprise attack against states  
 
With the above characteristics, although arguably still weaker than states 
that have legal authority, non-state actors have some illicit authority and capacity to 
influence laymen. Inflicting huge psychological, financial and economic damage 
for the survivors of attacks, let alone the high death and casualty toll, it presents a 
grave challenge for devising counter-policy. The human, economic and 
psychological toll and the challenge of crafting an effective counter-policy 
significantly affect states and decision-makers.  
Within that framework of the nature of the threat, the reason why national 
means alone are not sufficient to fight transnational terrorism requires emphasis. 
The reason is plainly that threats of transnational nature neither recognize 
                     
523Pape, Robert. 2005. Dying to Win. New York: Random House. 
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borderlines nor are totally congruent with the classical distinction between inside 
and outside politics of a nation-state. The latter reason has become a cliché in 
academia since the September 11 attacks.524 However, like most clichés it captures 
an essential part of reality. The conventional analytical distinction in International 
Relations between inside/domestic politics and outside/international politics (as the 
organizing principle of the state-system template) can still be used for studying 
terrorism but only with a shortcoming that must be borne in mind: When 
confronted by such threats that transgress borders, the distinctive characteristic of 
‘territoriality’ or territory-centric thinking becomes reduced (though not vanished) 
in practicality and importance.  
Why does the decline in practicality and importance of territory-centric-
thinking occur? It occurs because transnational terrorism is a deterritorialized 
threat: A deterritorialized threat in that, first, it presents the weakening of ties 
between time and space, and secondly, it presents the conflation of the scales of 
violence. Weakening of the ties between time and space denotes that conduct of 
terrorist attacks became less dependent on the parameters of territorial-defense due 
to interconnecting transportation and communication capabilities worldwide. 
Physical distance became less burdensome. Accordingly, the logistics, skill and 
organizational capacity of private actors increased due to globalization.  
As for the conflation of the scales of violence, it becomes hard for states to 
decide whether it is homegrown/domestic, international, regional or global 
terrorism that they face. Constantly changing scale of violence complicates the 
exposure of threats. International terrorism evolved into transnational terrorism 
because nation-states’ affiliation or sponsorship lack in the conduct of transnational 
                     
524For a lucid analysis of the problems terrorism presents for both International Relations and policy-
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terrorist groups. These compounded aspects may roughly be defined as 
‘deterritorialization’,525 which enables non-state entities to run away from the 
control and authority of nation-states.  
The deterritorialized threat has important implications for cooperation and 
alignment of states against terrorism. As it is further discussed in the following 
sections, deterritorialized threats are hard to perceive, define and fight against. 
The elusiveness or ambiguity of the threat is one of the fundamental reasons why 
states perceive the threat differently. The deterritorialized nature of transnational 
terrorism circumscribes international cooperative behaviors of states that aim to 
curb it. In addition to its above-listed characteristics, its incongruence to territorial-
defense parameters and its conflated scale of violence add up to the ambiguity of 
the threat. The form of the threat itself is a limit to cooperation among states 
because it is ambiguous. States have hardship to fight a threat which they cannot 
clearly define, detect or find. 
 
7.2. Implications of the Distinct Features of the Threat 
for Inter-State Cooperation 
In a political environment where civil and military means of attack mix into 
each other as another facet of the ambiguous threat, international efforts to curb 
terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks started as a campaign 
whose goal and strategy were initially not clear to all participating states. Since the 
threat was not clear, the goal was not easily settled. Especially, as part of the wider 
international effort to fight terrorism, ‘War on Terrorism’ started off with an 
ambiguous threat assessment. The goal of the campaign against terrorism was not 
                     
525Patman, Robert G. 2006. “Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror” Third 
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clear.526 Nation-states’ hardship to set goals and their hardship to strategize is the 
main implication of the ambiguity of the threat of transnational terrorism. 
The threat was not clear for states in its nature, location, ideology, 
organization, methods and constituency. The goal and strategy of Al-Qaeda the 
Central and the Al-Qaeda the Social Movement527was neither intelligible nor 
comprehensible to nation-states in the first years of the international endeavor due 
to the enhanced secrecy of terrorist activities unattached to territory and state-
sponsorship.528 Compared to the alignment of states during the Cold War, the 
emerging pattern of cooperation and alignment against terrorism in the aftermath of 
the September 11, 2001 attacks was obviously different. The difference lies in lack 
of commonly perceived strategic goal, target and clarity: The first NATO Secretary 
General Lord Ismay, famously described that NATO’s goal was "to keep the 
Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down".529This was NATO’s goal 
succinctly described. However, contemporary alignment of states against terrorism 
still lacks such a succinct goal and a similar alliance structure functioning 
effectively against terrorism. NATO has been set up as an alliance for 
institutionalized cooperation against any threat to the political values and regimes 
of its members, and as such it was an instrument of the wider grand strategy to 
defend such values and interests. It was serving the grand strategy of containing 
                     
526Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007'Chapter One: Beyond the 
War on 
Terror',Adelphi Papers,47:389,17 — 34 
527Al-Qaeda Central and Al-Qaeda social movement were two different organizational aspects of the 
threat. For details, Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First 
Century. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
528Al Qaeda use of Afghan territory under Taliban rule is just one facet of the transnational mode of 
operations which showed its real significant effect on the states’ foreign policies in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001attacks and subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe and Asia. Besides, Taliban did 
not sponsor Al Qaeda, but the reverse is the case. It was hijacking of a failing state that cannot sustain 
its rule. The Taliban government was sponsored by the terrorist organization in contrast to the cases of 
state-sponsorship during the Cold War.  
529Schorr, Daniel. “With No Clear Mission NATO Has Little  Power” NPR,  
www .npr.org/templates/story/story.php ?storyId=102618942> 
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and deterring the Eastern bloc, which was then the main threat to Western political 
system. The problem with assigning NATO a clear and effective role against 
terrorism originates in the ambiguity of the threat itself.  Clarification of the goal 
and the strategy was not easy for states due to the fact that the threat of 
transnational terrorism was vague as Wyn and Aldrich concludes: “…while some 
officials have begun to identify the shape of current problems more accurately, 
their elusive nature means that neither Europe nor America yet has convincing 
answers”.530 The threat was open to interpretation - each nation-state perceived and 
assessed it in its own self-style. States developed different threat assessments over 
time. Concurrently, the debate among states on the proper response-strategy 
resulted in different strategies.531 This is one of the important limits to cooperation 
of states, which has its roots in the deterritorialized, non-centric ambiguous threat. 
The need for cooperation among states in their fight against transnational terrorism 
arises from the ambiguity of the threat, which is above all the unknown location of 
the perpetrators. States cannot detect perpetrators on their own. However, 
ambiguity keeps hindering cooperation when collective efforts do not know where 
to focus, whom to focus and when to focus.  
If terrorism had a headquarters, much cooperation would not be necessary; 
a single state could destroy it. If it had a territorial base, it would not be terrorism in 
the very first place. That would be insurgency or guerrilla warfare. Terrorism often 
manifests itself in urban cities of the world with suicide-bombing, truck-bombing 
or remote-controlled bombing. Even September 11, 2001 can be seen as a suicide-
bombing case, the bombs that suicide-attackers carried were the airliners. Thus, 
                     
530Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic 
divergence or convergence?” International Affairs 81, 5, p. 906. 
531Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic 
divergence or convergence?” International Affairs 81, 5, 905-923. 
384 
 
Federally Administrated Areas around the Pakistani and Afghan borderlines is a 
snapshot of the alternation among different forms of unconventional warfare, 
namely terrorism, insurgency, guerilla war and civil war. 
The threat must be clearly understood. Threat scale and nature of the 9-11, 
2001 attacks in the US and subsequent attacks of 3-11, 2004 Madrid and 7-7, 2005 
London are instructive: In the first place, these attacks were neither nationally-
oriented nor so formed. Their mode of working was not nation-state centric. Thus, 
modus operandi of global terrorism seems to be the most original aspect of it. As 
for the case of September 11 in particular, borderlines were imposingly rendered 
meaningless because there was not even any belligerency declared by a state in 
advance. The element of surprise was not military in form unlike the blitzkrieg 
raids of conventional armies in the past. The oceans that separate the US form 
other continents as the natural buffer zones, which are customarily explained to be 
factors enhancing American defense, were rendered dysfunctional. 
The response to the attacks was controversial in a strategic sense. From a 
strategy of conflict perspective,532state-responses must match the threat they target 
to communicate with the enemy; sending the message that attacks will not go 
unpunished. However, ‘who to punish’ became the critical question. The US 
argued that states may intentionally or unintentionally serve as safe havens for 
terrorists. Intentional support is state-sponsoring of terrorism. Unintentional 
support is the use of the territory of failed states by terrorists. The states that 
support or provide safe haven for terrorists are held to be accountable by means 
that includes the use of force. That is meant to change the conflict environment 
from which terrorists are fed. The deterritorialized threat was translated to 
                     
532Thomas C. Schelling. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
pp.121-130. 
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territorial terms with the attachment of the states that are held to be accountable. In 
order for states to take action, the threat needs to be in territorial terms. That is the 
also the understanding included in the US strategy to counter terrorism.533 
Although the terrorists cannot be located punctually and their whereabouts 
are not clear before they conduct attacks, the locations or hotbeds of terrorism are 
sometimes approximated by nation-states. For instance, Pakistan and Afghanistan 
have vast regions that are out of government control. Although the form of conflict 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan are more about guerilla warfare and insurgency than it 
is about terrorism, one hotbed of conflict (such as those in the Federally 
Administered Tribal area along the Afghan-Pakistani borders) is known to 
authorities in the very least. Therefore, horizontal interagency cooperation among 
different states that focus on societies within which terrorists are assumed to be 
residing is seen as helpful by states in the quest to curb transnational terrorism.  
Another implication of the ambiguity of the threat is that lack of a clear 
target leads to other security concerns among cooperative states and among those 
that do not cooperate: The scale of states’ cooperative behaviors must be 
transnational through interagency coordination among different states in order to 
match the transnational threat. These cooperative efforts must be built upon 
agreements on the modalities of cooperation. Modalities are about other inter-
related issue-areas such as the non-intervention principle of sovereignty versus 
intervention in other states; energy security regarding petroleum and natural gas; 
how to fight terrorists, and how to save failed states. The point is detailed in the last 
chapter where state responses are examined particularly within the NATO platform. 
The necessity to find common ground on issue-areas such as military-
                     
5332003 Iraq and 2001 Afghanistan interventions seem to be the implementation of the 2002 and 2006 
national security strategy documents and Libya also conceded to US demands to relinquish efforts to 
acquire WMD after the invasion of Iraq. 
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intervention on the grounds of curbing terrorism, energy security (especially of oil), 
and how to fight terrorism in general is the implication of the ambiguity of the 
threat because the ambiguous whereabouts of terrorists provide intelligence threat 
assessments of a state with a leeway to advise policies that undercut other states’ 
interests. For instance, according to Jervis the way towards the 2003 invasion of 
Iraqis the result of an assessment which sees that particular states are responsible 
for terrorism and that use of force against them is a strategic must.  
Ambiguity of the threat paves the way for a scalar-variation of the threat or 
the conflation of scales of violence (local, regional, global and internal, external) 
which might be taken as a reason for different state strategies. The gist of the point 
is that the scale of violence is not fixed, it varies: It may be seen either as internal 
or external at times. However, most of the time, it defies signifiers such as 
‘internal’ and ‘external’. That is partly why it is dubbed ‘transnational threats’- 
going beyond national boundaries and interests. The depiction of the September 11 
attacks by the world media demonstrates the hardship to understand the scale and 
deterritorialized nature of violence. Just hours after the incident, many media 
sources around the world flashed the subtitles ‘America at War’ that does not hold 
technically and logically.534 Nor does it make sense theoretically.535 All the 
political considerations and diplomatic tact aside, the analytical question remained 
regarding the ‘war on terrorism’: Who is the enemy? It may be known tacitly, but 
tacit targets are no substitutes for clear strategic ones. Besides, the concept of ‘war’ 
appears to be a victim of the ambiguous and unaccustomed deterritorialized nature 
of the threat as demonstrated most vividly by the response labeled as ‘war’ after the 
                     
534 Military history and strategy does not conceptualize ‘war’ as a clash between states and non-state 
actors. Besides, it does not record a ‘war’ against a tactic, but against an enemy.  
535 In International Relations theories, terrorist groups are not regarded as actors or unit of analysis. 
They are simply not studied as such. 
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September 11, 2001. 
The ambiguity of the threat and enemy is compounded by the asymmetry 
between the room of maneuver of nation-states and that of terrorists. When states’ 
monopoly of violence inside their territories is challenged by terrorist attacks, 
different patterns of response appear: On the one hand, when nation-states apply 
legal use of force, they also take advantage of non-state entities such as private 
military companies alongside their armies. Since private military companies 
acquire legal mandate through authorization by states, they are bounded by law just 
as national armies are. On the other hand, illegal/terrorist violence does not regard 
law or any restrictions whatsoever. While states cannot act as they please, non-state 
actors can do so. When states act as they please without regard to other states and 
established norms of the international society of states536, they act only at the risk 
of economic sanctions and/or military interventions or at least they risk losing 
legitimacy that comes with the soft-balancing.537 While states are relatively locked 
down by these limitations, violent non-state actors are not restrained by similar 
concerns since they are not sovereign political formations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
536International society and security community are two intertwined concepts that may be used to 
describe the community formed by Canada, The United States, Japan and the member-states of the EU. 
This society of states is also a security community where disputes among them are hold to be resolved 
without threat or use of force. They expect from each other to obey international law, refrain from using 
force as an instrument of politics. That is why France and Germany were in disagreement with Poland 
regarding the Iraqi intervention in 2003.  
537‘Soft-balancing’ is explained in Chapter1 on cooperation, alignments and alliances. Suffice it to note 
here that when confronted by soft-balancing, losing legitimacy and credibility may become problematic 
for states in the long run. 
388 
 
7.3. Contemporary Conflict Environment 
7.3.1. Terrorism and the State-System during and after the Cold War 
It is important to note that neither ‘terrorism’ nor ‘globalization’ is a new 
phenomenon. Current phase of globalization or that of terrorism has just different 
forms in our present day. The nature of terrorism is still political yet its methods, 
organization style, source and mode of operations are different. As detailed in the 
previous section, it has some distinct characteristics. Those features give way to the 
label of ‘new terrorism’.  
Moreover, terrorists take advantage of the permissive causes that are 
presented to them by the globalization process. This is where the structural factor 
of globalization and the nature of the threat feed into one another in keeping the 
diffusion of power world over. The permissive causes presented by globalization 
are mainly two-fold: First, there is the impact of current state and mechanism of 
globalization. Globalization interconnected much of the world through availability 
of high technological means of various sorts and via telecommunication and 
transportation. Secondly, the power-vacuum in the aftermath of the bipolar 
international order cut criminal and terrorists organizations away from state 
manipulation.  
As for the first facilitating factor originating from globalization, supply, 
logistics and intelligence equation of power struggle became ever more 
complicated for the nation-state authorities to decipher. In other words, the supply, 
logistics and intelligence equation acquired a terrorist-friendly usage. For instance, 
in addition to the orthodox face-to-face contacts such as the hawala method, 
encrypted-websites are added to the terrorist tool-kit. Technological innovation 
marked by cell phones, global positioning devices, satellite facilities, fax, 
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susceptible electronic banking and airliners smooth the way for terrorist operations; 
also bettering the probabilities of contact between terrorists and criminals. Yet, that 
does not refer to the dominance of information technology over terrorist operations 
in all its facets. Alongside being empowered by high-technology, orthodox face-to-
face contacts among terrorists (such as hawala or hundis, contacts in transmission 
of information and money unregulated by states) continue to go to the heart of the 
issue.538 
Second permissive cause is the power-vacuum that cuts criminal and 
terrorists organizations loose. Terrorism went out of state-control after the end of 
the Cold War, which is conducive to transnational terrorism. This is the second 
realm where the nature of the threat overlaps with the structural factors.  
Since the end of the Second World War, major war has not taken place 
amid the leading industrial states. Gist of the waning of major war argument is that 
war is not even contemplated or anticipated among big industrial powers such as 
continental European states, Canada, the USA and Japan. These states find war as 
an undesirable means to reach their goals. Accordingly, absence of war among 
most developed industrial states denotes an estimate of nation-states that 
probability of regular war among them seems very low even in the long term.  
The estimate covers observation of the period since the World War II; 
however, it is an argument that addresses the post-Cold War era. European states 
still do not go to war among each other in spite of the fact that the threat posed by 
the former Soviet Union disappeared. Absence of conventional wars among major 
powers was also a fact of the Cold War era, lasting into the twenty-first century. 
The political landscape of rival power-blocs institutionalized mainly as Warsaw 
                     
538Aydinli, Ersel. 2006. “From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists’ 
Achilles Heel,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18: 301-313.  
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Pact versus NATO, and the Cold War was a ‘cold’ war or struggle during which 
most powerful states did not openly fight each other on battlefields. However, 
different from the situation today, there was a grim anticipation of war that was 
kept at bay via the ‘balance of terror’.539Anticipation of war declined among the 
mentioned powers starting from the 1950s onwards.  
Critical for the formation of the transnational threat of terrorism, the 
political landscape of the Cold War created a check-and-balance system for all the 
power-foci in the world. This check-and-balance system was possible owing to 
tight grip or influence of the two superpowers (the USSR and the USA) over their 
respective peripheries in Eastern Europe under the Warsaw Pact and Western 
Europe under the NATO. The Cold War period can briefly be seen as a quest for 
hegemony in the world and an accompanying ideological clash. During this clash 
of interests over world domination, the superpowers’ sphere of influence over other 
entities not only comprised peripheral states, but also included non-state entities 
such as proxy-terrorist groups. Terrorism was a lever with which states tried to 
reach their various targets.540 
When states’ sphere of influence over their peripheries acquired a different 
configuration and faded away to certain extent as of the 21st century, a freer 
political play-ground came into being in comparison to the Cold War. Thus, the end 
of the Cold War loosened the mechanisms that held non-state entities under state-
control. When some of the terrorist groups lost their state-sponsors or patrons, 
others emerged self-reliant such as the Al-Qaeda. Thus, the end of the Cold War 
served a relatively freer play-ground for terrorism due to the relaxation of the 
                     
539 ‘Balance of terror’ denotes the credible deterrence situation where the former USSR and the US 
threatened each other with destruction.  
540Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter? 
Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 1477-271X, Volume 3, Issue 4, pp. 287-304. 
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superpowers’ control of world politics at large.  
However, there is more to the evolution of global terrorism, which is related 
to the decline of major war: As an understudied aspect of terrorism of the Cold War 
era, terrorism and waning of major conventional wars among most developed 
nation-states mutually reinforced each other since 1945. Terrorism has been one of 
the two facilitators of the waning of major conventional war, which was partly 
possible through the war-by-proxy tactic of the states that manipulate terrorist 
groups during the Cold War. The other facilitating factor was the balance of terror. 
The US support for the Taliban and mujahidin before and during the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 is an example. War-by-proxy is the former stage 
of the evolution of transnational terrorism, which replaced conventional wars 
between huge regular army battalions. Superpowers and their peripheries did not 
often militarily confront each other in the open-battlefield, but they rather 
conducted covert operations or unconventional wars through sponsorship of 
terrorism.  
Unlike the case in the twenty-first century, terrorism during the Cold War 
era was mostly a tactic in the service of nation-states. Thereby, terrorism was 
mainly in the service of state-system during the Cold War whereas it is much more 
independent as of the turn of the century. Formerly, terrorism was not challenging 
the main contours of the international state-system itself because terrorist targets 
were predictable within fixed borders of a certain state, and they did not break free 
from the control and support of the major powers that dominate the international 
system.  
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While that was the political environment of the Cold War from 1945 to 
1989, twenty-first century witnesses a rise in the power of non-state entities that are 
largely freed from state-sponsors. Today, global terrorists are acting at the inter-
societal or transnational level; they are, for the most part, capable of operating 
without state-sponsorship.541 Global terrorism does not strictly act according to the 
game-rules of the nation-state-system anymore. They are ‘out of control’.542 Global 
terrorism, unlike the terrorism of the Cold war era, challenges nation-states and the 
international state-system rather than serving it in the role of a proxy.543 
 
7.3.2. Deterritorialized Economy of the Threat 
Not only finance and economy of violence, but economy at world-large are 
bereft of most nation-states’ full control. Within this control-proof economic 
environment, economy of violence operates without a fixed geography or territorial 
address. It manifests itself in global black markets of trade, smuggling and 
trafficking of drugs, diamonds, electronics, heroin, small weapons, sex-slaves and 
various covered illicit financial transfers. This is also named as the non-military 
forms of deterritorialization. The money acquired by these illicit transactions is 
used by criminal and terrorist organizations to challenge the sovereignty of nation-
states.544The interconnectedness among all economic and financial transactions 
including those of the global black market empowers both transnational 
corporations and transnational criminal and terrorist entities. The finance of 
                     
541Desouza, Kevin C. and Hensgen, Tobin , “Connectivity among Terrorist Groups: A Two Models 
Business Maturity Approach”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:7, 593 - 613 
542Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1993. Out of Control New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, pp.45-74.  
543Yet this does not negate that terrorism’s nature is resiliently same. The difference of the twenty-first 
century is that global terrorism survives largely without state-sponsorship and it has different methods; 
this is the ‘new’ feature despite the same nature of politicalness. 
544Dillman, Bradford. 2007. “Introduction: Shining Light on the Shadows: The Political Economy of 
Illicit Transactions in the Mediterranean”, Mediterranean Politics, 12:2, 123 - 139 
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violence is possible due to the fact that economy went out of national borders and 
national control. 
The typical example for the interconnected global economy that is free from 
nation-states’ effective control is world economic and financial crises: financial 
disruption and economic meltdown in one country quickly spreading around the 
world without regard to territorial boundaries and national controls. 1997 South 
Asian economic melt-down started in Asia, then quickly felt in Hong Kong, and 
then jumped to Russia and, in turn, to the West. Likewise, 2001 and 2008 were the 
dates where a global economic and financial downturn spread across the world. 
Worldwide-knit-economy or via Thomas L. Friedman the electronic herd545left few 
nations unaffected from financial crisis that spread all around the world. There is a 
mismatch between the scale of overall world economic activity and the scale of the 
national control of economy. In geopolitical lexicon, geo-economics is not 
constrained to state control alone. As a corollary, finance of terrorism is hard to 
control, too. 
Our world becomes ever more interconnected through mobility of goods 
and ideas. Economy, culture, ideas and civil and military technology go to many 
corners of the world. However, borders and states as bureaucratic apparatuses are 
local and not mobile; they are fixed to geography. Projection of their power and 
outreach of influence onto their external spheres mainly spring from their territory. 
Previously, governments could relatively easily control their national economic 
policies because world economy was arguably not as interconnected as is the case 
today. At the very least, the speed of transportation of goods and financial 
transactions were certainly lower before the advance of the information technologic 
                     
545Friedman, Thomas L.  1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; Friedman, 
Thomas L.  2003. Longitudes and Attitudes-World in the Age of Terrorism NY: Anchor Books. 
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innovations. Seen from the historical continuum of centuries, the world was not 
cabled and computerized. There were no intergovernmental economic 
organizations as effective and influential as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
or the World Bank in previous eras. There were few transnational companies -
world’s local corporations- having branches in many states. Furthermore, the 
world-wide black market expanded ever more taking advantage from the 
establishment of new states following the dismemberment of the former Soviet 
Union, which ended a rival economic system with the result of liberal market 
principles becoming the single global economic mechanism.  
Non-state actors are not always at bad terms with nation-states though; they 
may also cooperate with them. The nation-state benefits from private entities at 
times for it give the opportunity to maintain power without much accountability.546 
In consequence of that, states sometimes may become complicit in the shift of 
authority to private actors. Hence a direct challenge to the system of sovereign 
states in the security realm emerges. The point is marked by the existence of 
‘private armies’ or ‘private firms’ that provide surveillance, intelligence, logistics 
and manpower. There are private military companies (PMCs) such as Global Risk 
International, Dyncorp, Vinnel, Blackwater Security Consulting, or Erinys. By way 
of example, private military companies (PMCs) operate extensively in Iraq, 
sometimes with highly sophisticated military means including helicopters and 
advanced computer systems allowing them to engage in direct combat as shown 
during the operations against the Army of Mahdi in May 2004 in the city of 
Nadjaf547. 
                     
546Bruce Hall, Rodney. “Private Authority: Non-State Actors and Global Governance” Harvard 
International Review, Summer2005, Vol. 27 Issue 2. 
547Blakely, Gregg. 2002. Marketized Soldiering: How Private Military Companies Challenge Global 
Governance, Erode Accountability and Exacerbate Conflict Unpublished Dissertation-University of 
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Another example is bluntly provided by Rodney Bruce Hall: 
If you have mining interests in Africa and need to get a government changed to permit 
you to operate without interference, you might ring up a firm specializing in the 
provision of "security" services with offices around the world that would be willing to 
fix your little problem for you for a fee. What Biersteker and I call "illicit" authority is 
exercised by mercenaries and mafias and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) 
worldwide. Private armed forces and TCOs penetrate weak states and provide under-
provided public goods, like security from guerilla violence in Sierra Leone, to public 
services of kinds from Medellin, Columbia to former Soviet Central Asia. They 
provide control over the private means of violence where governments do not enjoy a 
public monopoly of the use of force. Significantly, they provide a means by which 
private actors, such as transnational corporations (TNC's) can acquire military 
capabilities. As such they pose a direct challenge to a system of sovereign states in the 
security realm.548 
 
As it is the case with the flow of worldwide finance-capital or states’ 
hardship to control their own economies, national means are not good enough to 
capture transnational terrorism and its financing. ‘Borders of national-economy 
maintenance’ does not match with the borders of economic activities in total. Since 
the Treaties of Westphalia, physical or territorial borders of a nation remain largely 
intact on paper. But the intangible borders of economy went ever beyond nation-
states’ economic sphere of influence. As Al-Qaeda (world’s local terrorist 
organization) plainly shows, borders of national security do not start and end in 
national borders. That might be taken as an indication of how security and nation-
state are gradually becoming globalized. State is becoming globalized because most 
non-state or societal violence and economic transactions are taking place in its 
sovereign space, yet nation-states cannot effectively control them. Establishing 
control is hard because money, technology and information are moving without 
much hindrance of physical distance. Even if insiders’ attacks against their own 
countries are to be neglected, terrorists are mostly able to take advantage of the 
advanced civil means of electronic-communication, banking, and advanced 
                                                                
Toronto. 
548Bruce Hall, Rodney. 2005. “Private Authority: Non-State Actors and Global Governance”, Harvard 
International Review, Summer Vol. 27 Issue 2, p. 69. 
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transportation in infiltrating the borders of a nation. When working mechanism of 
economy goes beyond national scale coupled with the weaponization of modern 
transportation and communication into tools of infiltration, it becomes easier for 
any kind of terrorism to challenge states.  
The challenge occurs when a terrorist attack itself occurs: The mere 
realization of the terrorist act constitutes the challenge because such an attack 
questions the legitimacy of governments and the legitimacy of state institutions and 
apparatus. States’ raison d'être partly depends on the state's ability to keep its 
monopoly on the use of force. State monopoly on the use of force is legitimized by 
state's capacity, credibility and duty to protect its citizens. If the state cannot keep 
such monopoly or when a state fails to protect its citizens, its legitimacy and 
capacity to exist becomes challenged. Although states’ ultimate goal is survival, 
which is not always about gaining legitimacy rooted in domestic and international 
public opinion, the concern of sustaining loyalty of citizens is a power-resource for 
states. Different from earlier historical periods, foreign and domestic politics of 
states is ever more open to inquiry of citizens and to the world over. Moreover, 
democratic societies arguably cannot always justify survival or raison d'état 
arguments readily and at all costs. In sum, when states face transnational 
challenges, they cannot always utilize their territories as a means of effective 
control and influence. Boulding’s ‘home strength’ argument is therefore not always 
applicable to transnational and deterritorialized threats. The ‘home strength 
argument’ is of the military and national defense lenses. That kind of lenses hardly 
respond to a grey threat where civil and military realms are enmeshed. Moreover, 
the dynamics of conflict seem to evolve. It is these evolving dynamics that follow 
in examining the threat of transnational terrorism.      
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7.4. Old Threat, New Threat?  
Different Perspectives and Non-Cooperation  
 
Although many varieties of terrorism are said to be existing, the basic 
nature or the ontology of terrorism is one and the same. It is true that methods of 
terrorism change due to changing technological means of a particular era. However, 
a change in methods does not equal to a change in its nature. It may make sense to 
discuss the pre-Cold War era terrorism, the Cold War era terrorism and the twenty-
first century terrorism owing to different methods and capabilities available for 
terrorists in respective eras.  
Yet, transformation or newness of terrorism is controversial because the 
basic nature and the basic goal of terrorism seem to be the same over time. Basic 
nature of terrorism is to challenge and defy the political status quo established by 
major foci-of-power of a particular era. Terrorism is basically political because it 
challenges and aims to revise the political environment by unconventional means, 
and it is used or appropriated by disparate groups for realizing different ideologies. 
Neatly put, its nature has been to challenge politically and its aim has been to 
achieve political revision or total destruction of a particular political system in a 
specific time-period. Throughout history, the basic feature of terrorism has been 
constantly in place without regard to the different degrees of terrorist success, 
different technology, ideology and methods employed. When ‘methods’ is taken as 
the criterion to assess the newness of terrorism, contemporary terrorism comes 
close to be new; however, when its ‘basic nature’ is concerned it is not new.  
‘The new terrorism debate’ is examined because it is directly related to the 
different approaches and perceptions of nation-states against terrorism. The 
disagreements on whether terrorism is ‘new’ influences the responses of states and 
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their divergent policies in fighting terrorism in that while one sees it as a criminal 
issue another sees it as mainly a military issue. Prosecution through law 
enforcement versus reactive punishment through military operations constitutes the 
main axis of diverging nation-state approaches, originating mainly from the 
perceptions about the new-ness of terrorism.549  
 
7.5. Transnationality, Al Qaeda and the PKK: 
 A Discussion on the Scales of Threats 
Since transnational terrorism is not international terrorism, it is determining 
to examine ‘transnationality’. This may help studying non-state entities and the 
states’ cooperative difficulties against them. ‘Transnationality’ is the co-existence 
of entities that overlap with one another. ‘Entities’ can be elaborated as political 
spaces, which are distinguished by people’s loyalty and identity differences. Non-
state entities are not territorially demarcated: Inasmuch as they are diffused or 
atomized, they are more distinguishable through the study of people’s identity and 
loyalty. Therefore, transnational threats are defined more by the dividing-lines 
within societies than by territorial borders. Transnational terrorism mainly works at 
the societal level and that is why it occasionally manifests itself as if it were mere 
internal threat. The scale of the transnational terrorism is a conflation or synthesis 
of both the internal and the external. As such, it is difficult to pinpoint its adaptive 
mode of operations, organizational build-up, financial, logistical and human 
resources. 
 
 
                     
549 Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic 
divergence or convergence?” International Affairs 81, 5, pp. 905-923. 
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A rough illustration may be of the following: an Islamist militant following 
the teachings of Sayyid Qutb; or a Christian fundamentalist550 that follows 
(Christian) Identity movement which is an anti-Semitic Aryan American 
movement; or a person that dedicates himself/herself to Pastor Pete Peters; a Green 
activist that denies all ideologies, but the Green politics; or a feminist and/or 
Marxist wo/man; a far-rightist that is a member of the Christian Patriots Defense 
League (CPDL); a social democrat in the European self-style; or even a Maoist or 
Stalinist; or a person of any persuasion that is different from the above-mentioned 
leanings can all live side by side in the same city of the same nation-state. They 
also may contact with people of similar tendencies in other countries. They may 
occupy the same territory of a country, which is itself a particular manifestation of 
a certain political space. Yet, they communicate and move beyond one territory of a 
state into another. In that sense, globalization is not an external factor to the state. 
Globalization cannot be totally external to nation-states due to its transnational 
character. 
Globalization manifests itself in the diffusion of authority and power that 
are rooted in loyalties and identities of people both within and beyond nation-states. 
It is not totally external to nation-states. Since it is not totally external to the state, it 
might be plausible to discuss ‘globalized security’.551 As a corollary, the most 
important feature of ‘globalized security’ is arguably the eroding utility of the 
distinction between the inside and outside politics of states or the distinction 
                     
550As the eminent scholars of terrorism point out, ‘fundamentalism’ is historically and jargon-wise 
associated with Christian religious extremism and violence, not with Islamist violence. Hence the terms, 
‘Islamist militant’ and ‘Christian fundamentalism’. 
551Most significantly, the literature on the connection between globalization and security is about the 
problematique that globalization imposes on the canonical distinction between inside and outside or 
between domestic and international. The issue, which is theoretically unorthodox, has not been 
theoretically settled enough to reach an overwhelming academic consensus yet. Bilgin, Pinar. 2005. ‘11 
Eylül Öncesinde ve Sonrasında Küreselleşen Güvenliği Anlamak’ (Understanding Globalised Security 
Before and After September 11), in Küreselleşme ve Alternatif Küreselleşme (Globalisation and 
Alternative Globalisation), Cem Karadeli, ed. Ankara: Siyasal: 59-80. 
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between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ security due to the new form and methods 
of terrorism. Indeed, transnational terrorism does not seem to be permitting 
traditional approaches to stay intact, but rather relativized according to varying 
contexts and issues. 
Implications of globalization on security in general and on nation-states in 
particular can be explained by keeping on with the above illustration where people 
with different persuasions live side by side in the same city. Accordingly, 
psychological distance as the cornerstone of the concept of ‘political space’ must 
be underlined: Although the fact that people with different persuasions live together 
might sound nothing new, the frequency and pace of contact between people, and 
the flow of ideas, goods and weapons that transgress borders is. They are not 
strictly encapsulated and effectively controlled by states as it once was. There have 
been many citizens of various persuasions in a state, but their volume of contact to 
other people in other continents has increased. Thus, the example of Green 
activists, far-rightists, Islamists and Christian fundamentalists, feminists and 
Marxists living in the same city may be enhanced with the possibility of their reach 
to similar minded-people in other continents and regions. Contact of people with 
each other is a crucial determining factor in politics for the reason that non-
territorial political spaces are transnational when the psychological distance among 
people is low independent of geographical or territorial distance.  
On occasion, manifestation of the threat that transnational political spaces 
or transnational groups pose is akin to domestic threats due to insider or citizen 
involvement. Yet, face-to-face contact is not indispensable for making common 
cause. The so-called “franchising style” of the Al-Qaeda enables citizens of 
different countries to join the terrorist cause. Information technology turns out of to 
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be the dark vehicle of globalization on these occasions that provides access to 
terrorist masterminds for guidance. Thus, from the policy-making perspective, the 
threat has internal features. However, the threat does not always remain internal or 
local, but it is connected to a certain transnational ideology and loyalty that goes 
beyond state.  
Distinguishingly, transnational threats can materialize without the deliberate 
support of a state. The threat is not necessarily coming from a state though at times 
it may seem to be manifesting itself as such, too. If a state leader makes ambiguous 
references about terrorism, it may cause suspicion and indeed lead to 
reconsiderations of threat assessments. However the state-sponsorship of terrorism 
should not always be taken as synonymous with transnational deterritorialized 
terrorism. The citizens of any country may stand up to fight against their own 
country or against any other country by associating themselves with a certain 
global terrorist group. To the extent that people do so without any state’s deliberate 
support, the threat is deterritorialized, and not strictly international. Therefore, 
global threats are not only restricted to the internal realm. Global threats are ‘Grade 
A Transnational’. ‘Grade A’ signifies the degree of going beyond state-control or 
sponsorship and the degree of private violence in its organizational build-up, 
recruitment, logistics, finance and operational tactics of strike. If the threat were 
restricted to the internal, local or regional realm, the degree of transnationality and 
the scale of operations would be relatively smaller as seen in the cases of Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is also called 
KADEK, Kongra-Gel, or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). However, the threats 
presented by Al-Qaeda are not local, but global.552It strikes diverse societies at 
                     
552Terrorism presented by Al Qaeda is basically political despite religious mobilizing features. It aims to 
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every continent. 
The phenomenon of terrorism can be analyzed under two main 
categorizations: local terrorism, and global terrorism. Local terrorism is terrorism 
by non-state actors that targets only one single state while global terrorism553 is the 
repeated use of politically motivated violence that targets more than one state 
without state support. Local terrorist groups also have transnational connections 
albeit to much lesser degree than that of global terrorism, and distinguishing it 
again from global terrorism, local terrorist groups usually strike a single country. 
To illustrate, we must bear in mind the differences between the activities of 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)554, and those of Al-Qaeda. Did PKK bomb 
institutions, buildings, public places in different countries in the world? Where did 
Al-Qaeda atrocities take place? The answers to these questions show the 
differences between local and global agendas of different kinds of terrorist groups 
operating on separate levels. Al-Qaeda operates almost all around the world (such 
as Bali, Istanbul, Washington, Madrid and London), whereas PKK’s attacks - 
though having some transnational connections - take place mainly in Turkey.  
By way of analogy, violent non-state groups (terrorist groups, criminal 
groups and the merger of the latter two groups) are like the leeches or parasites that 
live in and through other organisms/states; yet, they act independently in the case 
of global terrorism. The analogy is meant to refer to the inextricable co-existence of 
states and those of non-state actors under globalization. Via Coker, globalization is 
                                                                
achieve political aims to change policies of governments and political regimes themselves. That is not 
something new about terrorism; however, the scale of its reach and mode of operations, the degree of 
independence from a state-sponsor is different, which constitutes its newness. 
553Ambiguous definitions generically mark international terrorism as terrorism involving citizens or the 
territory of more than one country. Definitions of international terrorism are not helpful because it 
cannot surmount or ease the difficulties presented by the conflated scale of the transnational threat-the 
constant alteration between inside borders and outside of state borders.  
554PKK later tried to gain an allegedly more political basis as Freedom and Democracy Congress of 
Kurdistan (KADEK). 
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interconnectedness.555 Interconnectedness manifests itself both in peaceful and 
conflictive co-inhabitance of different world-outlooks, loyalties and allegiances. 
That is, interconnectedness manifests itself in the cooperation and/or clash of 
different political spaces and dispersed groups that overlap each other. Different 
political groups may share or intersect at the same territory of a state. Yet, 
territorial borders are not practical benchmarks to understand whether the threat. 
Traditional national security lenses do not plan and prepare for global threats, and 
they are not fit to the conflated scales of threat, which is blurred and alternating 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ or between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’. Most 
of the time, national security doctrines have conventionally been prepared and used 
against external threats, not against internal ones. That is also exactly why internal 
security or law enforcement and police operations have come become significantly 
useful in fighting against terrorism.   
The level at which terrorists are perceived to be operating determines the 
scale of the terrorist threat. The more the threat is perceived global, the more the 
number of states whose interests are at stake become. The question of why 
American administrations would act in total concert with Turkey to erase PKK’s 
terrorist activities is to the point. Whether states perceive to have any vital interest 
in cooperating against terrorist groups whose attacks focus only on a single state is 
crucial. ETA, IRA and PKK are among those terrorist groups that strike a single 
state. There can be studied on a relatively local level. Al-Qaeda type globally active 
terrorist groups create global problems affecting many states. This global sort of 
terrorism appears to be highlighting the inevitability of international cooperation 
more successfully because victim states have a common wound. Thus, local 
                     
555Coker, Christopher. 2002. “Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the 
Management of Risk” Adelphi Paper 245, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 
pp.23-24. 
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grievances resonate locally while global ones do globally.  
 
7.6. Cooperation Setback: The Features of the Threat  
and Different Threat Assessments 
In the light of deterritorialization of the strategic landscape, the difficulties of 
perceiving and assessing unconventional threats can be disaggregated to the 
changing weighted-roles of the components of threat assessment. Components of 
threat assessment are intention and capability of the adversary. States use them, in 
concert with one another, to assess threats. However, nation-state authorities weigh 
them differently within different menacing contexts. This is particularly and 
crucially important as to why nation-states differ in their threat assessments. 
‘Intentions’ and ‘capability’ are weighed differently by different nation-states. The 
way states weigh them is analyzed also differently by three distinct schools of 
thought, namely Waltzian neo-Realist theory, Liberal Theory of IR via Andrew 
Moravcsik and the English School via Hedley Bull. 
Viewed from the neo-realist system level, structure comes forth as the 
principal shaping and shoving force for state behaviors. In other words, structure is 
the permissive and constraining cause for state behaviors. Although structure is not 
directly determining, it affects the behavior by conditioning it. Within this 
neorealist approach, capability is taken as fungible with threat formation in the 
anarchic international system (composed of self-reliant states vying for security in 
the absence of any supra-state authority to rule over all nation-states). Realist 
theory, with its assumptions of a unitary state and fixed preferences, simply 
presumes that the greater the wealth and military power of a state, the less the 
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marginal cost of deploying it, thus reducing power to capabilities.556 
Liberal theory suggests different predictions, especially regarding 
preventive wars initiated by democratic states. Liberal theory of international 
politics is not democratic peace theory; it rather refers to the Liberal Theory of 
International Politics as explained by Andrew Moravcsik.557 Liberal theory of IR 
focuses on the link between domestic policies and foreign policies of states. 
Importantly, it differentiates between liberal ideology and liberal theory. It keeps a 
distance from democratic peace argumentations so much so that it urges to explain 
how democratic states can indeed be war-prone and initiate preventive wars.  
Through the lenses of a third school of thought, intentions, capabilities and 
threat formation are, yet again, seen from a separate vantage point. In an 
‘international society’ or via Hedley Bull in an ‘anarchical society’, fungibility of 
capability for threat assessments cannot always be taken for granted.558 For 
instance, the European Union provides a distinct case where intentions are taken to 
be more important than capabilities in threat formation: despite the fact that 
Germany does not possess nuclear weapons, it is known to be able to build nuclear 
weapons in a very short time.  
Following the scholars who define the EU as a distinctive actor, capability 
factor works in a different manner: Provided that political norms and economic 
situation of the EU remain resilient over time, Germany would probably not be 
contemplated as a threat against France, Britain or the United States arguably even 
after it builds nuclear weapons.559 
 
                     
556 Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. NY: McGraw-Hill. 
557Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics” International Organization 51-4, Autumn, pp. 513–553. 
558Bull, Hedley. 1977. Anarchical Society-A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan. 
559Boniface, Pascal. 1997. Gucsuzluk Istegi. Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlari. 
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Given these three academic schools of thought trying to understand the 
threat assessments, policy-makers seem to differentiate between threats emanating 
from other states and those threats originating from non-state entities. Such 
differentiation seems likely to matter and move in direct proportion to the 
ambiguity of transnational terrorism.  
In the formation of state-to-state threat assessments or in assessing threats 
coming from other states, intentions are regarded to be secondary in importance 
when compared to actual (operational or actionable) capabilities of enemies. The 
reason why this is so perceived originates in another perception, namely the 
perception of the nature of intentions. The nature of intentions is generally 
understood to be mercurial. Intentions are regarded as being intrinsically 
changeable and erratic. Put differently, intentions are hold to be changing quickly 
in contrast to capabilities that does not change overnight. Besides, intentions are 
hard to measure due to their abstract nature. Capabilities do not change in a short 
time and they can at least be operationalized in numbers of weapon systems, 
machinery and manpower. Therefore, capabilities are more susceptible to 
measurement than intentions. Last but not least, materialization of violent 
intentions requires actual capacity. Hence ‘capabilities’ are seen as more conducive 
to realistic threat assessment.  
The question of relative unreliability of intentions as a determinant of 
conventional threat assessment remains a point which is hard to dispute. This is due 
to possible quick changes in intentions of states. From that point forward, 
intentions become an unreliable factor to count on while making threat 
assessments. This makes sense especially in the military-strategic context where 
nation-states are juxtaposed to one another. Unlike the case in domestic politics 
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where the intention-capability relationship among state institutions may somewhat 
differ regarding the nature of a regime or the political moves made within the state, 
the pace of change in intentions matters especially in international security because 
‘intention’ includes the willingness to inflict punishment and use of armed force in 
retaliation for or conditional upon a foreign policy move. That is why assessing the 
intentions of the possible or actual adversary is vital for national security. Still, role 
of ‘intentions’ is seconded to role of ‘capability’ in making state-to-state threat 
assessments for the reasons mentioned-above. 
For states, that is the customary way of perceiving and assessing threats. 
Although this kind of threat assessment speaks to threats that are emanating from 
other nation-states, it does not always hold true for threats emanating from non-
state entities. Since transnational terrorism includes several forms of attack 
including those conducted by networked-citizens against their own state, the 
working-mechanism of state-to-state-threat-assessment becomes problematic. The 
customary way of perceiving and assessing threats is unlikely to be tenable against 
unconventional threats that may be intra-state, sub-state or simply beyond states.  
There are several reasons for why customary threat assessment is not valid 
enough when faced by non-state threat or use of violence. First, perpetrator of the 
threat is no more a nation-state in such a case, but a group of people (that may also 
include citizens of target-state) with connections beyond target-state. Secondly, 
since terrorists lack conventional capabilities, they are simply not as resourceful 
and hierarchically organized as nation-states are. They have to fight 
unconventionally for they cannot conventionally take on regular armed-forces of 
nation-states. However, a window of opportunity arises for terrorism: wider range 
of weapons and weaponization of any nation-state facility. Whether they are 
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civilian soft-targets (such as a shopping-mall, public transportation vehicles, 
beaches, discos or bazaars) or protected hard-targets such as military instillations, 
all nation-state facilities can be weaponized onto itself through explosion. Besides, 
corrupt officials (as intermediaries of the gray markets) smuggle small weapons 
and nuclear materials from states’ arsenal in addition to the leftover weapons from 
previous conflicts.560 
Thirdly, transnational terrorism operates horizontally. It is neither 
accountable to a nation/public nor organized hierarchically. Its organizational 
scheme is chiefly horizontal: disparate citizens contact each other all around the 
world and they are capable of acting in many states including their own. In 
contrast, states have vertical and hierarchical structures that cause an organizational 
mismatch with transnational terrorism. 
Since formation of threats that nation-states pose to its peers is irrelevant to 
terrorist methods and threats, the conflict environment within which nation-states 
rival each other and the one in which the non-state entities operate do not 
correspond to one another. They are asymmetric. However, ‘asymmetry’ goes 
further from asymmetry in capabilities into an asymmetry in strategizing. Indeed, 
the former seems to cause the latter. While victim is thinking through nation-state 
analytical lenses, aggressor takes no strict nation-state template for its operational 
plans. 
In an asymmetric conflict, nation-states have clear superiority in 
conventional capabilities such as high precision, surveillance, and fire power; states 
may use tanks, helicopters and fighting jets against which terrorists cannot respond 
                     
560 Cukier, Wendy. 2002. “Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Public Health Approach” The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs Spring Volume IX, Issue 1; Kupatadze, Alexander. 2007. “Radiological 
Smuggling and Uncontrolled Territories: The Case of Georgia” Global Crime Volume 8, Issue 1: 40-
57. 
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in kind. But the problem of nation-states is that terrorists do not have to respond in 
kind. Recognizing the conventional superiority of national armies, terrorists 
dislocate it. They choose to fight by terrorism, an unconventional form of warfare, 
which does not require them to attack or retaliate in kind. Thereby, they do not 
have to respond or deal with conventional weaponry. Potential enemies took note 
of the conventional superiorities and acted to dislocate it. Non-state actors like al-
Qaeda developed asymmetric approaches to side-step regular military power of 
states. Side-stepping occurs by rendering it functionally irrelevant, which in turn is 
realized through operating in environments where states cannot bring their military 
capabilities to bear. This is how terrorism as one of the types of unconventional 
warfare becomes the tactic of the weak. When the fighting terrain is shifted, the 
weaknesses gradually transform to be strengths. This is the essence of any irregular 
form of warfare whether of small wars, insurgencies, guerilla war, low-intensity 
conflict or terrorism.561 
In congruence with the above-mentioned reasons (namely, the permissive 
international structure that does not allow previous state-control over private 
violence, availability of power resources for terrorism and existence of horizontal 
societal linkages across/trans nations), fourth reason for why customary threat 
assessments are not valid enough when nation-states are exposed to terrorist 
violence is that the sociological build-up of contemporary terrorism is hard to 
capture, control or change: The way terrorists use power is different from the way 
                     
561Warfare is the basic concept denoting clashing applications of violence. It has regular and irregular 
forms or manifestations. Conventional manifestation is ‘war’ that place among nation-states. Irregular 
(unconventional or asymmetric) manifestations of warfare are not referred to as ‘war’. They are often 
referred to as insurgency, low-intensity conflict, guerilla warfare, urban guerilla warfare or terrorism. 
Although these labels are used to denote different forms of irregular warfare that have some distinctive 
characteristics, they are not totally separate or mutually exclusive. They are different shades of the 
unconventional warfare spectrum. They are much more overlapping than completely separate. 
Nevertheless, on the merits of distinctiveness the most noticeable one seems to be terrorism, which is 
unattached to territory. Incendiaries or radicals who use terrorism as a political means may occasionally 
shift among these above-mentioned unconventional or irregular forms of warfare.  
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states use it. That is because the sociological build-up of non-state entities 
themselves and the threats they pose are different from those of the states. 
Formation of threats that nation-states pose to its peers is a subject matter largely 
irrelevant to terrorist methods and threats, and to debates on how to respond 
terrorists per se. 
Fifth, terrorists’ resolve for destruction (which is reflected in their 
declarations and past terrorist attacks) indicates their willingness to have a say in 
politics incommensurate to their legitimacy and legal status. Their illegality gives 
them the freedom to do anything without international obligations and 
responsibilities. It enlarges the terrorist freedom of maneuver while increasing the 
fog of war/strategic uncertainty for nation-states whereas states are bounded by 
expectations of acting within the framework of law, democracy and individual 
rights and liberties to keep their campaign legitimate in the eyes of the domestic 
and international public opinion.  
Finally and most importantly, the sixth factor that increases the fog of 
unconventional warfare is that terrorists do not have any address to retaliate at. 
Terrorists are seemingly civilians without uniforms who act in secrecy. Nation-
states do not know where they are or where they live. They do not reside in or cling 
to a fixed portion of territory. When they start to live and fight on certain territory, 
the form of unconventional warfare shifts from terrorism to guerrilla warfare. 
Although guerilla war presents big problems of combat for armies, it is easier to 
fight against when compared to the military combat against terrorism. It is more 
susceptible to nation-states’ territory-centric mode of combat. Although non-state 
forms of warfare may oscillate between terrorism and guerilla war, terrorism is not 
guerilla warfare. Guerilla war is not deterritorialized unlike terrorism, it 
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concentrates on certain territory. Nevertheless, there is a special kinship between 
the two forms of unconventional warfare in that it is not uncommon for violent 
extremists to switch between them.  
Under these advantageous circumstances on the part of terrorists, high 
intention or resolve for destruction comes down to mean high cost for states. It does 
not compare much whether the probability is low or not; the fact that the 
probability exists is enough reason for worst-case scenarios to dominate the 
security agenda of nation-states. How is this possible? Compounded by 
unpredictable timing of terrorist operations and vague whereabouts of their 
locations, intention cannot be seconded to actual capabilities anymore: In a time of 
ubiquitous technological know-how, weapons and materials, intention to hurt 
matters more than ever. Leaving aside the vulnerability of any civilian facility as a 
possible target, wide avenues of obtaining weapons exist in contrast to narrow 
avenues of overseeing whether terrorists acquire them. When violent intentions and 
declarations have no address or when the place of people that call for destruction is 
not known to state authorities, a preventive-approach based on intention-analysis 
came forth as seen in the preemptive-strike doctrine.562  
Previously, adversarial capabilities of nation-states could be overseen or 
constantly examined so as to understand whether capability is coupled with 
intention to destroy. This was the way it was gauged; because whatever the 
intention was, threat could only materialize with the acquisition of destructive 
capability commensurate with declared intentions. In other words, capability must 
correspond to intentions in its amount and magnitude so as to form a credible 
threat. There has been such proportionality between capability and intention. Faced 
                     
562The White House. 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 
2002. Washington, p.15. 
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with conventional threats, nation-states weigh or gauge the proportionality between 
capabilities and intentions with a ‘capability slant’. Capability factor is prioritized 
because, as discussed above, states’ intentions are hard to perceive and they may 
change.  
The same underlying logic does not appear to be corresponding well to 
unconventional threat assessments. Since location of terrorists is not easily 
determined and overseeing whether they acquire additional means of capability is 
hard, ‘intentions’ or hostile declarations may come to be regarded as reasons for 
taking action before waiting for the evidence of actual acquisition of capability. For 
instance, when a terrorist organization declares its intention to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction as Al Qaeda did repetitively,563 it becomes strategically prudent to 
incapacitate it as soon as possible because states cannot accurately know how close 
terrorists are to obtaining or building a nuclear weapon. In the face of the existence 
of black markets all around the world, Al-Qaeda’s repetitive declarations indicating 
their pursuit of and willing to use weapons of mass destruction increases the weight 
of intentions in making threat assessments. When faced by unaccounted and 
missing nuclear materials from the former Soviet nuclear arsenal,564 ‘the factor of 
intentions’ in making threat assessments gains greater weight.  
States’ previous criterion of threat assessment regarding another state which 
rested mainly on capability-acquisition happens to be coming forward to respond to 
terrorist threats: Faced with the unconventional threat of terrorism, ‘intention’ may 
itself become sufficient for states to perceive a vital threat. Indeed, nation-states 
may perceive existential threats that threaten their survival physically and 
politically. The case of Israel may be illustrative: When the damage of nuclear 
                     
563Ibrahim, Raymond. 2007. The Al Qaeda Reader. NY: Doubleday. 
564Weiner, Sharon. “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction Progress, Problems and Issues for 
the Future” The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 16, Issue 2, pp. 211-235. 
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terrorism is contemplated for a small state that does not have enough strategic 
depth to survive after a first-strike or detonation, the point becomes vivid. An 
alternative contemplation as to what a series of consecutive nuclear terrorist attacks 
could do to major-power/s raises similar concerns of survival. Even without nuclear 
weapons, terrorist attacks would still cause great numbers of casualties, political 
and economic damage and instability. Yet, the point is that even the mere 
possibility -leaving out the probability- is enough for states to prepare accordingly. 
Given that terrorists cannot be located clearly and that their dynamic 
weapons procurement process cannot be observed punctually, existence of violent 
intention is neither regarded as inferior to capability-assessments, nor prospective 
capabilities of terrorist groups are prior to their ‘intentions’ in considering 
unconventional threat formation. Indeed, ‘intention side’ of the traditional threat 
assessment came to have a bigger role owing to dramatically shortened duration of 
the formation of threat perception. To count as a threat, capability-acquisition or 
weapons procurement is not as determining as it once was. It became strategically 
prudent to act before it is too late to respond against terrorists.  
Globalization’s impact on distance and strategy is shrunk-distances or 
‘proximate distances’ through advanced communication and transportation. 
Globalization shortened the time-span of delivery of goods, money, ideas, weapons 
and people. In parallel, delivery of threats shortened in time, too. Enemies acquired 
high and fast mobility: High mobility in that they move frequently from one 
location to another; fast mobility in that their movements or travel are faster than 
before. That brings about fast delivery of threats. Pace of perceptions followed suit: 
threat perceptions are formed in very short time span following violent declarations 
irrespective of capability. ‘The factor of intention’ in making threat assessments 
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seems to acquire upper-hand due to the inability to locate all terrorist hubs. In 
making threat assessments, such an inability reduces the weight of ‘the capability 
factor’: Without whereabouts, capability cannot be observed and assessed. 
Correspondingly, acting before anticipated act of aggression becomes a 
strategic must. Acting before anticipated aggression is intrinsic to prevention, and 
prevention is basically about timing. Although above-examined unconventional 
threats have no address, initiation of response must still come before the initiation 
of the threat itself. Waiting for evidence of capability-acquisition is strategically 
unwise. Otherwise, no meaningful defense appears to be possible.  
There is an obvious irony though: how to respond to threats whose place are 
not known to nation-state authorities? That is exactly where and why ‘intentions’ 
acquire greater weight in threat assessments: Suspicion about different groups of 
people originates from declarations of violent intentions communicated through 
media. In consequence of that, anticipation of attack increases because no accurate 
measure or scalar of threat is available to weigh the imminence of attack. States get 
suspicious and fearful about the activities of non-state entities, and even more so if 
they were hit before. Loaded with no measurement of any certainty as to the time 
and place of attack, suspicion amplifies the intentions factor of threat-assessment. 
Gradually, the factor of ‘intention of the enemy’ begins to rule in threat 
assessments. In due course, suspected units (units that threaten states) become 
potential targets of nation-states irrespective of their capability. However, how to 
name a ‘threat’ becomes controversial at this juncture. A point of dispute among 
nation-states arises for generally there is not enough intelligence on the 
whereabouts and capability of the adversary.565 If nation-states knew the original 
                     
565Grimmett, Richard F. Coordinator Specialist in Congressional Research Service National Defense-
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location of a terrorist threat, ‘intentions’ probably would not come to have a 
broadened role in shaping threat assessments, because it is the lack of information 
on whereabouts of terrorists and the following lack of information on their 
capabilities that cause suspicion and fear. Suspicion formed thereby turns 
‘intentions’ into a greater determinant of threat perception and assessment.  
Congruent with this argument that ‘the intentions factor’ have acquired 
greater role than the factor of the ‘capabilities of the enemy’ in making threat 
assessments, Robert Jervis argues that great fear coupled by great power or 
capacity to punish causes significant counterterrorism responses.566The United 
States of America shocked and humiliated by September 11 terrorist attacks fears 
similar and even bigger subsequent attacks. It apparently and understandably 
cannot overrule the probability of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Its 
foreign policy behavior, especially the 2003 intervention in Iraq, is the 
implementation of the principles of preemptive-strike doctrine enshrined in the 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America of both 2002 and 
2006.567 Ideological value-judgments aside and notwithstanding the debate whether 
America’s actions are justified or whether they are pre-emptive or preventive, why 
and how America acted the way it did after September 11 can probably and partly 
be explained by the rising weighted-role of ‘intentions of enemy’ in making threat 
assessments due to high fear and suspicion of nation-states originating in violent 
declarations with no address. This is a rather technical explanation for why states 
acted as they did after September 11. However, perceptions of the international 
                                                                
Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division, USA. 2006.  9/11 Commission Recommendations: 
Implementation Status, December 4, RL33742. 
566Jervis, Robert. 2003. “Compulsive Empire”, Foreign Policy July-August, pp. 83-87; Jervis, Robert. 
2005. American Foreign Policy in a New Era. New York: Routledge, pp. 54-58. 
5672002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002 Washington: 
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public opinion may differ: strikes that originate from the above-mentioned 
conditions would arguably be regarded as being more plausible in the international 
arena when directed against terrorist hubs rather than nation-states. At the very 
least, a political rhetoric presenting the situation as such would ease out the 
tensions among both states and publics for then they might not see pre-emptive 
strikes as threat to themselves and as a preliminary example-setting foreign policy 
move that damages sovereign-nonintervention principle. This would require a 
different set of actions that involve the participation and cooperation of states 
within which terrorists are presumed to be residing or sheltered, rather than 
addressing states themselves as targets. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
 
 
THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTER ON NATO TRANSFORMATION, 
THE NEW THREAT AND  
THE CONVERGENCES-DIVERGENCES OF THE ATLANTIC 
ALLIES REGARDING THE NEW THREAT* 
 
 
 
8.1. Interviews conducted with NATO Authorities 
 
NATO’s cooperation with former adversaries did not prove to be easy as 
political adviser James Bergerson puts it: “Russians did not show up to be the 
partners that we hoped they would be”.568Robert Wedan agrees by stressing the 
importance of solidarity: “The quality of the group is as strong as the weakest link 
in the group”.569The NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Guy Roberts, in an interview with the candidate, underlined the 
difficulties of working with new members and partners: “An Estonian official came 
                     
*‘The new threat’ (the working definition as defined in the introductory chapter one, and elaborated in 
chapter two) is used as only referring to the different dimensions and manifestation of transnational 
terrorism short of getting involved in the new terrorism debate. 
568The candidate’s interview with James Bergerson, Political Adviser to Admiral Bruce Clingan-
Commander Striking Force NATO, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-
Greece, 19 October 2009.   
569The candidate’s interview with Robert Wedan, Office of General Council, Department of Defense, 
NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 19 October 2009. 
418 
 
out to be a spy that worked for the Russians and took NATO classified information 
to Russia.”570These instances of uncooperative behaviour coupled with spying 
dampen the embryonic culture of intelligence-sharing. Intelligence-sharing is 
important regarding almost all fields of NATO work-load, yet it is particularly 
significant for the alliance’s new goal of fighting terrorism.571   
However, cooperation difficulties are not limited to difficult transition of 
former enemies into partners. NATO authorities stress that intelligence gathering, 
exchange and assessment acquired an all-time high importance due to the terrorist 
threat that they confront. Guy Roberts underlines the features of the new threat as 
the reason for the increasing need to acquire reliable intelligence: “Non-state 
entities took advantage of technology and globalization well-before nations 
did.”572Roberts’ emphasis testifies that transnational terrorism is the advanced form 
of private violence under the effects of globalization. As private sector and 
transnational corporations are good at using technology, perpetrators of private 
violence follows suit in using high-technology.  
Availability of technology, weapons and funding are the structural effects of 
globalization, which requires a different response: Roberts goes on to indicate that 
“the threat is daring but not invincible. It can be defeated, however, by a network of 
networks composed of nations and international organizations.” The phrase 
‘network of networks’ has become a catch-word for the NATO’s comprehensive 
                     
570The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.   
571Newsome, Bruce. 2006. “Expatriate Games: Interorganizational Coordination and International 
Counterterrorism” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:75-89; Lander, Stephen. Former Director 
General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside 
Perspective”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 17, Number 3, October, and, 
Interview with Guy Roberts, NATO MIO Seminar, Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009. 
572The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.   
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counterterrorist strategy especially after the 2002 Prag, 2004 Istanbul and 2006 
Riga Summits of the NATO. 
 
Yet again, implementation of the Summit decisions faces obstacles other 
than the effects of globalization. Societal problems of governments constitute great 
impediments in establishing ‘a network of networks’. This has also repercussions 
for NATO policies. It is instructive to trace the institutional threat assessments of 
NATO during the late 1990s in order to understand the difficulties of fighting 
transnational terrorism today. What is rarely mentioned about the latest NATO 
Summits is their political and societal background, which gives clues as to what 
extent states are prepared to define and declare the threat clearly, and thereby 
reduce the ambiguity of the threat assessments used for the political and operational 
phases of inter-state responses.573  
Even before the current Strategic Concept, namely the 1999 NATO 
Strategic Concept, is adopted and before the consecutive terrorist attacks around 
the world took place in the timeline of 2001-2010, NATO Secretary General Willy 
Claes, in 1995, stated that “Islamic militancy has emerged as perhaps the single 
gravest threat to NATO Alliance and Western security.”574According to NATO 
Secretary General Claes, the threat was more than that of the Cold War due to the 
fact that it encompassed elements of ‘terrorism, religious fanaticism and the 
exploitation of social and economic injustice’.575This would appear to suggest that 
NATO has for long recognized the severity of the threat. However, it is not exactly 
                     
573Williams, Timothy N. 2004. EU-NATO Cooperation in the Fight Against Islamic Fundamentalist 
Terrorism, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, www.isn.ethz.ch, p.195. 
574Williams, Timothy N. 2004. EU-NATO Cooperation in the Fight Against Islamic Fundamentalist 
Terrorism, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, www.isn.ethz.ch, p.194. 
575Williams, Timothy N. 2004. EU-NATO Cooperation in the Fight Against Islamic Fundamentalist 
Terrorism, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, www.isn.ethz.ch, p.195. 
420 
 
the case: “Claes’ remarks caused widespread outrage across the Muslim world, and 
he quickly retracted them.”576The fact of public outrage portrays the difficulties of 
European and American governments in tackling the religious extremism openly: 
NATO documents do not specify the threat. The threat definition is left unclear due 
to the reluctance to stir riots and protests in cosmopolitan capitals. It also translates 
to that countering terrorism is also an internal security problem especially for the 
European governments that could not manage to integrate their immigrants in 
full.577This is particularly important in confronting religious-political extremist 
dimension of the transnational terrorism threat, which is also ‘a threat 
within’.578Different from the former Soviet threat, transnational terrorism is not 
only ‘out there’, but also ‘here within’ the societies.  
Comprehensive strategies presume a conception in that a combination of 
networked national policies with again a network of international organizations 
would fulfill the task of countering transnational terrorism, hence a network of 
networks. Such a strategy is being crafted in a way that corresponds to the new 
dimensions of the transnational terrorism threat whose features enforce authorities 
to respond to both internal and external threats.579In answering such a combination, 
internal and external tools of state apparatus such as law enforcement, judiciary, 
military strategy and intelligence has become simultaneously important. Indeed, 
there have to be a synergy among the latter. However, NATO does not have an 
                     
576Pipes, Daniel. 2002. “Who is the Enemy?” Commentary, January. 
577Lindstrom, Gustav. 2004. “Protecting Europe”, http://www.iss.europa.eu/ 
578Chalk, Peter. William Roseanau. 2004. Confronting the “Enemy Within”: Security Intelligence, The 
Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies, www.rand.org; Chalk, Peter. 2000. “The Third 
Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation, Anti-terrorist Collaboration and Liberal Democratic 
Acceptability,” in Fernando Reinares ed., European Democracies against Terrorism. Governmental 
Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation Aldershot, pp. 175–210. 
579Hamilton, Daniel, Charles Barry, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Flanagan, Julianne Smith, James 
Townsend. 2009. Alliance Reborn-An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century, The Washington NATO 
Project of Atlantic Council of the United States , Center for Strategic and International Studies  Center 
for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins 
University SAIS, February.  
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intelligence unit operating on its own: It depends upon the capabilities of its 
member-states. The same also goes for any other aspect of the collective effort 
undertaken because NATO is inter-governmental in organization and all member-
states have sovereign prerogatives such as national decision-making, refusing or 
acceding to a new Memorandum of Understanding580 (MoU) that is intended to 
develop a new policy, or restraining intelligence as they see fit. 
Thus, nation-states (as sovereign bodies) not only must come to an 
agreement on the terms of a policy prior to its implementation, but they must also 
devise new protocols to overcome ‘classical problems of intelligence 
sharing’.581Yet, governmental decisions and preferences are preliminary for 
intelligence exchange to be conducted. Although intelligence-sharing is crucial for 
both policy-making and implementation, it must also be activated by the 
preferences and decisions of nations. However, different political cultures and 
national preferences seem to be limiting the inter-state cooperation within the 
framework of NATO: 
The transatlantic disputes of the past two years have undermined any prospect of 
updating it (the 1999 Strategic Concept). One result of the transatlantic disputes 
within the NATO organization is the lack of agreement on the development of the 
purpose and mission of the organization, and how to modernize the pre-conflict 
decision-making process. If nothing else, according to Ronald D. Asmus, NATO 
                     
580Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is one of the building-blocks of a new policy by the member-
states not only for NATO alone, but it is a common international legal and diplomatic instrument to 
determine and activate ‘the best practices’ to be followed.  
581The problematic of intelligence-sharing is illustrated by the Former Director General UK Security 
Service Stephen Lander in the following vein: “International intelligence cooperation is something of 
an oxymoron. Intelligence services and intelligence collection are at heart manifestations of individual 
state power and of national self-interest. The very language used about the work makes the point. 
British legislation talks about 'national security' and the UK's 'defence and foreign policies'. The role of 
the UK agencies is, thus, essentially to support and supplement other government activities where 
adversaries' secrets are involved. In terms of international relations, the role is, therefore, necessarily 
competitive if not aggressive. Intelligence is able, to pull out a few examples, to (a) maximise the 
effectiveness of your own armed forces by illuminating others' capabilities and dispositions; (b) to 
secure comparative political or strategic advantage internationally by disclosing others' intentions; or (c) 
to protect the safety and well-being first and foremost of your own citizens, if necessary at the potential 
expense of someone else's (e.g. action against people smuggling and the deportation of terrorists)”, 
Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International 
Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 
17, Number 3, October, p. 481. 
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needs to reinvent itself politically to create a functioning EU-NATO relationship as 
well as a strategic EU-US relationship.582 
 
In addition to the need for prior agreement among the Allies with regard to 
rebuilding the relationships of EU-NATO and EU-US, the new basis of the 
relationships should address the new dimensions of the threat. Any form of 
response that excludes a networked-form of strategizing does not address the new 
threat. Indeed, this is acknowledged by the NATO member-states through Riga 
Summit Declaration on 29 November 2006 and Prag Summit Declaration on 21 
November 2002.583 
To implement such a networked-response, NATO ‘tries’584to follow a two-
track policy:  
First track is internal overhauling: NATO established a new Command, the 
Allied Commander Transformation (ACT). Thus, command structure and 
organization is being modified. The ACT underlines the importance that NATO 
attaches to the new threat. It indicates the importance given to the new threat more 
than the first-time invocation of the Article 5 of NATO Charter in 2001 does. 
Invocation of Article 5 was as a sign of solidarity with the US, and NATO's role 
and mission extended qualitatively beyond its Strategic Concept and beyond its 
traditional core concern in Europe. However, the ACT points to an attempt at 
                     
582Henning, Riecke. 2005. “The Need for Change” NATO Review, Special Issue-Spring, p. 14; Asmus, 
Ronald D. 2003. “Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance”, Foreign Affairs, September-October.  
583Prag and Riga summit declarations, as they are in the NATO Online Library, can be retrieved from:  
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm and http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm 
584Kamp, Karl-Heinz. 2009. “Just What Is It For?” NATO Defence College, Rome-Chatham House, 
October, pp.24-25; Security and Defense Agenda (SDA) Discussion Paper – Belgium “Re-Launching 
NATO, or Just Re-Branding It?” http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/; Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin 
Schreer. 2009. “Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the process of Strategic 
Change” International Affairs 85: 2, 211–226; Hunter, Robert E. NATO after the Summit-Rebuilding 
Consensus, Testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on 
European Affairs on May 6, 2009; Herda, Graeme P. and Tuomas Forsberg. 2008. “Constructive 
Transatlantic Strategic Dissonance: Making a Virtue out of Vice?” International Politics, 45, 364–
381.LDTODAY 
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modifying the Alliance mission. NATO has also embarked upon an Article 5 
operation, namely Operation Active Endeavor (OAE). OAE is NATO’s only 
Article 5 operation, and it was the first substantive military action the alliance took 
after the September 11 attacks to address the terrorist threat. According to General 
James L. Jones, OAE indicates NATO’s shift from common defense to common 
security.585Operation Active Endeavor has been significant for the Allies because:  
This activity corresponds both to Washington’s goal of preventing terrorist attacks 
and to NATO’s antiterrorism strategy. After deploying in the eastern Mediterranean 
in October 2001 as a deterrent and surveillance measure in support of the U.S. 
intervention in Afghanistan, OAE evolved into a broader counterterrorism initiative. 
It expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean in 2003; and during the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq, it escorted ships through the Strait of Gibraltar (at the United States’ request) 
to alleviate concerns that terrorists might target such ships. OAE has focused on 
monitoring shipping and the safety of ports and narrow sea lanes.586 
 
The second track of NATO transformation policy is its urge to establish 
partnerships with other organizations. Since September 11, 2001, NATO as an 
Alliance has continuously emphasized cooperation among international 
organizations. That is, it aims to work with other regional, international, 
supranational and global organizations such as the European Union on rebuilding 
EU-NATO and EU-US strategic relations, the United Nations on the legal 
regulations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
on illicit trafficking, democratization, border guards and interdiction training, and 
World Customs Organization (WCO) on controlling all customs regulations in the 
world. 
In short, NATO’s response against transnational terrorism is covered mostly 
in NATO transformation process, which includes two dimensions: an internal 
rearrangement dimension with its new command structure and operations, and 
                     
585General James L. Jones, “NATO: From Common Defense to Common Security,” Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong., 2d sess., February 7, 2006, http://foreign.senate.gov/ 
hearings/2006/hrg060207a.html. 
586De Nevers, Renée. 2007. “NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era” International 
Security, Vol. 31, No. 4, Spring, p. 41. 
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secondly, the inter-organizational cooperation dimension. This is the gist of 
NATO’s transformation and its attempts to respond to the transnational terrorist 
threat. These two dimensions with new missions are further detailed in the 
following pages, but it might be useful now to turn to other relevant points 
regarding the contemporary form of inter-state cooperation and different 
approaches to ‘the new threat’. 
Previously, NATO did not work with an eye on institutional partners. 
During the Cold War up to the late 1990s, NATO members mainly concentrated on 
cooperation among each other rather than with other international organizations. 
The urge to create new institutional partnerships is a new dimension of the 
Alliance. This second track of NATO transformational policy is a novel feature, 
fundamentally because the new threat requires the Alliance to conduct joint work 
with other regional and international organizations. The first track of organizational 
rearrangement within the Alliance aims to re-organize the cooperative relations 
among the NATO member-states and new partner states, while the second-track 
aims at realizing inter-organizational cooperation with an emphasis on the OSCE, 
World Customs Organization, the EU, the UN, the Council of Europe and the 
Mediterranean countries.  
These are the institutional methods with which NATO tries to answer the 
transnational terrorism threat. While these methods (intra-alliance rearrangements 
and inter-organizational cooperation) gives the ongoing institutional response, it is 
also important to underscore over what issues these methods are applied. NATO, in 
partnerships with other international organizations, concentrates on several new 
topics. These topics are new when compared to its previous Cold War activities 
centered on military build-up and war contingencies among national armies.  
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The new topics are terrorism with a global reach, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, illicit trafficking, land borders security and maritime security 
or the surveillance of transportation that might possibly include weapon 
components of different sorts. All of these issue-areas are chosen as the necessary 
fields to answer the new threat. However, it is important to emphasize that NATO 
does not make a clear distinction between the threat of terrorism and that of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  
The relation between the latter two is ambiguous. This is mainly due to two 
factors: first, different counterterrorism cultures of its members lead to different 
response strategies. That is, allies perceive the threats differently. While the US 
perceives the new threat as a ‘new terrorism’, the EU does not agree on the novelty 
of contemporary manifestation of terrorism.587 
Secondly, the connection between WMD and terrorism is ambiguous due to 
the ambiguity of the new threat that is open to different assessments. The 
occurrence of different threat assessments and consequent different methods or 
strategies of fighting terrorism originate from divergent security understandings or 
counterterrorism cultures. The ambiguous features of the threat facilitate national 
divergences. The noticeable features of the threat that cause ambiguity (and the 
points of disagreement among states in carving out a common strategy to fight it) 
are: 
- Multiple nation-state targets: It strikes a large group of nation-states, not a 
single nation as a fixed target 
- Ideologically active all around the world: Its counter-hegemonic ideology 
resonates transnationally, not nationally. Advantaging a transnational 
                     
587Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic 
Divergence or Convergence?” International Affairs 81, 5, 905-923. 
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ideology that has mobilizing set of ideas (which encourages and achieves 
suicide-missions) spreading around the world as a counter-hegemonic claim 
against democracy, rule of law, human rights and secularism.588 A hybrid 
ideology with both religious and secular features. 
- Operationally active around the world at the inter-societal level across state 
borders 
- A massive and dispersed body of followers all around the world whose 
whereabouts are unclear 
- No state-control, manipulation or sponsorship 
- Merger with organized crime and unregulated financing that is supported by 
black markets and corrupt officials589 
- Lack of a territory (base, headquarters or address) to be retaliated at, which 
cancels deterrence 
- Incorrigibility; closed to bargaining, negotiation or compromise 
- Open endorsement of indiscriminate killing as determined choice; pursuing 
any means that give catastrophic effect such as exploding jets into 
buildings, suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or seeking WMD 
- Possessing suicide-bombers as the smartest mobile bombs590 
- Effective combination of the pre-modern and modern skills and technology in 
carrying out attacks (the use of traditional methods of money transaction 
                     
588Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. “Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North–South Divide” 
International Studies Review 9, 629–643; Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. “Global Liberalism versus Political 
Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics,” International Studies Review 7, 
547–569; Ozen, Cinar. 2007. “Al-Qaeda’s Religious Terrorism and the New Cold War”, COE-DAT 
Newsletter Vol. 1, Issue 4, November, pp.16-19. 
589Thachuk, Kimberley. 2008. “Countering Terrorist Support Structures”. Defense Against Terrorism 
Review DATR Vol.1 No.1, p.13-29. 
590Pape, Robert. 2005. Dying to Win. New York: Random House. 
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such as hawala, hundis, and also modern banking system,  and modern 
weaponry and instruments such as explosives, GPS and the Internet) 
- A learning curve higher than other terrorist groups, which enables to be 
adaptive to state-responses. 
- Being devoid of international law requirements and sanctions (extended room 
of operational maneuver in comparison to that of states)  
- Unaccountability and due lack of responsibility to protect a population or 
followers  
- Invisibility; upper-hand of surprise attack against states  
 
The US assesses the new threat as being more about both terrorism and 
WMD as a compact, whereas countries such as Germany and France are more 
inclined to make a separation between terrorism and proliferation of 
WMD.591However, these two issues are interlinked on WMD-terrorism, which is 
WMD use by terrorists. On the latter, the Atlantic Allies are mostly in agreement 
about protective measures, yet again they divergence on the pro-active measures 
such as pre-emptive and preventive strikes.592  
More importantly, although the threat is acknowledged by most of the 
Allies, the difference comes with the strategy to be followed to counter the threat of 
WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism. While the US sees the latter as inter-
related top national security threats, Europe slows down the beat of urgency and 
warns that the threat must not be exaggerated or inflated in a way to deviate the 
Allies from concentrating on anti-terrorism methods that avoid use of 
                     
591Binnendjik, Hans, David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler. 2005. “A New Military Framework for 
NATO,” in Simon Serfaty ed. Visions of the Atlantic Alliance: The United States, the European Union, 
and NATO Washington DC: CSIS Press, pp. 85-89. 
592Andrews, David M. ed. 2005. The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US–European Relations after Iraq 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
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force.593Europe is more inclined to separate the issue of terrorism from that of 
WMD.594 
This point of divergence indicates a serious problem not only for 
counterterrorism cooperation, but a problem for the future solidarity and mission of 
NATO because the difference on the use of force (and the differences between 
European anti-terrorism measures short of using force and the US counter-
terrorism measures for that matter) constitutes one of the main bones of contention 
among the generic European approach and that of the US: 
Differences over the nature of NATO's future role and mission are deep. They 
include concerns over "reliance on the use of force, the legitimacy of pre-emptive 
war, and whether to foment sweeping political change throughout the Middle East." 
Rather than confront these differences, the Alliance has avoided them and it now 
resembles "an alliance of choice, not commitment.'' The enlargement of the Alliance 
to include twenty-six members and the continuation of consensual decision-making 
practices reinforces a disconnect between military and political decision-making. It 
also neglects the profound transformation of the Alliance from primarily a military 
defense pact into a political instrument to promote stability and support 
democratization.595 
 
Illicit trafficking is another issue-area that NATO deals with in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. Especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks 
and the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, illicit trafficking, border security, 
maritime security, proliferation of WMD and terrorism came to be understood as 
interrelated subjects - a group of issues that requires ‘a comprehensive approach’, 
which have become a buzz-word for international organizations.596 Indeed, the 
NATO, World Customs Organization, the United Nations, the EU and the US have 
decided to follow comprehensive strategies that have common points. However, as 
                     
593Bendiek, Annegret. 2008. “Counter-terrorism and police cooperation: combining effectiveness with 
democracy”Wednesday,04June,http://www.epc.eu/en/er.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER
/EN/detail&l=&AI=699 
594Guertner, Gary L. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy”, Parameters, 
Summer-2007, pp. 33-37. 
595Seroka, Jim. 2007. “Security Considerations in the Western Balkans: NATO's Evolution and 
Expansion” East European Quarterly, XLI, March, No. 1, p.29. As of 2010, NATO has 28 independent 
nation-state members. NATO, in its official website, is defined as a ‘military alliance of democratic 
states in Europe and North America.” 
596Interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor, in NATO Seminar on Maritime 
Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009.  
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Roberts underlines, there seem to be differences on the implementation phase.597 
Guy Roberts, in answering the main problem of the Allied cooperation, maintained 
that ‘Threat is same, but the execution of response is different.’ In addition, he 
summarizes ‘the comprehensive approach’ of NATO as creating “a network of 
networks” among international organizations and nations in order to counter 
terrorism-related threats including that of WMD terrorism. Yet, such effort is a 
multiheaded-one with divergent interpretations about the way the common 
response is undertaken. 
Although each of these new issue-areas that NATO works on may be 
regarded as constituting a threat on its own, the hybrid threat or transnationality of 
‘the new threat’ is assessed by NATO as requiring a correlation among all these 
areas.598Nevertheless, in practice, the NATO’s priority seems to fall on WMD 
proliferation and WMD-terrorism, not on terrorism per se.599As of late military 
interventions, the spread of WMD to other states (horizontal proliferation) and the 
probable access of terrorists to WMD materials and devices are associated with the 
2003 Iraq intervention by the US. Terrorism, as a subject-matter separate from 
WMD proliferation, is more discussed within the framework of Afghanistan 
intervention of 2001 and within the counterinsurgency against the Taliban forces 
and Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan along the Afghanistan borders often referred 
to as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Yet, NATO is on the sidelines 
in the ongoing combat roles in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the unconventional 
                     
597The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.  
598The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.   
599The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.   
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war-fighting is done by a group of countries that voluntarily participate. It is 
oftentimes called as ‘coalition of the willing’. Before detailing the Coalition of the 
Willing and the relevance of Afghanistan and Iraqi conflicts for the inter-state 
cooperation against the new threat, it is important to keep on with the changing 
threat assessments. 
NATO threat assessment focuses on WMD use by terrorists as the heart of 
hybrid threats. NATO top officials that are interviewed in 1999, 2005 and 2009 told 
the candidate that NATO does not see WMD terrorism as a farfetched threat 
assessment. Thus, it is a constant concern through the 2000s in assessing the 
strategic environment. Although some countries regard it as an issue that is too-
much politicized, most major powers of the Alliance agree that the threat exists. 
That is one of the basic reasons behind the establishment of WMD Center in 
NATO.  
WMD proliferation has been assessed as a threat during the Cold War, too. 
NATO threat assessment includes WMD long before the contemporary sequence of 
terrorist attacks. However, what is fundamentally different as of the first decade of 
the new century is that NATO countries, in cooperation with the UN, started to 
penetrate proceedings of new internal and international legislature to prevent 
terrorists from acquiring WMD. This is new for NATO. In that regard, Robert 
Wedan, Office of General Counsel to US Department of Defense underlined that 
NATO must elevate its legislative entrepreneurship by giving force to the recent 
resolutions such as UNSCR 1540 of 2004. He underlines that strategy and law 
became interrelated, and that there is no other way to devise an effective response 
to terrorism and proliferation without addressing legal problems that obstruct 
nation-states’ cooperation against terrorism. He goes on the maintain that the 
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addition of law into strategic planning, or the need to consider legal requirements in 
designing counter-strategies is a feature of the new strategic environment.600This 
points, again, to the structural effect of globalization, which connects separate 
fields of work to one another. Categorizing bureaucratic realms or separating 
different job-definitions became harder. NATO has worked with lawyers all along; 
however, NATO military doctrines and strategy did not have any noticeable legal 
element. Now, law and strategy are combined in order to devise an effective 
response because the internal threats and the external threats conflated into each 
other through transnational terrorism threat. NATO countries urge all nations to 
support interdiction of suspected vessels at sea, protect military hardware against 
terrorist attacks and participate in the UNSCR 1540. Although UNSCR 1540 is not 
an initiative taken within the NATO institutional framework, the Resolution is 
crafted by the diplomatic attempts of the NATO members in the Security Council.  
The connection between legal initiatives and the NATO is not restricted to 
undertakings in the international realm. In the long interview conducted by the 
candidate, Wedan outlined the importance of domestic law of nations in devising 
an international cooperative response against terrorism: “International law has big 
respect for sovereignty. That means working through domestic systems. 
Sovereignty is the linchpin of the international system. It is also central to counter-
proliferation. For instance, no legal enforcement with teeth in Chemical Weapons 
Convention exists because states are sovereign bodies. The same goes for 
counterterrorism, too. The domestic laws of nations are determining. Giving teeth 
to international law enforcement requires states to refer to domestic law. For 
example, UNSCR 1540 calls upon the states to take cooperative action to prevent 
                     
600Interview with Robert Wedan, Office of General Council, Department of Defense-US, NATO 
Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009.   
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illicit trafficking in accordance with their national legal authorities and 
international law. The Resolution seeks to prevent WMD and their means of 
delivery from getting into the hands of non-state actors.”  
Thus, NATO urges states to take necessary domestic measures to ratify new 
resolutions into law that aims to curtail terrorist logistics. In that regard, the 
UNSCR 1540 has a binding nature for all the UN member-states. However, Eric 
Rosand argues that the implementation process has not yet foreseen a group of 
experts to provide independent analysis to reduce problems of coming together:       
It will be difficult to convince many countries of the urgency of the threat and the 
need to allocate the necessary domestic resources to address it without any 
independent analysis to explain why the threat is not simply the possibility that al-
Qaida might employ WMD in an attack against the U.S. homeland or its interests 
abroad, but that, for example, biological or chemical agents produced in a sub-
Saharan African country with lax monitoring of any biological or chemical facilities 
could be used by a local insurgency group or in the context of a civil war.601 
 
Thus, domestic and international law have become involved in preventing 
terrorist use of WMD. Law has an important part to play in addressing the threat of 
terrorism per se because contemporary dimensions of terrorism manifest itself both 
as an internal and external threat. Involvement of law in strategy is regarded by 
NATO as one of the important aspects of fighting terrorism.602However, each 
nation-state must adopt the UNSCR 1540 as their internal law so as to implement it 
effectively. That is one of the examples of how domestic law has started to find its 
way into the Allied strategy. Yet, the ratification of agreements or implementation 
of the UN Resolutions by many sovereign nations takes a long time that paralyze 
the collective-effort. Persuasion of all NATO members is desirable, but it does not 
appear to be feasible in a short period of time. Another example is the use of the 
2005 Protocol to (the International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful 
                     
601Rosand, Eric. 2009. “Global Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540-An Enhanced UN 
Response is Needed”, Center for Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, October Policy Brief.  
602“Examining NATO’s Transformation”. 2005. NATO Review, Special Issue Spring, pp. 36-39.  
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Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome 1988) the SUA Convention, 
in combination to the UNSCR 1540 of 2004.603  
States must internalize these resolutions and protocols, which are aimed at 
responding to the new threat, before an international response is strengthened. This 
is why NATO is sometimes operationally-sidelined in maritime interdiction 
operations when there is an instant intelligence on a sea vessel carrying weapons or 
weapon materials and devices, and this is partly why Coalition of the Willing-type 
state groupings or alignments are recently seen as the better-suited response.604This 
seems to be a case of simple arithmetic where increasing number of states 
decreases the chances of finding a common denominator for all.  
Yet, cooperation problems are not restricted to nation-states per se; there are 
also institutional problems of cooperation at the international organizations level: 
As a partner institution to NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) concentrates on terrorism and illicit trafficking of waste materials, 
drugs, human beings, WMD, WMD related devices, weapons-material and delivery 
means. OSCE also seeks to strengthen cooperation with other international 
organizations under its policy of ‘comprehensive security.’605For instance, OSCE 
and NATO cooperate on training maritime security personnel and border guards 
training. Given its tasks, it might be suggested that OSCE could conduct joint-work 
with other institutions, such as the EU, that has similar tasks. Yet, the status of the 
cooperative relations between OSCE and the EU, Bolton stresses, hints at the 
counterterrorism cultures of states. “The cultures of these organizations reflect the 
                     
603Malirsch, Maximilian and Florian Prill. 2007. “The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 2005 
Protocol to the SUA Convention”, ZaöRV, 67, 229-240. 
604Tago, Atsushi. 2009. “When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of 
Troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ ”, Journal of Peace Research 46, 219, p. 220.  
605Interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor, in NATO Seminar on Maritime 
Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009. 
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strategic understandings of their state members, we do things in different ways”, 
says Henry Bolton the OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor.606  
Moreover, he goes on to underline another point, which is about 
institutional competition: ‘OSCE and the EU are fighting like cats and dogs. The 
rivalry and envy between these two institutions hinder cooperation against 
terrorism.’607While NATO can be set apart from OSCE and the EU due to its 
military origin, the latter two are more of a non-military security organization that 
does not focus on the contingencies of the use of force. OSCE and the EU reflect a 
rather common approach based on anti-crime methods. They both emphasize the 
binding role of law in implementing policies. Despite the seemingly common 
approach, they reportedly disagree with each other owing to simple envy. 
The OSCE gives training to nations’ personnel on three fields: political-
military security, economic and environmental security, and human security. It is 
also a platform to establish political dialogue among states. These have been the 
issue-areas of OSCE. However, Bolton notes that job-definitions are blurred and 
changes quickly during the last decade: “We were training customs officers, and 
then we started to train border guards,”608and in his answer to the candidate’s 
question as to what are the limits to international cooperation, Bolton enumerated 
the following inter-state and inter-organizational problems at world-large:  
? Insufficient forward planning  
? Insufficient cohesion: Reactive policies 
? Still not thinking out of the box 
                     
606Interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor, in NATO Seminar on Maritime 
Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009. 
607Interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor in NATO Seminar on Maritime 
Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009. 
608The candidate’s interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor in NATO 
Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009. 
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? Insufficient interagency information exchange and insufficient 
convening or meetings 
? Weak intelligence analysis  
? Insufficient up-streaming and route disruption 
 
Mr. Bolton emphasizes that almost every international organization and 
nation has these cooperation shortfalls. Although Guy Roberts agrees with Henry 
Bolton, he adds: “Nevertheless, we (NATO) are transforming. We’ve gone well 
beyond the traditional military issues. We need to reach out other organizations 
more, to civil society and industry”.609When asked about the reason for reaching 
out other organizations, Roberts answers in one sentence: ‘the complexities of the 
threat.’ During the interview, he wrote down ‘three qualities that complicate the 
definition of the contemporary threat of terrorism’:610 
 
? State actors vs. Non-state actors 
? Financial motivations and prestige 
? Transnational networks611 
 
The network that A. Q. Khan established was given as the best example to 
these qualities of the new threat. Experts had suspected Dr. Khan for a long time, 
but couldn't confirm their suspicions until October 2003, when Italian authorities 
                     
609The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.   
610In this respect, Ozen, Cinar. 2008. “International Strategic Cooperation in Asymmetric Warfare and 
the Problem of Defining ‘Terrorist Organization’ ”, COEDAT Newsletter Vol. 2, Issue 7, July, pp.18-
22. 
611The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.   
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seized a German ship carrying 1,000 centrifuges headed for Libya. The parts were 
made in Malaysia and shipped through the Middle East, according to news 
reports.612Libya was able to get nearly complete centrifuges through the network, 
as well as blueprints for a Pakistani-designed nuclear warhead. Dr. Abdul Qadeer 
Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's nuclear program, confessed that he had 
shared nuclear designs and information with other countries, confirming experts’ 
long-held suspicions.613Previously, proliferators bought bits and pieces of nuclear 
components from private middlemen, and then had to assemble them to set up 
functional nuclear systems. Khan turned this route into creating ‘a Wal-Mart of 
proliferation’ that offered technical advice, parts, and customer support:614 Due to 
the network's efficiency, Mohamed El Baradei, former head of the IAEA, called it 
the "Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation that increase the risk of WMD use by 
terrorists."615 
 
8.2. Whose New Missions? 
Although the Khan network is underlined by the NATO authorities as a 
manifestation of the new threat,616 it is important to note that the Khan network is 
not addressed or resolved by the NATO. After the 9/11 attacks, the American 
administration devoted efforts to combating the spread of weapons of mass 
                     
612The Sunday Times, “Investigation: Nuclear scandal - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan” September 20, 2009, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6839044.ece; Dahlkamp, Juergen Georg 
Mascolo and Holger Stark, “A.Q. Khan's Nuclear Mafia-Network of Death on Trial Part 2: Part II: 
Khan's Worldwide Network”, http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,405847-2,00.html, 
03.13.2006 
613SourceWatch,http://sourcewatch.org/index.php/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan; 
and,http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/khan.html 
614Corera, Gordon. 2006. Shopping for Weapons: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise 
and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network Oxford: Oxford Uni. Press, pp. 3-86. 
615Zenko, Micah. 2004. “Proliferation for Profit” Op-Ed, BALTIMORE SUN MARCH 12 AND 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1339/proliferation_for_profit.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexp
erts%2F727%2Fmicah_zenko 
616The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.   
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destruction and particularly to keeping them out of the reach of terrorists. The 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by the Bush administration on 
May 31, 2003 is an agreement between 11 countries617 to stop and search vessels in 
their territories suspected of carrying banned weapons or technology in order to 
stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air or on land. The initiative is another 
example to the Coalition of the Willing type of cooperation among states.  
PSI gives countries broad powers to board vessels and seize illicit cargo. It 
was under this initiative that the centrifuges headed for Libya in the fall of 2003 
were seized.618The 9/11 Commission of the US recommended that the United 
States seek to expand PSI’s membership as a means of counterterrorism and the 
European Union and the G-8 fully endorsed PSI.619 
Apart from the US, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom joined the initiative. 
An additional 70 countries including Russia have since publicly committed to it. 
Significantly however, the PSI participants have downplayed the concept of 
membership in the initiative, explaining in a press statement that PSI is "an activity 
not an organization."620U.S. officials have courted China to join the PSI, but so far 
China has kept its distance, citing concerns about the legality of interdictions.  
 
                     
617On Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Logan, Samuel E. 2004-2005. “Proliferation Security 
Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges”, Transnational Law & Policy, 253; Byers, Michael. 
“Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative” The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 98, No.3, pp. 526-545; Garvey, Jack I. 2005. “The International Institutional Imperative for 
Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Proliferation Security 
Initiative”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 10: 125-147; http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21881.pdf 
and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm. 
618 Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7751/#p4 
619Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/synopses/psi.cfm, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI; The 9-11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Authorized Edition, New York: W.W.Norton 
and Company, July 22 2004, p. 381. 
620As a chief example of it, the British government issued the above-mentioned in-text statement as part 
of its Chairman's Conclusions following an October 9-10, 2003 meeting of PSI participants in London. 
For details, globalsecurity.org 
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PSI is followed by the UNSCR 1540 whereby NATO started to enter the 
stage, in partnership with the UN, by stressing the importance of maritime security 
and surveillance of sea transportation in the fight against WMD proliferation and 
terrorism.621Thus, new tasks exist for the NATO, but it has not yet excelled on 
them. The NATO’s emphasis on maritime security is just one of the 
counterterrorism measures in the making.622  
So far, the new fields or issue-areas over which NATO works, the methods 
followed by NATO and the cooperation problems are outlined. Initiatives such as 
PSI and the UNSCR 1540 are given as examples to the interstate counterterrorism 
efforts which are often named as the work of Coalition of the Willing.623Utmost 
importantly, NATO has not been an insider to these counterterrorism initiatives, 
which are designed and implemented mainly outside of its institutional 
framework.624  
At this juncture, it is also important to present a case study about why 
NATO transforms in the first place. The section below discusses the main reason of 
NATO transformation and its implications for the inter-state form of cooperation 
                     
621Rosand, Eric. 2007. “Multilateral Responses to an Extraordinary Threat”. Coping with Crisis 
Working Paper Series International Peace Academy, April.  
622Allied Command Transformation ACT, NATO’s Maritime Security Operations Concept and New 
Alliance Maritime Strategy-NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 19 
October 2009; NATO Briefing. 2003. Combating Terrorism at Sea. December.  
623Stevenson, Jonathan. 2010. “Jihad and Piracy in Somalia”, Survival, 52: 1, 27-38; Stuart, Douglas T. 
2004. “NATO and the wider world: from regional collective defence to global coalitions of the 
willing”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58:1, 33-46. 
624The works that study coalition of the willing or ad hoc alignments of states for particular missions-as 
a development outside of NATO-include, Menkhaus, Kenneth John. 2006-7. “Governance without 
Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping” International Security, 
Vol. 31, No, 3, pp. 74-106; Andres, Richard. 2005-6. “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the 
Afghan Model” International Security Vol. 30, No. 3 Winter, pp. 124-160; Achvarina, Vera, Reich, 
Simon. 2006. “No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers” 
International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer, pp. 127-164; Walt, Stephen M. 2001-02. “Beyond bin 
Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 56-
78; Art, Robert J., Brooks, Stephen G., Wohlforth, William, Lieber, Keir A. 2005-06. “Correspondence: 
Striking the Balance” International Security Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 177-196; De Nevers, Renée. 2007. 
“NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4, 
Spring. 
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against transnational terrorism. After the discussion about the reasons of NATO 
transformation, follow-up themes will be clearer. The discussion is followed by, 
again, the developments on the ground with an emphasis on nation-states’ 
behaviors before and after terrorist attacks, the implications of globalization and of 
the new threat for the contemporary form of inter-state cooperation/Coalition of the 
Willing, and the whereabouts of NATO within the contemporary form of inter-state 
cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorist threat. 
 
8.3. Why Does NATO Transform?   
8.3.1. A Case Study on NATO Transformation from the Alliance 
Politics Perspective 
Alliances have been used to extend a state’s power beyond its borders and 
to prevent or prepare for military conflict. A widely accepted point of departure for 
alliance scholarship is the work of the Correlates of War (COW) project625 which 
defines alliances as formal, written, mostly voluntary, agreements, treaties, or 
conventions among states pledging to coordinate their behavior and policies in the 
contingency of military conflict. In descending order of commitment, the COW 
project identifies defense pacts, non-aggression/neutrality treaties, and ententes. 
 However, this definition has recently become redundant for there is no 
anticipation of a major war. ‘The decline of conquest or waning of major war 
among the most industrialized states’ makes it more tenable to use a definition 
                     
625Singer, J. David & Melvin Small, 1966. “Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description”, 
Journal of Peace Research 3(1): 1–32; Singer, J. David & Melvin Small, 1968. “Alliance Aggregation 
and the Onset of War, 1815–1945”, in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics. New 
York: Free Press (247–286). Small, Melvin & J. David Singer, 1969. “Formal Alliances, 1816–1965: 
An Extension of the Basic Data”, Journal of Peace Research 6, 3: 257-282. Smith, Alastair, 1995. 
“Alliance Formation and War”, International Studies Quarterly 39, 4: 405-426. Snyder, Glenn H., 
1997. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Gibler, Douglas M. & Meredith Reid 
Sarkees. 2004. “Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-
2000”, Journal of Peace Research 41, 2: 211-222; http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
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based on collective security approach.626 After the Cold War, state policies draw 
more on peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, humanitarian intervention and crisis 
management rather than on military conflict as the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept 
underlined early on with the end of the Cold War: 
 
The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from 
what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of 
NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer 
provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a 
surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum allied warning time 
has increased accordingly. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the 
risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-
directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.627 
 
 
                     
626Gray, Colin S. 2005. “How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?” Parameters, Spring, 
pp.14-26 Simons, Anna. 2003. “The Death of Conquest” The National Interest Spring, pp.41-49; Van 
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Obsolete? - A Review Essay” International Security 14:42–64; Mueller, John. 1989. Retreat from 
Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books; Mueller, John. 1995. Quiet 
Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics. New York: Harper Collins; 
Mueller, John. 2004. The Remnants of War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Ray, James Lee. 1989. 
“The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War” International Organization 43:405–439; 
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Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Van Evera, 
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Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War” International Security 22:5–43; 
Mandelbaum, Michael. 1998/1999. “Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival 40:20–38; Mandelbaum, 
Michael. 2002. The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the 
Twenty-First Century. New York: Public Affairs; Jervis, Robert. 2005. American Foreign Policy in a 
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Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; An 
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Richard N., “The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?” Foreign Affairs, May/June 
2008; Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005-06. “The Impending Demise of the Postwar System,” Survival 47(4): 
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War became less of a politics by other means. The common forms of 
political contestation among nation-states have relatively shifted from the military 
struggle to economic and normative struggle. The state of international politics 
started to include the fact of decline of major war. It marked a reduction in the 
expectation and assessment of conventional and nuclear warfare.  
 
NATO never fought a day during the Cold War. Today, it is involved in five different 
operations - fighting and securing stability in Afghanistan; keeping the peace in 
Kosovo; assisting defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina; patrolling the 
Mediterranean in an anti-terrorist mission under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
and training Iraqi security forces. The Alliance launched an extensive humanitarian 
relief operation for Pakistan after the massive earthquake in 2005, helped victims of 
Hurricane Katrina in the United States, and provided security support to the 2004 and 
2006 Olympics and 2006 World Cup. New members have joined the Alliance, more 
are expected soon, and others are applying. Budding partnerships have been cultivated 
with the UN, the European Union and nations from the Mediterranean to the 
Pacific.628 
 
Thus, the contemporary definition of alliances can be taken to be 
international security cooperation alongside defense cooperation among state 
partners. Alliance structure is established by and enshrined in treaty-based 
organizations, which give them an institutionalized hard-law form. In other words, 
institutionalized security cooperation comes with a treaty-based international 
organization, which can then be called an alliance.  
Alliance, as of today, denotes institutionalized security cooperation alongside 
defense cooperation. In light of the previous sections above, and different from the 
classical definition of the COW project, it is not tenable to see alliances of our day 
as mere treaties concluded against external threats or military conflict 
contingencies. Therefore, there is a difference between the alliances of the Cold 
                     
628Hamilton, Daniel S. 2009. A New Balance for NATO Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee European Subcommittee May 6, p. 7 and Hamilton, Daniel, Charles Barry, Hans 
Binnendijk, Stephen Flanagan, Julianne Smith, James Townsend. 2009. Alliance Reborn-An Atlantic 
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, Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 
NDU, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, February. 
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War era and those of the post-Cold War era. The difference mainly originates from 
the decline of a military conflict contingency. The major threat has shifted from 
being state-centric to non-state-centric. Significantly, the latter change in declining 
and rising threats is the driving-motor of NATO transformation.  
NATO has long been a ‘defensive alliance’ or a collective defense 
organization. However, after the Cold War, the authorities formally declared it to 
be a political alliance alongside its traditional defensive and military nature.629 That 
is an important indication of an ongoing urge to transform the Alliance. 
Meanwhile, the label of ‘defensive alliance’ is still used for the NATO, the post-
Cold War debates on the absence of a common NATO goal and strategy 
notwithstanding. The debate on the resilience, goal and strategy of the post-Cold 
War NATO signals a connection between ‘alliances as military-defense oriented 
cooperation among states’ and ‘cooperation in general that includes non-military 
tasks’. This can be viewed through NATO’s above-mentioned recent trajectory.  
During the Cold War, NATO was a defensive alliance mainly focused on 
national armies and contingency plans of conventional attack and nuclear 
deterrence. The military nature of the Alliance was on the forefront different from 
the recent security dimensions of the Alliance under transformation.  
Is there a commonality between the emergence of different forms of inter-
state cooperation such as the Coalition of the Willing-type cooperation among 
nation-states and NATO’s present trajectory that includes security missions?  
 
 
                     
629Kibaroglu, Mustafa and Baris Caglar. 2007. “Cooperation Failure in the Fight against Global 
Terrorism” COE-DAT Newsletter Vol.1 No.2 June, pp.12-16; Oguzlu, Tarik. 2009. “Turkey and the 
Transformation of NATO” SETA Policy Brief July No: 33, pp.3-10; Shea, Jamie (NATO Director of 
Information and Press). 2002. “NATO-Upholding Ethics in International Security Policy” Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs Volume 15, Number 1, pp.75-82.  
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To elaborate the question: Is there a commonality between the emergence of 
different forms of inter-state cooperation such as the Coalition of the Willing-type 
cooperation among nation-states (experienced in Afghanistan and Iraqi 
interventions of 2001 and 2003 respectively, and also witnessed in Presidential 
Security Initiative (PSI) that commits 70 states without an institutional framework, 
or the implementation of UNSCR 1540 that binds all nations regardless of whether 
they are members of any alliance or not) and NATO’s present trajectory that 
includes security missions (such as Operation Active Endeavor and training non-
member states’ nascent armed forces, internal security personnel; providing 
humanitarian relief operation for Pakistan after the massive earthquake in 2005, 
helping victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States or providing security 
support to the 2004 and 2006 Olympics and 2006 World Cup and cooperating with 
the OSCE to halt illicit trafficking)?  
This point seems essential to picture the contemporary cooperation and 
alliance landscape; and the answer is: Since the main threat of the contemporary 
security environment has shifted from being state-centric to non-state-centric, 
nation-states try to form a corresponding response to non-state threats by coming 
together in the form of ad hoc re-groupings or re-alignments for particular tasks. 
Meanwhile, NATO is trying to adapt to the new security landscape under the 
effects of globalization, decline of major war and the corollary rise of non-state 
transnational threats. Thus, it can be posited that there is a commonality between 
the above-mentioned two developments: Both are answers to security threats, or 
reflect a gradual cooperative response against common security threats different 
from the previously demonstrated inter-state cooperation centered on defense. 
While NATO transformation is the name of the ongoing institutional answer or 
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adaptation to the new threats, diplomatically improvised alignments or groupings of 
states for a particular mission is the ad hoc or un-institutionalized form of answer to 
the security threats.  
How do we come here? The departure point of any analysis about NATO’s 
transformation must be the waning of major war. That is, main threats are not 
emanating from other states. Regrettably, this crucial point is not analyzed enough 
within the alliance politics and theory literature. Without addressing this point and 
its repercussions, no empirical analysis makes sense regarding alliances in general 
and the NATO in particular, mainly because when states do not contemplate 
regular war, alliances start to change.  
Defensive alliances are established against the anticipation of an external 
military attack from out-group states. It is, therefore, important to know which facts 
speak to alliances and how. It is thereby possible to provide an analytical direction 
to the examination of recent form of inter-state cooperation and NATO’s attempt at 
transformation. Thus, decline of major war or low anticipation of conventional war 
among armies is a determinant of NATO transformation. The contemporary threats 
are emanating from non-state formations, not from other states. Consequently, the 
form of the threat determines the form of inter-state cooperation. 
As the alliance literature indicates clearly, alliances are formed against 
common threats.630When the threat against which allies cooperated is no more, 
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alliances start to go through modifications regarding the missions, goals and 
strategies followed. The main Cold War theatre of anticipated war was Europe, 
which presents important clues for elaborating the following point: War was seen 
as possible and probable during the Cold War. That is why superpowers found 
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utility in deterring each other. However, nuclear deterrence was different from 
conventional deterrence in that balance of terror largely cancelled out actual war-
making on the ground owing to the possibility of mutual nuclear annihilation.  
As a corollary, the meaning and strategy of warfare changed starting from 
1950s onwards. As examined in previous chapters, warfare has become 
deterritorialized shifting from conventional warfare to war by proxy, covert war 
and espionage to keep the balance of power in the superpowers’ spheres of 
influence. The arms race between the superpowers accompanied their economic, 
propagandistic and ideological race. 
The contemplation of mutual annihilation stopped clashes and skirmishes 
short of all-out large-scale war. Nuclear age prevented escalation of political 
conflicts from pouring into battlefields, which were replaced by diplomatic 
courtrooms and emergency hot-lines between the superpowers. The US and the 
USSR paid attention not to step on one another’s foot.  
However, there was a continuous grim expectation of war throughout the 
Cold war era, not even erased by the detente period. The contemplation of war, and 
high probability of war created thereby, gave way to development of nuclear 
deterrence policies, military contingencies or contingency plans of war-making in 
the event of a deterrence failure or inadvertent nuclear attack. Europe, in particular, 
was a theatre of anticipated war; that was exactly why Europe experienced an 
‘entrapment-abandonment dilemma’ pertaining to its relation with the US.631 
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Yet, there is a change that took place after the fall of the Berlin Wall: 
Europe is not a theatre of anticipated or probable war as of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century.632 Otherwise, it would not be hard for scholars to strongly 
support Mearsheimer’s extrapolation of ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe 
after the Cold War’ which presents the strategic environment as basically 
unchanged.633That extrapolation appears to be missing the basic contour of the 
post-Cold War political landscape. War is not in the offing634, and there seems to 
be hardly any tenable reason to credibly predict one in the foreseeable future: 
Importantly because, NATO not only was formed to defend against the Soviet 
threat, but it was equally functional to solve ‘the German problem’ as well. Due to 
the US-USSR enmity in the wake of the Second World War, a peace treaty to settle 
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the geopolitical problems of Europe was unwritten.635 By the end of the Cold War, 
both the German problem636 and the Soviet problem were no more. Europe, under 
the paralleling double impact of the Soviet threat and the US security assurances, 
largely managed to solve the European geopolitical problems. Germans are down, 
Russians are out and the US is still in Europe.637The Cold War mission that glued 
the transatlantic partnership is completed. In the meantime, Europe evolved into the 
EU as a distinct economic and normative soft power that shuns the use of force, 
eroding the cornerstone of any defensive alliance.  
Any defensive alliance principally presumes that member-states can use 
force if need exists. If members do not tend to use force, then the alliance backs 
away from being a defensive one.638That is where and why the present transatlantic 
relationship started to return to the rocky times, which had already been 
experienced before the Cold War with ‘an old Europe’ originally proclaimed by 
Roosevelt.639France and Germany are no longer in conflict in a strategic-military 
sense except for the political and economic ‘cooperative competition’ to shape a 
united Europe far into the future.640Having the Soviet and German problems largely 
solved, the security dilemma of Europe shifted to non-military issues within itself 
as well as towards ‘insecurity dilemma’ of the candidate countries trying to join 
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it.641 
A combination of human security642 and national security policy-making 
changed the former pure power politics approach that dominated the long European 
history of diplomacy and war.643It shifted the classical geopolitical approach from 
military warfare to economic and cultural rivalry. Geo-economics and geo-culture 
became the terms that enhanced geopolitics.644Geopolitics did not change all 
together though; it just widened to include other forms of rivalry manifesting itself 
as rule-based competition short of war. European states still clash with each other 
economically and politically, yet this time without thinking use of force even as a 
choice of last resort. Their conflict is rule-based under the aegis of supranational 
institutions and norms easing the clash of sovereign prerogatives coupled with 
interdependent national economies. That is an important exception and a significant 
development in the history of the world when evaluated along the historical 
continuum of past wars.645  
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The US, on the other hand, has found a strategic environment freed from the 
European entanglement and the Soviet threat. With tremendous differential power 
un-balanced by serious state-centric-threats, it seemed expedient to turn unilateral 
to keep the dominating margin over other states.646Sustaining global dominance has 
always been the openly declared basic interest of the US as indicated in its several 
national security strategy documents.647  
As a consequence of such strategic environment in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, defensive alliances gradually risk turning into coffee-shops of inward-
looking collective security alliances without a clear common external threat and 
corresponding goals and strategy. This is not to belittle the development however; 
it is just meant to make clear the shifting security ground in the aftermath of the 
Cold War.  
From a viewpoint of the essentials of a defensive alliance, ‘coffee-shops’ is 
not an unrealistic portrayal of the current working-mechanism of contemporary 
alliances.648Whether that is desirable changes according to different interests of 
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states, and it is beyond the point for the moment. Nevertheless, referring to 
increasing diplomatic and political tone of defensive alliances,649 ‘coffee-shops’ 
marks the gradual resemblance of defensive alliances to security alliances 
following the decline in anticipation of military confrontations.   
If war did not wane, that is, if war anticipation did not decline, would there 
be an official NATO transformation attempt? Would there be membership 
extensions of the NATO and the EU? Would there be inclusion of new member-
states? The answer would most likely to be ‘no’.650Although the answer is given in 
hindsight, it is still tenable to argue that these above-mentioned developments 
would not take place if war was still expected among major industrialized nation-
states of Europe. If post-Cold War relations among continental European states 
returned to days reminiscent of the World War years or to war-prone environment 
of their long history, even the collapse of the former Soviet Union would not be 
enough to initiate NATO transformation and membership extensions.651 In such a 
case, NATO would be the bulwark that prevents war among European powers, if 
not the bulwark against the former Soviet Union. 
The withdrawal of American forces from Europe has been a point 
considered between the Atlantic Allies; however, no complete withdrawal has 
materialized. American forces in Europe and the NATO has turned more into a 
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political instrument that ties the US to Europe. NATO’s political dimension is 
demonstrated by the late 1990s Balkan interventions to an internal conflict of a 
non-allied country, namely former Yugoslavia.652NATO has thereby acquired a 
political dimension that institutionalizes the transatlantic link and serves as a 
preeminent forum in which the Allies can discuss issues of security and strategy 
even in the absence of the former Soviet threat.653However, the Balkan conflict was 
a problem in the neighbourhood of the European geographical core. In that sense, it 
was an out-of-area mission for NATO. Different from the past, the US-led NATO 
interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia did not aim to prevent the European allies from 
going to war against each other. 
The Balkan interventions were made due to the inability of Europe to 
control the fragmentation of its neighborhood, not because the EU member-states 
clashed among each other militarily. The former Yugoslavian crisis was an intra-
state problem, not an inter-state clash. Thus, the intervention was not aimed at 
preventing the European Union member-states from going to war with each other. 
The German problem was resolved, and the former Soviet military threat had 
disappeared to a large extent. 
What, then, initiated NATO’s transformation and why? The answer is the 
waning of major war, which means the significant lowering of the threat 
assessment with respect to the former Soviet Union. It also refers to the lowered or 
reduced security dilemma and power-politics dynamics within Europe itself. If the 
relationship among European states returned to the pre-Cold War era power 
politics, the demise of the Soviet Union would probably not change the probability 
of war in the post-Cold War Europe. If wars were anticipated, it would be hard to 
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start NATO’s transformation.654With clear and present threats in the offing, it 
would not be easy for the US and Europe to declare NATO’s political missions to 
support democracy and human rights, out-of-area missions and the inclusion of 
new members. Expectation of war would rule out the latter and introduce military 
contingencies.655 
NATO, as an alliance established under the strategic conditions of the Cold 
War, has lost its classical defensive form: No credible state-centric threat from out-
group-states exists. No external threat so consensual as to diminish or minimize the 
current transatlantic divide appears to be present either.656NATO members 
apparently do not find contemporary threats, including terrorism, threatening 
enough to leave aside their disagreements or to solve the transatlantic rift.657The 
Allies argue over different approaches and strategies to counter threats; threats that 
are emanating not from states, but threats coming from non-state entities. Thus, 
although NATO’s original purpose to protect Western political values is still intact, 
its defensive nature has gone through soul-searching. Its members did not give 
NATO a strategic clarity to keep the alliance as a defensive one.658  
Dana H. Allin, Gilles Andréani, Philippe Errera and Gary Samore’s detailed 
account of the NATO and of the contemporary transatlantic relations and ‘the war 
on terrorism’ highlights the point: The Western alliance of the Cold War had its 
                     
654“NATO’s Role in Civil Emergency Planning”, NATO Backgrounder, September 2006, p.1. 
655NATO Handbook. 2001. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press, Chapter 2: 
Transformation of the Alliance, pp. 35-38. 
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own disagreements, but it also had clarity of purpose. It was intended to address 
one problem, the Soviet threat in Europe. The clear boundaries and purpose are 
gone. The present security agenda is a daunting one that includes the struggle 
against transnational terrorism, strategies against nuclear proliferation, and the 
stabilization of failed or failing states. All of these concerns affect Americans and 
Europeans alike, but this does not mean that they can provide the same degree of 
strategic focus as was supplied by the Soviet adversary.659 
The transatlantic partners are said to be re-strategizing in order to answer 
the contemporary security threats mostly underlined by non-state actors.660This was 
argued to be done in lieu with the new threat. However, it is controversial that 
NATO successfully shifted its threat assessment from the former Soviet Union to 
the threat of global terrorism.661The reports still indicate a vague threat assessment 
and lack of a clear strategy to be followed by all members effectively.662Previously-
explained variables such as the distinct features or ambiguity of transnational 
terrorist threat seriously curtail a common threat assessment.663Significantly, the 
new threat is not solely an external threat. Nor does it come in regular armed 
formations from states and it does not have an address to retaliate at. It requires not 
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only military strategists to devise counter-policies, but it also entails the 
contribution of law enforcement or police forces, internal and external intelligence 
agencies and the judiciary as well as land borders, sea-lanes, airport and cargo 
security among others. This is the impact of the new threat variable in exacerbating 
the transformation of NATO. 
Even when global terrorism is set as one of the basic threats with which 
NATO copes, the ambiguity (that is transnationality) of the threat and the wider 
political and conflict environment under globalization do not permit NATO to 
continue functioning as a defensive alliance.664This is the structural impact of 
globalization as Brent Scowcroft indicates: 
There are new forces at work: Information technology has politicized world’s 
people. People and societies are involved. Almost everybody has a TV set. They are 
informed instantaneously. We cannot do with traditional tools of power/economic or 
military. The way power is exercised is changing because national borders are 
eroding, because of the growth of non-state actors. It's a different kind of a world. 
We are tied down by a tiny little country -- Iraq. It's amazing, given the disparity in 
military economic strength. It's a -- it's a world where most of the big problems spill 
over national boundaries, and there are new kinds of actors and we're feeling our 
way as to how to deal with them. I think it is less policy oriented than Zbigniew 
indicated. I think it's more systemic.665 
 
More often than not, alliance members turned inward and started to disagree 
with one another over guarding against the consequences of the use of differentially 
great American power. ‘Managing the hegemon’ has become the unofficial de facto 
task of NATO members alongside responding to threats such as transnational 
terrorism.666Intra-alliance politicking and entanglements among NATO member-
states have become the questions of inquiry for the scholars and analysts.667Intra-
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alliance cooperation became a problem in the absence of an external threat and in 
the absence of a common strategy to struggle against terrorism.668  
To sum up, NATO is not over; yet it does not appear to be a strict defensive 
alliance anymore. Contemporary alliances, though not dismembered, turned into de 
facto security alliances lacking clarity of purpose and strategy for they do not 
contemplate military contingencies.669An uncertain period is experienced during 
which authority and legitimacy as a power-resource is being contested anew after 
the Cold War. Breakdown of power is not constrained to states alone. The 
institutional tools of authority allocation alongside states such as the UN, the 
NATO, the EU, World Bank and World Trade Organization are challenged by non-
state entities such as transnational corporations (market authority), transnational 
criminal and terrorist organizations (illicit authority), and by various types of non-
governmental organizations (moral authority). An additional factor that complicates 
this break down of power even further is the adjustment and coordination problems 
among states mainly caused by the distinct features of the new threat and diverging 
national counterterrorism cultures.  
The interviews and the process-tracing included in this study indicate that 
different threat perceptions and different response-policies cause adjustment 
problems and friction among the Allies. In the face of friction, as Kissinger 
maintains, dialogue and cooperation has acquired a strategic importance670: 
institutions provide suitable arenas to lessen frictions through dialogue, which is 
                     
668Kydd, Andrew. 2005-06. “In America We (Used to) Trust: U.S. Hegemony and Global Cooperation” 
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the principal medium of establishing consensus at the inter-governmental level. 
Intergovernmental level is one of the interfaces or meeting realm of structural and 
unit-level factors conditioning inter-state cooperation. In institutionalized settings 
such as NATO, negotiations and bargaining among authorities of different nations 
can be held and a check-and-balance system or a mechanism of managing power 
becomes available to certain extent.671 
This is not just paying lip service to idealistic schemes because it is told by 
the authorities to be the only way out of the Alliance uncertainties regarding its 
strategy and cohesion.672During the candidate’s interview with Jeroen Van der Veer 
in April 2005 NATO Headquarters-Brussels, Belgium, ‘sustaining dialogue’ was 
his main theme in mending relations. Van der Veer, who serves as of 2010 in the 
NATO Strategic Concept Expert Group, maintained that in the absence of war 
expectation, dialogue seems to be the only and least costly way out of cooperative 
problems in fighting terrorism. In lieu with that, the recent emphasis put on 
international cooperation in the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration is worth 
highlighting as the most recent effort of the Alliance in finding a common stance. 
The Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration was issued by the Heads of State and 
Governments participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Strasbourg-Kehl on April 4, 2009. Thereby, NATO leaders adopted a Declaration 
on Alliance Security reaffirming the basic values, principles and purposes of the 
NATO Alliance. They also launched the process to develop a new Strategic 
                     
671Grobe, Christian. 2010. “The power of words: Argumentative persuasion in international 
negotiations”  
European Journal of International Relations, 16: 5-29. 
672“NATO's New Strategic Concept discussed in Prague”, 12 January 2010 
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Concept, a document that will define NATO’s longer-term role in the new security 
environment of the 21st century. They agreed that NATO’s transformation, in order 
to ensure the provision of deployable forces prepared to conduct the full range of 
military operations and missions, will strengthen the Alliance’s ability to confront 
21st century threats. NATO leaders acknowledged that security in the Euro-
Atlantic area is closely tied to Afghanistan’s security and stability and declared that 
the UN-mandated ISAF mission in Afghanistan is NATO’s key priority. In a 
comprehensive approach combining military and civilian resources, NATO remains 
committed to help the Government of Afghanistan to support Afghanistan’s long-
term security and stability, together with the international community. Leaders said 
that strong constructive engagement by countries of the region is also critical and 
pledged to reinforce cooperation with all Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially 
Pakistan. 
As an important backgrounder to the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, NATO’s 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched at the Alliance's Summit in the 
Turkish city of Istanbul in June 2004, aimed to contribute to long-term global and 
regional security by offering countries of the Middle East region practical and 
bilateral security cooperation with NATO.  ICI is another example to the second 
track of the NATO transformation efforts, an example to the NATO’s efforts to 
reach out other organizations and nation-states. ICI focused on practical 
cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. Six 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were initially invited to participate. Four 
of these - Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates - have joined. 
Saudia Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest in the Initiative. Based on the 
principle of inclusiveness, the Initiative is open to all interested countries of the 
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broader Middle East region who subscribe to its aims and content, including the 
fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction673 
What, then, is the mechanism underlying such negotiations and bargaining? 
What makes cooperation work within the NATO? What enhances the contribution 
of NATO to the wider international cooperation against terrorism? Interviews that 
are conducted in NATO headquarters in 2005 on the clause of 
anonymity674underline three requirements to be fulfilled to get cooperation work:  
First, all states must be able to participate to achieve cooperation. Allies 
must keep all members of the Alliance acting through the Alliance norms and 
strategy, not outside of it. Keeping the US acting with other NATO members 
became a conundrum especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Although 
NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, the United States refused NATO involvement and preferred 
to act largely on its own at the outset of the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, with 
the only notable exception being Britain’s participation. The American refusal to 
work together with other Allies is also repetitively stressed in the literature in 
addition to the interviews conducted. 
Secondly, decisions must be made multilaterally without fait accompli. The 
leadership tension obstructs cohesion in the Alliance, which is elaborated in the 
following section. Last, but certainly not least, is the need to reduce the regulatory 
and capability disparities in undertaking military interventions to stabilize failed-
states, in intelligence gathering and in border security that are needed to protect 
                     
673Sources retrieved from the official NATO web site, 
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allies from terrorists.675This is crucial to realize division of labor and burden-
sharing among the Allies. However, these interrelated conditions are not easy to 
meet owing to the intra-alliance security dilemma that is examined below. 
 
 8.3.2. Handling the Preponderant Power: 
 The Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma  
The end of the Cold War left the US as the preponderant power. The 
absence of any immediate balancer (similar to the former Soviet power) led to 
potential for divergences in threat perceptions, which are contingent upon different 
security cultures. End of bipolarity raised a debate on the causes of threats and how 
best to respond to them; a debate mainly originating in the absence of a clearly 
identifiable enemy.  
Transatlantic relations have been uneasy for the allies since the start of the 
twenty-first century.676This has continued to be lasting with regard to defining 
terrorism. ‘The new terrorism’ debate of the post-September 11 period 
demonstrated the transatlantic divergence on threat assessments between Europe 
and the US.677The new terrorism debate displayed the contending approaches to 
fighting terrorism. Although the NATO Prague Summit of November 2002 
identifies fighting against the threat of transnational terrorism as one of the goals of 
the Alliance, and although the 9/11 attacks opened up new opportunities for the 
Alliance, the allies have been slow to seize them due to their struggle among each 
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other.678 
The struggle within NATO results from a dilemma, namely the alliance 
security dilemma. Although they want to maintain the pre-existing security 
arrangements as a means of managing threats such as the former Yugoslavian 
crisis, the Allies need to tackle with the dual concern of either being trapped into 
their preponderant partner’s (America’s) policies or being abandoned by it.  
On the one hand, allies fear entrapment, which is the fear of being dragged 
into conflicts in which they have no direct stake or voice opportunity. Indeed, for 
some of the states, American policies were deemed detrimental and undercutting 
their national objectives and interests.679 
In the run-up to the Iraq war, the reluctance of France, Germany and other 
like-minded Transatlantic Allies to engage Turkey - in planning for the defence of 
Turkey as an NATO-member or ally should it be attacked by Iraq - triggered what 
the US ambassador to NATO called a ‘near-death experience’ for the Alliance.680 
Another example is the Turkish refusal to allow the use of its soil for the 
2003 intervention in Iraq. According to Barkey and MacDowall, the US invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003 provided a safe haven in northern Iraq where the terrorist 
organization PKK re-emerged from semi-hibernation.681Originating in Turkish 
concerns about such a development, the Turkish non-cooperation regarding the 
intervention was a bone of contention between the US and Turkey. This is an 
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example to the non-cooperation between the US and Turkey that have been NATO 
allies since 1949. They had dissimilar concerns with regard to terrorism, 
independent of the fact that they have similar strategic cultures that do not shun the 
use of force at all times. The Turkish behaviour was an alignment strategy of 
‘balking’, which is simply to say no and to increase the costs of intervention. 
Although the Turkish behaviour did not cancel the intervention, it forced the US to 
change war-plans and made it more costly.682  
On the other hand, allies fear abandonment, the fear that their big ally will 
not fulfill alliance commitments in times of need. An example is a possible future 
case similar to the Balkan conflicts during the late 1990s and early 2000s.683The 
dilemma is that the more they try to reduce the risk of abandonment, the more they 
increase the risk of entrapment, and vice versa. This constitutes the main obstacle 
against the intra-alliance cooperation. 
To reduce the dilemma, small allies require meaningful cooperation among 
each other. However, it is important to highlight that this is not an ‘intra-balancing 
act’ proper: They do not build up arms against the US. Small partners are just 
trying to minimize the damage to their interests by forsaking cooperation with the 
US.684To the extent it is seen as balancing, it was not an outright classical balancing 
because they did not confront the US militarily. It was the balancing of the US as ‘a 
transatlantic power’ within the same club, rather than attempting at matching its 
military power to a degree that can change the distribution of capabilities at the 
systemic level. Allies tried to ‘manage’ the primacy of American power. They tried 
                     
682Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy. New York: 
W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 131, 142, 143. 
683“Bosnia still needs international supervision: top official” Sarajevo, 26 February 2010, 22:04 CET 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/bosnia-politics.365/, and, Chivvis, Christopher S. 2010. “Back to 
the Brink in Bosnia”, Survival, Vol. 52, Issue 1 February, pp. 97-110. 
684Press-Barnathan, Galia. 2006. “Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity” Security Studies 
15, no. 2 April–June, 271-30. 
463 
 
to constraint American policies, while at the same time maintaining their security 
arrangements with the US mainly through NATO.685  
 
8.3.3. Behaving Uncooperatively to Avoid the Intra-Alliance Dilemma 
Since overcoming the intra-alliance security dilemma of NATO enhances 
the role of NATO in establishing and maintaining cooperation against several 
threats including counterterrorism and since it reduces other national security 
concerns such as Kosovo or European and NATO enlargements, small partners (or 
the NATO members other than the US) looked for ways to solve it. For about two 
years from 2001 to 2003, major European powers such as France and Germany 
took the lead in trying to divert the American war-plans regarding Iraq.686A 
preponderant power with a set of global interests pursued a military approach to its 
problems.687As it demanded Allied support, its allies felt entrapped and tried to 
influence the preponderant alliance member not to pursue certain objectives that 
clash with their own. They tried to restrain it through a bargaining process in which 
allies can withhold diplomatic support, insist on more consultations during a crisis 
or at the dawn of an operation, threaten defection or realignment within NATO. 
They also attempted to bind the preeminent partner into intergovernmental 
organizations such as the NATO and the UN.688That is vividly demonstrated by the 
realignment within NATO during the onset of the 2003 American intervention in 
Iraq: As an example to the alignment strategy of binding, France and Germany 
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tried to hinder American behaviour by withholding international legality and the 
UN mandate. They tried to tie down the US institutionally through their Security 
Council membership and veto power. European states that were against the Iraqi 
intervention of 2003 were led by France and Germany, confronting states such as 
Spain, Britain and Poland that approved the intervention. These realignments 
caused bitter criticisms by some of the European states and within the EU 
institutional framework.  
France even politically threatened new-comer and candidate members of the 
EU. In reaction to the support of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, all of 
whom have, at the time, dates for EU membership, and in reaction to the EU 
members Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Portugal which sent letters supporting 
Washington’s stance on Iraq, French President Chirac said in 2003: "These 
countries have been not very well behaved and rather reckless of the danger of 
aligning themselves too rapidly with the American position. It is not really 
responsible behavior. It is not well brought-up behavior. They missed a good 
opportunity to keep quiet. I felt they acted frivolously because entry into the 
European Union implies a minimum of understanding for the others," Chirac said. 
Chirac called the letters of support "infantile" and "dangerous," adding: "They 
missed a great opportunity to shut up."689Thus, the disagreements revolving around 
the Iraqi intervention affected not only the relations in NATO, but also the relations 
within the EU as well. The American administration argued for the intervention to 
stop terrorist organizations among other justifications such as halting the 
proliferation of WMD.690 Different from the Cold War form of cooperation among 
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allies, the contemporary form of cooperation was set back due to the disagreements 
about how to conduct the fight against terrorism.   
The US saw 2003 Iraqi intervention as part of ‘the war on terror’. However, 
this had been defined by Chirac as counterproductive to the cause of fighting 
terrorism. Even after the terrorist attacks in Europe, French President Chirac was 
openly critical of the US about the way it conducts its war on terrorism, especially 
in Iraq: “As France had foreseen and feared, the war in Iraq has sparked upheavals 
that yet to show their full effects” while addressing the French diplomatic corps 
gathered in Paris on 5 January 2007. 
He declared that the Iraqi conflict that started in 2003 ‘had offered terrorism 
a new field for expansion’.691Germany supported the French stance.692The major 
powers disagreed once again reminding the days of the Cold War. The alliance 
experienced hard times before, too. The Vietnam War and the crisis of the tactical 
nuclear missiles deployment in Europe caused divergences in transatlantic relations 
back in the Cold War days; however, the definition of the situation is still different 
now:693 
The Western alliance of the Cold War had its own disagreements, but it also had 
clarity of purpose. It was intended to address one problem, the Soviet threat in Europe. 
It did so within the conceptual framework of a defensive military strategy, coupled – 
over the decades – with détente and political engagement with the Soviet Union. 
There was also clarity as to where the alliance ended, and a tacit agreement to tolerate 
disagreements on many issues not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty: in the Middle 
East regarding the Suez crisis, the various Arab–Israeli wars and the OPEC oil 
embargo; in Asia regarding Vietnam and China.694 
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Different from the Cold War years, the divergence over Iraqi intervention 
occurred in the absence of an existential threat. The allies disagreed on the method 
of fighting terrorism in the absence of a unifying common existential threat.695The 
transatlantic debate on whether contemporary terrorism is new indicates that 
transnational terrorism is not regarded as an existential threat for all allies. 
Although it is a credible national security threat for most of them, it apparently 
does not constitute a threat as threatening as to overrule disagreements quickly.  
Allies drifted apart about defining the contemporary threat. Moreover, they 
diverged on the means to counter it. Counterterrorism cultures of the two sides of 
the Atlantic accounts for such a divergence. Although the ambiguity of the new 
threat paved the way for different interpretations, contending national 
counterterrorism cultures or different security understandings were the additional 
reason behind different national strategies of fighting against transnational 
terrorism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
695Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2009. “Reshaping America’s Alliances for the Long Haul” Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments CSBA; National Intelligence Estimate, The Terrorist Threat to 
the US Homeland, July 2007, accessed at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf on 
August 26, 2008. 
467 
 
8.4. Counterterrorism Cultures on the Two Sides of the Atlantic 
 
The concept of counterterrorism culture and strategic culture has been most closely 
connected with defence issues and with all war-fighting problems. Caroline 
Ziemke, one of the first to make use of this approach, has suggested that it is about 
a state’s self-conception, mediated though the historical experience of its past 
conflicts. Historical experience and strategic culture are often connected though a 
process of reasoning by analogy. Decision-makers tend to focus strongly on the 
commanding heights of their past strategic experience, navigating in terms of 
major episodes which are regarded as successes or failures. These seminal 
experiences have burned themselves deeply into the national psyche and have 
significant unconscious meaning. Munich and Suez, more recently Vietnam and 
Somalia-perhaps soon Afghanistan and Iraq-are all examples of what Dan Reiter 
has called the ‘weight of the shadow of the past’.696 
 
 
The European and American responses to the terrorist attacks in their 
continents illustrated the contending counterterrorism cultures between them. Prior 
to 2003 and to the terrorist attacks in Europe, most European countries were 
reluctant of American policy in the Middle East. Even after September 11 attacks, 
despite the initial support they provided for the US, most European countries did 
not perceive themselves to be the main targets of transnational terrorists: They were 
not hit by transnational terrorist attacks yet.697Before September 11, terrorism has 
been an external threat that is gauged in criminal terms, not in national security 
terms: 698The global terrorist threat was out there for Europe. This has changed 
after the bombings of Madrid and London and the threat started to be defined as an 
internal one still to be countered with anti-criminal or justice-based approach, as 
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examined in the discursive section through the end of the chapter.   
The July 2005 terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom have re-focused 
attention on the threat from extremists. Parallels have been drawn with the attacks 
on Madrid in 2004 and the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. 
Nevertheless, different responses arose from the Atlantic Allies.699In a nutshell, the 
US declared a ‘global war on terrorism’. It channeled full resources of a ‘national 
security’ approach against the threat posed by a ‘new terrorism’, whereas Europe 
pursued regional multilateralism and diplomacy rather than military unilateralism 
against a threat that is perceived to be not so much new.700 
It is instructive to look at the security and counterterrorist cultures in 
America and Europe before the terrorist attacks, and then comparatively examine 
whether there is any change regarding counterterrorism cooperation in rhetoric and 
action after the states were hit. 
The transatlantic divergence (which is also rightly or wrongly perceived in 
the US as part of anti-Americanism)701has a history going at least back to the 
conduct of the Second World War. Lieutenant General Mark Clark, in 1944, told 
that “I was about ready to agree with Napoleon's conclusion that it is better to fight 
allies than to be one of them.”702This is generally argued to be a consequence of 
power disparity. The theme of the unprecedented dominance of the United States 
on the world stage has been among the enduring topics of international discourse 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.703French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine 
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famously characterized the US as ‘the world’s hyperpower’ though his words 
reportedly did not carry any pejorative meaning: 
Q: During US elections, Obama read Zakaria’s book, which you wrote the 
introduction to in the French edition. McCain was reading Kagan. Are we in a post-
American world?  
A: The content of Zakaria is somewhat different than the title. Zakaria talks of a 
post-monopolistic world, but he thinks the US will retain its lead. I coined the word 
‘hyperpower’ in 1998. In French, there is no pejorative dimension to the word; it is 
purely descriptive. I still think that the US remains the greatest power of all time, 
even though China may outgrow the US in statistical terms one day.704 
 
 Clinton administration’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proclaimed 
the U.S. the international order’s single “indispensable” nation, which might be 
seen as a benign equivalent of Védrine’s formulation.705Henry Kissinger referred to 
“America at the Apex,” able to insist on its view and prevail in almost any arena. 
However, he worried that the US remains unsure of the ends to which it should 
apply its might. He was unsure of the importance of global political and military 
engagement at all.706Swedish Prime Minister Goran Perrson echoed Védrine during 
his country’s tenure in the presidency of the European Union. However, he also 
called for Europe to position itself as a balance to U.S. domination of global 
affairs.707 
Beyond Europe, even as the Clinton administration spoke of “strategic partnerships” 
with both Russia and China, leaders of those two countries had begun exploring how 
to transform the “unipolar” world into a “multipolar” one. In 1996 Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin and Chinese Premier Li Peng met and, as one observer noted, “all but 
branded the United States a threat to peace” and explicitly labeled it the world’s 
“hegemon,” guilty of “repeated imposition of pressures on other countries.” Third 
World figures ranging from Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Moussa to Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad voiced at least as emphatically the same analyses 
and concerns as had come from their European, Russian, and Chinese counterparts.708 
 
 
                     
704CSMonitor interview with Vedrine on January 27, 2010, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0127/Interview-former-French-diplomat-Hubert-
Vedrine-on China-and-a-West-in-disarray/(page)/3 
705Albright, Madeleine in Online News Hour: Newsmaker: Madeleine Albright March 6, 1997- 
Transcript www.pbs.org 
706Kissinger, Henry. 2001. “America at the Apex: Empire or Leader?” The National Interest, July. 
707Perrson, Goran quoted in, Kupchan, Charles. 2002. “The End of the West”, Atlantic, November. 
708Judge, Clark S. “Hegemony of the Heart”, Policy Review, December 2001-January 2002. 
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However, since September 11, 2001 attacks, American power while 
impressive was not as overwhelming and unchallengeable as it had been a half-
century earlier.709Since September 11, American authorities had a hard time to 
prevent 19 attempted-terrorist-attacks on America.710Most of these attacks were not 
made public so as not to cause panic in the public. However, one of the foiled 
attacks became televised due to its occurrence in an international flight: The failed 
terrorist attempt in the Amsterdam-Detroit flight on 25 December in 2009. The 
number of the foiled attempts declared since 2007 was 19, which highlights the 
severity and continuity of the new threat. If not for the EU and the rest of the world, 
September 11 changed the twenty-first century in the American eyes.711  
Yet, an eminent security analyst, Therese Delpech asserts that 9-11 does not 
change the European outlook towards terrorism: 
Most Europeans do not accept the idea of a ‘war’ on terrorism. They are used to 
dealing with this phenomenon with other methods (intelligence services, police, 
justice), and have not really taken in the consequences of the magnitude of the change 
wrought by the events of 11 September 2001.712 
 
According to Tony Bunyan of Statewatch, “[o]f the eleven measures being 
rushed through in the EU, six were proposed before 11 September and another four 
were firmly on the EU’s agenda.”713  
 
 
                     
709The 9-11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, Authorized Edition, New York: W.W.Norton and Company, July 22 2004, pp. 339-
343. 
710Carafano, Dr. James Jay. 2007. “U.S. Thwarts 19 Terrorist Attacks against America since 9/11”, 
November 13”, Heritage Background Paper No. 2085 November 13. 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2085.cfm 
711Miller, Steven E. 2005. “Review Essay-Terrifying Thoughts: Power, Order, and Terror After 9/11” 
Global Governance 11, 247–271. 
712Delpech, Therese. 2002. “International Terrorism in Europe”, Chaillot Papers No. 56 Paris: Institute 
for Security Studies, p. 21. 
713Bunyan, Tony. “Statewatch Analyses of Post-11 September EU Measures Affecting Civil Liberties 
and Accountability,” Statewatch, 14 October 2001, available at 
www.statewatch.org/news/2001/oct/14analyses.htm 
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American history did not record a terrorist era similar to the European ones 
that dealt with anarchists, the left and the ultra-right. Furthermore, separatist 
terrorism is relatively absent in American history. Terrorism was rarely on the main 
American political agenda. Although the United States has been involved in 
counterterrorism since the mid-1960s, it was only after the Iran hostage crisis of 
1979 that terrorism featured regularly on the presidential agenda. Even then, 
terrorism was an undervalued political issue. In the White House there was fear of 
encouraging public expectations that could not be fulfilled and a tendency towards 
blame avoidance.714The US intelligence community was narrowly focused on the 
Cold War, playing to its strengths in technical collection and relying on Allied 
expertise for coverage in areas deemed less important. Terrorism was frequently 
perceived as something sponsored by the Soviet bloc and was regarded as a minor 
subdivision of the real problem of containing the former USSR. The US experience 
of terrorism has been confined to its presence overseas as experienced in the loss of 
241 US Marines in Beirut in 1983.  
As for the in-land, September 11 was not the first hit in the US soil. The 
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the bombing of the federal building 
in Oklahoma City in 1995 are the still-remembered faces of terrorism. 
Nevertheless, absence of sizeable and prolonged terrorism campaigns similar to the 
European ones such as the Red Army Brigades, Baader Meinhof, PIRA, ETA, and 
PKK caused no perception of terrorism as a domestic threat. In accordance, before 
September 11, there was a feeling that the country was invulnerable.715 
 
                     
714Clarke, Richard A. 2004. Against all enemies: Inside America’s war on terror New York: Free Press, 
p.34. 
715Talbott, Strobe and Nayan Chanda. eds. 2001. The Age of Terror-America and the World after 
September 11, NY: Basic Books and the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, pp. 53-56. 
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While this is the limited American encounter with terrorism, American 
strategic and security culture in general contrasted sharply with its terrorism 
experience. America has a clearly defined strategic culture, which is emphasized by 
‘its sense of exceptionalism’ and ‘technologism’. American exceptionalism has 
been the belief that its political and moral values are superior to those of the rest of 
the world and justify its position of leadership.  
 
Thorne and Dunn maintain that  
Exceptionalism has given America a sense of mission in the world and a confidence 
that its actions are in the broadest interests of humanity. This self-belief has been 
allied to strategies that seek ways to leverage its vast material and technological 
power. It has predisposed American policy-makers towards a national security culture 
that privileges a military response. As a superpower, the US sees the use of force as an 
important signal of resolve within the international community. Its military gives the 
US a global reach and ensures that no targets are beyond its ability to strike.716 
 
 
The European experience with terrorism in particular and European strategic 
culture in general is markedly different from that of the US. Europe has a long 
history of terrorism. Yet, European history of terrorism is multi-faceted for Europe 
includes 27 nations, which have transferred some of their sovereignty to the EU. 
Although each nation has a particular history of terrorism, elements of a European 
style have emerged during efforts against Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigades in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Guertner indicates that Europeans have been fighting 
terrorism for decades, but the terrorist groups were mostly Euro-specific, with the 
exception of groups like Hamas or the Kurdish PKK who used Europe as a support 
base to attack outside the EU or committed acts of violence against very precise 
targets.717 
                     
716Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic 
Divergence or Convergence?” International Affairs 81, 5, 909. 
717Guertner, Gary L. 2007. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy” 
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In time, European anti-terrorism efforts have evolved into the contemporary 
European style of fighting terrorism, which focuses on the judiciary and regulatory 
anti-terrorism responses. In contrast to ‘counter-terrorism approach’ of the US, the 
EU advocates ‘anti-terrorism policies’ that shun the use of force and military 
instruments. That is the biggest difference between the counterterrorism cultures of 
Europe and the US. 
Anti-terrorism is perceived by Europeans as a corollary of their common 
values such as liberal democracy, secularism and adherence to rule of law. 
However, the US does not interpret the same values as a reason to avoid use of 
force against terrorism. Consequently, the inclination to use force or the reluctance 
thereof lies at the heart of the contending counterterrorism cultures of Europe and 
the US.  
The divergence on the use of force is not only limited to counterterrorism, 
but it is also the main bone of contention in contemporary transatlantic relations 
and contending strategic cultures of the Allies. Smith explains that Europe and the 
US need each other and will not ‘divorce’ because the relation between them is not 
one of classical balancing act. Even when there is no balancing in between, it does 
not change the differences about the political and strategic cultures of the Atlantic 
Allies. It is argued in the literature that Europe took lessons from the two World 
Wars and raised a different strategic understanding that aims to solve conflicts by 
means other than brute force.718 
                                                                
Parameters, Summer, p. 36; “PKK Konusunda Saçmaladik - Türkiye-AB Parlamento Komisyonu 
Eşbaşkanı Joost Lagendijk, 10 Yıldır Terör Örgütünü Yanlış Algıladıklarını Söyledi”, En Son Haber, 
23 Kasım 2007, 06:26, http://www.ensonhaber.com/gundem/94273/pkk-konusunda-sacmaladik.html 
718Brown, Chris. 2007. “European International Relations and the 800-Pound Gorilla” (review of the 
International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives, and Destinations. 2006. eds. Knud Erik 
Jørgenson and Tonny Brems Knudsen. New York: Routledge) International Studies Review 9, 732-737. 
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Smith argues that the EU has a distinctive identity, which is arguably soft-
pedaling the US through soft-power, or balancing it in an unconventional way-
normatively: 
The second reason is that, pace the realists, the dynamic at work both within Europe 
and across the Atlantic is not one of the balance of power. As Richard Rosecrance 
has argued, the EU is a “new type of international actor,” which attracts countries 
towards it, rather than in opposition to it. As Europe unites, balance of power theory 
would tell us that it should generate an opposing coalition to balance it. Yet instead, 
outsiders want to join the EU or be linked with it. The EU does not threaten 
outsiders-it attracts them. This is because the EU does not appear to outsiders to be 
amassing power for the sake of pursuing exclusive EU interests, or to compete more 
effectively with other international actors. To assume that what is going on in 
Europe is merely an attempt to balance the United States is to misunderstand 
fundamentally the nature of the enterprise. This is not an attempt to recreate state 
sovereignty on a larger scale, but to overcome the problems posed by the exercise of 
sovereignty in Europe…European strategic culture is shaped by the European 
experiences of the two World Wars.719 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly recommendations, as an 
attempt to reach out to non-European states, neatly summarize the European 
approach to terrorism: 
 
- (The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly) Considers that the most 
efficient remedy to fight against terrorism phenomenon, is the preventive remedy 
that starts by adopting a global approach in international relations based on peace, 
security and development, besides it aims at eradicating its root causes underlying 
the rise of terrorism and the conditions that facilitate its propagation by relying 
essentially on human development and paving the way for its causes, anchoring 
human rights expanding the field of consultation and participation, eradicating 
poverty and providing comprehensive and sustainable development for all social 
categories and regions.  
 
-Affirms that combating terrorism largely depends on the methods adopted to 
counter this phenomenon, the most important of which being: no countering of 
violence by violence; no exclusive reliance on security solutions.720 
 
Contemporary anti-terrorism approach of the EU, as a part of the generic 
European strategic culture defined above, did not emerge in one day. Countries 
such as France, Spain and the UK have confronted significant domestic terrorist 
                     
719Smith, Karen E. “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations”, The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs Winter/Spring 2003 – Vol. IX, Issue 2, p. 110. 
720Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly Recommendations on the Implementation of the Code 
of Conduct On Countering Terrorism, Athens, 27 March 2008, p. 4 
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movements, whereas others such as the Netherlands and Belgium have been spared 
a major domestic threat. Some European countries such as France have more 
historical associations with counterinsurgency and terrorism in an ‘end-of-empire’ 
context, but again these experiences differ from one another, too. Thus, although 
today there is a more-or-less unified stance on the way Europe defends itself 
against terrorism, intra-European cooperation against terrorism has been poor in 
that inter-state anti-terrorism structures were not built. European states addressed 
terrorism privately with their internal security systems. 
This has started to change during the 1980s and it demonstrated its peak in 
the 2000s. The change into a more structured European response against terrorism 
was especially marked by French responses to Islamist extremism during the 1980s 
and 1990s.721The challenge of contemporary manifestation of terrorism has suited 
the EU’s post-World War II foreign policy attributes: Internal security of its 
member states and its activities in the field of justice and home affairs ensured that 
the EU would be the mechanism chosen for ‘regional counterterrorism’. Since 9/11 
there has been a high momentum to build a more robust system of inter-state ‘anti-
terrorism’ cooperation among European states.722The UK, as the nation that has 
used the counterterrorism approach the most, engaged in a long military campaign 
against the Provisional IRA. However, even the UK gradually allocated more 
responsibility for counterterrorism to civilian agencies.  
 
                     
721Brady, Hugo. 2008. Intelligence, emergencies and foreign policy The EU’s role in counter-terrorism 
Centre for European Reform, CER July 2009. 
722Munday, Peter, Michael Pakenham, Alexander Nicoll, Jean-Yves Haine, Kristiina Rinkineva, Meeri-
Maria Jaarva, Judith Johnson and Adrian Waller. 2006. New European Approaches to Counter 
Terrorism ESSTRT Deliverable D6-1 Final Report, Thales Research and Technology (TRT), UK 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), Finland 
Thales e-Security (TeS), UK Project funded by the European Commission under the PASR 2004 
Programme, pp. 2-7  
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The EU’s anti-terrorism coordinator as of 2010, Gilles de Kerchove 
underlined repetitively that Eurojust and Europol have a leading role as of 
2010.723The EU’s counterterrorist effort is marked by the regulatory approach with 
its focus on civil agencies. That means defending (rather than fighting) against 
terrorism more as a domestic problem of the Community. Kerchove stressed that 
Al-Qaeda has still been the primary ‘internal’ threat to Europe, particularly for 
Britain, Belgium and France.  
As a response-policy, Kerchove underscores, EU state-members work at 
strengthening their domestic instruments legally and operationally. The regulatory 
response has suited current European Union supranational politics because of its 
strong domestic dimension that tries to rearrange and connect the internal politics 
of each nation under a common denominator. As Kaunert explicates, anti-terrorism 
is regarded as a good leeway to achieve the European goal of unified domestic and 
foreign policy.724 
However, European anti-terrorism coordinator Kerchove also points out the 
problems of reaching a unified position: that each nation has still sovereign 
competence. National decisions must be respected, for example, with regard to 
hosting former Guantanamo detainees. Thus, while the EU member states are 
trying to form a unified response at the supranational EU level, differences among 
the member-states of the EU persists at the national level. For example, Germany 
decided, in 2009, not to host Guantanamo detainees, and as Kerchove underlined, it 
was not legal to resist such a sovereign decision.  
 
                     
723European Parliament TV Interview with Gilles de Kerchove, ‘Interview: the End of the War on 
Terror and The Closure of Guantanamo’, Europarltv, February 2, 2009. 
724Kaunert, Christian. 2010. “The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: 
Competences, Interests, and Institutions”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22: 1, 41-61. 
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8.5. The Words and Deeds from September 11, 2001 to Terrorist   
Attacks in Madrid and London 
American declarations regarding terrorism have been consistent throughout 
the first decade of the century.725While the U.S. Government's portrayal of ‘the war 
on terror’ has been consistent, the U.K. Government's framing of the terrorist threat 
has evolved over time starting from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  
President G. W. Bush declared the day following the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon attacks:  
“The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against 
our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. This will require 
our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and 
democracy are under attack. The American people need to know that we are facing 
a different enemy than we have ever faced.”726 
The quotation above reflects the general framework of American 
declarations both in tone and in the way they perceive the terrorist attacks in and 
outside the US. American declarations about the terrorist attacks around the world 
including those in Madrid and London followed the same consistent theme and 
tone of condemnation. They are perceived as ‘acts of war’ marking a new kind of 
terrorism that is to be answered by all means necessary.  
 
 
 
                     
725In reaching that conclusion, the study also took advantage of a scientific survey on American and 
British media discourse analysis: Cristina Archetti and Prof. Philip M. Taylor Managing Terrorism 
after 9/11: the War on Terror, The Media, and the Imagined Threat The Institute of Communications 
Studies, University of Leeds, UK. http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/index.cfm?pbcrumb=ICS Home 
726The announcement of President Bush shortly before 11 a.m., September 12, 2001 at the end of a 
Cabinet meeting, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/etc/cron.html 
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Taylor analyses the general framework of the American declarations: 
The interpretation of the 9/11 events is very clear: the attacks are as an 'act of war' 
on  civilization (problem definition) by evil terrorists (moral evaluation) motivated 
by hate  for human life (causal interpretation) against which the world should unite 
to defeat  barbarity and defend freedom (treatment recommendation). This frame has 
not been changed since the attacks and has helped the U.S. Government placing both 
domestic and international events that have followed 9/11 (such as terrorist alerts, 
counter-terrorist measures, and military operations in Afghanistan or in Iraq, but also 
restrictions of civil liberties) into a solid context.727 
  
The initial international reaction to September 11 attacks was favourable on 
the side of the US. The beginning of the international coalition against terrorism 
took off by the tele-conference conducted between President Bush and Prime 
Minister Tony Blair who pledged his total support. Pakistani President Pervez 
Musharraf also made a pledge of support for the US. NATO announced that it is 
prepared to invoke for the first time Article 5 of its Charter, which states that an 
attack against one member would be considered an attack against all members of 
the Alliance. This step was formally taken at a NATO meeting on October 2, 2001. 
The U.N. Security Council passed the Resolution 1368, which unanimously 
condemned the attacks and recognized "the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense" under the U.N. Charter. It called on the international community “to 
bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks.” 
It is important to note the criminality underlined by the UN in that it mentioned 
‘bringing the perpetrators of these attacks to justice’.  
‘War on Terror’ is the American state-response against terrorism as separate 
from the wider inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism, while Britain 
has been the ardent supporter of the American conception of the War on Terror. 
Although Britain was the foremost supporter of the ‘war on terrorism’, its initial 
                     
727Cristina Archetti and Prof. Philip M. Taylor Managing Terrorism after 9/11: the War on Terror, The 
Media, and the Imagined Threat The Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, UK. 
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declarations were inconsistent and vague regarding what ‘war’ and ‘war on terror’ 
referred to. The U.K. Government did not provide a strong post-9/11 frame similar 
to the above-mentioned speech of the US President Bush.  Taylor compares the 
Lord Major Speech (November 11th , 2002) regarded as the UK Government’s 
blueprint for its anti-terrorist strategy to another speech held with George W. Bush 
in occasion of his state visit to Britain at the time of the Istanbul bombings 
(November 20th , 2003), and he underlines a change in rhetoric. The second speech 
marks a clear move of the British towards the US Government’s frame.728 
On 18 September 2001, France pledged support to the US: French President 
Jacques Chirac visited the White House and pledged "total solidarity" with the 
United States, although he expressed concern over the use of the term "war." Two 
years later, while French President Jacques Chirac addressed the UN General 
Assembly, in New York on September 2003, he laid out the French and German 
stance on the fight against terrorism in general and war on terror in particular: “... 
Multilateralism is a concept for our time, for it alone allows us to comprehend 
contemporary problems globally and in all their complexity. First of all, the 
settlement of conflicts that threaten international peace and security. In Iraq, the 
transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis who must have sole responsibility for their 
future is essential for stability and reconstruction. It is up to the United Nations to 
give legitimacy to this process. It is also up to the United Nations to assist with the 
gradual transfer of administrative and economic responsibilities to the present Iraqi 
institutions according to a realistic timetable and to help the Iraqis draft a 
constitution and hold elections. Last, it is up to the United Nations to give a 
mandate to a multinational force commanded naturally by the main troop 
                     
728Cristina Archetti and Prof. Philip M. Taylor Managing Terrorism after 9/11: the War on Terror, The 
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contributor, in order to ensure the security of Iraq and all those helping with the 
country’s reconstruction.”729 
Chirac, representative of those European nations that were opposed to the 
Iraqi intervention in 2003 and then of those who were opposed to the way it is 
conducted, urged for the involvement of the UN as a quest of the implementation 
the struggle against terrorism through common values. The emphasis that is put on 
the centrality of the United Nations was largely absent from the US rhetoric: 
 
In today’s world, no one can act alone in the name of all and no one can accept the 
anarchy of a society without rules. There is no alternative to the United Nations.... 
Multilateralism is essential.... It is the (United Nations Security Council) that must 
set the bounds for the use of force. No one can appropriate the right to use it 
unilaterally and preventively.730 
 
 
The above speech had been characteristic of the French and German stance 
against the War in Iraq in 2003. Chirac, while addressing the Conference on 
‘Against Terrorism-For Humanity’ in New York on 22 November 2003 also told 
that: 
“Our destinies are intertwined. We must stand by these peoples (the Middle 
Easterners). We must help them overcome the challenges facing them, help them 
hold out prospects of another future to their young, that of development and 
democracy, modernity, openness to the outside world and dialogue. Our world is 
characterized by the growing gap between rich and poor, by the destabilization of 
traditional societies, by the difficulties encountered by the developing countries’ 
middle classes in securing a minimum of stability. A key goal in the fight for 
                     
729Chirac, Jacques Speech to the opening meeting of the 58th session of the United Nations General 
Assembly: New York, September 23, 2003,http://www.ambafranceus. 
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economic development is to share our prosperity in order to give each and every 
one a fair chance and a share in progress, and thus to diminish feelings of injustice 
and exclusion.”731 
As for the actions on the ground, the European Union member-states did not 
have combat roles, but provided mostly non-military support for the aftermath of 
the 2003 Iraqi intervention: In addition to the involvement of a number of EU 
members in providing security in Iraq, the EU’s efforts since the war in 2003 have 
mainly focused on providing humanitarian relief, political and financial support to 
launch the reconstruction process. In early 2003, the EC set aside €100 million for 
the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) to provide humanitarian 
aid to Iraq; EU Member States pledged more than €731 million. Following 
adoption of UNSC Resolution 1483 on 22 May 2003, the EU lifted its sanctions 
against Iraq. The Madrid donors conference held on 23-24 October 2003 launched 
the multilateral effort to assist Iraq’s reconstruction. At the conference the EU as a 
whole pledged over €1.25 billion, including the EC contribution. The conference 
also welcomed the UN and World Bank’s intention to establish a multi-donor trust 
fund for Iraq – the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq.  
Since October 2003, EU assistance for Iraq has widened in scope. While the 
humanitarian needs of the population were declining, resources for reconstruction 
were supplementing humanitarian work to rehabilitate core public services, and 
expanding to include the provision of employment, poverty reduction and the 
strengthening of Iraq’s institutions and administration. EC assistance has also been 
directed to supporting the UN role in the political process and the development of 
Iraqi civil society and democratic institutions. Since 2003 the EU has provided 
                     
731Chirac, Jacques Speech to the Conference "Against terrorism - for humanity", New York 22.09.2003 
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assistance amounting to €305 million from the EC budget to Iraq.732 
As for the military contribution, French, Danish, German, Spanish, Greek 
and Italian forces undertook mostly non-combatant or minor war-fighting roles. 
The French and German contributions are representative of the European effort at 
large for they were representative of the sizeable non-military security support in 
training, aid, reconstruction and protection. The latter translates to protective means 
rather than offensive means of response. 
 There were more than 4,200 French military personnel currently operating 
in the CENTCOM AOR. The French Air Force, deploying C-160 and C-130 
aircraft to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, have provided humanitarian assistance as well as 
national and coalition airlift support. Two KC-135 aircraft have deployed to Manas, 
Kyrgyzstan to provide aerial refueling. Six Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft have also 
deployed to Manas to provide close air support (CAS) capability. French engineers 
helped construct runways, a tent city and a munitions storage facility at Manas. 
France also provided airfield security (with dogs), a field mess unit, a deployable 
weather bureau, and a Civil Military Operations (CMO) team.  France deployed an 
infantry company to Mazar-e-Sharif to provide area security up to December 2001. 
Two French officers served as air coordinators at the RAMCC. Atlantique aircraft 
deployed in Djibouti under national control are participating daily in Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. France provided its only Carrier 
Battle Group to support combat operations in the North Arabian Sea. Aircraft from 
this Battle Group have flown more than 2,000 hours for OEF to date, supporting 
the coalition with air reconnaissance, strike and AEW missions. France's naval 
contribution to OEF accounts for approximately 24 percent of their entire naval 
                     
732Data retrieved from, Commission of The European Communities Communication From The 
Commission To The Council and The European Parliament Brussels, 9.6.2004 Com, 2004, 417 Final. 
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forces. France is the only coalition country to be flying fighter aircraft from Manas 
airfield in Kyrgyzstan. Their Mirage and tanker aircraft actively supported the 
coalition (not the NATO) during Operation Anaconda and were maintaining their 
full support capabilities for further operations. The World Health Organization, 
French Embassy, Loma Linda (NGO) and French forces (500 personnel) inserted 
into ISAF worked to make major improvements to the Kabul Medical Institute - 
with equipment, books and a new curriculum.733 
As for the German contribution to the fight against terrorism, there were 
2,800 German personnel currently operating within the CENTCOM AOR. 
Germany has taken the lead in the establishment and training of the Afghan police 
force. German Special Operations Forces are currently in Afghanistan performing 
the full spectrum of SOF missions. The German Navy has had three Frigates, one 
Fast Patrol Boat Group (five units) and four supply ships operating out of Djibouti, 
in the Gulf of Aden area since January 2002. Additionally, there were two German 
Sea King helicopters based in Djibouti. A German A-310 (Airbus) aircraft is on 
alert in Germany for use as a Medevac platform. Germany led and supported the 
Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) by providing its commander, a majority of 
the KMNB staff, one battalion-sized Infantry task Force, field hospital and other 
combat support troops. This force was supported by an air transport element 
operating out of Uzbekistan. Employment of Afghan war widows - USAID and 
CJCMOTF are planning to employ Afghan war widows to make uniforms for the 
Kabul police force, a micro-industry proposal made possible by a German 
contribution of 10 million Euros to help train and equip the police force.   
 
                     
733The US Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs 703-697-5131 Fact Sheet June 7, 2002, 
revised June 14, 2002. 
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Germany has conducted air transport flights in support of Humanitarian 
Assistance missions primarily in Afghanistan. Iraqi involvement of Germany was 
the first time German ships and maritime patrol aircraft have been operationally 
involved in a Middle East deployment in more than 50 years. Three German 
maritime patrol aircraft began conducting reconnaissance operations from 
Mombassa, Kenya. Germany conducted HA flights to support relief efforts for 
earthquake victims in Afghanistan. 
 
8.6. Speeches and Actions after the Attacks in Europe 
An international wave of condemnation has followed the rush-hour 
bombing of Spanish trains. The Madrid train bombings consisted of a series of 
coordinated bombings against the Cercanías (commuter train) system of Madrid, 
Spain on the morning of 11 March 2004 (3/11, three days before Spain's general 
elections), killing 191 people and wounding 1,800. 
European Commission former President Romano Prodi told reporters that 
“I'm here to express our deep grief at this bloody, ferocious and senseless attack. 
There is no justification whatsoever behind which the authors of this bestial crime 
can hide. This is violence without object, without sense against which the entire 
international community has to mobilize itself. All the peoples of Europe are now 
close to Spain.” 
European Parliament former President Pat Cox said, “It is an outrageous, 
unjustified and unjustifiable attack on the Spanish people and Spanish democracy. 
There is a general election due in Spain on Sunday. What happened today is a 
declaration of war on democracy. Let Sunday show that Spanish democracy is 
determined to overcome terrorism.” 
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NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer “On behalf of the 
Alliance, I condemn in the strongest possible terms this mindless act of cruelty and 
barbarism.” 
In September 2005, the Commission came up with a package including a 
proposed directive on data retention, a communication on radicalisation and 
a decision to allocate €7 million to prevention, preparedness and response to 
terrorist attacks.734  
Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso said “Terrorism is 
an absolute evil and before it there can only be one response: absolute 
determination, without doubts or hesitation.”  
The UN former Secretary General Kofi Annan said “Once again we see 
senseless killing of innocent people. Killing of innocent people cannot be justified 
regardless of the cause. I offer my deepest sympathy. I hope that the perpetrators 
will be brought to justice swiftly.”  
The US President George W Bush, in his reaction to the Madrid attacks, 
said: “We stand strongly with the people of Spain. I appreciate so very much the 
Spanish government's fight against terror, their resolute stand against terrorist 
organizations like ETA. And the US stands with them. And today we ask the God’s 
blessings on those who suffer in the great country of Spain.” 
Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, whose country held the EU presidency at 
the time of the bombings, “The timing of the bombings was clearly designed to 
wreak the greatest level of havoc... and cannot be justified by any political cause.” 
French President Jacques Chirac said, “These irresponsible acts, which can 
have no justification, are from every standpoint to be condemned.”  
                     
734“European Anti-Terrorism Policy”, Euractiv Network, http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/anti-
terrorism-policy/article-136674, accessed at 16 January 2009. 
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UK Prime Minister of the time Tony Blair said, “This terrible attack 
underlines the threat that we all continue to face from terrorism in many countries 
and why we must all work together internationally to safeguard our peoples against 
such attacks and defeat terrorism.”  
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said, “These abominable terror 
acts that claimed so many lives fill us with deep sadness and outrage.”  
US Ambassador to the EU Rockwell Schnabel, on behalf of President Bush 
said, “Today we stand together with all people of Europe in sorrow, but also with 
resolve to stop these crimes against humanity. There is no cause that can justify 
terrorism.” 
Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan 
said, “Terrorists must know that with attacks such as the monstrous and 
unconscionable bombings in Madrid today they will not succeed in destroying the 
edifice of international law and human rights the international community has been 
building for so many years.”  
Madrid attacks were followed by the 7 July 2005 London bombings (7/7) 
were a series of coordinated suicide attacks on London's public transport system 
during the morning rush hour. Europe has suffered from terrorism from various 
sources for decades. ETA and IRA have been among the most prolonged terrorist 
groups in Europe. A policy of increased judicial co-operation between member 
states had already been agreed as part of the Tampere Programme when the attack 
against the US took place in 2001.735  
 
 
                     
735European Anti-Terrorism Policy”, Euractiv Network, http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/anti-
terrorism-policy/article-136674, accessed at 16 January 2009. 
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The anti-terrorism action plan was the immediate European reaction to the 
twin tower attacks which was followed by a framework decision defining terrorist 
offences and aligning the level of sanctions between member states. Following the 
Madrid bombings, however, the Council issued a declaration against terrorism and 
appointed Gijs de Vries as anti-terrorism coordinator. The action plan is updated 
every 6 months. From December 2005, the Commission decided to produce 
a scoreboard showing the level of implementation of action plan measures.736 
The Hague Programme, adopted in November 2004 to succeed Tampere, 
includes a number of ambitious measures on exchange of information, border 
control, security of travel documents and police and judicial co-operation. In 
December 2004, the Council adopted specific measures on combating terrorist 
financing, civil protection policy, and prevention of recruitment, critical 
infrastructure protection and external security policy.    
Following the London attacks in July 2005, EU interior ministers held an 
extraordinary meeting where they agreed that all measures already decided on 
should be implemented as a matter of urgency. These include: European evidence 
warrant; strengthening of Schengen and visa information systems; biometric details 
on passports; combating terrorist financing; prevention of recruitment and 
radicalization; greater controls over trade, storage and transport of explosives. 
Thus, an energetic intra-EU institutional, regulatory and legislative 
overhauling took place after the attacks in Europe. Yet, the cooperation between 
the US and Europe remained mostly on a bilateral basis. French-US and British-US 
cooperation in intelligence has increased after the attacks in Madrid and London.737 
                     
736European Anti-Terrorism Policy”, Euractiv Network, http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/anti-
terrorism-policy/article-136674, accessed at 16 January 2009. 
737Nesser, Petter. 2006. “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational 
Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe” The Transnational Radical 
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Yet again, no institutional and all-out Europe-American cooperation has 
materialized due to the contending counterterrorism cultures between countries 
such as Germany and France on one side and the US on the other.738   
Even after the attacks in Europe, French President Chirac was openly 
critical of the US about the way it conducts its war on terrorism, especially in Iraq: 
“As France had foreseen and feared, the war in Iraq has sparked upheavals that yet 
to show their full effects” Chirac told the French diplomatic corps gathered in Paris 
on 5 January 2007. He declared that the conflict, which the US still describes as 
part of the ‘war on terror’ it launched in 2001 following the September 11 attacks, 
‘had offered terrorism a new field for expansion’.739Chirac said the war had 
repercussions for the wider region and he criticized the US-led invasion of Iraq, 
saying that it destabilized the region and allowed terrorism to spread. 
Chirac even said France looked forward to the emergence of a multipolar 
world, as China, India and Brazil take on ‘the status of global powers’, with 
influence shared between the old and new giants. He predicted that “the rise will 
mark the end if the centuries long, undivided Western domination of the world” 
and hopefully address the “persistence of extreme poverty in a world growing ever 
richer” - “a moral scandal as much as an economic absurdity and a major political 
threat”. 
 
                                                                
Islamism Project, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) Kjeller-Norway, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, 29:323-342; Brady, Hugo. 2009. Intelligence, emergencies and foreign policy 
The EU’s role in counter-terrorism Centre for European Reform, CER July. 
738Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes. 2009. “Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Change and 
Continuity or Crisis and Transformation?” Intelligence and National Security Vol. 24, No. 1, 6-25, 
February; Dittrich, Mirjam. 2008. “The Future of CFSP-The Madrid Agenda: A report from the 
international conference on Democracy, Terrorism and Security” European Policy Center, 
http://www.epc.eu/en/er.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=487, 
Wednesday 04, June; Newsome, Bruce. 2006. “Expatriate Games: Interorganizational Coordination and 
International Counterterrorism” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:75-89. 
739“Chirac Renews Attack on Iraq War”, BBC News, 5 January 2007, 16:09 GMT, 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6234759.stm 
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Chirac, yet again in 2007, said that “Iraq war bred terrorism.” As one of the 
fiercest opponents of the US-led war in Iraq, he warned that “today the conflict had 
provided a dangerous new breeding ground for terrorism.” He declared that “the 
war in Iraq exacerbated the divisions between communities and threatened the very 
integrity of Iraq. It undermined the stability of the entire region, where every 
country now fears for its security and its independence”. 
 
8.7. Different Counterterrorism Understandings and Different 
Responses after the Terrorist Attacks in Europe 
After 9-11, American overseas policy was shaped by the identification of 
connections among ‘terrorism with a global reach’, weapons of mass destruction 
and ‘states of concern’. As for internal security, the US has undertaken major 
changes to its governmental structure, tightened controls at points of entry into the 
country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement officers and courts and 
rearranged its intelligence and security agencies, and established the Homeland 
Security division.740The American perception has conceptualized the terrorist threat 
as a new kind of terrorism and as an act of war that must be countered militarily.741  
In contrast, Europe has perceived the problem differently. European 
countries saw their military forces useful for peacekeeping and reconstruction 
missions rather than in combat formations. Leaving aside the United Kingdom and 
Poland, most European nations did not take major roles in combat operations. 
Europeans were behind the frontlines of ‘the war on terror’ in Afghanistan and 
                     
740The 9-11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, Authorized Edition, New York: W.W.Norton and Company, July 22, 2004, pp. 108-
143. 
741Posen, Barry R. 2001-2002. “The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics” 
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 39–55. 
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Iraq.742 
The mission in Afghanistan is determining for both the future of the 
Alliance and the security of Western societies: 
For many Americans, NATO’s solidarity and effectiveness will be decided in the 
caldron of Afghanistan, where European Allies and Partners contribute 
approximately 28,000 of the 55,000 troops (including nearly 23,000 Americans) in 
ISAF. European and American leaders broadly agree that if Afghanistan were to 
become a “failed state,” terrorist networks would be able again to operate there with 
relative impunity, posing a direct threat to an unstable and nuclear-armed Pakistan 
and, eventually, to the European and American homelands. But whereas American 
public support for the Afghanistan mission remains strong, the European public’s 
support for the ISAF effort is wavering.743 
 
European threat assessment and corollary policy that has continuously 
emphasized the containment of ‘risk’, consensus-building and diplomacy had not 
been in tune with that of the US.744Domestically, European legal changes with 
regard to surveillance and civil rights were less sweeping when compared to those 
of the US. European conviction, that the ‘newness’ of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda 
has been exaggerated, led to different policies. The implications of these divergent 
cultures for the future of the relationship between Europe and the United States 
appear to be remarkable, for they seem to be long lasting into an undetermined 
future.745  
The ambiguous features of the new threat are worth separate and special 
emphasis. These features severely exacerbate common stance regarding the 
                     
742NATO figures as of January 2009; Canada and Australia (not a NATO member) provided 2830 
troops and 1090 troops, respectively. Some 10,000 additional U.S. military serve in Afghanistan under 
Operation Enduring Freedom’s Combined Joint Task Force 101. Since late 2008, all U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan report to ISAF’s Commander, U.S. Gen. David McKiernan. In March 2003, General 
McKiernan commanded all coalition and U.S. conventional ground forces that attacked into Iraq to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power. 
743Michel, Leo. 2009. ‘ Euro-Atlantic Security Relations and U.S.-French Cooperation’ in Avenir De La 
Relation Franco-Americaine Groupe Stratégique Franco-Américain Projet, Johns Hopkins University,  
Fondation Robert Schuman Etude and Center for Transatlantic Relations, Janvier/January, p.7. 
744Lesser, Ian O.  “Strategic Priorities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East” in Avenir De La 
Relation Franco-Americaine Groupe Stratégique Franco-Américain Projet, Johns Hopkins University, 
Fondation Robert Schuman Etude and Center for Transatlantic Relations, Janvier/January, pp. 25-31.  
745Candidate’s interview with the anonymous NATO military and civil bureaucratic personnel in NATO 
MIO Seminar, Crete, Greece, October, 2009. 
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definition of the threat and due common counterstrategies. Since the threat does not 
possess an accustomed form in the eyes of the decision-makers and civil and 
military bureaucracies, since it is not clear in the form of a nation-state against 
which established working protocols and best-practices had been used in diplomacy 
and military realms, it is hard even for like-minded people to come to consensus 
regarding the specifics of a response-policy.  
The new threat is, thus, selected as a variable that complicates inter-state 
cooperation even in the absence of the contending counterterrorism cultures: The 
above-mentioned list of different features of the threat helps explain why the threat 
itself is an ambiguous one that is open to divergences even among states that have 
similar strategic and military cultures. The above-mentioned initial differences 
between Britain and the US and between Turkey and the US are examples to 
hardships among states that have similar strategic cultures. Because of the features 
of the threat, countries perceive the international fight against terrorism with 
differences. 
Although the weight of the unit-level variables or preferences of states 
cannot be ignored, the following features of the threat seem to be more determining 
than the divergent counterterrorism cultures of states, especially because these 
features create operational counterterrorism ambiguities regardless of different 
national security understandings: 
- No state-control, manipulation or sponsorship 
- Merger with organized crime and unregulated financing that is supported by 
black markets and corrupt officials746 
                     
746Thachuk, Kimberley. 2008. “Countering Terrorist Support Structures”. Defense Against Terrorism 
Review DATR Vol.1 No.1, p.13-29. 
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- Lack of a territory (base, headquarters or address) to be retaliated at, which 
cancels deterrence 
- Open endorsement of indiscriminate killing as determined choice; pursuing 
any means that give catastrophic effect such as exploding jets into 
buildings, suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or seeking WMD 
- Possessing suicide-bombers as the smartest mobile bombs747 
- Effective combination of the pre-modern and modern skills and technology in 
carrying out attacks (the use of traditional methods of money transaction 
such as hawala, hundis, and also modern banking system- modern weaponry 
and means such as explosives, GPS and the Internet) 
 
These features complicate the implementation of a common and cooperative 
response at the operational level. Even when following a common strategy in the 
absence of different security understandings, the fight against terrorism is 
operationally crippled by the threat itself. These features defy organizational and 
bureaucratic working-mechanisms of nation-states as the following declarations by 
the authorities indicate.  
Numerous declarations and documents emphasize the weight of the new 
threat with its distinct features. One of the noticeable examples is the European 
Security Strategy of December 2003. The distinct features seem to find their way 
into the latter European strategy document even before the attacks in Madrid and 
London occurred.  
 
 
                     
747Pape, Robert. 2005. Dying to Win. New York: Random House. 
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The document clarifies the significance of the threat with its different 
dimensions: 
Global Challenges 
The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the 
internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.  
Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of 
democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have 
perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments 
have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international 
affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an 
interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields. 
 
Key Threats 
Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe 
faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. 
Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine 
the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to 
the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, 
connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause 
massive casualties. The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is 
linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include 
the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation 
of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own 
society. Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are 
targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been 
uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action 
is indispensable.748 
 
 
Ambassador Ivo. H. Daalder, United States Permanent Representative to the 
NATO, also emphasizes the significance of the threat and the form of response it 
requires: 
 
Today, in 2010, the common security threats we face demand a resolute, common 
response. What is notable - and new - about these threats is the reality that they are no 
longer limited in terms of geography. They are instead what President Obama has 
called “a world of threats that know no borders.”  
In this age of global politics, no country, not even as great and powerful a nation as 
my own, can deal with this complexity of challenges and opportunities by itself. We 
need the help of others. That is why the United States needs NATO and why NATO 
needs partners. These partnerships offer mutual reinforcement and reciprocity in a 
world that demands that we work together on a truly global scale.749 
 
Ambassador Dell Dailey, the U.S. State Department’s coordinator for 
counterterrorism, also emphasizes the deterritorialized and diffused form of the 
new threat. He goes on to underline that common goals and strategy are needed to 
                     
748A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 2-
3. 
749Ambassador Ivo. H. Daalder. (United States Permanent Representative to the NATO). 2010. “NATO 
Partnerships”, The US Mission to the NATO January, 
http://nato.usmission.gov/Speeches/Daalder_Partnerships_Vilnius.asp 
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defeat the new threat. However, he also points out that this has not occurred yet.   
Dealing with al-Qaida is complicated by the fact that it is a decentralized enemy that 
is professional and highly adept at using sophisticated propaganda to exploit 
electronic data through the Internet, Dailey said.  
 
“The international community, the governments and international organizations, 
politicians, academics, religious and community leaders, in general, need to do better 
in disrupting terrorist propaganda and its misinformation,” Dailey said. 
 
“We can destroy terrorist leadership, disrupt terrorist networks, and eliminate terrorist 
safe havens, but unless we prevent terrorists from recruiting new members locally and 
expanding its reach globally, we will not be truly successful.” Dailey said a key 
component in U.S. counterterrorism policies is counter-radicalization and its 
precursor, anti-radicalization. “Evidence shows that terrorists manipulate grievances, 
whether real or perceived, to subvert legitimate authority and create unrest,” he said. 
Dailey likened this process to a conveyor belt in which terrorist groups convert 
alienated populations to extremist viewpoints and turn them by stages into 
sympathizers, supporters and finally terrorists.750 
 
 
The post-Cold War threat assessments, including that of terrorism, suffer 
from the shift from state-centric threats to diffused threats that are transnational in 
nature. That translates to different form of cooperation against transnational threats. 
However, cooperation and alignment against the new threat is wrought with dire 
difficulties of reaching a common ground for action. Transnational threats are 
perceived differently, as being either internal or external or as being both internal-
and-externals, by different governments.  
In the absence of high anticipation of conventional war, transnational threats 
and in particular transnational terrorist threat itself is assessed differently by states. 
That is how the discussion of waning of major war in the preceding chapters is 
important in understanding the reasons why different threat assessments occur. 
 The new threat itself is thereby open to be interpreted differently in the 
absence of a unifying existential threat that may annihilate or invade countries; the 
Former Director General UK Security Service Stephen Lander explains: 
                     
750Ambassador Dell Dailey, the U.S. State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, “Defeating 
Terrorism Requries Common Goal, Strategic Effort” The United States Mission to the European Union, 
Brussels, Belgium, October 2008. http://useu.usmission.gov 
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So far as the essentially competitive nature of intelligence work is concerned, 
developments since the end of the Cold War have pulled in different directions. On 
the one hand, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the strategic threat to 
the West posed by the Soviet Union have led to greater competitiveness and divisions 
between the former Western allies, and thus between their intelligence services. When 
there was NATO on our side and the Warsaw Pact on theirs, there was clarity about 
friend and foe. Since then, that clarity has departed and states can now much more 
easily be allies on one issue and adversaries on another. Differences of European 
perspective on the Balkans in the 1990s or more recently on the war in Iraq make the 
point.751 
 
As for the implications of the distinct features of the threat of transnational 
terrorism for intelligence agencies and international cooperation, Lander provides 
an insider view: 
For the intelligence community in the UK, this has led to some schizophrenia about 
international relationships, with close collaboration possible with allies on some issues 
(such as terrorism and drugs), but no-go areas on others where there are foreign policy 
tensions. The UK has clearly not been alone in finding these relationship issues more 
complex than they used to be, with policy differences in particular about the Middle 
East complicating the intelligence exchanges in Europe and beyond.  
 
Pulling in the opposite direction in respect of international cooperation since the end 
of the Cold War has, of course, been the emergence of a new strategic threat, that of 
terrorism, not this time from nationalist or separatist groups with an essentially one-
country focus, such as, to cite two of many, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) or the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), but from al-Qaeda (AQ) and its 
like with their internationalist and wide-ranging aspirations. I might make the point 
here that a threat that operates virtually irrespective of nationality and national borders 
poses particular challenges for intelligence services and for international collaboration 
between states.752 
 
 In addition to the dimensions of the new threat (State actors vs. Non-state 
actors; Financial motivations and prestige; Transnational networks) as outlined by 
Guy Roberts,753 different national security understandings also contribute to 
diverging state responses. Yet again, ‘the new threat’ or the distinct dimensions of 
the threat come as an independent factor or variable that aggravates the contending 
counterterrorism cultures of the transatlantic partners because the divergences is 
                     
751Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International 
Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 
17, Number 3, October, p. 482. 
752Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International 
Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 
17, Number 3, October, p. 482-3. 
753The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 
22 October 2009.  
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not counter-terrorism specific but extends to the different strategies to be followed 
in security and foreign policies of the Atlantic Allies.  
 
The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States and its 2006 
expanded version describe broad strategic goals of the US. Those goals and the 
way they are articulated have become known as the Bush Doctrine: military 
primacy, global transformation of political regimes, pre-emption, and a willingness 
to act unilaterally. Most Europeans worried about the juxtaposition of ‘the 
unachievable goal’ of completely ending tyranny throughout the world, the 
confusion between pre-emptive war and preventive war, the use of 9/11 as a pretext 
for unilateralism, and the document’s preface declaring “This is a wartime national 
security strategy . . .”.754From the perspective of most Europeans, these goals are 
perceived as overly-broad and in sharp contrast with the European preference for 
multilateralism and consensus.755The ostensible lack of nuance was regarded as an 
invitation to abuse the cause of counterterrorism for other national objectives. The 
application of the above-mentioned elements of the Bush Doctrine in the Iraqi 
intervention in 2003 largely eroded the European sympathy for the US 
policies.756The unilateral declaration of when to use military force against another 
state seems to be the point where most Europeans diverge from the Bush Doctrine’s 
explicit shift from deterrence to pre-emption (or to prevention).757  
                     
754Guertner, Gary L. 2007. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy” 
Parameters, Summer, pp.37-39; Kotsopoulos, John. 2006. “A human security agenda for the EU?” 
European Policy Center EPC Issue Paper No.48 June.  
755Biscop, Sven, Francesco Francioni, Kennedy Graham, Tania Felicio, Jeffrey Laurenti, Thierry Tardy. 
2005. The European Union and the United Nations-Partners in Effective Multilateralism. Chaillot 
Paper No. 78, June, pp. 89-72. 
756Wilkinson, Paul. 2005. International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response, 
Chaillot Paper No. 84 October, p. 31. 
757‘Pre-emption’ and ‘prevention’ are used as interchangeable with one another in the NSS 2002. 
Moreover, Chapter V of the NSS 2002 uses a strong expression while other usages of the term in 
preceding chapters are relatively weaker and softer, 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United 
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Previously, deterrence and containment have long been the basic strategy 
with regard to the states that the US confronts. However, pre-emption or prevention 
(the terms are used in the same meaning and logic regardless of their vocabulary 
and conceptual differentiation) has replaced deterrence in the case of ‘threats 
emanating from terrorists’. The National Security Strategy of the US 2002 uses a 
soft language in the chapter discussing the strategy of pre-empting terrorist groups 
before they attack while it retains the explicit language in Chapter V where the pre-
emption against nation-state actors is spelled out in detail. Thus, European analysts 
and politicians, coupled with the Iraqi intervention in 2003, saw the American NSS 
2002 as basically a manifesto for attacking other states.758That seems to be 
perceived by Europeans as a hijacking of the fight against terrorism. The 
transatlantic divergence on counterterrorism lied in the strategy of pre-emption, the 
use of force against states, and the lack of trust that underlie the transatlantic 
relations as to the real objectives of the war on terror. 
The French headline that declared, “Today we are all Americans,” captured the 
feelings of virtually all Europeans. The assistance clause of NATO’s Article V was 
invoked for the first time in history, and Europeans joined Americans in the 
continental defense of the United States. The war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan was broadly endorsed as legal and reasonable retaliatory responses. The 
publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy precipitated a healthy debate 
among Americans and Europeans that might have ended in a strong consensus on the 
appropriate use of force against terrorist organizations and their sponsors. The 
extension of pre-emption to embrace preventive war as described in the NSS and its 
application to regime change in Iraq, however, derailed a critical debate on how to 
formalize broad alliance policies against terrorism and created instead bitter divisions 
between the Franco-German position and the Bush Administration.759 
 
Alongside different security understandings or cultures, the features of the 
new threat also play an important part in divergent responses. Due to the different 
dimensions of the transnational terrorism, Lander stresses that intelligence 
                                                                
States of America September 2002, Washington: White House. 
758Guertner, Gary L. 2007. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy” 
Parameters, Summer, p. 40. 
759Guertner, Gary L. 2007. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy” 
Parameters, Summer, p. 33. 
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agencies’ activities have started to become closely interlinked with the activities of 
government, legislation and diplomacy:  “the emergence of what may best be 
described as intelligence diplomacy”: 
 
Whether it is intelligence chiefs at Camp David with the prime minister and the 
president, or visiting India and Pakistan to carry government messages about Kashmir, 
or travelling to Moscow to raise concerns about proliferation of Russian weapons 
technologies, this has been a feature of agency life that is new. It reflects not some 
general invasion of diplomatic space by spies, but the recognition by governments that 
there are relationships and understanding in their intelligence communities which can 
be used diplomatically. That recognition has arisen in the UK, I suggest, because of 
the far greater relevance of agency work post-Cold- War to the day-to-day concerns of 
government and the greater familiarity of ministers and senior officials with the 
agencies' business which has resulted.760 
 
He goes on to make ‘the new threat’ clearer: 
A comparison of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) first-order requirements for 
intelligence (what might best be described as Her Majesty's Government's (HMG's) 
wish list for other people's secrets) for today and, say, 1980 would, I imagine, make 
the point. In 1980, those requirements presumably included something like: 
 
• the organisation and capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces; 
• the staff identities, modus operandi and operations of the Soviet intelligence 
services; 
• the same for the East European intelligence services; 
• Soviet relations with Cuba and Angola; 
• etc. 
These are all important subjects given the strategic context, but hardly the day-to-day 
concern of ministers and Parliament. Now, I imagine that today's JIC first-order list 
probably includes something like: 
• international terrorism, and the whereabouts, capabilities 
• and intentions of AQ members in particular; 
• heroin and cocaine smuggling, people, routes and methods; 
• weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes and plans; 
• terrorism associated with Northern Ireland; 
• the Middle East peace process; 
• the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan; 
 
These were all subjects about which government is exercised at many levels. They 
matter to government on a daily basis and also importantly to the media. The two, of 
course, go together, pointing out that this greater government and media familiarity 
with the agencies and legislation to govern their activities.761 
 
Terrorism has long been a source of friction between the United States and 
Europe. Many terrorism scholars, such as Bruce Hoffman, have argued that the 
                     
760Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International 
Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 
17, Number 3, October, p. 483. 
761Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International 
Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 
17, Number 3, October, p. 483-4. 
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differences in terrorism perception have had negative implications on U.S.-
European counter-terrorism relations.762 
A survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund in 2004 points out a 
relative increase in non-military dimensions of counterterrorism cooperation. Both 
Europeans (71%) and Americans (76%) share concerns about international 
terrorism, and thus have a ‘similar’ perception of the threat. However, they differ 
‘markedly’ in their response to terrorism; Americans prefer a military response 
(54%), whereas Europeans agree with this option only to a more limited extent 
(28%). Consequently, it is more likely for America and Europe to achieve a 
positive working relationship on counterterrorism issues that are of a non-military 
nature.763 Yet, European-American counterterrorism cooperation is not strong. 
Kaunert summarizes the state of European-American counterterrorism relations as 
“larger member states prefer to deal with the US on a bilateral basis rather than 
through the EU”, which underlines an unstructured, non-unified and un-
institutionalized European cooperative approach towards the US: 
EU counter-terrorism policy has received significant scholarly attention recently. The 
Journal of Common Market Studies even published a special issue on the topic in 
January 2008 edited by Geoffrey Edwards and Christopher Meyer. In the 
introductory article, it is claimed that the entire ‘‘governance of the European Union 
has been changed through its responses to international terrorism,’’ which is not too 
surprising if one believes the European security scholars who frequently cite 
terrorism as one of the most salient security threats across Europe amongst national 
publics. This is also underlined by the aforementioned German Marshall Fund survey 
of 2004. This leads Edwards and Meyer to present the puzzle that ‘‘the politics of 
counter-terrorism have contributed to the blurring of differences between the so-
called three pillars established by the Maastricht Treaty,’’ but that ‘‘larger member 
states prefer to deal with the US on a bilateral basis rather than through the EU.’764 
 
                     
762B. Hoffman, 1999. ‘‘Is Europe Soft on Terrorism,’’ Foreign Policy, No. 115 Summer, 62-76; R. 
Rosecrance, 1998. “‘The European Union: A new type of international actor,’’ in J. Zielonka, ed., 
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 15-23; F. Cameron, 
2007. ‘‘Transatlantic relations and terrorism,’’ in D. Spence, ed., The European Union and Terrorism 
London: John Harper Publishing; Monar, J. 2004. ‘‘The EU as an International Actor in the Domain of 
Justice and Home Affairs,’’ European Foreign Affairs Review 9, 395–415. 
763F. Cameron, 2007. ‘‘Transatlantic relations and terrorism,’’ in D. Spence, ed., The European Union 
and Terrorism London: John Harper Publishing, pp.142-145. 
764Kaunert, Christian. 2010. “The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: 
Competences, Interests, and Institutions”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22: 1, p. 49. 
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8.8. Action and Rhetoric after the Attacks in Madrid and London:  
Increasing Intra-European Counterterrorism Efforts, Mediocre EU-US 
Counterterrorism Cooperation 
 
As highlighted in above sections, European countries fought terrorism within 
their borders long before Al Qaeda. Spain fought the Basque ETA, Britain fought 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Italy, the Red Brigades, and Germany fought the 
Red Army Faction (RAF). Counter-terrorism cooperation among European nations 
has developed within the framework of the TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, 
Extremism, Violence, and Internationalism) Group. It was formed by European 
police officials to exchange information and provide mutual legal assistance on 
terrorism and related international crimes under the auspices of the Ministers of 
Justice and Home Affairs of the European Economic Community.  
These efforts were codified under the Treaty of European Union in 
Maastricht 1992, and amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, and Nice 2001. 
As Kaunert underlines, three areas were of vital importance to create EU 
competences, which could then facilitate EU-U.S. counter-terrorism relation: a-
police cooperation, b- criminalizing terrorism, and c- extradition.  
First pillar counterterrorism measures are built on the indirect or implied 
powers derived from the ECJ verdict in the AETR case. The European Union 
derives most of its current internal legal competences in the area of police 
cooperation from the revisions of the Treaty of Maastricht through the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. According to Article 29 EU, the objectives of the third pillar are to be 
achieved through: a-closer cooperation between police forces, b-customs 
authorities, and c- other competent authorities in the Member States and the 
European Police Office (Europol). However, a limited competence for Europol was 
501 
 
already established under the Treaty of Maastricht, and thus the agency started 
limited operations in The Hague in the form of a drugs unit in 1994. In 1995, the 
Europol Convention was formally drawn up in Brussels, which came into force on 
1 October 1998 after full ratification. The legal mandate of the Convention 
included improving the effective cooperation among police authorities of the 
member-states, to prevent and combat serious international organized crime, to 
investigate criminal areas, such as drug trafficking and other forms of crime, as 
well as terrorism. In 2002, the mandate was expanded to deal with all serious forms 
of crime. Yet, despite its clear value in combating terrorism, Europol lacks of 
executive powers and autonomous investigative powers. 
Madrid and London bombings demonstrated the severity of the coordinated 
attacks with massive casualties. The Madrid and London bombings of 2004/5 
represented the most shocking attacks in the EU in recent years. There have 
however also been an alarming number of other attempted attacks many of which 
went unnoticed. In 2007, almost 600 failed, foiled or successfully executed terrorist 
attacks were carried out in eleven EU Member States.765 
In terms of prevention, the EU funded several projects including a 
handbook for tackling radicalisation in prisons.766The directive on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for terrorist financing extended the obligation to 
report on suspicious transactions to non-financial business including casinos and 
lawyers. As a result of the regulation adopted in 2005, travellers entering or leaving 
the EU with €10,000 or more in cash are required to make a written 
                     
765Europol, 'EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007', 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/TESAT/TESAT2007.pdf 
766 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15-17. 
502 
 
declaration.767The EU adopted legislation768for the criminalisation of terrorist 
training and recruitment and of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, 
including over the Internet. Funds were allocated for the installation of an EU-wide 
Early Warning System to notify authorities of threats posed by missing or stolen 
explosives. Instruments to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure of the 
EU such as roads, railways, electricity networks and power stations are 
prepared.769The Commission’s consultations on bio-preparedness by way of a 
Green Paper aimed at a package of proposals to reduce the risk of chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear threats, which have the potential to harm 
thousands of people, to destroy agriculture and to damage severely the food supply 
chain.770 The EU’s work during the past 5 years was predicated on the 'principle of 
availability' whereby a law enforcement officer from one Member State during the 
course of his duties can obtain information, where it is available, from another 
Member State. The exchange of information and intelligence was simplified.771 The 
incorporation of the Prüm Treaty into EU legislation provided indirect access to 
Member States' databases on fingerprints and DNA information, and direct, 
controlled access to vehicle registration files.772It seems likely to improve police 
cooperation throughout the EU by enabling them to know what information is 
                     
767Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 
on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005. 
768Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, pp. 20-22. 
769Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, COM(786) final, and Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the 
identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to 
improve their protection, OJ L 345, 23.12.2008. 
770Green Paper on bio-preparedness, COM 2007. 
771Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of 
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, pp. 89-91. 
772Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, pp. 1-3; Council 
Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the 
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ 
L 210, 6.8.2008, pp. 10-12. 
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available. Conditions for access for security purposes to the VIS were adopted.773 
Moreover, conditions for the retention of electronic communications traffic and 
location data were transposed by most Member States in relation to fixed telephone 
networks and mobile telephony.774 The Council Decision establishing the European 
Police Office (Europol) and replacing the former Convention aims to give the body 
greater operational flexibility to respond more rapidly to trends in crime.775 In 
addition to its information system, designed to collect data relating to serious cross 
border crime and to allow for its exchange, Europol's Analytical Work Files are 
tools to provide law enforcement services in Member States with relevant 
intelligence on specific criminal phenomena, including trafficking in human beings, 
terrorism, credit card fraud and synthetic drugs trafficking.776 
The European Union has had to act internally in order to create the 
competences necessary to protect Europe from this particular terrorist threat. 
Europol reacted immediately to the attacks. The Operational Center that was 
created to provide 24/7 service for the exchange of information had been 
overhauled and enhanced after the attacks. A specialized counter-terrorist unit 
became fully operational with experts and liaison officers from police and 
intelligence services of the member-states.777 Their mission is to collect and 
                     
773Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation of the Visa 
Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes 
of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal 
offences, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008 
774Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006. 
775 Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol), 
OJL 121, 15.5.2009. 
776Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 10.6.2009 Com (2009) 263 Final 
Communication from the Commission To The Council, The European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Justice, Freedom and Security in 
Europe since 2005: An Evaluation of the Hague Programme and Action Plan {Sec (2009) 765 Final} 
{Sec (2009) 766 Final} {Sec (2009) 767 Final}, pp. 8-12. 
777Solana, Xavier. 2004. ‘Terrorism in Europe: how does the European Union respond to this 
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analyze counterterrorist information and intelligence in order to shape a European 
threat assessment. Currently, there is just 15 Europol permanent staff. In addition, 
10 seconded staff members working on terrorism exist as well as 22 analysts that 
help connecting the dots.  
As the Commission reports indicate, coordinating the EU’s global action is 
regulated through definition of terrorism and the European arrest warrant. As for 
the European definition of terrorism, the Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism is important. The European Commission presented a proposal to that 
effect to the aforementioned special meeting of EU Justice and Home Affairs 
ministers in Brussels on countries in September 2001. It intended to put in place a 
definition of terrorism, alongside penalties and sanctions that come on extradition 
procedures and mechanisms for exchanging information. Effectively, this is the 
first time such a definition has been agreed to on a supranational level, especially in 
the light that a number of member states did not even have definitions of terrorism.  
The EU’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, agreed to politically 
in December 2001, firstly defines what is meant by terrorist acts in three parts: a- 
the context of an action; b- the aim of the action; and c- the specific acts being 
committed. ‘‘They must be intentional acts, which given their nature or context, 
may serve to damage a country or an international organization. These acts must be 
committed with the aim of either seriously intimidating a population or unduly 
compelling a Government or international organization to act or fail to act, or 
seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional 
economic or social structures of a country or international organization.’’ In 
addition, a list defines eight specific acts. The definition also covers behaviors 
                                                                
phenomenon?’ EU Council document S0266/04, 7 October. 
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which may contribute to terrorist acts in third countries.778 
 
The Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism thus ensures that terrorist offences 
are punished by heavier sentences than common criminal offences in all EU member 
states would have provided for. Furthermore, it approximates the level of sanctions 
between member states according to the principle that sentences have to be both 
proportional and dissuasive. Member states are legally responsible to act in cases of 
terrorist incidents that take place on their own territory or that are committed against 
their own people. The Framework Decision is favourable for EU-U.S. cooperation in 
the fight against terrorism as this offence is now recognized as a criminal offence on 
both sides of the Atlantic. However, this framework decision also enables the EU to 
conclude criminal justice agreements with third countries, such as the USA.779 
 
However, according to one report, addressing the progress of implementing 
the Framework Decision, “[b]y the deadline of Article 11 (1), only two Member 
States had introduced specific legislation on terrorism, while at least five had 
legislation on the matter previous to the framework decision. Six members had 
adopted new measures transposing the Framework Decision after the Deadline.” 
With reference to the incomplete and messy implementation of provisions 
regulating terrorist offenses, the authors of the report conclude that the behaviour of 
member states “may disrupt the systematic and political aim of this instrument and 
the clarity of implementation, and can hinder the full implementation of relating 
provisions.”780 
Alongside the Framework Decision, the flagship of EU counterterrorism 
efforts has been the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in 2001. 
Yet, it is important to highlight den Boer’s study underlining that current EU 
response are not initiated against the transnational terrorist wave of the new 
century, but already on the agenda before the attacks: 
 
                     
778Kaunert, Christian. 2010. “The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: 
Competences, Interests, and Institutions”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22: 1, p. 52. 
779Kaunert, Christian. 2010. “The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: 
Competences, Interests, and Institutions”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22: 1, p. 54. 
780Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism Brussels, 12 October 2004, pp. 6-7. 
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The ‘Euro-warrant’ had already been on the shelves, the coordinated fight against 
terrorism provided a window of opportunity for political decision-making on this 
instrument.”781 
 
The Commission’s proposal arguably went much further than the plans to 
simplify extradition law within the EU based on the 1999 conclusions of the 
Tampere European Council. Firstly, the EAW abolishes the term extradition, and 
replaces it with the term ‘‘surrender.’’782The national judicial authorities will be 
responsible for its enforcement, thus virtually excluding political decisions and the 
national executives from the decision-making process.  
Secondly, the legal effect of this measure is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice if member states sign a declaration approving of this. 
This may be limited, but it is an improvement to the previous legal position. 
Thirdly, the EAW abolishes the principle of double criminality for serious offences.  
Again, the importance of the European Arrest Warrant for the USA derives 
from the ECJ Jurisprudence and the parallelism between first and third pillar 
counter-terrorism measures which are built on implied powers. The fact that the EU 
has now agreed on an EU-wide extradition policy enabled the Commission 
politically to start negotiations on behalf of the Council with the USA in its 
extradition agreements.  
Without the European Arrest Warrant, the political consensus to conclude an 
international extradition agreement between the EU and the USA would not have 
existed. For the EU, this would have meant that it might have become sidelined in 
future counter-terrorism agreements, whereas the U.S. would have needed to 
                     
781Den Boer, Monica.2003. “The EU Counterterrorism Wave: Window of Opportunity or Profound 
Policy Transformation?” in Marianne van Leeuwen ed., Confronting Terrorism - European 
Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, p.195. 
782“European arrest warrant replaces extradition between EU Member States”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/criminal/extradition/fsj_criminal_extradition_en.htm, May 2005. 
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conclude 27 bilateral agreements with the current 27 member states of the EU 
instead. However, this is the developing legislation status; it is not the 
implementation status. 
European Arrest Warrant would make the lengthy, cumbersome and 
unpredictable method of extradition among European countries unnecessary. The 
EU Arrest Warrant is based on the principle of mutual recognition of all the 
criminal judgments of all member-states by fellow member-states. It becomes an 
administrative procedure and is aimed at being a fast-track means of transferring 
suspects.  
The European Arrest Warrant is seen as an essential element of the fight 
against terrorism, as well as the fight against organized crime at the European level 
as it will make it harder for criminals to find a safe haven in another EU Member 
State. However, some Member States experienced considerable difficulty in 
implementing the required legislation. Some expressed concern about their 
sovereignty and their country’s right to protect its citizens: As for the 
implementation status, European Arrest Warrant is a partial success at best 
according to the Final Report of the Commission of the European Communities.783 
The report of the Commission underlines the delay in implementation of the 
Warrant among the EU member-states: 
Delayed implementation though now almost EU wide 
The arrest warrant has been implemented by 24 Member States with up to 8 months 
delay (CZ, DE). Only half complied with the time limit laid down (BE, DK, ES, IE, 
CY, LT, HU, PL, PT, SI, FI, SE, UK). The delay was the cause of transitional 
difficulties. Nevertheless, as of 1 November 2004, all the Member States had 
transposed the Framework Decision except Italy, which still has its draft legislation 
before Parliament. All Member States have adopted specific legislation and several 
had to revise their constitutions in order to do this. However, some (DK and EE) have 
dispensed with binding rules for certain provisions, which do not meet the 
                     
783Most recent reports on the implementation status are of 2005. Commission of The European 
Communities Brussels, 23.02.2005 Com (2005) 63 Final Report from the Commission Based On Article 
34 of the Council Framework Decision Of 13 June 2002 On The European Arrest Warrant and the 
Surrender Procedures Between Member States {Sec (2005) 267}, pp. 2-4. 
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requirement of legal certainty. In practice, from 1 January 2004, eight Member States 
applied the arrangements for the arrest warrant between them; by the date of 
enlargement the number had risen to 16, and since 14 January 2005, the date of first 
application in CZ, there have been 24. In 2004 the arrest warrant thus gradually 
replaced extradition between Member States and appears even to have surpassed it in 
volume terms. Only a handful of Member States exercised the right to limit its 
temporal or substantive scope. As regards the former aspect, some did so in 
accordance with the Framework Decision, once this had been adopted, in particular by 
ruling out the warrant's application to acts that occurred before a given date (Article 
32: FR, IT, AT). Others, however, wanted to make such a limitation without 
complying with the Framework Decision, whether with regard to procedure (Article 
32: CZ, LU, SI), the substance of the limitation (CZ, LU) or even the effective date 
(CZ). The extradition requests which they continue to present therefore risk being 
rejected by the other Member States.784 
 
Besides, The Annex to the Final Report maintains that there are various 
problems in the implementation process of the EAW across different EU member-
states as regards to785the scope of the EAW, mandatory and optional non-execution 
of the EAW, determination of the competent judicial authorities, recourse to central 
authority, transmission problems, keeping the person in detention, decision in the 
event multiple requests, time limits and procedures for the decision to execute the 
European Arrest Warrant, privileges and immunities and competing international 
obligations of the states. 
European Union Committee 30th Report, of Session 2005-06 European 
Arrest Warrant, concludes that: 
 
Conclusion 
The EAW is now widely used to secure the arrest and surrender of persons across 
the Union and, as the Commission’s report indicates, has largely overtaken 
traditional extradition procedures as between Member States. Problems have, 
however, arisen in some Member States where their constitutions provide protection 
against extradition of own nationals. Questions relating to the legality of the EAW 
are also pending before the European Court of Justice. Until the legal uncertainty 
raised by this litigation is resolved it is inevitable that the effects and benefits of the 
EAW will not be fully felt across the whole Union and there may be caution and 
delays in moving forward on other EU legislative proposals based on mutual 
                     
784Commission of The European Communities Brussels, 23.02.2005 Com (2005) 63 Final Report from 
the Commission Based On Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision Of 13 June 2002 On The 
European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States {Sec (2005) 267}, p. 
2.  
785Commission of The European Communities Brussels, 23.02.2005 Sec (2005) 267 Commission Staff 
Working Document Annex To The Report from The Commission Based On Article 34 of the Council 
Framework Decision Of 13 June 2002 On The European Arrest Warrant and The Surrender Procedures 
Between Member States {Com (2005) 63 Final}. 
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recognition; for example, the proposed European Evidence Warrant (EEW) 
currently under negotiation in the Council of Ministers.786 
 
A paper by Amnesty International (as a non-state entity that closely 
monitors and pressures governments’ policies) entitled “More Justice and Freedom 
to balance Security: Amnesty International’s Recommendations to the EU” 
published on 27 September 2004 points out that the principle of mutual recognition 
which forms the basis for initiatives such as the European Arrest Warrant fails to 
acknowledge the significant differences in the standards of justice in EU countries. 
Following a heated political debate, the Czech Republic and Italy was among the 
last Member States to adopt the arrest warrant. In the time from 2004 to 2010, the 
same problems of counterterrorism cooperation continue to exist according to the 
Commission reports.787  
An eminent terrorism expert and scholar, Paul Wilkinson also reports that 
“the value of this measure to combat terrorism is all clear in theory. However, in 
practice, European Arrest Warrant has been somehow undermined by the 
continuing desire of the member-states to maintain total national political control 
and it derailed the transatlantic collaboration.”788 
                     
786European Union Committee 30th Report of Session 2005–06 European Arrest Warrant—Recent 
Developments Report with Evidence Ordered to be printed 28 March and published 4 April 2006 
Published by the Authority of the House of Lords, p.12.  
787Commission of The European Communities Brussels, 20.4.2009 Com(2009) 170 Final Report From 
The Commission To The Council, The European Parliament And The European Economic And Social 
Committee On The Application of Council Directive 2004/80/EC Relating To Compensation To Crime 
Victims [Sec(2009) 495], and, European Union Committee 30th Report of Session 2005–06 European 
Arrest Warrant—Recent Developments Report with Evidence Ordered to be printed 28 March and 
published 4 April 2006 Published by the Authority of the House of Lords, and,  Commission Staff 
Working Document-Accompanying Document To The Report From The Commission To The Council, 
The European Parliament and The European Economic And Social  Committee On The Application Of 
Council Directive 2004/80/EC Relating To Compensation To Crime Victims [Com (2009) 170 Final], 
and, Commission Of The European Communities Brussels, 24.6.2009 Com(2009) 292 Final 
Communication From The Commission Legislative Package Establishing An Agency For The 
Operational Management of Large-scale IT Systems In The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
{Com(2009) 293 Final} {Com(2009) 294 Final} {Sec(2009) 836} {Sec(2009) 837}. 
788Wilkinson, Paul. 2005. International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response, 
Chaillot Paper No. 84 October, p. 30-31. 
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Remarks of the Commissioner responsible for the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice Antonio Vitorino points to the weaknesses, 
The EU Commission also responded very quickly to the attacks of September 11 with 
legislative proposals. In speaking to the European Parliament, the Commissioner 
responsible for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (formerly better known as 
Justice and Home Affairs), Antonio Vitorino, remarked: ‘‘Terrorist acts are 
committed by international groups with bases in several countries, exploiting 
loopholes in the law created by the geographical limits on investigators and often 
enjoying substantial financial and logistical resources. Terrorists take advantage of 
differences in legal treatment between States, in particular where the offence is not 
treated as such by national law, and that is where we have to begin.’’.789 
 
EU measures are vital to achieve effective counterterrorism cooperation 
between the US and the EU. All of the legislative proposals are necessary for the 
EU to be able to conclude international agreements with the USA. Legal 
regulations and arrangements regarding counterterrorism, although not completed, 
seem to be evolving. However, ‘absence of a unified EU policy’, (without which 
the US-EU counterterrorism cooperation cannot be activated in full) hinders 
cooperation. In order to establish effective counterterrorism cooperation with the 
US, the EU must form a European-wide counterterrorism policy that can streamline 
and structure separate European state-responses. Such a policy is in the making, but 
it is not completed. Accordingly, EU-US counterterrorism cooperation suffers from 
the incomplete measures undertaken by the EU.  
The European measures undertaken after the bombings in Europe are vital for 
transatlantic counterterrorism cooperation, yet the insufficient coordination among 
the European states in both legal matters and in implementation impedes US-EU 
counterterrorism cooperation. Ongoing European measures that are examined in 
this chapter are also the weak points of the inter-state cooperation between the US 
and the EU.  
                     
789Antonio Vitorino as cited in Kaunert, Christian. 2010. “The External Dimension of EU Counter-
Terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and Institutions”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22: 1, 
p. 51. 
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In order to form an internal EU counterterrorism policy, the parallelism of 
first and third pillar counterterrorism measures must be regulated legally before 
activating such measures on the ground. Indeed, before any external action in 
counter-terrorism with the USA can be activated, these measures need to be first 
agreed to at the EU supranational-institutional level and implemented in full among 
EU member-states; however this does not seem to have happened. 
EU-US counterterrorism cooperation is hampered by European perception 
and assessment that the issues of illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and other 
types of organized crime were closely linked with terrorism and that dealing with 
each of these criminal activities separately would make little sense. Furthermore, 
European countries in general appear to be suspicious of allowing any external 
organization to interfere in their politically sensitive internal security as opposed to 
criminal justice affairs. This originates in the Dublin Agreement: terrorists were 
one’s own affair; only “apolitical” criminals could be extradited.790 
According a European analyst, the institutionalized arm of the European 
Union’s counterterrorism activities acknowledge the existence of terrorism, but in 
its legal formulae the European states were reluctant to formally distinguish 
politically motivated terrorism from economically motivated crime, organized or 
other. The reason for the European Union’s ambivalence toward the political nature 
of terrorist violence was that the “criminalization” and half-denial of terrorism had 
become the implicit and subvocal political sine qua non of cooperation between 
member states.791 
 
                     
790Chalk, Peter. 1996. West European Terrorism and Counterterrorism-The Evolving Dynamic 
Basingstoke, pp. 127-129. 
791 Zimmermann, Doron. 2006. “The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29, p. 126. 
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Documents of the European Security Strategy, the EU Commission Staff 
Working Paper, and the up-date of the EU Plan of Action mention the need for 
integrating within the European Council’s Secretariat an intelligence capacity “with 
a view to informing EU policy.”792 It requires coherence and the promotion of the 
fight against terrorist finance, and underlines the need for improving the Union’s 
ability of preventing and handling the consequences of terrorist attacks. The report 
also corroborates the argument for strengthening inter-Pillar counterterrorism 
efforts. It states the need for “integrating the fight against terrorism into EU 
external relations policy.”  
The Union’s leadership tacitly acknowledges the reluctance of national 
intelligence services in its member states (no incentive for sharing of sensitive 
information relevant to national security) and recognizes it for the principal 
stumbling block to effective action.793 
It has thus accepted the significance of an autonomous intelligence analysis 
and assessment capability toward becoming an increasingly independent actor in 
European counterterrorism. The Union also realizes the shortfalls of pan-European 
counterterrorism efforts absent an enforceable coordination tool in general, and 
with respect to cross-border disaster consequence-management in particular. 
The implication of all these intra-European developments is limited and 
bilateral cooperation of the US with each of the European states separately. 
                     
792A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 12, 
available at (http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf), accessed 25 January 2005; EU Commission 
Staff Working Paper: Commission of the European Communities, European Security Strategy: Fight 
Against Terrorism, SEC 2004 332, Brussels 19 March 2004; Council of the European Union, “EU Plan 
of Action on Combating Terrorism—Update,” Doc. No. 16090/04; Brussels, 14 December 2004 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st16/st16090. en04.pdf; Gijs de Vries, transcript of article, 
Financial Times, 30 November 2004,  
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Article_Financial_Times_30.November.2004.pdf, accessed 25 
January 2005. 
793 Gijs de Vries, transcript of article, Financial Times, 30 November 2004, 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Article_Financial_Times_30.November.2004.pdf, accessed 25 
January 2005 
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Bilateral cooperation is limited because it lacks most of the information that other 
European states may provide.  
A recent example as of 2010 is the European blocking of the help for the 
US in tracking suspect finances: The United States criticized as recently as on 
February 2010 a decision by EU lawmakers to block a key data deal, calling it a 
“setback for EU-US counter-terror cooperation”. “This outcome is a setback for 
US-EU counter-terror cooperation,” the US mission in Brussels said in a statement 
after deputies voted not to allow access to data from the interbank transfer system 
SWIFT to track suspect funds. “This decision disrupts an important counter-
terrorism program, which has resulted in more than 1,500 reports and numerous 
leads to European governmental authorities and has contributed significantly to 
collaborative counter-terrorism efforts between the United States and Europe” it 
said. In a vote in Strasbourg, 178 lawmakers rejected the deal to allow information 
to be lifted from the interbank transfer system SWIFT to help track suspect 
finances, with 196 in support. There were 31 abstentions. 
The assembly's main concern reportedly is that personal information, 
possibly including data from electronic bank payments, could be used by US 
authorities and handed on to other governments. Lawmakers also fear the nine-
month deal could set a precedent and tie EU hands in future talks, as a long-term 
agreement must soon be drafted. The US and the EU authorities have pressed the 
deputies in recent days not to reject the agreement, warning of a dangerous security 
gap, or at least postpone their vote to a later date.  
“Leading up to this vote, senior US officials have communicated with 
numerous European Union officials, including European parliament leaders, about 
the importance of this agreement to our mutual security” the US mission to Europe 
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reported. “We also urged for a postponement of the vote so that members of the 
European parliament -many of whom are new to the issue- could consider all of the 
information available regarding the elaborate privacy protection measures that are 
secured in this agreement” it said in a statement.794 
Even if the US tries to work with several European nations, it does not 
appear to be easy to add an effective EU dimension to the Atlantic counterterrorism 
cooperation. The Allies disagree on a plethora of issues, which are mostly ‘tried’ to 
be dealt with on a bilateral basis and outside the NATO institutional framework. 
Leaving aside the rhetoric of the politicians that try to create a mild political 
atmospherics of cooperation,795US officials express frustration that the EU does not 
always seem to take the terrorist threat seriously, whereas European officials are 
frustrated at the limited US information and intelligence sharing.796 For example, 
the US point to the EU’s failure to list the political wing of Hamas as a terrorist 
organization. “Basically, we see terrorism as an existential threat and [the EU] 
doesn’t,” said a senior Pentagon staffer.797 EU officials are of the opinion that they 
have long experience in fighting terrorism, and, in the case of Hamas, the 
experience of the Northern Ireland peace process shows that political channels must 
be kept open for dialogue - a controversial analogy that is not shared by the two 
sides of the Atlantic. 
                     
794“EU data vote 'setback' for counter-terror cooperation”, Brussels, 11 February 2010, 15:33 CET 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu 
795Setting up a mild diplomatic climate for effective cooperation or building-up political atmospherics is 
arguably no small feat though, given the governments’ need for public support in democracies. Such an 
attempt tries to tone down the public resistance and urges approval for state polices, especially in the 
face of polls that indicate negative public leanings. A Financial Times/Harris opinion poll of June 2006 
demonstrated that 36 percent of respondents in the five biggest member-states (Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain) identified the US as the biggest threat to global security. Alden, Edward, 
Daniel Dombey and John Thornhill. 2006. ‘Europe still sees US as greatest threat to stability’, Financial 
Times, 18 June 2006. 
796Speeches quoted as in Aldrich, Richard J. 2004. “Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation” 
International Affairs 80, 4, 731-754; Declarations as quoted in Bensahel, Nora.  2003. The 
Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union, RAND. 
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8.9. Findings   
In order to further clarify the differences between the Allies, core narratives 
and assumptions at the two sides of the Atlantic is briefly presented. The candidate 
worked through numerous declarations and speeches of state officials and the press 
briefings of the bureaucratic personnel. The approximate number of texts and 
declarations that are reviewed is 4, 300 to 4,500. By categorizing the main themes, 
similarities and differences of these declarations, speeches and official texts, 
several conclusions are derived.  
Discursive findings as to how Europeans and Americans perceive the threat 
throughout the first decade of the 2000s is the subject of this sub-section, which 
also examines the changes in states’ counterterrorism rhetoric after the attacks in 
Europe. Importantly, these discursive findings focus on transatlantic allies, but they 
are not exclusively about the EU and US, they constitute the main issues and 
approaches of the counterterrorism discourse of most states in the world. Moreover, 
the institutional languages of the UN, NATO and OSCE incorporate this discourse 
whose main traits are outlined below. 
 
8.9.1. Similarities of the European and  
American Counterterrorism Discourses 
The first similarity is that both European states and the US perceive 
terrorism as a non-state form of violence by individuals or networks. In spite of the 
labels such as ‘state-sponsors of terrorism’ or ‘axis of evil’, none of the official 
texts mention state-terrorism. Terrorism is not portrayed as counterinsurgency used 
by a state-actor either. Unaccustomed use of official language points to the mixed-
methods and tactics of both counterinsurgency and terrorism by networked non-
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state actors. Thus, official documents clearly indicate the features of the threat as 
freed from any state control.  
Second similarity between the European and American discourses is that 
terrorism not only threatens unimaginable mass destruction and mass casualties, but 
also it is a threat to ‘democracy’, ‘peace and human rights’, ‘ways of life’, 
‘civilization’ and ‘the international system itself’. 
Third, the perception of the terrorist networks or transnational terrorism is 
common: sophisticated, well-funded networked cells operating through complex 
networks that live ‘among us.’ Especially, Europe is concerned about ‘the threat 
within’. 
Fourth, terrorists are perceived to be abusing the freedoms provided by 
democracies. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, for example, argues that the 
‘increasing openness’ and the ‘free movement of people, ideas, technology and 
resources’ in the EU creates ‘an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their 
objectives’ (Council of the European Union 2005, paragraph 2). 
Utmost importantly, in the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid and London, 
the EU counterterrorism discourse experiences a shift in denoting terrorism as ‘an 
external threat’, or ‘global threat’ to as ‘the internal threat’ occasionally, and ‘both 
an internal and external threat’ at other times. Even though the September 11 plot 
was linked to Hamburg, EU texts describe it as a ‘global threat’ to Western 
societies because it was towards at another state rather than against EU members. 
However, by late 2003 a change occurs and EU texts begin to describe terrorism in 
terms of both internal and external dimensions, a discursive evolution that is fully 
realized following the Madrid and London attacks. In March 2004, for example, 
EU leaders stated: ‘Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples. The threat 
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of terrorism is a threat to our security, our democracies and our way of life in the 
European Union’ (General Affairs and External Relations Council 2004). 
Afterwards, the notion that terrorism poses both an internal and external threat 
becomes an established feature of EU counterterrorism discourse. 
After the attacks in Madrid and London, the EU counterterrorism discourse 
drew closer to that of the US about the new terrorism. However, that is a change in 
discourse, not in policy implementation.  EU texts frequently argue that ‘the nature 
of terrorism has changed’ (de Vries) and that the ‘new’ kind of ‘indiscriminate 
cross-border religiously motivated terrorism’ (de Vries) is ‘willing to use unlimited 
violence to cause massive casualties’ (Council of the European Union 2003). The 
logic of these assumptions is that the religious fanaticism at the heart of the ‘new 
terrorism’ means that there is no possibility of dialogue or diplomacy as a solution 
to terrorism. 
Another similarity is the moral tone of the discourses. Terrorists are 
frequently described as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’, ‘barbaric’, ‘savages’, ‘faceless killers’, a 
‘cancer on the human condition’ and a ‘modern scourge’. In particular, the 
September 11 attacks, as well as the Madrid and London attacks, are constantly 
described as assaults on civilized values, attacks on democracy and tolerance. 
 
8.9.2. Differences between the European  
and American Counterterrorism Discourses 
First and most important difference is that while the American texts refer to 
terrorism as ‘acts of war’, European texts use ‘criminal acts’ or ‘crime’, or ‘a 
matter of criminal justice, ‘prosecution and law enforcement’ to refer to terrorism. 
This is seemingly a small difference, but it indeed gives the fundamental 
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divergence between the counterterrorism understandings. The discourses pictures 
the EU as being closer to the judicial or anti-criminal prosecution approach against 
terrorism, in which prevention and defense (rather than fight) against terrorism is 
often pronounced.  
American texts, however, use counterterrorism as both referring to 
defensive and offensive measures including the use of force. Not even one single 
word such as war or another word with the same connotation exist in the European 
official documents such as Security Strategy papers or declarations of politicians. 
European texts oftentimes denote terrorism as ‘struggle against terrorism’, while 
the American texts almost always use ‘the war on terror’. These discursive labels 
and traits seem to be a clear an indication of the difference in transatlantic 
approaches and methods.  
Complementarily, commentaries of analysts and academics also include 
criticisms of the other side of the Atlantic either being ‘soft on terrorism’ due to 
criminal-based approach, or being ‘heavy-handed’ due to force-based approach.  
Second difference comes with the use of the word ‘justice’. While the EU 
texts use it in relation to international law and human rights, American texts use it 
in relatively vague terms or in terms of ‘divine justice’. Accordingly, the 
counterterrorism discourse of the EU is arguably more secular when compared to 
that of the US. 
Thirdly, European discourses focus on the relation between the causes of 
terrorism and the European policies. The Council of the European Union for 
example discusses the need to change the perception of the European policies 
among Muslims:  ‘We must also ensure that our own policies do not exacerbate 
division’ (Council of the European Union 2003, paragraph 10). The latter kind of 
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approach is absent in American, British and Polish texts. 
Fourth, the US frames the response to terrorism within a war-based 
narrative, whereas the EU views it more as a question of law enforcement and 
intelligence cooperation. The EU heavily stresses the importance of cooperation, 
while the US discourse often refers to forceful, decisive and unilateral responses if 
need exists. This might suggest the effect of underlying counterterrorism 
understandings.  
Although the counterterrorism mandates rests with the sovereign member-
states, the EU itself (as an institutional body of relations among European states) is 
a complex mechanism of intra-European cooperation. The EU, with paralleling 
roles of the first and third pillars at the forefront, is the platform where European 
states try to unify and design their counterterrorism policies. 
Fifth discursive difference is the urgency put on the WMD terrorism and the 
connection between WMD and terrorism. It appear to be the case that while 
European declarations reduces the tone of urgency about ‘the risk of WMD 
terrorism’, the American texts and declarations clearly picture it as a top national 
security threat that must be responded immediately. 
 
8.10. Summing Up the Empirical Findings 
This chapter focused on the discursive examination of summit declarations, 
speeches of politicians, content analysis of national security strategies of Europe 
and the US, and the interviews conducted with the NATO authorities that work on 
the Allied Transformation. It tried to enliven the theoretical discussions of the 
previous chapters through content and discourse analyses and interviews.  
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To be able to clarify the analytical direction in reading the empirics and to 
establish the linkage with the research question, this chapter also attempted to 
provide a case study on the reasons of NATO transformation within the framework 
of the new threat. The factors that paved the way for contemporary inter-state 
cooperation, which is different from the previous era cooperation form, are 
explained.  
It might be useful to sum up the findings that are derived from these items: 
The analyses conducted up to now concludes that even when future strategic 
doctrines change in form or converge in style, immutable essences of strategic 
cultures on both sides of the Atlantic is likely to make their application different.  
In the wake of 9/11 and especially after the Madrid and London bombings, 
the European Union enacted a host of measures not only to combat terrorism, but to 
do so in a more efficient manner, and with a view to drawing on the assets of its 
member states in a coordinated and coherent way. The effect of the attacks on the 
Union was an unprecedented acceleration of political decision making (as opposed 
to implementation) of counterterrorism measures and instruments within Europe, 
rather than between the US and the EU. Thus, convergence of American and 
European counterterrorism efforts, especially regarding joint-action on the ground, 
appears to be difficult and partial at best without showing a patterned 
instutionalized framework.  
European past counterterrorism approach and efforts (which can be read as 
also its counterterrorism culture or understanding) seems to be shaping an 
adaptation to the current terrorist threat in a way different from the adaptation of 
the US. This can be summarily explained, first, by the European justice model or 
approach towards the threat. Secondly, the EU does not have executive mandate to 
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coordinate and unify separate efforts of the state-members. Third, the prospects are 
bleak and the lack of mandate is unlikely to change soon owing to the sovereign 
prerogatives of states and their reluctance to implement new measures. That is, new 
measures that presumably aimed at giving the EU new powers (in order to form a 
unified European policy) are only reluctantly implemented by the European states, 
which seem to be foot-dragging in the implementation of the measures taken under 
the EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. The latter 
is the most important intra-European counterterrorism framework without which 
cooperation between the US and the EU cannot be established in an effective and 
coordinated way. 
Currently, the European states do not appear to be implementing the 
Framework Decision in full. Without its full implementation, no unified and 
institutional EU-US cooperation setting can be established, leaving the cooperation 
to the current bilateral and minor exchange in intelligence between the G5 (France, 
Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain) and the US. Political rapprochement was 
partially achieved on paper by the joint EU–U.S. Declaration on Combating 
Terrorism adopted at the EU–U.S. summit held at Dromoland Castle, Ireland, in 
June 2004.798However, even in the case of bilateral cooperation between the US 
and the EU, serious disagreements hinder cooperation mostly due to the above-
mentioned non-unified and un-institutionalized EU counterterrorism efforts that 
create legal impediments.799These developments have taken place largely outside 
                     
798Council of the European Union, “EU-U.S. Declaration on Combating Terrorism,” Dromoland Castle, 
Ireland, 26 June 2004, http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom accessed 26 January 2005. 
799The United States Mission to the European Union, “EU-US Counterterrorism Cooperation” 
http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Terrorism/default.asp; The European Union Delegation to the US, 
http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Terrorism/default.asp; Grant, Charles. 2009. “Making a success of 
the EAS”, Thursday, May 21, CER, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2009/05/making-
success-of-eas.html; Keohane, Daniel. 2006. “Unblocking EU-NATO Cooperation” June-July, CER 
Bulletin, Issue 48, http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/48_keohane.html 
522 
 
of the NATO institutional framework, yet of course implications for the NATO 
work-load.  
NATO has a role in contributing to the fight against terrorism, yet NATO’s 
role in shaping a cooperative response against transnational terrorism is limited by 
the distinct features of a non-state centric threat against which NATO is not 
originally designed. What is more, NATO’s transformational trajectory to adapt to 
the ambiguities of the new threat appears to be limited.  
Two factors account for such hardship of adaptation. First factor is the 
examined dimensions of the threat. Secondly factor is the problems of different 
security understandings of the Allies and duly divergent methods in responding to 
transnational terrorist threat. Particularly, the transatlantic divergence on the use of 
force, the legitimacy of pre-emptive war, different national perceptions of the role 
of institutions and international law erode a common Allied approach and 
implementation not only for counterterrorism efforts, but also for other 
international security topics of the Alliance agenda.  
Inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism continues in an un-
institutionalized form. It occurs either bilaterally or multilaterally. Importantly 
though, it is outside of a single institutional framework.  
As the answer to the research question of the dissertation, previously 
demonstrated cooperation and alignment behaviors centered on defense affairs are 
rarely shown against the transnational terrorist threat. It is only partly visible in the 
Afghan counterinsurgency effort. Yet, even then, the cooperative effort is not a 
clear NATO operation with regard to its decision-making, initiation of the 
intervention, the conduct of combat roles, and the resilience of the effort through 
time.  
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The Afghanistan case is largely an operation of the Coalition of the Willing, 
in which nation-states are not initially allowed to participate within the framework 
of NATO. NATO contributions came later in a sideliner role in the follow-up to the 
main tasks of combat. The European Allies play a supporting role behind the 
frontlines of unconventional battles. NATO still tries to transform and determine 
the Alliance’s main goals, strategy and missions. 
The divergences between the Allies still impede the efforts to solve 
Alliance’s crisis of common stance. In addition to the empirics provided, the 
prolonged up-dating process of the NATO Strategic Concept testifies to NATO’s 
hardship to reach consensus. By and large, the Allies have not shown their previous 
cooperative and alignment behaviors against transnational terrorism. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
 CONCLUSION 
  
 
 
9.1. Findings of the Research 
 
To what extent nation-states, which involve in alliances or align to one 
another rather easily in the face of threats emanating from other nation-states, can 
show these alignment behaviors against transnational terrorist groups? The latter is 
the research question of the dissertation. A distillation of the chapters helps giving 
the answer, which is simply put as: to a large extent, nation-states do not 
demonstrate their previous cooperation behaviors against transnational terrorist 
groups. Previously demonstrated Cold War alignment and cooperation behaviors 
among nation-states are almost not existent this time against transnational terrorism 
as of the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is the first finding of the 
study. 
This dissertation is an attempt to initiate a study about the form and 
dynamics of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism 
best exemplified by Al-Qaeda. Importantly, this is tried to be done with an eye on 
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the differences between the Cold War inter-state cooperation-form and the post-
Cold War inter-state cooperation-form.  
Since international security is traditionally regarded as the parcel of nation-
states, transnational terrorism as a non-state entity is a conceptual new-comer to the 
alliance theory literature. Furthermore, the scale of contemporary terrorist 
operations reflects a security environment structurally different from that of the 
Cold War. The states are posed a distinct threat in a different environment.  
Does contemporary inter-state cooperation and alignment against 
transnational terrorism correspond to the previous alignment behaviours of states 
that were conducted against other states? Analyzing the role, relevance and 
evolving form of cooperation in general and the form of cooperation in alliances in 
particular regarding the transnational terrorist threat constituted the aim of the 
study. Thereby, the study tries to establish a nexus between the past and present of 
the alliance theory literature. It is an attempt to reconsider the contours of the 
cooperation and alliance literatures under the developments of the present era, 
which manifests a new structural environment as well as a distinct threat 
confronting states. During the Cold War, cooperation among states was mainly 
defense-oriented. Inter-state cooperation was ‘defense-cooperation’, which 
primarily focused on military contingencies and arms-build-up. However, 
cooperation against transnational terrorism in the post-Cold War era can be named 
as ‘security cooperation’ that includes non-military fields of cooperation. The form 
of inter-state cooperation has evolved to shift from ‘defense’ to ‘security’. 
The second finding of the study is that major war wanes. Decline of war 
among the most industrialized nations such as the EU member-states, Canada, 
Japan and the US is a noteworthy development given the long continuum of past 
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wars. The form of warfare, on the side of most developed states, has changed in 
form and shifted to non-military ones such as economic and normative rivalry. 
Terrorism, on the side of non-state entities, is becoming another form of warfare 
that is used against states. Non-state entities acquire a semi- or pseudo-actor status. 
Despite their significance, both terrorism and non-state entities are largely ignored 
in the alliance politics and theory literature.  
Third finding is that the dominant threat profile or assessment of states has 
changed to include non-state centric threats. While not ignored, defense-related 
threats are relatively on the back-burner. Security-related threats are assessed to be 
profound ones. The threat of large-scale invasion of countries by other states 
appears to be on the decline. Contemplation of force-on-force confrontations of 
armies has reduced. This gave way to increasing security concerns, rather than to 
defense/military concerns: The threat emanating from non-state violent groups are 
at the forefront. Last but not least, the threat is distinct with its new dimensions. 
Fourth finding is an implication of the third finding: the form of threat 
determines the form of cooperation among states in international security. The form 
of inter-state cooperation in general and particularly the cooperation form in 
alliances are evolving from ‘defense’ to ‘security’. Post-Cold War inter-state 
cooperation (especially in the timeline of 2000-2010) demonstrates un-
institutionalized re-groupings/alignments of states for particular tasks. Ad hoc 
cooperation or coalition of the willing type of cooperation among nation-states is 
carried out as a cooperation-form largely outside the institutional framework of the 
NATO. The conduct of the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq interventions 
demonstrated a group of nations that came together without an institutional scheme. 
State actions under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the UNSCR 1540 
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are other examples to the workings of the coalition of the willing type ad hoc inter-
state cooperation against terrorism. Moreover, police and intelligence cooperation 
against terrorism is again devoid of any clear institutional or alliance framework. 
The latter cooperation mostly takes place in an ad hoc and bilateral fashion. Thus, 
coalition of the willing-type inter-state cooperation has emerged as the rising form 
of inter-state cooperation especially applied against the transnational terrorist 
threat. 
   Within the framework of the research question, the empirical chapter 
points to the following: States do not cooperate against transnational terrorism in 
the way and form they cooperated against other states during the Cold War. 
Besides, the empirical chapter underlines that the Atlantic Allies frame both the 
threat itself and their responses to the threat differently. The latter is, by and large, 
determined by the threat of transnational terrorism itself, which is also the most 
important determinant of the contemporary inter-state cooperation and alliance 
politics. The threat itself is a limit to cooperation among states.  
‘The new threat’ or the distinct dimensions of the transnational terrorist 
threat do not appear to be conducive to give way to cohesive alignments. The 
distinctive features of the transnational terrorism threat make the new threat hard to 
define, detect and defend against. The latter hampers inter-state cooperation against 
transnational terrorism. The definition of a common enemy, common threat 
assessments are not forthcoming due to the peculiar manifestations of the threat - 
presenting itself either internal or external one, or both. Such 
ambiguity/transnationality of the threat is the biggest obstacle in the way to 
effective cooperation among states. The threat mechanism works horizontally at the 
societal level in contrast to vertical, institutional, and relatively hierarchical 
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national bureaucratic organizations. Features of the threat create operational 
ambiguities regardless of different security understandings. It is both an internal 
and external threat with no-state control or supervision. Other features include 
merger with organized crime and unregulated financing, lack of territory or 
headquarters to be retaliated at, open endorsement of indiscriminate killing, 
effective combination of pre-modern and modern skills and technology. These are 
the chief features that make the threat transnational and ambiguous for states. 
Moreover, the organizational culture of states and that of terrorist entities are 
different from one another due to different loyalties and past experiences. The 
state-to-terrorist groups confrontation is an analytically and bureaucratically 
unaccustomed form of political contestation. 
Alongside the threat factor, contending counterterrorism cultures of states 
and globalization also affect inter-state cooperation as analytically discussed in the 
middle chapters and empirically studied in chapter eight. The empirical chapter 
engrosses in the process-tracing of summit declarations, speeches of politicians, 
national security strategies of Europe and the US, and the interviews conducted 
with the NATO authorities that work on the Allied Transformation. It tries to 
enliven the theoretical discussions of the previous chapters through content and 
discourse analyses and interviews conducted by the candidate abroad. 
To be able to clarify the analytical direction in reading the empirics and to 
establish the linkage with the research question, it attempts to provide a case study 
on the reasons of NATO transformation within the framework of the new threat and 
alliance politics. The factors that paved the way for contemporary inter-state 
cooperation (which is different from the previous era cooperation form) are 
explained. The empirical chapter highlights that even though future strategic 
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doctrines change in form or converge in style, immutable essences of strategic 
cultures on both sides of the Atlantic is likely to make their implementation 
different. 
However, divergent counterterrorism cultures are not the only determinant. 
The structural variable of globalization exacerbates cooperation and alignment. It 
provides a terrorist-friendly environment by diffusing power-resources such as 
finance and means of violence. Deterritorialization of means of violence and 
economy provides a permissive or facilitator cause for terrorist operations, while it 
presents difficulties for policy-making of nation-states. Globalization 
interconnected issue-areas, which are previously regarded as separate, so much so 
that making policy choices and prioritization became harder ever. Policy-making 
and strategizing required trade-offs due to interlinked issues over which foreign and 
security policies are made. This caused duplication and inefficiency in the policy 
implementation of states.  
This occurred in an environment of waning of major war. Given the latter 
and the non-state involvement that is studied, non-polarity is discussed to be the 
appropriate analytical scheme for the research question at hand rather than a 
framework based on polarity or balance of power. The waning of major war or 
decline of war is caused by the absence of war contemplation and anticipation in 
the post-Cold War era. Waning of major war, together with the distinct features of 
the threat, play into the relative absence of easily identifiable enemies. Alliances 
(as treaty-based defense cooperation) and alignments (groupings of states in 
general either within or outside an alliance setting) suffered from lack of consensus 
on the nature of the threat and the methods of response. Thereby, Allied unity of 
purpose has comparatively deteriorated. 
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In the wake of 9/11 and especially after the Madrid and London bombings, 
the European Union enacted a host of measures not only to combat terrorism, but to 
do so in a more efficient manner, and with a view to drawing on the assets of its 
member states in a coordinated and coherent way. The effect of the attacks on the 
Union was an unprecedented acceleration of political decision-making (as opposed 
to implementation) of counterterrorism measures and instruments within Europe, 
rather than between the US and the EU.  
As discussed, no effective US-EU counterterrorism cooperation can take 
place before Europe manages to form a unified EU counterterrorism policy. Thus, 
convergence of American and European counterterrorism efforts, especially 
regarding joint-action on the ground, appears to be difficult and partial at best 
without showing a patterned instutionalized EU-US framework.  
European past counterterrorism approach and efforts (which can be read as 
also its counterterrorism culture or understanding) seem to be shaping an adaptation 
to the contemporary threats in a way different from the adaptation of the US. This 
can be summarily explained, first, by the European justice-model or approach 
towards the threat. Secondly, the EU does not have executive mandate to 
coordinate and unify separate efforts of the state-members. Third, the prospects are 
bleak; the lack of mandate is unlikely to change soon owing to the sovereign 
prerogatives of states and their reluctance to implement new measures. New 
measures that presumably aimed at giving the EU new powers (in order to form a 
unified European policy) are only reluctantly implemented by the European states, 
which seem to be foot-dragging in the implementation of the measures taken under 
the EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. The latter 
531 
 
is the most important intra-European counterterrorism framework without which 
cooperation between the US and the EU cannot be established in an effective and 
coordinated way. 
Currently, the European states do not appear to be implementing the 
Framework Decision in full. Without its full implementation, no unified and 
institutional EU-US cooperation setting can be established, leaving the cooperation 
to the current bilateral and minor exchange in intelligence between the G5 (France, 
Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain) and the US. Political rapprochement was 
partially achieved on paper by the joint EU–U.S. Declaration on Combating 
Terrorism adopted at the EU–U.S. summit held at Dromoland Castle, Ireland, in 
June 2004. However, even in the case of bilateral cooperation between the US and 
the EU, serious disagreements hinder cooperation mostly due to the above-
mentioned non-unified and un-institutionalized EU counterterrorism efforts that 
create legal impediments. These developments have taken place largely outside of 
the NATO institutional framework, yet of course with implications for the NATO 
work-load.  
NATO has a role in contributing to the fight against terrorism, yet NATO’s 
role in shaping a cooperative response against transnational terrorism is limited by 
the distinct features of a non-state centric threat against which NATO is not 
originally designed. NATO is currently not a strict collective defense organization, 
and it has evolved become more of a collective security organization as of 2010. 
Nevertheless, NATO’s transformational trajectory to adapt to the ambiguities of the 
new threat appears to be limited.  
Two factors account for the hardships of NATO’s adaptation. First factor is 
the examined dimensions of the threat. Second factor is the problem of different 
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security understandings of the Allies and due divergent methods in responding to 
transnational terrorist threat. Particularly, the transatlantic divergence on the use of 
force, the legitimacy of pre-emptive war, different national perceptions of the role 
of institutions and international law impair Allied solidarity and sense of mission. 
These erode a common Allied approach and implementation not only towards 
counterterrorism efforts, but also for other international security topics of the 
Alliance agenda. In great part, inter-state cooperation against transnational 
terrorism continues in an un-institutionalized form. It occurs either bilaterally or 
multilaterally among states; importantly though, it is outside a patterned 
institutional or international organization framework.  
As the answer to the research question of the dissertation, previously 
demonstrated cooperation and alignment behaviors centered on defense affairs are 
rarely shown against the transnational terrorist threat. It is only partly visible in the 
Afghan counterinsurgency effort. Yet, even then, the cooperative effort is not a 
clear NATO operation with regard to its decision-making, initiation of the 
intervention, the conduct of combat roles, and the resilience of the effort through 
time.  
The Afghanistan case is largely an operation of the Coalition of the Willing 
in which nation-states are not initially allowed to participate within the framework 
of NATO. NATO contributions came later in a sideliner role in the follow-up to the 
main tasks of combat. The European Allies play a supporting role behind the 
frontlines of unconventional battles. NATO still tries to transform and determine 
the Alliance’s main goals, strategy and missions. 
The divergences between the Allies still impede the efforts to solve the 
solidarity crisis of the NATO. In addition to the empirics provided in the study, the 
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prolonged up-dating process of the NATO Strategic Concept alone testifies to 
NATO’s hardship to reach consensus. By and large, the Allies have not shown their 
previous cooperative and alignment behaviors against transnational terrorism. 
   
9.2. For Future Research 
Another finding is that nation-state decisions or policies have important 
consequences for international security. Although it might seem common-sense, it 
is not. Neorealist accounts of cooperation and alignment prioritize structural 
explanations and underestimate the weight of unit-level preferences and actions 
taken by governments. The comparison of the European and American national 
strategic cultures points out that the states behavior affects consequences more than 
the structural factor alone predicts it. Although many states confronted the primacy 
of American power, all of them did not align with it. Some resisted, if not militarily 
balanced it. Similarly, choices between unilateral and multilateral policies and 
choices between a criminal approach and that of a military one affect inter-state 
cooperation significantly. 
Other relevant questions were: do the alignments of states against non-state 
entities entail a new outlook or perspective to international relations, or, is there 
need to modify and improve prevailing perspectives on alignment? Utmost 
importantly, are the theoretical literatures on cooperation and alliance well enough 
in guiding us to understand this understudied dimension of alignment dynamics 
against non-state entities? If there is a need to improve the prevailing literature, in 
what ways can it be done? What are the problems and analytical pitfalls? What may 
be the modest analytical steps to undertake in understanding and explaining this 
understudied dimension?  
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Although the study of state to non-state dynamics does not require a 
ground-breaking new approach, the theoretical literatures on cooperation and 
alliance are not well enough in guiding us to understand this understudied 
dimension. In accordance, the literature needs improvement in its approach to 
incorporate non-state entities and due level of analysis to examine it.  
The historical approach must be applied more in order to depict change and 
to dissect the continuities and changes. A marriage between history and political 
science/international relations seems urgent than ever before, as exemplified by 
Mansbach. The analytical scheme proposed herein, (which includes a historical 
examination of the state-system, sovereignty, forms of warfare and sociological 
developments that are attuned to evolution of technology and ideational 
developments) might contribute in studying future subject-matters. As for the 
question of what might be the initial steps towards studying the state to non-state 
dynamic, it can be underlined that no single theoretical straight-jacketing is 
appropriate. If theories are to be advantaged, new realist and liberal research 
programs might be worked out in a way to incorporate the impact of non-state 
entities upon states. Above all, the most important emphasis is that not realist or 
liberal theories per se, but realist and liberal ‘research programs’ should be acquire 
priority in research. As a corollary, the level of analysis becomes vital.   
It is concluded that international relations has become so complex that it 
cannot be examined through a single level of analysis. It requires studying the 
interplay among levels. The demise of the bipolar world is the most fundamental 
shift in international security. In accordance, the concepts of power and polarity 
have undergone numerous debates after the Cold War. Therefore, conceptual and 
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structural discussions have become a must for this study rather than a choice. 
Current political landscape of international relations can be approached from 
different vantage points: Viewed from the traditional system level of analysis, 
actors are structurally shaped and shoved via Waltzian analysis. However, when the 
vantage point shifts to the unit or nation-state level, the political landscape might be 
regarded as one that is channeled by states’ bureaucratic decision-making processes 
and by two-level games, which are studied by neo-classical realists such as 
Schweller. Finally, from an individual level of analysis, the context may also be 
studied as one influenced by leaders or skilled individuals empowered with 
advanced technology. Most studies on alliances and cooperation work at a single 
level of analysis. As Graham Allison pointed out, the three levels of analysis are 
not exclusive alternatives. Research must press on with their connections. 
The studies that focus on the repercussions of the end of the Cold War are 
mostly empirical - using the established paradigmatic lenses that suited the Cold 
War era well. Thus, there is need for alliance and cooperation politics and theory to 
be reconsidered and improved. This study attempted to take a modest step in that 
direction. What might be seen as a contribution to the literatures on alliances and 
cooperation is that this study introduces and discusses previously unstudied factors 
facing cooperation among states.  
‘Cooperation’ had been studied from several perspectives in the literature 
with the problem of the security dilemma being the primary setback of cooperation 
under anarchy; however as yet, the implications of the shifting security ground - 
diffusion of power, nonpolarity and the threat itself as the limits of cooperation - 
are not studied. While the dissertation builds upon the extant literature that aims to 
explain cooperative problems among states, it examines factors or variables that are 
536 
 
not mentioned by the cooperation and alliance theories. The variables put forward 
might contribute to the literature. The in-text examination of the structural factors 
was not conducted previously within the framework of the alliance and cooperation 
literature. In particular, the threat factor and the non-state entities should be 
introduced into the studies of cooperation and alliance. There was no previous 
study that attempted to examine non-state threats systematically or in conjunction 
with other variables. As such, the dissertation tried to shed light on the pitfalls of 
cooperation and alliance under the contemporary dynamics of international security 
at large.  
In accordance, the alliance and cooperation literatures have not only to 
concentrate on the interface between levels of analysis, but it must start to work on 
how to incorporate non-state entities into established theories. The unit, structural 
and threat variables can be put to work in other issue-areas that involve 
transnational dynamics. Alternatively, one of the variables can be singled out for 
further development. Yet again, another further step could be to look for 
intervening variables so as to develop the examination of the interplay between 
variables at different levels.  
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